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This project explores how we might understand the practice of democracy promotion as 
conducted by sub-states. It begins by exposing two problems related to making sense of 
or understanding, sub-state democracy promotion. Firstly, the international relations 
(IR) literature, the theoretical field within which democracy promotion is explored and 
understood, is lacking in its understanding and its accounts of sub-states and their 
international activities. Paradiplomacy scholarship meanwhile, that examines the 
international activities of sub-states, does not account for their democracy promotion in 
relation to the broader IR discussion of the practice. This initial problem leads to the 
exploration of two research questions; how to better understand sub-state democracy 
promotion, and; what do paradiplomacy, and democracy promotion studies gain from 
doing so?  
To better understand sub-state democracy promotion, the thesis develops Andre 
Lecours’ (2002) analytical framework; an historical institutionalist examination of 
‘opportunity structures’ that condition paradiplomacy. It is modified, however, to 
account for and capture data that relates to key factors raised within the democracy 
promotion literature. The approach is applied to three most different case studies, 
Flanders (Belgium), Maryland (USA), and Wales (UK), to produce new empirical data 
from which a better understanding of sub-state democracy promotion can be 
constructed.   
The research finds that sub-state democracy promotion can be understood to take place 
in three forms – it can be explicit, implicit, or subcontracted. It is explicit when the 
activities of sub-state governments or legislatures specifically seek to promote 
democracy abroad. It is implicit when the international activities of sub-states 
inadvertently promote democracy without specifically seeking to do so, most notably 
through international development programmes. Finally, other types of democracy 
promoters subcontract sub-state officials, their knowledge, and expertise. Besides 
exploring these types of activity, and motivations for them, the thesis also finds that 
sub-states promote a particular, more inclusive form of democracy and that they initiate 
democracy promoting activities at key, formative periods in their existence, shortly 
after the decentralization of power. The thesis argues that this is in part a symbolic 
activity and a means of constructing the international actorness of the sub-state at a 
key, formative period.  
This research seeks to make a contribution to both the paradiplomacy, and the 
democracy promotion literature, not least by providing the first detailed account of, and 
the first systematic, empirically based understanding of sub-state democracy 
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Sub-states, the level of governance immediately below the central state, promote 
democracy. But the academic literature does not document or explain their activities. 
Exploring that initial puzzle reveals further weaknesses and problems associated with 
the understanding of both sub-states and their democracy promotion. In solving this 
puzzle however, and by developing a means by which sub-state democracy promotion 
can be understood, the project contributes beyond that core objective. By offering an 
understanding of sub-state democracy promotion – how, when, and why it is conducted 
– the project makes an important empirical and analytical contribution to a range of 
theoretical discussions, the understanding of sub-states, and of democracy promotion.  
Democracy promotion is a key foreign policy agenda, justifying billions in expenditure 
by the world’s most powerful countries and institutions. But international relations (IR) 
theory, the theoretical field within which democracy promotion is explored and 
understood, is lacking in its understanding of sub-states and their international 
activities; their existence is hardly acknowledged. The academic literature that does 
account for sub-states and their international activity meanwhile, derives from various 
branches of political science; from diplomacy studies, federalism studies, and 
comparative politics most notably. This treatment of sub-state international activity is 
itself however, rarely if ever related to the international relations literature. 
Furthermore, even within those isolated pockets of academic investigation, studies tend 
to be general in scope, treating paradiplomacy as “all international activities”, a cohesive 
and coherent concept, understandable as a whole. Very rarely are specific activities 
focused upon, and none concentrate on democracy promotion. The academic field 
surrounding the core puzzle is disparate and unhelpful at first glance. 
Unhelpful perhaps, but also an opportunity for this thesis to make a constructive 
contribution to the understanding of the world, its politics and those who engage in it.  
While the understanding of the fast-developing governance structures at the sub-state 
level is enriched,  the thesis holds important implications also for sub-state, democracy 
promotion, and IR theory.  
This is achieved by addressing the following questions;  
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1) What are the problems associated with understanding sub-state 
democracy promotion?  
2) How might these problems be addressed, and the how, when, and why of 
sub-state democracy promotion better understood?  
3) In what ways will this new understanding contribute to the knowledge of 
sub-states and democracy promotion?  
In addressing the first question in chapter 1, the deficiencies of IR theory in 
understanding and explaining sub-states are exposed. While the democracy promotion 
of sub-states might be incorporated into, and indeed understood through those 
perspectives if refined, it is argued that currently, such approaches do not do justice to 
the nuance and complexities of sub-state international activity. Significant adjustment 
would be required to allow IR perspectives to account for the variables that are thought 
to be key to an understanding of sub-states. In further pursuit of the first question, 
paradiplomacy theory is explored in chapter 2, but the understandings and of sub-state 
international activity do not relate to broader IR theory, particularly democracy 
promotion theory.  
The second question therefore arises from the answer to the first. If existing 
understandings of sub-state democracy promotion would be inadequate with regard to 
either the understanding of sub-states and how they engage internationally, or in their 
understanding of democracy promotion; how can sub-state democracy promotion be 
better understood? That understanding is defined as how, when and why sub-states 
promote democracy. The question essentially asks how sub-state democracy promotion 
can be better understood, in a manner that is contextualised and relevant to both 
existing scholarly fields? 
Essentially, the question asks for an analytical framework, a means by which empirical 
data can be analysed, and inductively, the how, when and why consequently explained 
in a manner which is still relevant to the broader understanding of both democracy 
promotion, and sub-state international activities. This question is explicitly answered in 
chapter 3. A modified version of Andre Lecours’ multi-level framework of opportunity 
structures – the key institutional variables that are theorised to condition sub-state 
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international activities – is adopted as a means of bridging the two literatures, and 
developing an historical institutionalist analysis of sub-state activities that is relevant to 
the key themes of the IR discussion on democracy promotion, its actors, and methods.  
Three empirical case studies will then put the analytical framework to the test, aiming 
to generate by way of a comparative conclusion, an understanding of sub-state 
democracy promotion in chapter 7. This understanding of how and why sub-states 
promote democracy will allow the final question to be answered directly in chapter 8.  
The aim of the thesis 
This thesis seeks to understand sub-state democracy promotion.  Given the paucity of 
material on the subject, it will involve an inductive approach, constructing an empirical 
account of the phenomenon and an analysis of how, when and why it comes to pass. In 
the framework of this thesis, given that both sub-states and democracy promotion are 
already understood in particular ways by academic scholars, the understanding 
constructed should relate to these broader discussions. In short, it should “make sense”, 
or “speak” to both those literatures.  
Specifically therefore, “understanding” becomes a shorthand for how, when, and why 
sub-states promote democracy. It also involves understanding those aspects of sub-
state democracy promotion in a manner that can relate back to existing understandings. 
The latter aspect allows the project to make a contribution to broader scholarship, to 
enrich the understanding of sub-states and of democracy promotion more generally.  
What are sub-states? 
In this project, the focus is upon the international activities of specific governance 
structures located immediately below the central state, sub-states. This level of 
government, at times referred to as the meso level (see Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel, 
2010; Keating, 2013: 104-111; Sharpe, 1992), is state-like, with legislative and fiscal 
autonomy; competing political factions and parties; powers and competences; budget 
and staffing resources that can be used in pursuit of policy goals. They are 
constitutionally a part of the state, interlinked with the central governance structures. 
They cannot be understood outside that context. But their actorness, what they do and 
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how they do it, demonstrates that they can also, to some degree or other act 
autonomously from the central state in both state-like and non-state-like manner.  
More specifically, sub-states may be territorially and legally defined by borders and a 
constitutional settlement. They exist at the level immediately below the central state but 
may also be above other levels of government and administration. The administration is 
directed by an executive and thus involves a political context of its own as they ‘...draw 
in social interests, and provide power bases for politicians and administrative actors’ 
(Keating, 2013: 105). Sub-states may also be more than simply fragments or localized 
elements of the state; ‘[t]hey are also territorialized and “localized” representations of a 
constitutionally “plurinational” state’ (Aguirre, 1999: 204). In this regard, they may 
possess populations of a distinctive linguistic, cultural or ethnic makeup to that of the 
rest of the state and hold an historic, geographic, political or economic DNA distinct 
from its counterparts within the central state; though not necessarily.  
Sub-states may be most easily identified within federal states such as the USA (States 
with their state legislatures and general assemblies) or Germany (Lander and their 
Landtag). However this would be to ignore their unitary state counterparts, manifested 
for example in the UK (Nations and their devolved administrations) or Spain 
(Autonomous Communities and their respective parliaments). Even this differentiation 
does not reflect the diversity of institutional features however (see Keating, 2013: 105-
107), which might even grow as a consequence of devolving power and creating sub-
states. 
Sub-states are responsible for the public administration of policy fields that are 
increasingly conditioned by an international context, and for this reason the demands 
upon them to act internationally in pursuit of their interests will more than likely 
increase as the globalization of policy agendas intensifies. However, their international 
activity is complex and varied; again due to their hybrid nature and ability to act 
through, and independently of the central state, but also due to their structured agency. 
Attempts to explain why their activity takes the form it does have preoccupied some 
theorists since the mid-1980s, and are discussed in depth in chapter 2.  
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Scholars of sub-state international activity use a variety of terms to specify or broaden 
the type of unit under consideration, further muddying the waters. Non Central 
Governments (NCGs), constituent units, federated entities and subnational governments 
are all terms used within the literature to refer to units of government immediately 
below the central government – the focus of this project. However the terms used 
amongst authors are sometimes intended to incorporate levels below those again. Not 
all of what is alluded to by those authors is specifically related to units immediately 
below the central state. The term sub-state in this project is therefore intended to 
incorporate the relevant contributions of scholars, as well as remaining specific to a 
particular kind of actor with regard to the project. Sub-states are the level of governance 
immediately below the central state.  
A puzzle with problems 
This project seeks to better understand sub-state democracy promotion. If democracy 
promotion activities are conceived in a broad way, then the current key actors are 
states, international organizations, NGOs, political foundations and contractors (Hobson 
and Kurki, 2012: 3). In a period when the record of global democracy promotion has 
been less than optimistic (see Carothers, 2006; 2008; 2010; Diamond, 1999; Whitehead, 
2010), the literature has given increased attention to new emerging actors in the area of 
democracy promotion, including rising democracies such as Brazil, India, South Africa, 
Indonesia and Turkey (Carothers and Youngs, 2011). 
To date however, no attention has been paid within the democracy promotion literature 
to whether the international activity of sub-state governments and legislatures 
contributes towards democracy promotion, whether as new actors or in any other form.  
This situation reflects how the increasingly active role of sub-state governments at the 
international level is an under-developed area of research in the international relations 
(IR) literature more generally. This project therefore seeks to contribute to rectifying an 
empirical and analytical deficiency within the democracy promotion, and broader IR 
literature.  
The absence of attention to sub-states within the democracy and IR literatures contrasts 
with the most recent sub-state diplomacy literature which highlights the extent of sub-
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state international activity (Michelmann, 2009; Criekemans, 2010a; Kuznetsov, 2015). 
Some scholars have theorised that sub-states can be understood as democracy patrons 
(Kincaid, 2010), and others emphasise that their engagement internationally is not only 
functional, but may also be characterized as more altruistic or of normative concern 
(Cornago, 2010a). Yet none seek to understand their democracy promotion.  
In one such example, John Kincaid argues that these actors may be ‘perhaps better 
suited than their nation-state governments to promote and strengthen democracy 
abroad’ due to their proximity and in being directly responsible for services to citizens 
(2010: 27). As is the case with new actors in democracy promotion, it is argued that 
sub-state governments can make a different and potentially more relevant contribution 
than the more conventional Western state governments to democracy promotion. 
Kincaid argues that:  ‘Trends towards decentralization and federalism in today's world 
also heighten the relevance of established constituent governments for cultivating 
democracy in emerging constituent political communities’ (2010: 27).   
However, such theoretical claims are just that, theoretical, lacking any extensive 
empirical support. Some empirical accounts of democracy promotion are documented 
by sub-state scholars (see Berghe, Alstein and Neeb, 2004; Cornago, 2010a; Jeffrey, 
2010; Kincaid, 1999; Owen, 2010; Royles, 2010), but these accounts are often passing 
references, or instances where the activities are not framed within the theoretical and 
conceptual context of democracy promotion. The themes, concepts, and language of 
democracy promotion is not used to explain the activities, consequently rendering such 
accounts incapable of contributing to the broader, IR understanding of the activity. 
These are further problems associated with the core puzzle, that neither literature 
relates to each other.  
Solving the puzzle 
The solution adopted, is to develop and implement Andre Lecours’ (2002) multi-level, 
historical institutionalist framework of ‘opportunity structures’. The opportunity 
structures correspond to the key structuring factors and conditioning variables that 
have been emphasised by sub-state scholars with regard to sub-state international 
relations. The historical institutionalist perspective meanwhile, offers a means of 
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understanding the complex agent-structure relationship associated with sub-state 
international activities. The framework is a map of the multiple factors and variables 
that influence paradiplomatic activity. Exploring the opportunity structures’ role in each 
case using an historical institutionalist perspective, is a means of constructing an 
understanding relevant to the paradiplomacy literature.  
The framework is an inductive means of developing an explanation, a precursory step to 
theorising, hypothesizing and further refinement. Only in concluding the thesis and 
analysing and comparing findings from empirical cases therefore, can the thesis begin to 
offer hypotheses regarding sub-state democracy promotion specifically.  
The framework is modified to allow the incorporation of further variables as 
opportunity structures; variables that IR scholars claim are relevant to the 
understanding of democracy promotion. In this sense, the framework also ensures its 
relevance to the democracy promotion and IR literature, and offers a better way 
forward empirically and theoretically. It allows for the construction, in chapter 7, of a 
better understanding based on data from three, most different empirical case studies; 
Flanders (Belgium), Maryland (USA), and Wales (UK). 
Drawing on the democracy promotion as well as the sub-state literatures, the project 
identifies key themes for consideration such as the influence of a national interest upon 
the motivations, the methods of democracy promotion employed, the nature of the 
democracy promoted, and the role of nationalism. By ensuring that the explorations 
consider these prominent themes, the Lecourian-institutionalist approach remains 
relevant to the broader literature and theory on the promotion of democracy.  
In in better understanding sub-state democracy promotion and explaining sub-state 
activities, this project goes further than enriching the understanding of democracy 
promotion with its empirical, analytical and normative contributions. It also links sub-
state activities to broader IR scholarship. The relevance of the former is realised, and 
the limits of the latter addressed. Valuable insights are gained, not only into the 
democracy promotion of sub-states, but to democracy promotion as an activity, the role 
of various hitherto underappreciated actors and factors within that field, and the nature 




The thesis can be divided into two general sections followed by a discussion. The first 
section (chapters 1-3) seeks to address the first two questions, exploring the existing 
scholarship with regard to both democracy promotion and sub-state international 
activities and developing the analytical framework. The puzzle – how to understand 
sub-state democracy promotion – and its associated difficulties are explored in detail 
and a solution proposed. That theoretical solution is then applied in three case studies 
based on empirical research conducted during 2014-2015 (chapters 4-6). Chapter 7 
compares the cases to construct a means of understanding sub-state democracy 
promotion. Chapter 8 seeks to address the final research question directly by exploring 
the implications of the understanding for the broader academic scholarship and 
understanding of sub-states, democracy promotion, and IR more generally.  
Chapter 1 explores the academic understanding of democracy promotion. It firstly seeks 
to identify and define what exactly the practice of promoting democracy entails. Though 
encompassing a broad range of activities, from regime change to international 
development projects, the practice is nonetheless facing a “backlash” since the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars of the 2000s, and reversal of a general global trend toward further 
democratization that had begun after the fall of the Soviet Union. An exploration of the 
actors involved and how they engage, further enriches the understanding of who and 
what democracy promotion entails, as does an examination of the nature of the 
democracy being promoted by the actors. This allows for a relevant comparison and 
contextualization of the findings of the case studies. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of democracy promotion theories. Themselves 
deriving from broader IR, the various perspectives compete and contrast in their 
explanations of the practice. They do nonetheless address to a greater or lesser extent, a 
central question with regard to democracy promotion; why do actors promote 
democracy? The competing answers offered emphasise and detail a commitment to 
certain values and ideals, or an instrumental pursuit of interests, or democracy’s role as 
cover for capitalist interests. While competing and at times innovative, none of these 
theories incorporate sub-states into their frameworks.  
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The democracy promotion literature does not offer a means to understand sub-state 
democracy promotion. The literature does not reveal what sub-states do, how they do it, 
when, nor why they might wish to promote democracy. But it does constitute the 
theoretical context for such a understanding. Chapter 1 therefore enriches the 
understanding and allows for a contextualization of the findings, while also detailing the 
puzzle at the heart of the project. But the deficiencies of the IR perspectives necessitate 
a further and broader exploration of the academic literature. 
Chapter 2 consequently turns to the literature concerned with the international 
activities of sub-states. A review of the literature establishes that sub-states have 
engaged abroad extensively over the past thirty years. Though rarer than economic, 
cultural, or scientific activities, the most relevant to the project is what is termed 
“political paradiplomacy”, or activities that seek to affect socio-political change 
elsewhere. The key factors concerning political paradiplomacy, such as the influence of 
local nationalist forces, or the capacity of sub-states to engage differently to states in the 
political field, are also discussed. These discussions further enrich and contextualize the 
empirical work of the project. A brief section also explores the (very) little scholarship 
that has looked at sub-states as democracy promoters, noting that the discussion does 
not relate to the IR literature, and is lacking in any significant empirical support for the 
few theoretical claims made. 
The chapter then moves to outline the development of paradiplomacy theory, noting 
that an early phase lacked a coherent attempt to build theory. More recent scholarship 
however has converged on several key variables that structure the capacity of sub-
states to engage internationally. Andre Lecours specifically, has “mapped” the variables 
in his analytical framework.  
Chapter 2 enriches the project’s understanding of sub-state international activities, and 
offers to contextualize the findings of the empirical research of the project. Key factors 
are also identified for consideration during the empirical research. With regard to the 
core puzzle however, a solution is adopted in the form of the Lecourian framework; a 
means by which sub-state democracy promotion can be investigated and understood, 
consistent with the most recent paradiplomacy scholarship. Ultimately, chapters 1 and 
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2 act as literature reviews that; firstly details the answer to the first research question, 
and secondly, contributes to and informs the answer to the second research question, 
and the means of better understanding sub-state democracy promotion.  
Chapter 3 addresses the second research question directly, outlining a means by which 
sub-state democracy promotion could in theory, be better understood. Specifically, it 
draws upon the findings of chapters 1 and 2 to modify the Lecourian framework. The 
multi-level framework is detailed, noting the opportunity structures that will be 
considered at the regional, national, continental, and global levels. Key themes are also 
identified so as to refine and focus the exploration of the empirical cases in order to 
remain as relevant to the democracy promotion and sub-state literature as possible.  
The chapter also sets out the justification for the selection of three case studies; 
Flanders, Wales, and Maryland. A most different system design is adopted in order to 
explore fully the extent and nature of sub-state democracy promotion. Selection is 
guided by the key domestic structures purported to be key conditioning factors.   
Flanders can be seen as perhaps the most constitutionally “empowered” sub-state in the 
world, particularly with regard to international activity. The Flemish government has 
broad, legally defined international affairs powers, a high level of involvement with 
international networks and an integral role in defining the central state’s foreign policy 
through formalized intergovernmental processes. Its government enjoys ‘fully 
legitimate and legal direct access to the international stage’ (Bursens and Massart-
Pierard, 2009: 97), and the presence of a strong and often ruling nationalist party 
characterizes its political scene.  
Maryland occupies an almost opposite position to Flanders; a functional international 
actor at most, sporadic and informal relations with the federal government, and without 
sub-state nationalist or significant territorial-political forces impacting upon the 
political context.  
Wales meanwhile offers an insight into “other” or “mid-way” possibilities; a constituent 
part of a Unitary as opposed to a Federal state holding very limited formal capacity and 
competence international affairs. There is a presence of, but never dominating, 
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nationalist politics, and fluctuating, semi-formal intergovernmental relations with the 
UK Government.  
Chapters 4 (Flanders), 5 (Maryland), and 6 (Wales), are consequently the case study 
chapters. A range of democracy promotion activities are examined in detail, followed by 
an understanding of that sub-state’s democracy promotion based on the Lecourian 
framework and the relationship with the key factors and variables. 
Flanders is explored in chapter 4, and specifically the government’s Central and Eastern 
European Programme (CEEP), its bilateral relations, and its development cooperation 
programme since the key, 1993 reforms that effectively established Flanders in its 
current constitutional form. The CEEP emerges as a comprehensive socio-economic 
cooperation programme which explicitly seeks to promote democracy in former Soviet 
states. Bilateral relations with Chile also involves an explicit attempt to promote 
democracy in the post-Pinochet country. Development cooperation programmes 
meanwhile promote democracy more implicitly through good governance schemes 
adopted and emulated from the global development industry. Interestingly, the key 
agency of the first post-1993 Christian Democrat government is identified as key in the 
development of the explicit democracy promotion activities, not, as theorised, the 
nationalist party.  
A lack of agency in the field of political paradiplomacy from the executive forces is a 
distinguishing feature of the Maryland case, examined in chapter 5. The Governor and 
the state’s executive have not developed any political paradiplomatic activities. 
Consequently, the sub-state cannot be understood as a democracy promotion actor as 
such. Nonetheless, Maryland legislature staff, their expertise and knowledge of 
democratic governance has been frequently sourced, for various reasons, to supplement 
or supplant national level organizations’ democracy promotion work abroad.  
The National Guard have been subcontracted by US and NATO military organizations as 
providers of a “softer” cooperation programme to post-Soviet countries, explicitly 
aimed at promoting democracy. The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
meanwhile, the US’ largest, non-partisan organization representing legislatures and 
their staff, engage internationally to share and promote good governance practices and 
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techniques, subcontracting Maryland staff in doing so. Similarly, federal and national 
organizations subcontract legislature staff to again supplement their democracy 
promotion programmes with foreign partners. Finally, with Sino-US relations providing 
a difficult context within which US personnel can provide democratic governance 
support to Chinese officials, Maryland University, subcontracting Maryland legislature 
staff, offers a more acceptable means of facilitating the knowledge exchange. Briefly, 
Maryland can be seen as a supplementary or proxy source of specialist democratic 
governance knowledge to be subcontracted by democracy organizations. In the realm of 
democracy promotion, Maryland is better understood as an opportunity structure to 
other actors, than an actor capable of capitalizing on opportunities itself.  
Chapter 6, Wales, investigates the executive and legislature’s international activities 
since devolution in 1999. The government is found to be constrained from engaging in 
political paradiplomacy by the constitution and disciplining intergovernmental 
relations (IGR). It has however established an international development programme 
which, though implicitly, promotes democracy through good governance schemes 
adopted and emulated by Welsh practitioners from the global industry. The legislature 
meanwhile, following a de facto constitutional reform and empowerment of the Office of 
the Presiding Officer (OPO), has frequently engaged with international networks and 
partners to explicitly promote a distinctive, “Welsh” democracy. Furthermore, the 
legislature has become a source of expertise, sourced and subcontracted by the 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy. 
Alone, the findings of the three case study chapters offer a significant empirical 
contribution to the democracy promotion and the sub-state literatures. A Lecourian-
institutionalist explanation of each case further enhances the understanding. However, 
chapter 7 offers a general Lecourian-institutionalist understanding of sub-state 
democracy promotion with reference to key themes identified in early chapters. 
Chapter 8 moves on to address the final research question, and outline the theoretical 
implications of the project to the sub-state, democracy promotion, and IR scholarship. 
The findings and argument are discussed in the following section.  
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Findings on sub-state democracy promotion 
First and foremost, it is found that sub-states have been promoters of democracy across 
the globe. They have been engaging in this activity in a variety of ways; implicitly, 
explicitly, multilaterally, bilaterally, in line with global practices, innovatively, on behalf 
of broader democracy organizations, through development programmes, through 
transnational networks, or through a self-designed engagement with single, or multiple 
partners. Their absence from the democracy promotion literature does not mirror any 
absence from the “real” world of promoting democracy. Sub-states promote democracy.  
Chapter 7 discusses the findings from the three case studies and offers a means of 
understanding sub-state democracy promotion, based on the Lecourian-institutionalist 
framework. It is argued that there are three types of sub-state democracy promotion; 
explicit, implicit, and subcontracted democracy promotion. Each can be distinguished 
from the other, due to the opportunity structures and their relationship with political 
agency.  
Explicit democracy promotion is dependent upon key opportunity structures, namely 
the capacity and competence of the sub-state to engage in political paradiplomacy. This 
is not the case for Maryland and Wales’ executive, but is the case for the legislature in 
Wales, and for the Flemish government. Consequently the Flemish government can 
engage in such explicit democracy promotion activities as the CEEP, and its bilateral 
relations, while the Welsh legislature can engage in the explicit promotion of “Welsh” 
democracy. Furthermore, the institutionalist perspective emphasizes the agency of the 
Flemish government and Welsh Presiding Office who emerge as key forces initiating the 
explicit activities. They are motivated by the domestic political setting to a project a 
particular notion of the sub-state abroad at early and formative periods. In this case, 
sub-states can be considered democracy promotion actors.  
Implicit democracy promotion involves an inadvertent contribution to the promotion of 
democracy through the sub-state’s activities. Specifically, the Welsh and Flemish 
governments do so through “good governance” projects contained within their 
international development programmes. The capacity to engage in international 
development is an important prerequisite, as is the agency and decision of the 
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government to do so (though the government could be compelled by some 
constitutional arrangements). Nonetheless, a further factor emerged as integral to the 
implicit promotion of democracy, namely the influence of international development 
norms and practices. In taking a lead from, and emulating the practices and norms of 
the global development industry, sub-states have consequently adopted good 
governance projects as part of their development programmes. Though for the sub-
states, it is but a case of becoming a good international development actor, they have 
nonetheless become implicit democracy promoters. In this sense also, sub-states can be 
considered democracy promotion actors. 
Finally, where agency is absent from the sub-state’s governance structures, but staff, 
their expertise and knowledge has been sourced by other democracy promotion actors, 
we may refer to an instance of subcontracted democracy promotion. The 
federal/central government or national level democracy organizations such as the 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, or the NCSL 
have, to supplement broader democracy programmes, or as a proxy, subcontracted the 
staff, expertise, and knowledge of sub-states. As evidenced in the Maryland and Welsh 
cases, the sub-state itself becomes an opportunity structure for other actors, and a 
source or means of adjusting the nature of their democracy promotion. The sub-state 
cannot be considered an actor when its staff and knowledge is subcontracted. The key 
agency comes from other actors who look to source the particular knowledge.  
In all instances of democracy promotion it is observed that the global political-security 
context played a key conditioning role. Flanders’ explicit democracy promotion 
activities for example, depended on a dampened security context in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Chile, or South Africa. The global discourse surrounding international 
development at the time when both Flanders and Wales were setting up their 
programmes emerged as a significant influence shaping the form and location of the 
projects. The global political-security context is also a major factor in subcontracted 
democracy promotion. Sub-state officials and their National Guard emerged as ideal 
proxies while the Federal government’s relationship with other countries remained 
difficult, or where there was a desire to project a less aggressive posture internationally. 
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The global political-security context can create opportunities for sub-states as actors, or 
to be subcontracted by other actors.  
Furthermore, the temporal context was a key consideration in all cases, not least in 
conjunction with the global political-security context. At key periods over the past thirty 
years, the global context has facilitated and created opportunities for sub-state 
democracy promotion of various forms. Once established however, those activities 
invariably continue, and the historical institutionalist concept of path dependency helps 
explain such continuity. Also deriving from historical institutionalist theory is the 
notion that there are key junctures within the lifespan of institutions where rules are 
established or re-established. The key, formative period, shortly after the 
decentralization of powers to the sub-state is one such period. When the rules of the 
game are less clear, particularly if rules are often formed and maintained by a 
combination of constitution and IGR, those rules and consequently the international 
actorness of the sub-state can be defined and clarified by the agency of actors.  
In establishing the rules at key formative periods, the sub-state not only sets the path 
for the future, but also defines its international actorness. The Flemish government and 
Welsh legislature sought to do so by explicitly promoting democracy, in turn aligning 
the sub-state to particular values, and defining through activity, its actorness. 
International development programmes are also attempts, by both the Flemish and 
Welsh governments, to define through association and action, the type of international 
actors they are. This project argues that explicit and implicit democracy promotion are a 
means by which sub-states can construct the actorness of their sub-states at key, 
formative periods. 
Several scholars claim that the presence of nationalist forces are a key variable, their 
agency often responsible for the development of paradiplomacy beyond the economic 
field (see Kuznetsov, 2015: 110; Lecours and Moreno, 2003: 6; Lachapelle and Paquin, 
2005: 82-85; Paquin, 2004). However, the Flemish Christian Democrat and Welsh 
Labour parties proved to be the key agents in the cases explored in this project. It is 
argued that nationalism’s role in developing paradiplomatic activities is at least more 
nuanced than is claimed in the scholarship, or at most irrelevant. Rather, the 
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aforementioned post-juncture and formative period is the key factor when even non-
nationalist parties seek to construct the actorness of the sub-state at early, formative 
periods when doubt and a lack of clarity exists over the sub-state’s actorness.  
Finally, while the location and method of delivery is often influenced by global political 
factors or the norms of the industry, sub-states nonetheless often promote a particular 
model or aspects of democracy. It is argued that the sub-state knowledge being 
transferred is broadly similar and common in all cases. Themes of transparency, 
scrutiny of legislation and expenditure, accountability, and equality of access to 
governance structures are consistent areas where sub-state officials are involved in 
imparting their knowledge and expertise. These findings have implications for the 
broader understanding of the field. 
Chapter 8 discusses the implications of the understanding for the sub-state, democracy 
promotion, and IR scholarship. The chapter effectively addresses the third research 
question directly summarising the findings and exploring their implications. The 
chapter discusses the potential for sub-states to bypass political difficulties faced by 
states, or act as proxies for national governments and organizations. Their democracy 
promotion can be seen to complement current theories, providing an “extra-liberal” 
component to donor packages. Their subcontracted knowledge can also be seen to be a 
particular knowledge focussed on constructing legitimacy for the broader state. The 
latter, though tentative claim, suggests that the presence of sub-state democracy within 
broader democracy promotion packages betrays an attempt by the designers of those 
packages to construct legitimacy for the new governance structures.  
Further implications of the understanding are raised with regard to the explanatory 
potential of IR theories if sub-states and their international activities cannot be 
incorporated into their frameworks. The scholarship that seeks to theorise sub-state 
international activity is also addressed, noting the key role of the constitution, global 
political context, and regional agency in initiating activities. Further emphasis is placed 
upon the concept of constructing actorness at key, formative periods as a means of 
enriching the understanding of sub-state international activities. The role of nationalist 
parties meanwhile is challenged, based on the empirical findings and theoretical claims 
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made in the project. Finally, findings such as the role of sub-states as proxies, and 
practical benefits of subcontracted sub-state democracy promotion for other actors are 
also discussed before raising some practical implications and considerations for the 
policy and practitioner community by way of closing.  
The thesis will now proceed to chapter 1, and the review of the democracy promotion 




Chapter 1: Democracy Promotion 
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature regarding democracy promotion. In 
doing so, the gaps and difficulties of the literature with regard to explaining sub-state 
democracy promotion are highlighted. This begins to answer the first of the project’s 
research questions, detailing the current difficulties of attempting to understand sub-
state democracy promotion, and emphasizing the contribution the project may 
consequently make to current scholarship. Concurrently, the key issues, themes, and 
disputes regarding the activity, the actors, their methods, and the broader implications 
and role of democracy promotion within international politics will be highlighted. These 
strands will anchor this project’s study of sub-states within the established 
understanding of the practice, in turn helping to address the second research question 
addressed fully later on in the thesis.  
This chapter will begin with an overview of how democracy promotion is understood by 
scholars, highlighting the various broad categories, and the need to consider more 
implicit activities such as international development assistance. Following this, a brief 
review of the literature concerned with the conceptual underpinning of the practice 
reveals that the model of democracy in question is invariably a specific, liberal-market 
orientated one. An exploration of the established actors and their methods follows, 
before the prevailing crisis of democracy promotion, what has been termed the 
backlash against the practice, is introduced as an important consideration. These 
discussions set the context for how democracy promotion is understood. They also 
point to the important themes that any relevant study of sub-state democracy 
promotion must relate to.  
Finally, before concluding, a section explores the current IR scholarship and the manner 
in which democracy promotion is framed and explained. The section concludes that IR 
perspectives omit sub-states, and fail to account for their international activities, 
necessitating a broader search for an adequate analytical framework that will help 
answer the second research question.  
The main finding of this chapter is that, within the accounts and explanations of the 
practice of democracy promotion, sub-states are absent. The literature does not reveal 
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what sub-states do, how they do it, or why they might wish to promote democracy. 
While an understanding of democracy promotion is key to contextualizing this research 
project, another literature must be explored in order to develop an analytical 
framework, and a means of understanding sub-state democracy promotion.  
1.1 What is Democracy Promotion? 
 
…it means the processes by which an external actor intervenes to install or 
assist in the institution of democratic government in a target state (Hobson 
and Kurki, 2012: 3). 
Hobson and Kurki’s definition does not detail or disqualify any model of democracy nor 
any particular method. Consequently, explicit hard power and coercion or voluntary 
processes of soft or implicit measures may be employed to promote any of the myriad 
models of democracy and still fall within the scope of the definition. In theory, the term 
“democracy promotion” may encompass anything which promotes that so flexible and 
contested of concepts; “democracy”.  
However, such conceptual stretching risks losing any specific meaning if too much is 
attributed to the term. As Burnell warns:  
All things considered, it follows that if democracy assistance is defined as 
whatever helps democratization directly or indirectly, sooner or later, then 
our sense of it could be so generous as to undermine the value of the term 
(Burnell, 2000: 12). 
An immediate problem is faced therefore, when approaching the study of democracy 
promotion; it is simultaneously a term which describes and refers to a particular 
practice, and a concept that may be stretched as far as the understanding of democracy 
itself can be. An appropriate starting point may therefore be the academic literature 
that first engaged with questions of supporting democracy abroad.  
While looking at transitions form authoritarianism to democracy around the world, 
Lawrence Whitehead (1996) began to suggest that the international dimension was 
worthy of consideration as a key factor in the process. Huntington’s (1991) study of the 
‘third wave’ of democratization meanwhile led him to claim that international factors 
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were key to a global phase of democratization following the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Huntington’s study ‘sparked the view that the world was in the grip of a period of rapid 
global change, with democratization at its core’ (Grugel 2002: 44) as a ‘wave’ of states 
worldwide turned to democracy as a means of governing. 
Concurrently western governments began to deliberately emphasise and expand their 
efforts to promote democracy and encourage the process in other countries. The Clinton 
administration’s escalated rhetoric for example, declared that support for advancing the 
cause of democracy elsewhere was a ‘key organising principle’ (Carothers, 1999: 5). 
Since the early 1990s, international governance institutions and transnational NGOs 
have also become key players in the field of democracy promotion following the 
incorporation of new development aid practices which emphasized “good governance” 
(Abrahamsen, 2000: 1-24; Guilhot, 2005). In other words, international actors have 
sought to develop their potential as “democratizers” within other countries. Since the 
end of the Cold War; 
State and non-state actors alike have vigorously contributed to the 
emergence of a new international norm that considers democracy promotion 
to be an accepted and necessary component of international behaviour 
(Schraeder, 2002: 234). 
Though the practice was overwhelmingly dominated by the geopolitics of the cold war 
until 1990, three key global events seem to occur in this crucial period to create the 
conditions for what is generally accepted as a boom in activity and a proliferation in 
methods, actors and targets.  
1) The ‘withdrawal’ of Soviet power and the consequent absence of a globally competing 
or conflicting model of governance (see Carothers, 1999: 4-5; Huntington, 1991; 
Schraeder, 2002: 2-6), was consequently far more open and accepting of external actors 
trying to affect change; 
Suddenly, it was no longer the case that when the United States or another 
Western country crossed borders trying to affect the politics of another 
country, the first assumption was that this was part of Cold War tactics 
(Carothers, 2008: 124). 
34 
 
2) The pace of the wave and the global democratic trend provided a sense of 
inevitability which contributed to the enthusiasm. Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ 
can be seen as an attempt to explain this rather unique moment of global history where 
liberal democracy stood in unchallenged supremacy as a model of government.  
The democracy rhetoric escalated across the decade, leading to sweeping, 
utopian declarations such as Clinton’s prediction in his second inaugural 
address that, “The world’s greatest democracy will lead a whole world of 
democracies” (Carothers, 1999: 5). 
3) The development of the global political economy, also “freed” and enthused by the 
unrestrictive political context, has coincided with the growing influence and 
assertiveness of international governance institutions. Institutions such as the IMF, UN 
and World Bank attempt to tackle a perceived deficiency in development assistance by 
emphasizing the need to develop good governance globally. The institutions have 
attempted to impose a form of global order and establish norms in order to facilitate 
socio-economic development. Furthermore, the linking of democracy with socio-
economic development, and the international development agenda specifically, has 
incorporated more actors and resources into the practice. 
1.1.1 Various types 
Within the post-cold war context, the practice has taken many forms. Divergence within 
the practice can be observed in the choice of methods that now span a broad spectrum; 
from military intervention and “regime change” to technical and legal assistance to civil 
society groups.  
The proliferation in terminology used by actors to differentiate themselves and others 
can however seem perplexing. Exporting democracy; democracy assistance; 
underwriting democracy; democracy aid; political aid; governance reform; supporting 
human rights; legal reform or development aid are but some of the terms used to cover 
various or specific forms and methods of democracy promotion. They often refer to 
methodology or reflect an attempt by actors to distance themselves from other 
methods. In exploring the various types, we may identify the types of activities that sub-
states may or may not be able to engage in. 
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Some within the academic literature have advanced something approaching a limited 
typology of these variations (Burnell, 2000: 4-14), while others have attempted to place 
the various forms of intervention on a spectrum going from least to most violent 
(Schraeder, 2002: 219-220). To see democracy promotion inhabiting a broad spectrum 
of activities and methods is useful in that it supports the view that there is ‘significant 
overlap’ between the methods and ‘important sub-classifications will be required in 
order to distinguish between alternative paths and outcomes’ (Whitehead, 1996: 4). 
Whitehead’s qualifying statement emphasizes the complexity and fluid nature of 
democracy promotion. Furthermore, in recognizing the variation between types, we 
may use “democracy promotion” as an umbrella term that includes a plethora of forms 
and methods.  
At one end of the spectrum are attempts at Exporting Democracy to states where there 
is very limited or no indigenous movement toward democracy (Schraeder, 2002). The 
removal of the existing governance structures often involves the employment of “hard” 
power or military means. Underwriting Democracy meanwhile is where democratization 
is a process well under way with a degree of prominence. External forces attempt to 
“lock in” a state’s path to democracy through conditional assistance – the EU’s 
membership process would be an example of such a method. These would represent a 
coercive, or what some refer to as a ‘control’ method (Whitehead, 1996). We may see 
these activities occupying one end of Schraeder’s spectrum involving military force or 
conditioning membership of transnational organizations upon fundamental 
constitutional reform as the key mechanisms to achieving the goals. Exporting and 
Underwriting entail a strong ideological and political commitment backed up by “hard” 
power or a formidable status. These seem least relevant to sub-states that lack “hard” 
power tools or imposing international presence. 
‘Conditionality’ or the ‘deliberate use of coercion by attaching specific conditions to the 
distribution of benefits and rewards to recipient countries’ (Schmitter, 1996: 30; 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008), occupies a less aggressive section of the spectrum 
of activities. Adjusting the volume of aid depending on performance and issuing legal or 
economic threats also allows the promoter to take punitive action and to establish a 
negative linkage between the aid and the target. The reverse is also possible as 
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promoters may attach conditions to aid that reward good performance, establishing 
what have been termed ‘positive linkages’ (van Cranenburgh, 1999: 96-97). Budget 
support or more favourable trade conditions may be established in return for further 
progress along the democratization path for example. 
Democracy Assistance meanwhile is noted for the positive nature of its modus operandi; 
supporting, incentivising, inducing or rewarding elements of the democratization 
process. Assistance is achieved mainly through the provision of foreign aid and has been 
placed by those who have attempted typologies of democracy promotion on the; 
…least coercive end of the interventionist spectrum [and] not surprisingly 
includes the least controversial and most widely adopted forms of 
international democracy promotion: the pursuit of classic diplomacy and the 
provision of foreign aid (Schraeder, 2002: 220).   
Consequently the method can be more easily disassociated from connections to broader 
geo-political objectives. Activities are depoliticized, less confrontational, and less 
punitive in cases of resistance. The global backlash against democracy promotion may 
go some way in explaining the general shift toward Assistance and Support in a world 
where democracy partners increasingly seek to resist or push against democratizing 
forces (Bridoux and Kurki, 2014: 58). 
The important and defining characteristic of Democracy Assistance however as a 
particular means of promoting democracy is the recognition that the ‘primary motive 
force for democratization is and must be internal to the country in question’ (Burnell, 
2000: 9). That is, external actors lend support to local drivers of democracy. Electoral 
assistance to the state, technical support to the political parties and sharing best 
practices may characterise such assistance offered to targets. Democracy Support can be 
seen as occupying an even further end of the spectrum. Closely associated with 
assistance, the emphasis however is on support given to local actors to develop the 




1.1.2 The broader picture 
The spectrum of types outlined above have been categorized as ‘political’ promotion 
(see Carothers, 2009; Diamond, 1996) – explicit attempts at promoting democracy 
specifically. It is supported by the notion that democracy is a universal value relevant 
and able to take hold regardless of culture (see Sen, 1999). Political promoters regard 
democracy as an intrinsically good thing which leads to socio-economic prosperity, 
good governance and legal practice and a healthy respect for human rights. 
‘…democratization [is viewed] as a process of political struggle in which the political 
actors who can be clearly identified as democrats contend with the nondemocratic 
forces’ (Carothers, 2009: 7). Political aid is therefore opportunistic, risk-taking and 
more confrontational, like assisting a boxer in a bout at ‘important conjunctural 
moments with the hope of catalytic effects’ (Carothers, 2009: 5).  
But democracy promotion can be understood in a broader context. The promotion and 
establishment of human rights is regarded as priority for the UN for example (Joyner, 
2002: 147-172), and can be understood as a specific purpose in and of itself rather than 
an attempt to promote democracy. Legal reform can also be seen as a distinct aim; far 
smaller or more specific in scope than democracy and again not exclusive to 
democracies. The governance agenda on the other hand is particularly broad; a political, 
economic and administrative reform exercise – it’s an agenda far broader than 
democracy (Burnell, 2000: 19). 
Governance projects are frequently present within international development 
programmes and can be referred to as a ‘developmental’ approach to democracy 
promotion (see Carothers, 2009). However, the political and developmental approaches 
should not be understood as competing models, as Burnell argues, 
For example, the increasingly popular idea of “democratic governance” as 
furthered by the Inter-American Development Bank sees democracy and 
governance as “two faces of the same coin”, linking together the norms, 
procedures and institutions that must be in place if there are to be effective, 
efficient and open public policies. (Burnell, 2000: 19) 
Democracy for the developmental approach is seen as a contributing factor to 
socioeconomic development but not an intrinsic good or an objective in itself. 
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Practitioners believe the development process to be slow and ‘iterative’ (Carothers, 
2009: 9), with the possibility of making substantial socioeconomic progress without 
democracy, or even as the prerequisite of democracy. Theories of ‘sequencing’ and 
preconditioning democratic progress have been developed by development scholars; an 
anathematic idea to the political aid community. There is a fear that politicization and a 
confrontational approach would jeopardize the cooperative relationships nurtured with 
governments, engendering in turn an further aversion to the politicization of their aid.  
Attempts to promote human rights, good governance, and legal reform are understood 
as means of laying the foundations for democratic society and can thus be considered a 
key form of democracy promotion. With regard to the exploration of sub-states, this 
incorporation of an ever wider field of activities. In exploring the democracy promotion 
activities of sub-states therefore, we must not discount any international development 
programmes wherein much of the good governance, legal reform, and human rights 
projects can be found.  
1.1.3 What is the “democracy” in democracy promotion? 
In returning to Hobson and Kurki’s (2012: 3) open definition of democracy promotion, 
it is notable that the particular model of democracy being promoted need not be a given. 
Academics have observed however, that global democracy promotion coalesces around 
a specific model or at least a specific range along the spectrum of democracy (Burnell, 
2000; Burnell and Youngs, 2010). There is a perception amongst academic 
commentators, with an overwhelming dominance of US and western actors in the field, 
that the democracy in question can be generalized as a market-orientated, 
representative, liberal democracy which either causes or is an accompanying element of 
wider socioeconomic development, the rule of law and human rights.  
This particular understanding of democracy can be placed within (and partly explained 
by) its historical context. Kurki (2013: Chapter 2) traces the link between economic 
governance and democracy from the founders of political liberal thought and thinkers 
such as Mill, Locke and Adam Smith through to twenty first century reform and neo-
liberalism. Beate Jahn (2012: 55) meanwhile, notes how John Locke overcame the 
potentially contradictory relationship between economic liberalism and democracy 
39 
 
while also noting the complementary relationship between democracy, political 
liberalism ,and individual rights.  
The development and influence of empirical democratic theory offers a further 
indication as to why it takes the form it does. Much influenced by such theorists as 
Robert Dahl (1961), democracy is presented as a description of reality rather than a 
goal or set of values; “democracy” exists in the real world and it can be described, 
identified and therefore replicated. Schumpeter’s (1976) instrumentalization of 
democracy further enriches this understanding; viewing it as a collection of instruments 
which may be wielded as a means of achieving desirable market conditions rather than 
an end in and of itself; a minimalist or functionalist market-liberal democracy. 
Kurki, following empirical studies of states, IFIs, NGOs and development foundations, 
offers several key conclusions which further enhances the picture of democracy 
promotion today. 1) The democracy is implicitly rather than explicitly liberal and the 
practice increasingly depoliticized and distanced from big “L” liberalism. 2) The 
democracy is increasingly context-sensitive; ‘No longer do democracy promoters aim to 
coercively push an unproblematic one-size-fits-all approach to democracy support’ 
(Kurki, 2013: 217). 3) Nevertheless, the democracy still consists of liberal ideals albeit 
with 4) extra-liberal elements present. For example, IFIs place an emphasis on some 
social democratic notions of equality and participation (2013: 218). 5) There is a 
growing consensus not only on the methodology employed but also on the legitimacy of 
the practice – it is the “right” thing to do, and there is a “right” way to do it. 6) 
Opposition to this consensus and any challenge or raising of alternatives is dismissed as 
foolish or ‘dangerous’ (2013: 218). 7) Finally, civil support organizations and private 
actors “do” the promoting on the ground with support delivery increasingly if not totally 
privatized.  
Some variation and temporal development in the particular model of democracy being 
promoted has been mapped (see Bridoux and Kurki, 2014; Kurki, 2013: 146-172), but ‘a 
tendency towards consensus on liberal democracy is more pressing than interest in 
exploring the contestation over (liberal) democracy’s meaning’ (Kurki, 2013: 215). The 
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consensus regarding what democracy “is” can also be seen within much of the academic 
literature.  
Most studies work within a paradigm which sees democracy as an 
uncontested good, and crucially as a concept, the meaning of which is self 
evidently captured by Western liberal democratic understanding of 
democracy (Kurki, 2013: 6).  
Even recent literature searching for original approaches and policy solutions to address 
the issues raised by the backlash against democracy promotion (see, Burnell and 
Youngs, 2010; McFaul, 2010: Carothers, 2006; 2008), remain concerned with policy 
dilemmas or core questions of why and how democracy should be promoted rather 
than delving into more fundamental territory such as the nature of the democracy being 
promoted. Academic debates regarding the applicability of democracy to various 
contexts worldwide such as the Journal of Democracy’s focused issue on the meaning of 
the concept (see Braizat, 2010; Bratton, 2010; Cheeseman, 2010; Diamond, 2010), also 
tended to implicitly conform to a particular objective and minimalist notion of 
democracy which can be measured and quantified.  
Consequently, it is argued that; ‘Despite the considerable insights generated, much of 
this scholarship has been limited, and perhaps even distorted, by certain assumptions 
that have been uncritically accepted and repeated’ (Hobson and Kurki, 2012: 215). 
Kurki further warns against omission of such conceptual debates as to do so fails to 
treat democracy as what it is, namely something political; 
…failure to probe the conceptual underpinnings of democracy support is an 
important, and consequential, weakness of current democracy support 
scholarship and practice… [the literature on the topic takes an 
instrumentalist approach]… Such approaches depoliticize democracy 
support practice – a practice once conceived (rightly) as deeply normative 
and ideological in nature! (Kurki, 2013: 3) 
Scholars have emphasized therefore that the democracy being promoted abroad is a 
relatively narrow, uncontested market-liberal model. It is a model that is minimalist in 
its understanding, consisting often of quantifiable characteristics. To many, it is a 
depoliticized governance model that is being promoted around the world, key insights 
that support broader theoretical positions discussed later. Failure to engage with the 
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understanding of democracy however is perceived as a weakness of much of the 
literature on the topic. An important consideration in order to better understand and 
contextualize sub-state democracy promotion will be the particular type or model of 
democracy being promoted, and where sub-state democracy promotion could or should 
be located with regard within the democracy promotion world.  
1.2 Who does it and how do they do it? 
There is some agreement within the democracy promotion literature regarding the key 
actors in the field. If sub-states are to be understood with regard to current actors, brief 
overview of the key actors will be of value. This section aims to do so.  
Western States are key actors that sub-contract their democracy promotion to “middle-
men” – the foundations and organizations – that then design and subcontract specific 
projects to private companies and NGOs. The role of such foundations, as well as an 
industry of NGOs is key to understanding state-funded “political” and “developmental” 
democracy promotion. Equally important are the ramifications of accepting funding 
from, and being politically linked to states and their governments. International 
organizations meanwhile have risen to prominence over the past few decades as 
another distinctive group of donors and conductors of international democracy 
promotion. This section will explore the key actors within democracy promotion, and 
consider the key themes related to those actors and their activities.  
1.2.1 States  
The US has been explicitly promoting democracy since the Wilson administration’s 
declarations during the First World War at least, if not since its formative years and 
Thomas Jefferson’s hopes of a global democratic revolution. It is the most notable state 
engaged in the promotion of democracy, spending around $2.8bn on democracy support 
in 2013, while the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and France are also prominent 
Western states that promote democracy (Bridoux and Kurki, 2014: 24). 
The “assistance” of such states is commonly coordinated by quasi-governmental 
development institutes or political foundations, receiving donations from the state 
while contracting and coordinating programmes in the partner state. For instance, the 
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US Department of State plays a key role in setting the high level coordination, 
developing a diplomatic relationship that will facilitate entry, and ensuring that 
democracy and human rights are prominent within US foreign policy and its 
engagement with those other countries. The State Department can even use its 
diplomatic muscle to incentivise other states to comply with a democracy agenda. But 
the bulk of the development assistance itself is administered by institutes and 
foundations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
and the US Congress funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED), that itself 
operates through four affiliated institutes including the political party-affiliated 
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI). 
The funding by the state of separate institutions or foundations to manage the work is a 
common trend amongst states. Other Western states have created similar institutions to 
guide and manage both their political and developmental assistance. It has been claimed 
that at least 63 political foundations exist in Europe (Kurki, 2013: 180). German 
programmes example for are managed and delivered by the stiftungen or coordinated 
by the semi-official development body the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
then outsourced to NGOs. The British Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) 
operates from the UK. Funded mainly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 
its Board of Governors is appointed by the FCO and much of its work is carried out by 
British political parties and legislative staff giving assistance to civil society, 
parliaments, or training political parties and individuals. Burnell notes that the 
Foundation’s work;  
...illustrate[s] the collaborative and sub-contracting nature of democracy 
assistance, for, with funds from the Department for International 
Development as well as the FCO, the Foundation has engaged the British 
Council as well as Britain’s political parties in delivering the programmes 
(Burnell, 2000: 55). 
Indeed, the foundations are often the “middle men” of international democracy 
promotion, taking money from state governments and legislatures, then setting the 
strategies, and subcontracting specific projects to another set of actors; the NGOs, 




However the shifting priorities of foreign policy, political relations within the state and 
bureaucracy, an unclear mandate for some of the development work, and the use of aid 
as part of wider strategic politicking are the root of key failings (see Carothers, 2009b; 
Hook, 2002). Consequently, in the case of USAID for example; 
…the democracy and governance work suffers from inflexibility and rigidity; 
is slow, overly bureaucratic, and often mechanistic; lacks innovation and 
frequently relies on cookie-cutter approaches; conforms more to 
Washington demands or designs than to local realities; and tends to be 
bloated in country contexts that are already swimming in aid resources yet 
paltry in places starved for assistance (Carothers, 2009b: 18). 
Time and again therefore, whether in promoting democracy or good governance 
through development, the relationship between the donor state and the foundation is a 
key consideration. Political freedom and security of funding can encourage a broad 
range of responsive programmes in the vein of the ideal espoused by some of the recent 
revisionists of the practice (McFaul, 2010; Burnell and Youngs, 2010). However the 
reverse, domestic politicking, uncertain funding arrangements and stiff competition for 
the outsourced contracts results in being overly responsive to the donor rather than the 
target society. These mainly domestic concerns must also be taken into account while 
attempting to paint a picture of the motives and methods of sub states.  
The more overt, political link with the donor can also jeopardise the effectiveness of the 
aid in the partner country. “Co-option” is a concept referring to the contamination of the 
client – the organization carrying out the development work – by the donor – the 
funding state. A state’s political-historical status can cast a shadow over the credibility, 
legitimacy, or acceptability of the contracted NGO.  
Strongmen--some of them elected officials--have begun to publicly denounce 
Western democracy assistance as illegitimate political meddling. They have 
started expelling or harassing Western NGOs and prohibiting local groups 
from taking foreign funds--or have started punishing them for doing so 
(Carothers, 2006: 55). 
Co-option, as we see, can be the cause of a backlash for the NGOs carrying out the 
democracy promotion “on the ground”. Co-option is not inevitable however and;  
...there are no universal relationships between increasing dependence on 
official aid, and particular trends in NGO programming, performance, 
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legitimacy and accountability. Context, circumstances and the quality of 
relationships between the actors are of crucial importance (Edwards and 
Hulme, 1996: 969). 
It is however, an issue that must be explored if the project is to contextualize the 
democracy promotion of sub-states, and place their activities alongside other actors. 
The experiences of states, particularly the donor-client relationship, highlights many of 
the potential issues surrounding the subcontracting of international aid. This 
relationship can be identified as a key theme when attempting to understand actors. In 
exploring the international development programmes of sub-states therefore, there is a 
need to appreciate the possible influence, even dominance, of the broader state’s 
political-historical status with potential partners. It must be considered with regard to 
sub-state policy and activity and the consequences for the donor-client relationship.  
1.2.2 International Organizations 
International organizations have been categorized as another type of democracy 
promoter. Specifically, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and 
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) are identified as such actors. The EU and UN can engage in a state-
like manner, setting broad political parameters to any assistance or aid provided. 
Indeed the UN is often seen as a key normalizer of international development norms, 
manifested in their declarations of human rights or development goals.  
Within the institutions and organizations however, there are specific instruments that 
are used to design, manage, and subcontract the democracy or development projects 
with international partners. These include the EU’s European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and the EuropeAid, or the UN’s Democracy 
Fund. The World Bank and IMF meanwhile offer good governance support and anti-
corruption assistance. The IFIs also agree broad restructuring strategies with partners 
such as the Poverty Reduction Strategies that set the path for the socioeconomic and 
governance reform of partners in receipt of funding and support.  
Meanwhile, networks or umbrella organizations of smaller democracy foundations and 
NGOs have also been established. Organizations such as the European Network of 
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Political Foundations, a network of over 60 member foundations arranges for members 
to share good practice, access funding, and advocates on their behalf (ENoP, 2016).  
While the relevance of these organizations is not immediately apparent with regard to 
sub-states, they do play an important role in broad “agenda setting” and establishing the 
norms mainstreaming certain practices worldwide. Institutions such as the UN and EU 
in particular are key establishers of development norms, often enshrined in 
declarations such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), while internationally 
accepted criteria for evaluating reform and development are often designed by the IFIs 
to support their assistance partnerships. 
1.2.3 NGOs and a development “industry” 
NGOs have risen in prominence not only to conduct the majority of the development 
and democracy projects of foundations and organizations, but also to dominate the 
discourse, policy formation, and even to dictate spending levels of Western 
governments. This is particularly the case with regard to international development, 
where Western governments have willingly withdrawn their political involvement and 
surrendered control of the agenda to the development industry.  
NGOs, along with specialist private companies, carry out much of the work “on the 
ground”. This entails bidding for contracts from the state-funded foundations and 
institutions. Groups often specialize in specific areas of democracy or development aid. 
Alongside governance reform, by promoting citizenship, running advocacy campaigns, 
small scale participative schemes and sometimes as transnational social movements, 
NGOs have become a key promoters of democratic behaviour and norms abroad. As 
noted however, these groups can suffer the brunt of the backlash due to issues created 
by its link to the donor state. But the donor-client relationship can also work in reverse, 
with the client influencing the donor. This is particularly the case with regard to 
international development.  
NGOs have gained the ability to participate and influence in all aspects of global politics, 
particularly through the UN’s Economic and Social Council which gives access to 
governments around the world (see Willets, 2011: 32-64). Following the perceived 
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failure of the modernization view of development – large scale macroeconomic 
structural reform programmes – several scholars have noted the rise of NGOs as leaders 
of an alternative, civil society-based model of development anchored by the notion of 
good governance (Abrahamsen, 2000: 1-24; 52-56). The access NGOs enjoyed within 
global fora, facilitated the propagation of the good governance and civil society model of 
development. 
By 1989 the World Bank had officially adopted the good governance agenda (van 
Cranenburgh, 1999: 93-94). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an 
influential group of key donors within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) had meanwhile created a working group on Participatory 
Development and Good Governance by 1994. Meanwhile the European Council on 
Democracy, Human Rights and Development of November 1991, enshrined the 
Community’s policy in the area, committing itself to the same model. NGOs have 
transformed what international development is, and re-established its norms and 
practices, within these influential and agenda-setting global fora.  
They have also successfully pushed the model onto states. Grugel (1999) for example, 
looking at OXFAM, Christian Aid, Save the Children and WATER-WORLD, notes how the 
UK Government saw NGOs as holding the necessary range of professional skills and 
resources to design, as well as to deliver their development programmes, consequently 
becoming major donors of those NGOs. NGOs have come to co-design the development 
model as well as administer the resulting projects. Over 200 British NGOs are now in 
receipt of government funding and due to the increasing privatization; 
The boundaries are slowly being dissolved between official development 
cooperation, administered through the Department for International 
Development (DFID), and cooperation through NGOs, financed either totally 
or in part through the state (Grugel, 1999: 127) 
The picture of the growth in NGO involvement was reflected throughout the West by the 
turn of the millennium; from 1992-95 for example, the European Commission co-funded 
over 4,000 projects in Latin America through NGOs, spending over Euros200m which 
represented between 50-70% of the total costs of the projects (Freres, 1999: 54). Some 
have even claimed that; 
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They have moved from subordinate and antagonistic positions to dominant 
positions in the global networks of power. With a seat at every official policy 
table, virtually present in every corner of the globe, delivering expertise on a 
wide range of issues, NGOs are now run like multinational firms, by 
professionals whose career trajectories perfectly illustrate the new 
complementarity between NGOs and international organizations. Previously 
remote from each other, these institutional worlds are now getting closer as 
their boundaries are blurred and as a same personnel circulates between 
them or simultaneously occupies positions in both fields (Guilhot, 2005: 4). 
With regard to development assistance therefore, we must acknowledge the rise of an 
“industry”, made up largely of transnational NGOs and global fora. The “industry” is 
dominated and guided by a particular discourse that stresses the need to develop good 
governance and the infrastructure of at least a minimalist form of democracy – this 
discourse is examined later. The role of NGOs therefore cannot be dismissed as merely 
the “boots on the ground” of international development. They have become the key 
transnational industry that guides, sets norms, and develops the practices of 
international development. The influence of this industry must be taken into account 
when exploring sub-state international development.  
What is missing from the literature on democracy promotion actors and their methods 
are sub-states. There are no accounts of whether they promote democracy, how they do 
so, or whether they can be understood in a similar manner to states or other actors.  
1.3 The backlash 
Recent years however, have been noted for the absence of that 1990s enthusiasm and 
the hegemonic domination the concept could lay claim to. The democratic wave had 
crashed against something by the mid-2000s, and the geopolitical context no longer 
allows for the domination and unopposed promotion and espousal of a single form of 
governance. Not only has the “wave” peaked, but in some cases it is argued to be 
receding as governments backtrack and renege on the democratic reforms of earlier 
years. Several reasons are thought to have contributed to what has become accepted as 
a “backlash” against democracy promotion. Crucially however, it is the context within 
which the activities of sub-states over the past 10-15 years must be considered. 
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Thomas Carothers (2006; 2008; 2010) can be credited with the clearest and most 
explicit attempt to explain the backlash. For him the phenomenon is manifested in the 
backtracking on much of the openness introduced into Russian, Caucasus and Central 
Asian societies; China’s process of de-liberalisation which has reversed the political 
reform gains of the 90s; and even Central and Eastern Europe’s struggles with ‘vexing 
political standoffs’ such as the rise of the far right in Poland and political conflict in 
Hungary (Carothers, 2008: 9). Compounding matters is the economic success of China 
that debunks the notion that only democracy brings economic prosperity – there are 
other models of governance capable of doing that. 
The Bush administration’s (2001-2009) aggressive prosecution of its war on terror in 
the name of democracy meanwhile has prompted strong resistance to democratic 
imposition.  
This association of democracy promotion with what is widely viewed as 
unauthorised military force, violations of rights and a horrendous level of 
violence in Iraq, has been devastating to the legitimacy of the concept of 
democracy promotion (Carothers, 2008: 11-12). 
The change in administration has not brought about a dramatic change in the situation 
either; 
In the US, despite the many hopes invested in the Obama administration, and 
the many Clinton administration appointees flocking back to Washington, 
DC, at the beginning of 2009, it is not realistic to suppose that unipolarity is 
about to be restored, or that the severe damage done to global democratic 
idealism during the Bush administration can readily be undone (Whitehead, 
2010: 39) 
The contested nature of democracy and the difficulty in measuring its progress also 
makes the assessment of democracy promotion a difficult task. Revisions of the practice 
during the 1990s and early 2000s now raise serious questions as to the efficacy of the 
activities at the time. Carothers was quick to point to the fact that the mushrooming in 
democracy aid in truth took off after the “third wave” had begun (1999), so total credit 
could not be attributed to international factors. Larry Diamond has expanded the 
revision further arguing that Huntington’s wave has produced ‘hollow’ democratic 
regimes, vulnerable to a reverse wave (1999: 24-63), and the democratization process 
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has failed to achieve broad and ‘deep’ legitimation (1999: 65). The key task of 
democratizers for him, is to deepen and consolidate democracy in the target societies by 
institutionalizing the values and practice of democratic politics. Implicit in this criticism 
is the assertion that the methods and practices of promoting democracy do not and may 
never have contributed to meaningful democratization abroad.  
The backlash has on the one hand intensified the practical need to depoliticise the 
practice and to retreat further into technical or procedural approaches to the promotion 
of democracy. “On the ground”, this would involve either the promoters themselves 
refusing to acknowledge the political nature of their work, or tacit agreements with 
non-democratic governments to operate informally and without legal registration 
(Carothers, 2010: 65-67).  
Consequently, international development and its promotion of good governance has 
risen in prominence amongst practitioners seeking to appear less confrontational or 
political; ‘by reasserting a commitment to the objective through a more explicit 
association with the widely legitimate goal of development’ (Carothers, 2010: 67). This 
seems to point to a deeper suspicion that the practice, and democratic governance in 
general, is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. 
Meanwhile, the challenging environment has prompted scholars to attempt speculate 
regarding how the backlash can be overcome (see McFaul 2010; Burnell and Youngs, 
2010; Carothers, 2008). But even these innovative policy rethinks have been suggested 
to have their limits (Kurki and Hobson, 2012: 3), and a further, more fundamental 
reappraisal of the practice is currently taking place, delving into the conceptual issues at 
the heart of democracy promotion and exploring the conventions that govern the key 
concepts at play – namely the nature of democracy itself. Ultimately there is the claim 
that; 
Because democracy is a complicated political system, which includes some 
values that are universally understood and accepted and others that are far 
from being universally accepted in many countries, its ideological appeal is 
limited (Ottaway, 2010: 57). 
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The backlash is an essential context within which democracy promotion must be 
understood. It must also inform any understanding of sub-state democracy promotion if 
it is to be relevant.  
1.4 Understanding Democracy Promotion 
International relations (IR) theory explores democracy promotion and offers various 
ways in which the activity, its actors, and their methods can be understood. If any 
project exploring the democracy promotion of sub-states is to be relevant and 
contribute to the understanding of the practice, it must relate to this broader IR 
literature. In exploring theories of democracy promotion, themes and concepts are 
exposed that have become common – if disputed – amongst scholarly attempts to 
explain why democracy promotion takes the form it does. While such themes and 
concepts can anchor this project’s exploration of sub-states, the overview also identifies 
gaps and possibilities for this project to contribute to the existing literature and 
understanding of the activity. This section also notes the absence of sub-states from 
such IR approaches and begins to answer the first research question directly. 
The literature and its various perspectives, tend to dispute the answer to a central 
question regarding the activity; why is democracy promoted? Answers lead to a focus 
on the political agency of governments and states, almost instinctively encouraging a 
consideration of whether democracy promotion is a means of pursuing interests, 
promoting values, increasing power, expanding hegemony, or a combination of such 
motivations. These studies are perhaps naturally state-centric, and often fail to 
satisfactorily account for the role of other actors such as IFIs or NGOs, and there is no 
mention of sub-states. Critical perspectives approach the study of the activity differently 
however, and tend to focus and extrapolate from detailed studies of the methods 
employed. Nonetheless, even these fail to adequately accommodate sub-states into the 
broader framework. 
Proponents of democracy promotion can also be found operating within a liberal 
internationalist paradigm, occasionally referred to as optimists (Bridoux and Kurki, 
2014: 38). Their accounts are  grounded in the belief that core liberal principles can be 
spread, that they do allow for democracy and human rights to develop, and that this is 
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an intrinsic good that will contribute to a more peaceful world (see Kegley Jr. and 
Hermann, 2002: 15-29; Mandelbaum, 2007; McFaul, 2010). The role of promoting states 
and international organizations in particular are often emphasized by such perspectives 
(see Pevehouse, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett, 2006).  
There is a concurrent belief that promoting democracy is also in the interest of the 
states doing so. Unsurprisingly, liberal internationalists are often advocates of 
democratic peace theory. This allows a slight detachment from accusations that 
optimists believe that states are altruistic in their promotion of democracy, and the 
claim that it is a reasonable or realistic approach to international relations. Importantly, 
this viewpoint is believed to be common amongst practitioners of democracy 
promotion. 
These positions are important and, it can be claimed, underpin much of the 
practice and policy-making on democracy promotion. Many practitioners 
believe that democracy promotion is compatible with altruistic ends and also 
simultaneously with instrumental interest agendas. Promotion of democracy 
is then the best of both worlds... (Bridoux and Kurki, 2014: 38) 
The theoretical perspective is often implicit within the work of scholars who prefer to 
address more “problem-solving” aspects of the activity. Much focus is on the 
implementation of democracy promotion policies generally (see Burnell, 2000; Burnell 
and Youngs; Whitehead, 1996; 2002; Youngs, 2010), or in specific cases (see Wolff, 
2011; Teixeira, 2008; Zeeuw, 2005). 
Realists however, have developed a strong criticism of the optimistic view of democracy 
promotion. Their focus on democracy promotion is unsurprisingly concerned with the 
pursuit of interests. Structural or Waltzian realists argue against the validity of 
democratic peace theory and have even suggested that to pursue such notions is 
dangerous for the interests of great powers. Some argue for example that US democracy 
promotion would lead to ‘disastrous military interventions abroad, strategic 
overextension, and the relative decline of American power’ (Layne, 1995: 329). Some 
realists do however believe that democracy can reduce mistrust, and is indeed, as 
liberal internationalists argue, in the interests of states (see Schweller, 2000: 42-43; 
Kydd, 1997). Regardless of the debate, the realist interpretation of democracy 
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promotion is, unsurprisingly, overwhelmingly state-centric and concerns the 
instrumental pursuit of interests.  
From a realist perspective, it could be argued for example, that by diverting resources to 
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), President Reagan developed a weapon 
for taking the ideological fight to the USSR. An overtly political approach to promoting 
the ‘infrastructure of democracy’ (Reagan, 1982), was more palatable domestically than 
paramilitary sponsorship or the support lent to authoritarian regimes. The War on 
Terror has been read in a similar fashion. The Bush administration’s promotion of 
democracy was again seen as a ‘vaccination’, this time against radical Islam (Carothers, 
2003: 84), that could and should be administered abroad.  
Such arguments have led critical scholars in particular to remark on the complex and 
sometimes contradictory attitudes adopted by states toward the promotion of 
democracy. Western states have happily “propped up” undemocratic governments if it 
is in their interests as well as espousing democratic values elsewhere. Realists may 
shrug such accusations and argue that the hypocrisy merely supports their view; it’s 
about interests, not values – sometimes it’s worth promoting democracy, sometimes it 
isn’t. Ultimately we may turn to Schweller to sum up the realist view that democracy 
promotion is a foreign policy tool; 
In the end, I suspect that Americans are far more interested in maintaining 
global hegemony – which the Clinton administration seemed to believe could 
be achieved solely by further opening markets to American goods and 
culture – than they are in the promotion of democracy per se (Schweller, 
2000: 61). 
With regard to sub-states, it is difficult to see how relevant such an explanation can be. 
Liberal internationalists and realists have failed to address the existence of sub-states, 
let alone their interests or whether democracy promotion serves those interests. There 
are no accounts of sub-states.  
Nonetheless, issues of (sub-)national interests must become a consideration if the 
project is to relate to the core IR debates. What role for example, do sub-states play 
within the broader context of the central state’s promotional work? How much 
coordination, cooperation, or control is involved between the central and sub state with 
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regard to promoting democracy? Exploring the notion of (sub-)national interests, and 
the possibility that they are pursued by promoting democracy, is one that may be 
explored with a view to contributing to IR scholarship. 
This is not to suggest however that non-realists do not see foreign policy and national 
interest motivations behind the promotion of democracy. Critical scholars for example, 
curious about the inconsistencies of democracy promotion, have also argued that 
democracy promotion is a cover for the state’s strategic interests; 
A US stance in favour of democracy helps get the Congress, the bureaucracy, 
the media, the public, and elite opinion to back US policy… The democracy 
agenda, in short, is a kind of legitimacy cover for our more basic strategic 
objectives (Robinson, 1996 : 73). 
Critical scholars have also explored these aspects, and concluded more specifically that 
the real “interest” behind promoting democracy is a more structural, intended to extend 
and propagate a global capitalist market. Jean Grugel (2002: 118) for example, has 
suggested that; ‘democratization is a part of a wider process of deepening hegemonic 
control over the developing and semi-peripheral world’. Globalization brings states 
closer still and that regular contact between the periphery and the core becomes more 
common. The periphery is supported by the core through democracy and development 
support, and finds itself ‘locked in’ to a particular model of development – dependent 
upon market openness and a particular form of liberal democracy (Grugel, 2002). 
Grugel establishes Western states as the “core” and generally sees developing nations as 
the periphery. She firmly links the democratization efforts and the particular model of 
democracy promoted, with the perpetuation of an exploitative economic relationship 
between “developed” and “developing” worlds. Some go even further, suggesting that 
democracy promotion is a form of ‘neo-colonialism’ instigated by western countries 
(Shaw, 1991). The question of sub-states’ role within this structure remains to be 
explained however, or even acknowledged. 
Neo-Gramscians offer an account of democracy promotion which encompasses the 
other actors such as NGOs and IFIs as well as states. The focus is often upon the model 
of democracy in question, claiming that through its exposition and deconstruction we 
gain insight into deeper, more hidden motive and agenda behind US and Western 
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democracy promotion; ‘Promoting democratization or defending human rights are 
privileged channels for the exportation of political technologies, economic recipes or 
judicial models’ (Guilhot, 2005: 8). Specifically, the particularly liberal and market 
orientated conception of democracy prevalent amongst promoters is seen as a weapon 
or tool for maintaining and propagating liberal hegemony and world order.  
Robinson’s ‘Promoting Polyarchy’ (1996) exemplifies this approach by arguing that the 
aim, through the very minimalist conception of democracy which de-radicalizes citizens, 
is to promote ‘low intensity democracy’ amongst the developing nations. The spread of 
a particular model of democracy establishes a consensus on the model of economic and 
political government which diminishes any challenge to the economic system, leaving 
the US and West to remain the main beneficiaries of global capitalism. Robinson’s 
democracies are tools that create consensus over economic management in the 
developing world.  
Meanwhile, Guilhot’s account (2005) expands the explanatory “reach” of the theory 
further, arguing in turn that NGOs have become essential to the process of building the 
consensus around the model of democracy to be promoted. As the actors that “do” the 
promotion, he sees NGOs as ‘double agents’, embedded within the democratising states 
while simultaneously developing and promoting the hegemony-creating democracy 
described by Robinson. The newly professionalized NGO’s role is central to 
depoliticizing and repackaging the liberal, status-quo democracy as an acceptable, 
emancipatory agenda, simultaneously hiding the politics of what it “really means”. This 
in turn offers some explanation of the recent developments in the field such as the 
depoliticization of activities and the incorporation of new actors. In this sense, the 
theoretical incorporation of NGOs into the framework has offered important insights 
into their nature as actors and their role (highlighted above) in developing policy (see 
also Taylor 1999; Grugel 1999). 
The approach has been repeatedly countered in the literature however. It has been 
suggested that the ‘now standard critique of liberal democracy do not weather the 
scrutiny of empirical evidence’ (Youngs 2012: 100). Youngs continues to build his 
argument suggesting that Western actors are not overly-zealous liberal-marketeers and 
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that critical perspectives often fail to present a complete picture of the actors involved 
in democracy support – perhaps implicitly suggesting that the Neo-Gramscian literature 
tends to be very theoretical in its nature, and lacking in empirical support. Carothers 
holds no truck with the neo-Gramscian argument either, suggesting that the approach 
has fallen into a ‘trap of hewing to just one narrow line of critique that would seek to 
dismiss the whole enterprise as ill-intentioned and ill-conceived’ (Carothers, 2012: xiv). 
Another accusation comes from Kurki, who argues that even these critical accounts are 
guilty of missing the nuance of democracy and ‘...to assume an overly singular 
understanding of the ideology of democracy support’ (Kurki. 2013: 10).  
There is a further problem with the Marxist and Neo-Gramscian accounts of democracy 
promotion; sub-states are absent, and their role within the broader structure is unclear. 
There is some focus in broader literature upon the mechanisms of capital on the 
subnational level; technological, market, financial and regulatory denationalization and 
localization which establish capitalism within local contexts (see Sassen, 2013). The 
focal points are interactive technologies that reposition the local; from a field where 
global capitalism plays out to an arena where those forces are created. But sub-states 
are not understand as actors or sources of political agency – only spaces where the 
forces of global capital are (also) at play. Robinson on the other hand is equally 
unsatisfactory in his account – and a footnote is all that he offers on the topic – of sub-
states and decentralised governance structures.   
The movement towards the decentralization of the national state, such as 
“devolution” of administrative powers from the central government to local 
governments in the United States, or the transfer to municipal governments 
of formerly central state activities in Latin America, should be seen in light of 
changes in the state under globalization. No longer able to sustain the 
activities that provide for popular legitimacy, central states attempt to 
abdicate social welfare responsibilities and the costs of continued social 
polarization through the decentralization of such functions to local 
authorities (Robinson, 2008: 37). 
This view fails to take account of localized political forces at play and actively “pulling” 
power down to the regional level, observed most notably – but certainly not exclusively 
– amongst nationalist movements. Furthermore, central states such as the UK for 
example explicitly reserves control over social welfare policy and expenditure and even 
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holds – through its funding process for devolved administrations – a relatively tight grip 
on the overall spending in areas such as healthcare, social care and education. The 
Marxist and Gramscian understanding of devolution is itself oversimplified, and lacks 
any engagement with variables and factors (explored in chapter two) that students of 
sub-states would claim are integral to their understanding. Most notably is the denial of 
the agency of sub-states, a fundamental divide between this particular IR perspective, 
and all studies of sub-state international activity. 
These contradictions and oversights are yet to be tackled, posing a challenge to the 
Marxist interpretation of decentralization and devolution on the one hand and on the 
other raise significant questions for any attempt to incorporate sub-states as actors into 
the broader framework for understanding democracy promotion and IR generally. 
Concisely, for the purposes of this project, the explanatory potential of the theoretical 
perspective is deeply unsatisfactory. 
A more recent approach to the practice can be seen amongst those taking a Foucauldian 
perspective to its study, notably making use of the concept of ‘governmentality’. The 
approaches seek to deconstruct the methods used to promote democracy and expose 
the underlying power relations at work. Governmentality scholars have enriched the 
study of democracy promotion and exposed an implicit bias toward liberal market 
orientated democracy present within the methods employed by promoters.  
Abrahamsen (2000) and Ayres (2006) both suggest that due to Western dominance, the 
discourse and practice of international development, the model of democracy present in 
and promoted through governance schemes is one which is compatible with and echoes 
the pro-liberal, market democracies. Successful development policy not only embeds 
this particular model within the target states but makes the targets themselves 
responsible for its successful implementation and regulation (Abrahamsen, 2000; Ayers, 
2006). The very ideals espoused; elections, rule of law, human rights, and good 
accountable and participatory government are not natural or neutral aspects of 
democracy, but rather highly ideological aims (Ayres, 2006: 322-323). 
Julia Hearn is another example who, while looking at support to South Africa in the 
1990s, suggests that despite unprecedented amounts of international aid, there are two 
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main consequences of democracy promotion. Firstly, that the concept of democracy has 
been redefined, away from ideas of social democracy and toward a procedural and 
minimalist conception. Secondly, stability remains the priority for the promoters due to 
the methods of promoters and their targets for funding within civil society. 
Consequently the same intensely exploitative economic system remains but is now 
unchallenged and democracy is a form of ‘system maintenance’ rather than a means of 
restructuring of the social order (Hearn, 2000).  
We may return to Abrahamsen (2000) however for a more significant contribution, 
outlining as she does the construction of ‘development discourse’  which has come to 
dominate the aid industry internationally. Also using a Foucauldian approach she 
emphasizes the dominant role a particularly Western and liberal conception of 
democracy plays in the formulation of the development discourse and the good 
governance agenda. Power is seen to reside in the state, not in society; to take power 
away from the state is therefore to empower society. The market is understood within 
the discourse as the realm of freedom and liberty but without an acceptance that such 
economic liberalism can actually reinforce socioeconomic inequalities. There is no 
critique of the market, neither is there an acceptance that the state could intervene in 
society to reduce inequality. Good governance therefore always comes back to ideas of 
economic liberalization, dressed up as powerful concepts such as ‘empowerment’, 
‘democracy’ and the ‘release of energies’ or ‘liberation of society’ (Abrahamsen, 2000). 
The ‘emancipatory’ agenda meanwhile is ‘entirely subordinated to the logic of economic 
adjustment and neoliberal state reform’ (Abrahamsen, 2000: 193).  
Good governance within international development projects is consequently a very 
political concept. Furthermore, the powerful and hegemonic discourse of development 
coordinates and synchronizes a global move toward a very particular model of 
democracy through the international development activities. Nonetheless, due in part to 
the difficult and recent history of African states at the hands of external actors, the 
development doctrine was portrayed and expressed as a neutral enterprise ‘driven by 
humanitarian desire to universalise wealth rather than by any particular political or 
ideological objectives’ (Abrahamsen, 2000: 12). The de-politicization of development 
therefore became a distinguishing and important feature. But again, as with other IR 
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perspectives, there is little to aid with the understanding of sub-state democracy 
promotion.  
1.5 Conclusions 
Democracy promotion is a difficult activity to “pin down” for it is potentially as elastic as 
the concept of democracy. Nonetheless, academic studies of the activity have broadly 
agreed upon a range of activities that do constitute democracy promotion. This chapter 
has uncovered a fair notion of what to look for when exploring the activities of sub-
states. Democracy assistance and support are less confrontational means of promoting 
democracy and conceivable activities for sub-state governments with the capacity and 
remit to engage abroad. 
A further, key observation is the increasing de-politicization of the activity, particularly 
through its incorporation into international development. Democracy is increasingly 
promoted implicitly, and arguably, unknowingly by practitioners of development. An 
exploration of the international development programmes of sub-states, and efforts to 
promote good governance, are therefore important points for the empirical 
explorations.  
The conceptualization of democracy is also a commonly neglected, but nonetheless 
integral aspect of democracy promotion. Critical scholars infer key claims from their 
analysis of the democracy being promoted, while others are accused of neglecting the 
issue. Considering its role within broader understandings of the activity, an exploration 
of the model of democracy being promoted by sub-states will allow a further 
contribution to the IR literature, perhaps corroborating or challenging certain accounts 
of democracy promotion.  
The exploration of actors and their methods has also uncovered several strands that are 
key to understanding democracy promotion actors. These must therefore remain 
integral to the exploration of sub-states, if the research is to remain relevant to the 
broader understanding of democracy promotion actors. Briefly, these strands concern 
questions regarding a possible (sub-)national interest and its pursuit alongside, or 
hidden by the promotion of democracy. The donor-client relationship is affected by and 
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impacts upon all sides of the democracy promotion relationship. The policy formation 
process, particularly with regard to international development and the influence of 
dominant discourses and NGOs, is a further strand that has become integral to how the 
activity is understood.  
The review of the democracy promotion literature in the first sections of this chapter 
has identified the absence of sub-states. Here is a major element of the answer to the 
first research question, and a significant challenge in understanding sub-state 
democracy promotion. It also underlines the potential contribution of this project. The 
review has also begun to answer the second research question, and presented the 
context to which a better understanding must relate. The empirical investigations of this 
project, and the subsequent analysis, must relate to the themes, issues, and questions of 
the scholarship covered in this chapter. 
The chapter notes however, that IR scholarship does not offer a framework for the 
project to adopt with regard to the exploration of sub-states. IR theories do not 
acknowledge the existence of sub-states, let alone account for and understand their 
international actorness generally, or as democracy promoters. In their present state, 
without modification, IR perspectives cannot be employed to analyse and explain the 
empirical data of this project, or for that matter, offer an answer to the second research 
question, and a means of understanding sub-state democracy promotion.  
Nonetheless, the disputing perspectives converge on some central themes, most notably 
the key question of motivation – why do actors promote democracy. Is the activity 
pursued due to a commitment to certain values and ideals, as an instrumental pursuit of 
interests, or as a cover for hidden interests? The questions raised in this section will 
further anchor the study, and ensure that the analytical contribution of the project is 
relevant to the broader IR scholarship, but as noted, the analytical framework cannot be 
sourced from the IR literature.  
In seeking an analytical framework, the project must therefore broaden its scope. 
Chapter 2 will therefore explore a sub-strand of the diplomacy literature and broader, 
though disparate scholarship; concisely termed paradiplomacy studies. This small body 
of literature is concerned with empirical accounts and attempts to theorise and explain 
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how and why sub-states engage internationally. Due to IR theory’s inability to account 
for sub-states, we must turn to this literature for a theoretical framework that will allow 




Chapter 2: Sub-states and Paradiplomacy 
The exploration of the democracy promotion literature in chapter 1 concluded that IR 
theory does not account for the activities (or even existence) of sub-states. Nor does the 
IR literature offer an analytical framework through which the democracy promotion of 
sub-states can be examined. In an attempt to address the second research question, and 
develop a means of better understanding sub-state democracy promotion, this chapter 
seeks to review the paradiplomacy literature, the scholarship concerning the 
international activities of sub-states, to gain an understanding of how sub-state 
international activities can be understood.  
The limitations of the literature are discussed first and its lack of engagement with the 
democracy promotion activities of sub-states or the relevant IR literature. The chapter 
then outlines three main types of paradiplomacy identified, sometimes loosely, 
sometimes explicitly, by scholars. While economic paradiplomacy is prevalent and a 
second more multidimensional tier has emerged, of most interest to the project is 
“political paradiplomacy”; activities that seek socio-political change elsewhere. The 
chapter proceeds to detail the considerations and factors purported by paradiplomacy 
scholars to be key in its understanding such as the role of nationalism. A further section 
explores relevant assertions regarding how sub-states engage in paradiplomacy, namely 
the theorised ability of sub-states to avoid difficult political constraints, and the 
influence of transnational communication of ideas and practices. These sections 
strengthen the answer to the second research question, enabling an understanding of 
the forces and factors at play when sub-states act internationally, and assists in 
contextualizing and making relevant to the existing paradiplomacy scholarship, the 
project’s own account of democracy promotion activities. 
Finally, exploring the attempts to theorise and build analytical frameworks will further 
develop an answer to the second research question. It will support the attempt at 
developing an approach for better understanding sub-state democracy promotion while 
remaining relevant to the themes outlined in Chapter 1 and earlier sections of this 
chapter. Specifically, the key finding beyond establishing the ways in which sub-states 
act internationally, will be the identification of Andre Lecours’ analytical framework as a 
means of understanding paradiplomacy. It offers the most advanced means of doing so 
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while accounting for the paradiplomacy scholarship’s emphasis upon structuring 
factors. 
2.1 Challenges of the literature 
The literature concerning the international activities of sub-states, what is often termed 
“paradiplomacy”, is disparate, emanating from a range of sub-disciplines of political 
science. Some perspectives explore sub-state international activity as a means of 
generating empirical support for broader theories (see Hocking, 1993; Der Derian, 
1987), while others engage directly with the phenomenon of paradiplomacy (see 
Keating, 1999; Kuznetsov, 2015; Lecours, 2002; Lecours and Moreno, 2003 
Michelmann, 2007; 2009). Even within those dealing with paradiplomacy directly 
however, studies examine different variables such as the constitutional set-up (see 
Criekemans, 2010a; Michelmann, 2007; 2009), or the role of nationalism (Lecours and 
Moreno, 2003). Indeed Kuznetsov claims that explorations of paradiplomacy fall into 
eleven different and distinct categories (2015: Chapter 4). Each strand has its own focus 
and means and context of understanding paradiplomacy as an activity.  
The varied terminology employed only serves to highlight the disparity within the field. 
Even the term paradiplomacy is disputed and alternatives suggested (see Hocking, 
1993; Criekemans, 2010). Scholars also use a variety of terms to specify or broaden the 
type of unit considered to be engaging in paradiplomacy. For example, Hocking’s (1993) 
use of Non Central Governments refers to the governments of states and other federated 
units; of interest to this particular project. However, the term also alludes to the 
governments of cities and administrations below the federated level; not the focus of 
this study. Der Derian’s (1987) paradiplomacy meanwhile covers both sub-states – the 
focus of this project – and individuals like the Pope – not the focus of this project.  
Aguire’s (1999: 186) warning of a ‘hazardous intertextuality’ is consequently worthy of 
consideration when approaching the paradiplomacy literature. The terms “sub-state” 
and “paradiplomacy” are used in this project, but do not always relate directly to the 
entire contributions of some paradiplomacy scholars. In this project, paradiplomacy 
refers to the international activities of sub-states, defined in the introductory chapter as 
the level of governance immediately below the central state. 
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Consideration must also be given to the fact that much of the sub-state literature is 
rooted in the comparative politics method. Consequently, the majority of academic 
literature is case-specific, dissecting the motivations and methods of particular 
examples with case-limited attempts to generalize trends, but few efforts to extrapolate 
explanatory theories (see Lecours 2002: 93).  
Another limitation that must be considered is the overwhelming focus within the sub-
state literature upon federal states and their constituent entities. This focus may be due 
to the development of the study itself, beginning as it did with studies of North 
American cases, but the focus is still largely on federated sub-states in the more recent 
contributions (see Michelmann, 2009). For this reason, federalism can implicitly seem to 
be the ‘most important theoretical determinant’ in the literature (Lecours and Moreno, 
2003: 269) – a notion which, if discussed is often contested. Giving due regard to unitary 
states in this project may further combat this implicit theoretical bias. 
We have therefore a rather disjointed and disparate literature which is unconnected to 
broader IR theory. Nevertheless, the scholarship does offer empirical data from which 
to draw upon in preparation for this project’s specific inquiry. Present also are some 
theoretical considerations, valuable in attempting to construct a framework for 
examining and understanding sub-state democracy promotion.  
2.2 Sub-states as democracy promoters 
The weaknesses of the sub-state literature are accentuated with regard to democracy 
promotion. Not only is there very little mention of the practice, but the little that is 
covered is not discussed within the context of the democracy promotion literature 
examined in chapter 1. Despite the thinness of the literature however, there is a trace of 
a discussion regarding the theoretical suitability of sub-states to the task of promoting 
democracy.  
Kincaid and Hocking converge on a similar view of sub-states as actors that are 
particularly well suited to the promotion of democracy. Kincaid presents sub-states as 




…by initiating a policy, providing aid, or conducting negotiations in 
situations where it would be politically embarrassing, diplomatically 
awkward, or legally impossible for the nation-state government to do so 
(Kincaid, 2010). 
Something that Hocking also identifies and elaborates upon; 
More generally however, NCGs enjoy a degree of legitimacy as the direct 
representatives of local interests untainted by the failings of national policy-
positions on issues (such as labour standards in Third World countries) 
which national governments will need to balance against broader 
international policy considerations (Hocking, 1999: 28). 
Such views can be compared with Chaloux and Paquin’s (2012) work regarding climate 
change action, and the notion that sub-states can “bypass” difficult political contexts. 
Kincaid goes further, suggesting that they may consequently be used as international 
‘proxies’ for the central government ‘often act[ing] without the political and ideological 
encumbrances attached to national governments’ (Kincaid, 2010).  
…state and local officials can also open doors in unofficial ways that would 
be awkward or impossible for the US government to do officially… At times, 
state and local officials also provide aid to equivalent governments in 
another country where it is awkward for the United States to do so, or for the 
other national government to accept direct US aid (Kincaid, 1999: 128). 
A lack of supporting empirical evidence limit such suggestions, but they are nonetheless 
interesting considerations, particularly when the “backlash” is considered as a context 
for promoting democracy. Kincaid, again postulating without explicit empirical support, 
suggests that the very nature and scale of the activities engaged in by sub-states creates 
an image of them as ‘practitioners of goodwill’, directly involved with civil-societies in 
the target states; 
Constituent governments also are well suited to promote goodwill abroad 
through small-scale projects, people-to-people diplomacy, cultural activities, 
and sports competition, especially non-professional sports activities. This 
role also allows for substantial participation by civil-society institutions 
(Kincaid, 2010).  




...they can act as channels through which other actors, particularly non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) can articulate their own concerns – 
thereby using the locality or region as a base for global strategies (Hocking, 
1999: 22). 
From the very limited discussion of sub-states democracy promotion, they may be 
understood as potentially ideal actors to promote democracy. However the limitations 
of this debate must be acknowledged. Firstly, there are no understandings of sub-state 
democracy promotion, only assertions regarding the type of role they may play within 
the field. Both authors also hold a particular view of sub-states. Kincaid’s studies are 
concerned with federated entities, particularly US states that have shown very little 
desire or ability to act in contrast to federal activities. More challenging to his notion of 
proxies would be a federated entity that challenges or diverges from federal policy. Also, 
Kincaid’s image of democracy promotion is one of a functional activity undertaken for 
economic reasons – not a political activity. The motivation for promoting democracy is, 
for Kincaid, an economic one; 
If state and local governments wish to open more markets for their 
constituents’ products, and if the Sunbelt states are to resolve their concerns 
about illegal immigration and drug smuggling from Latin America, they will 
have to be attentive to the economic and democratic development needs of 
many countries around the world (Kincaid, 1999: 131). 
Hocking meanwhile is primarily concerned with drawing attention to the different way 
in which sub-states, specifically NCGs act internationally. His aim is to support his 
central argument that international relations has fundamentally changed in character, 
and a re-evaluation of diplomacy is required if the role of sub-states is to be understood 
(Hocking, 1993). Hocking is not overly concerned with the motivations and suitability of 
sub-states to promoting democracy (itself a concept and a practice which has developed 
since Hocking’s relevant contribution in 1993), only to show that they may be different 
international actors.  These limitations notwithstanding, there is some speculation and 
suggestion regarding their suitability to promoting democracy internationally, 
particularly within the context of the “backlash”.  
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2.3 Paradiplomacy  
The next three sections outline three broad categories of paradiplomacy and the related 
strategies for engaging internationally that have been identified by scholars. The 
categories are loosely based on Lecours’ (2008) categorization, itself reflecting the 
broader scholarship. The final, “political paradiplomacy” category differs from Lecours’ 
however, in order to allow for a specific focus upon activities most likely to promote 
democracy.  
Examined firstly is economic paradiplomacy, the most common and functional, 
overwhelmingly concerned with the promotion of trade and attracting inward 
investment. This sometimes develops into the second, a more multidimensional type of 
paradiplomacy in a range of fields involving educational, cultural, or scientific 
cooperation for example. This has been loosely termed “co-operational paradiplomacy”. 
Political paradiplomacy meanwhile is deliberately separated in this project. It is defined 
as an engagement in a specific activity that seeks to affect socio-political change 
elsewhere.  
Exploring these accounts will reveal what sub-states do, as well as why they engage in 
such activities. The sections will assist in contextualizing and informing the empirical 
contribution of this project by gaining insight into the kinds of factors and variables that 
may explain sub-state international activities with a view to informing the exploration 
of specific, democracy promotion activities. Firstly however, the broad context of 
globalization is summarised before a more detailed investigation of the three main 
types of paradiplomacy. 
2.3.1 Globalization 
Increasing global interdependence between actors and policy communities is often 
cited as an explanation for sub-states to engage internationally. Rosenau’s (1990) 
framework of a multi-centric global system and/or Keohane and Nye’s (1974; 1977; 
2001) theories of increasing interdependence are common theoretical reference points, 
forming a general theoretical background as to why sub-states “go abroad” in the post-
Cold War world. The growing interdependence of the foreign and domestic policy 
environments are thought to place pressures and motivate sub-states to engage 
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internationally in order to service their interests. Global standards in education for 
example, become domestic policy priorities for local education departments.  
More particularly, it can be seen as a manifestation of a world politics in 
which accepted hierarchies of political activity which have been regarded as 
separating the international level from the national and subnational, have 
been replaced by an intermeshing of all levels in an increasingly 
unpredictable fashion (Hocking, 1993: 29). 
Similarly, Keating argues that the restructuring of territorial politics, the globalization of 
economic, cultural, and political affairs, and the decline of the state’s capacity for 
territorial management are key factors explaining how, when, and why sub-states have 
taken it upon themselves to “go abroad” (Keating, 1999: 1-3). Others also point to the 
decline of a bipolar world, dominated by the ‘high’ politics of security since the end of 
the Cold War as contributory factors. Traditional international agendas of significance 
such as military security have declined while other areas such as the economy, 
educational cooperation, and sustainable development – areas where sub-states wield 
legislative and administrative competence and responsibility – have become pressing 
international issues. Sub-states are pressured and motivated to act in pursuit of their 
own interests internationally in areas where they hold competence. For paradiplomacy 
scholars like Hocking, this makes them purposive actors, pursuing their regional policy 
goals in an international setting. However, doing so simultaneously opens their 
governance structures to influence from the global pressures (Hocking, 1999: 22).  
2.3.2 Sub-states as international actors; strategies for engaging internationally 
The strategies sub-states employ to engage internationally can be varied, and they have 
displayed an ability to engage in both a state-like, and non-state-like manner. In this 
sense, sub-states are particularly well placed to engage internationally in pursuit of 
their interests and objectives within the various fields of competence.  
…the real competitive advantage that NCGs located in federal or quasi-
federal states enjoy in the arenas of world politics is rooted in “status 
ambiguity” reflecting their qualities as both “sovereignty-bound” and 
“sovereignty-free” actors (Hocking, 1999: 28). 
On the one hand they enjoy as actors, structured channels of access to the national 
policy-making machinery – privileged access which other non-governmental bodies are 
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denied – where they may promote particular interests in the formulation of national 
policy. Concurrently, if state structures such as intergovernmental relations do not 
suffice they may ‘employ modes of behaviour unavailable to national governments’ 
(Hocking, 1999: 28).  
The latter, primary strategies (Hocking, 1999: 30), are of particular interest to this 
project as they concern instances when the sub-state mobilizes its own resources. This 
may involve state-like activities such as the signing of treaties and establishment of 
bilateral or multilateral relationships. But it can also involve non-state-like activities. 
Ontario for example appeared in US courts over “acid rain” disputes promoting their 
own interests – something the Canadian national government could not do (Hocking, 
1993: 57). Meanwhile, the non-sovereignty status of another Canadian province allowed 
it to adopt the methods of a non-governmental actor to promote its interests; 
More focused political campaigns seek to influence public or elite opinion in 
key foreign countries. In the summer of 1997 British Columbia aired radio 
commercials in Washington State, giving its side of the fisheries dispute 
(Keating, 1999: 6). 
Sub states have the capacity to act, and to act differently to other actors – appearing 
state-like and non-state-like. The next sections explore specific types of paradiplomacy, 
and related strategies and activities, emphasizing that political paradiplomacy is the 
most likely to involve the promotion of democracy. 
2.4 Economic paradiplomacy 
California is so big, and its problems so immense, that it needs its own 
foreign policy. In an era when economics commands foreign relations, this 
does not mean embassies and armies, but it does mean more trade offices 
and state agents in foreign countries, its own relations with foreign nations 
and a governor and legislature willing to represent the state’s interest 
independently of Washington. California is a distinct region within the 
United States and needs greater freedom to act on its own – not to thrive, but 
as this devastating recession has shown, just to survive (Goldsborough, 
1993: 89). 
James Goldsborough’s claim over two decades ago illustrates the perceived notion that 
the US federal government cannot adequately address and promote the economic policy 
priorities even of a state with a GDP approaching $2 Trillion. Indeed there is broad 
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agreement within the literature that much of the paradiplomacy of sub-states involves 
the pursuit of economic objectives, and that economic activities are the starting point 
and the backbone of the phenomenon (Keating, 1999; Lecours, 2008; Lachapelle and 
Paquin, 2005; Kincaid, 1999; 2010; Hocking, 1993; 1999; Michelmann, 2007; 2009).  
Free-trade agreements and zones have led to the de-nationalization of economies, 
giving the region a legitimate and central role in the global economy (Lecours, 2002: 
99). Michelmann builds the case that economic factors motivate sub-states to engage 
internationally;  
…their governments are often not certain that their interests are given as 
much attention by their federal governments as they think they deserve, an 
attitude particularly prevalent in the United States (Michelmann, 2009: 348).  
Furthermore, there is perceived to be domestic pressure upon the executives to engage 
internationally to promote the interests of local companies. ‘Small and medium-sized 
businesses are keenly interested in sub-state policies that support the acquisition of 
new market shares and the advancement of exports’ (Lachapelle and Paquin, 2005: 79). 
The link between economic performance and winning elections has also long been 
claimed as a potential motivation for individual politicians to develop economic 
paradiplomacy; 
Through successes in the areas of reverse direct investment, trade, and 
tourism, subnational units can create new jobs, diversify their economic 
bases, and expand tax revenues, all of which should boost the electoral 
fortunes of government leaders (Fry, 1988: 57). 
Sub-states and their governing agents can therefore be seen to be pulled by the global 
economy as well as pushed by regional forces into economic paradiplomacy. This 
economic paradiplomacy is most prevalent amongst Western sub-states most 
integrated into the global economy; ‘...the extensiveness and intensity of these activities 
are directly related in most instances to the constituent units' level of economic 
development’ (Michelmann: 2009: 347). 
To meet these twin pressures, Keating argues that some sub-states have created a;  
...distinct model of development based on close linkages between 
government and private business... this neo-corporatist strategy is 
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underpinned by a shared culture and identity and a political project aimed at 
securing effective functional autonomy for the region, by securing effective 
control of both the political and economic leavers (Keating, 1999: 4). 
This strategy of ‘insertion’ is at least in part driven by an economic desire to maximise 
the benefits of independent activity within the international world. However, as Keating 
suggests, political motivations and benefits can, and are attached in certain cases, and 
economic paradiplomacy can develop into broader activities. 
While the aim is a depoliticized and functional engagement with the global economy to 
benefit the territory, engaging internationally can also lead to further entanglement as a 
consequence. Involvement with the European market for example, necessitates an 
adherence to a continental system for the implementation of standards and rights for 
products and workforces, and scientific or educational cooperation is then a logical step 
to take.  
2.4.1 How? 
In engaging internationally, the sub-states develop their resources and capacity to 
pursue their interests. Embassies and trade offices are set-up around the world, 
specialist staff are appointed, and an increasing number of transnational networks and 
organizations are joined, followed, and engaged with. Concurrently, sub-state 
government departments are sometimes established, and officials allocated to co-
ordinate the activities and implement increasingly numerous and detailed strategies as 
bureaucracies are, in Criekemans’ opinion, ‘verticalized’ (2010b: 44). 
There is little if any objection by central governments to the economic paradiplomacy 
that sub-states engage in, and their authority and autonomy to act comes from this 
acceptance by the central states. Economic paradiplomacy even predates the 
decentralization of executive functions in some cases such as Wales (see Royles, 2010), 
suggesting that the decentralization of economic governance is more legitimate, or at 
least more acceptable to central government than political and executive devolution. 
Pursuing economic interests, promoting trade and investment in particular, are the 
driving forces behind sub-state international activities in the last 30 years; to mobilise 
the governance and executive structures of the sub-state. To do so however, can push its 
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involvement beyond the functional and the de-politicized. The spill-over from economic 
involvement is unavoidable, even sought after by sub-states seeking to craft a political 
message onto its sub-state’s involvement.  
2.5 Co-operational Paradiplomacy 
The second layer of paradiplomacy refers to activities that go beyond the economic 
sphere, involving activities in a range of fields (Lecours, 2008: 3), loosely termed “co-
operational paradiplomacy” here to emphasize the cross-border partnerships and 
mutual gain involved. Motivations can be functional, to engage with and learn from 
policy fora, or cultural, to collaborate on linguistic or educational projects for mutual 
gain (Keating, 1999: 3-60). Mainly involving cultural, educational, technical, or 
technological cooperation, this form ‘...is more extensive and more multidimensional 
insofar as it is not simply focused in economic gain’ (Lecours, 2008: 3). Expanding the 
involvement beyond the purely economic field allows the sub-state to pursue its 
interests within particular policy fields and to influence the economic or other agendas 
that impact upon their domestic governance responsibilities. It may be the case that the 
sub-state wishes to engage in a cultural or educational exchange or co-operation with a 
partner, remain informed about developments at various international policy fora, or to 
engage in bilateral action as part of a network or group of actors.  
Co-operational paradiplomacy involves a particularly broad range of activities that are 
mutually beneficial to the sub-state and other partner(s) in the relationship. 
Educational, scientific, and cultural partnerships or exchanges are further areas of 
common activities (Keating, 1999: 3-6). Such activity can be designed for mutual benefit 
and to add value, or is developed out of necessity; what Kuznetsov (2015: 110) has 
referred to as cross-border housekeeping. US states for example, are increasingly drawn 
to international co-operation with Mexican provinces on border issues (Kincaid, 1999: 
130). Alignment to networks, organizations, and their norms and activities it is argued, 
can offer a means of developing the international personality of sub-states as well as 
enabling access to globalized policy communities. It is an important feature, relevant to 
this project, in that democracy promotion and international development, as discussed 




Constitutional settlements sometimes empower sub-states with the capacity for 
bilateral cooperation by bestowing upon them the competence for drawing up exclusive 
bilateral treaties. The treaties solidify the relationship and commit the signatories to 
action. Mixed treaties are also witnessed between the sub-state, the federal or central 
government and a third party (see Lecours, 2008: 3).  
However, the constitutional set-up is not always ‘able to capture the reality and 
relevance of the foreign relations of subnational governments. Many activities abroad 
are taking place despite or below/ besides the constitutional rules’ (Blatter, Kreutzer, 
Rentl, and Thiele, 2008: 466). Alternative methods of bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation are also open to sub-states. Cooperation agreements; transnational non-
legally binding contracts; Memorandums of Understanding; and cultural agreements or 
partnerships have been used. Wales for example has signed a host of cooperation, 
economic and cultural agreements and with foreign states and sub-states despite having 
very little formal competence in international affairs (Royles, 2010: 152).  
Other common tools include the securing of permanent representation and a regular co-
operational relationship with partners internationally rather than “one-off” activities. 
Sometimes such representations are alongside, and in cooperation with broader 
national institutions, as is the case with the Welsh Government’s with the British 
Council (Royles, 2010: 148). At times the representation is multilateral with sub-states 
of the same nation cooperating and using the same embassies as with Flanders (Berghe, 
Van Alstein and Neeb, 2004).  
2.5.2 Networks, organizations, and building an international profile 
Sub-states also engage with international organizations, transnational networks, and 
global agendas. They do so either in order to multiply their impact on the global stage or 
simply in order to benefit from the learning opportunities. Some have suggested that 
the motives behind such engagement ranging from economic incentives and political 
convictions, to an almost psychological desire to be ‘part of the group’ (Cornago, 2010a: 
7). Sub-state governments have showed a desire to be aligned ideationally to 
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transnational networks, international organizations, and their projects and activities, 
particularly when involving themselves in more altruistic activities; 
…what has been called by specialists peer pressure or less technically 
“metooism”, that is, the inclination to emulate what other federated entities 
do in the same field…But in addition, a genuine concern for social justice and 
international solidarity can also be, at least in some cases, a motivation for 
development cooperation initiatives (Cornago, 2010a: 6).  
Lecours goes further, and recognizes the multiplier effect of alignment to transnational 
networks and the manner in which involvement and membership helps construct the 
international personality of the sub-state; 
The potential of la Francophonie to further build the international profile of 
these governments is considerable since it is re-defining its role to include a 
political-diplomatic and commercial dimension in addition to its traditional 
cultural objectives. In other words, the benefits for Belgian sub-national 
units of belonging to la Francophonie with respect to their international 
personalities will increase as members (including these regional 
governments themselves) broaden the scope of the organization and make it 
more prominent in world politics (Lecours, 2002: 100). 
Criekemans also notes that sub-states seek to gain a degree of international recognition 
through co-operational activities; 
...acting multilaterally can also be seen as an opportunity to further develop 
the international recognition of Flanders... It is the hope of the Flemish 
Government that this would –in the long run– contribute to Flanders 
obtaining a certain degree of recognition and authority within the 
‘multilateral community’ (Criekemans, 2006: 16). 
Membership however is not a priority, or even a precondition for sub-states that seek 
alignment with global networks and organizations. Sub-states may simply declare 
adherence to, and adjust policy in line with the goals, norms, and practices (see 
Cornago, 2010a : 8-9).  By the late 1990s, there were over 115 independent regional 
“embassies” in Brussels lobbying the European Commission and networking with each 
other and the emerging European policy communities (Keating, 1999: 6). At this point 
however, we may note the overlap with political motivations regarding the building of 
an international profile, and attempts to construct particular notions of the sub-state’s 
international profile. More generally however, co-operational paradiplomacy more is a 
broad area of activities, pursued through various means for the benefit of the sub-state. 
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2.6 Political Paradiplomacy 
The final type is political paradiplomacy, which is deliberately distinguished from 
economic or co-operational activities and differs from Lecours’ (2008) notion. Lecours 
refers to the political dimensions of paradiplomatic activities, and where international 
relations are developed in order to ‘...affirm the cultural distinctiveness, political 
autonomy and the national character of the community they represent’ (Lecours, 2008: 
3). Such notions are discussed in the next section and incorporated into the analytical 
framework, but omitted from this project’s notion or “political paradiplomacy” which is 
instead defined as deliberate interventions by sub-states to affect socio-political change 
within a partner or target. This type of political paradiplomacy is most likely to be 
associated with democracy promotion.  
Engagement with global political agendas such as international development or 
democracy promotion explicitly for example, can be considered “political” 
paradiplomatic activities. As Cornago notes for example; 
[Sub-states] are particularly prominent in some clearly functional fields, 
such as economic cooperation, environmental issues, science and technology, 
transportation and basic infrastructure, but they are also becoming more 
and more relevant in areas of normative concern such as ethnic conflict, 
public health and education, cultural diversity, human security, 
humanitarian relief or development aid (Cornago, 2010a: 28). 
In a report for the European Union-Latin American Observatory on Local Decentralised 
Co-operation for example, five broad areas were identified within which paradiplomacy 
occurs between European and Latin American sub-states. Humanitarian aid and 
assistance; support for the different local public policies and strengthening of 
institutions; economic development and promotion of activities within a territory; 
political pressure to modify general conditions in the exercise of local power; and 
cultural change and relationships with citizens (Malé, 2008: 22). The OECD/DAC (2009) 
has also recognized the growing involvement of sub-state in international development, 
with the Basque Country, Catalonia, Belgian regions, and German Lander all developing 
extensive and strategic approaches to international development (see also Cornago, 
2010a: 33). Sub-states clearly engage in such political activities.  
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Indeed, several authors have discussed similar political activities, what this particular 
project would recognize as democracy promotion activities, though not in the same 
theoretical or conceptual context as the IR discussion (see Berghe, Alstein and Neeb, 
2004; Cornago, 2010a; Jeffrey, 2010; Kincaid, 1999; Owen, 2010; Royles, 2010). 
Ultimately these activities can be distinguished from co-operational activities as they 
seek to affect socio political change in other countries. They are also more likely to 
challenge or clash with the central state’s foreign policy.  
2.6.1 How? 
The basis for engaging in such activities can derive from a constitutional competence or 
less formal arrangements, as with paradiplomacy more generally. While Flanders’ 
competence and budget for international development has been constitutionally 
allocated for example, Wales’ international development is based on legal loopholes and 
facilitating IGR (Wyn Jones and Royles, 2012). 
Political paradiplomacy is defined through the activity, where sub-states engage in 
political activities that seek to affect change elsewhere. It is within this field that we 
encounter the real possibility for sub-state democracy promotion; through international 
development partnerships, or broader governance and democracy assistance activities. 
To what extent such activities are acceptable to central governments however, remains 
to be explored. 
2.7 Further aspects of Paradiplomacy 
There are three further aspects worthy of examination with regard to such sub-state 
activities that may offer insight and context to this project’s empirical explorations. 
Taking account of these aspects may assist in developing an answer to the second 
research question, and further enrich the attempt to better understand sub-state 
democracy promotion. Firstly, the impact of nationalist parties and territorial politics is 
purported by scholars to be an influential factor that “pushes” the sub-state to engage in 
more, and more varied paradiplomacy. Secondly, sub-states appear to be able to bypass 
the sometimes obstructive political contexts that face other international actors. 
Thirdly, engagement in political activities occasionally involves co-operation or 
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association with transnational networks or international organizations such as the UN. 
Finally, in co-operating and associating with the networks, organizations, and 
associated global discourses, the issue of the transnational communication of ideas, 
norms, and practices emerges as an important theme to consider.  
2.7.1 Nationalism and territorial politics  
Ivo Duchacek (1986: 248), one of the first to write on paradiplomacy was quick to note 
the often separatist message grafted onto paradiplomacy activities by sub-state 
governments. Several authors have since commented on the political motivations that 
drive attempts at expanding paradiplomatic capacity and activity (Keating, 1999: 3-6). 
Some argue that for nationalist parties, paradiplomacy is of particular benefit. Lecours 
and Moreno’s theory for example is that nationalism – in the context of globalization, a 
qualitatively different phenomenon to the previous territorially constrained concept – is 
‘the single most important variable conditioning paradiplomacy’ (Lecours and Moreno, 
2003: 273). They argue that nationalist parties in government can intervene at every 
level of sub-state interaction to influence and condition the paradiplomatic activities of 
sub-states.  
Noting that ‘nationalism logically leads regional governments to seek international 
agency’ (Lecours and Moreno, 2003: 268), these scholars claim that international 
activities contribute to the pursuit of core nationalist objectives, namely the 
construction and consolidation of a distinctive identity as an international actor; 
defining and articulating a national interest; and potentially achieving a degree of 
political-territorial mobilization. Lecours (2008: 3) has elaborated on these initial 
propositions, suggesting in a later text that the character of politically driven 
paradiplomacy (his “political paradiplomacy” category) differs from other forms; 
Here, sub-state governments seek to develop a set of international relations 
that will affirm the cultural distinctiveness, political autonomy and the 
national character of the community they represent. 
Other commentators have since supported the importance attributed to nationalism 
and noted the role paradiplomacy can play in furthering nationalist objectives. 
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Jordi Pujol does well at this game. The international strategies of the 
President of Catalonia are rooted in a public relations policy in which the 
President alone embodies the entire Catalan nation. With such international 
prestige, Jordi Pujol is in a strong bargaining position when the time comes 
to negotiate with the central authority (Lachapelle and Paquin, 2005: 84). 
Paquin (2004) also argues that paradiplomacy, when engaged in by sub-state 
nationalist governments, can become a means of contesting the central state’s 
monopoly on foreign policy. This form of ‘identitary paradiplomacy’ is noted in 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, Quebec, where sub-state nationalist governments have 
enthusiastically developed the paradiplomacy activity and capacity of their sub-states. 
Keating meanwhile (2001: 38-40), argues that the new global order and the blurring of 
sovereignty, gives a space for sub-state or minority nationalist movements to play out, 
for nation-building programmes to be pursued without confrontation or conflict with 
the central state. 
The idea is that the state system is now so penetrable, and the opportunities 
within continental regimes and the global trading order so great, that nation-
building can proceed without the necessity to declare formal independence 
(Keating, 2001: 38-39).  
Keating (1997: 702) has also claimed that paradiplomacy ‘...legitimizes nation-building 
and helps consolidate it at home by placing the minority nation in the wider family of 
nation-states’. This latter claim hints at the notion that paradiplomacy is a means of 
defining through activity, to a domestic audience, what the nation is and does, its 
character and actorness. 
Nationalist governments also seek to develop paradiplomacy further where possible, 
because of the spin-off benefits. Lachapelle and Paquin note that nationalism is a 
common factor with many of the most prominent paradiplomatic actors; 
…no doubt one of the most significant variables, yet it remains one of the 
most neglected in relation to the study of paradiplomacy…The most active 
sub-state powers in the field of international relations (Flanders, Walloonie, 
Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Homeland) all share a single attribute: 
nationalism (2005, 82). 
Indeed, it is where nationalist parties are strong that paradiplomacy tends to be most 
advanced and developed, and where it may arguably be expected to find more political 
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activities such as promoting democracy or supporting international development. 
Alexander Kuznetsov’s recent contribution to the field also echoes the views of his 
predecessors regarding the centrality of nationalism to political paradiplomacy. For 
him, key practitioners of political paradiplomacy; 
...includes secessionist regions with the intention to gain their own statehood 
or at least a high autonomous status. For instance, mostly all subnational 
entities with the status of non-recognized states (Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Abkhazia, etc.) have a strong political message in their external activities 
(Kuznetsov, 2015: 110). 
The presence of nationalist parties in government is considered a key factor of political 
paradiplomacy, and the literature clearly points to a greater likelihood of international 
projection in cases where there is a distinct national identity or ethno-nationalist 
characteristics. It could be understood as a key variable that is theorised to hold a 
recognisable relationship with the nature of a sub-state’s paradiplomacy. The presence 
of nationalist parties must therefore be a key consideration when attempting to 
understand sub-state involvement in political agendas such as democracy promotion. 
2.7.2 Bypassing difficult political contexts 
Sub-states, when engaging in paradiplomacy, have shown themselves capable of 
innovative progress in areas where more established actors have found the inter-state 
political context restrictive. A broader review of the literature reveals that sub-states 
have found themselves capable of overcoming difficulties faced by other actors. 
The federal governments of Canada and the US for example, pressured by domestic 
interests, stalled progress on a worldwide binding agreement for limiting greenhouse 
gasses at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. However the sub-state network, New 
England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers, implemented ‘one of the most 
ambitious climate change action plans and is still at the forefront of global warming 
issues’ (Chaloux and Paquin, 2012: 218). The participating constituent governments, 
with a history of working together on issues such as acid rain and mercury pollution, 
were able to develop collective mechanisms to combat global warming (see Chaloux and 
Paquin, 2012: 229). The approach went further than the inter-state treaties of 
Copenhagen or Kyoto could hope to, and suggests that the freedom from broader 
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domestic and international political contexts can at times allow sub-states to 
collectively develop innovative responses to difficult challenges. The authors go further; 
Furthermore, reduction targets and measures adopted by the premiers and 
governors influenced the other states and provinces, and subsequently, 
many of them developed action plans with similar goals, sometimes even 
going further than the original plan and thus creating a race to the top 
(Chaloux and Paquin, 2012: 232). 
Sub-states may in fact develop practices and approaches to global issues when it may be 
difficult or impossible for more politically entangled states to do so. Alongside earlier 
assertions regarding the suitability of sub-states as democracy promoters, this is of 
particular interest with regard to the difficulties facing established democracy 
promoters and the “backlash” examined in Chapter 1. 
2.7.3 ‘Transnational Communication’ 
The issue of international influence or the process of transnational communication 
refers to the exchange and adoption of knowledge, norms, and practices from 
international partners. A previous section identified international organizations and 
networks’ important role in influencing sub-state motivations and activities. The 
concept of transnational communication may consequently be of particular interest to 
this project in two respects.  
Firstly, the rise to prominence of international agendas such as sustainable 
development or international development, is claimed as a trigger for some sub-states 
such as Flanders to develop their own responses (Bachus and Spillemaeckers, 2012: 
53). ‘While the impact in the Flemish case was mostly from global developments, other 
cases are influenced more by the EU’, such as the Basque Country or the German 
Bundesländer (Happaerts, Bruyninckx and Vand den Brande, 2012: 245). Global 
political contexts and discourses are argued to compel sub-states to act within a 
particular field. This is not to discount or contrast the belief that nationalist parties are 
key factors pushing the sub-state into paradiplomatic activity, but that there is an 
additional, “pull” factor from outside the sub-state. 
The second point of interest in relation to transnational communication concerns the 
adoption of goals, norms, and even the formation of policy and practices in line with 
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those of the international organization or global “industry” in question. Holzinger, Knill 
and Sommerer (2008) who, in exploring state-level environmental policy convergence, 
point to the notion of ‘transnational communication’ as a factor which encourages 
convergence and homogenisation of policy and conceptual understandings; ‘...frequently 
interacting organizations (such as national bureaucracies) tend to develop similar 
structures and concepts over time’ which is achieved through ‘…mechanisms including 
emulation, lesson-drawing, and transnational epistemic communities’ (Holzinger, Knill 
and Sommerer, 2008: 558 – 559).  
Their paper, they argue, has shown;  
…that increasing international interlinkage has driven environmental 
policies of industrialized countries toward greater similarity, 
comprehensiveness, and strictness (Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer, 2008: 
584).  
Audet and Gendron (2012) take the concept to sub-state governments and conclude 
that in understanding sustainable development;  
Social and political construction of sustainable development by subnational 
governments is thus often embedded in global discourses and practices 
about sustainability (Audet and Gendron, 2012: 39).  
Some are more specific in relation to policy;  
At the level of the policy framing and the basic definition of sustainable 
development (and in some cases the sustainable development principles), all 
subnational governments were influenced by the Brundtland Report and the 
outcome documents of Rio (Happaerts, Bruyninckx and Vand den Brande, 
2012: 245). 
Others have also noted the impact of supranational dynamics not only on the 
understandings of sustainable development but also on the actions taken; 
Basque Policies are recipients of the international diffusion of concepts, 
general arguments and mechanisms for action, which in the final analysis 
have altered the construction and definition of the problem of sustainable 
development (de la Pena Varona and Hinojal, 2012: 80). 
The notion of ‘transnational communication’ enriches the analysis of sub-state 
engagement with globalized agendas. These are important considerations when 
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exploring the democracy promotion and international development of sub-states and 
attempting to explain how and why they engage in such activities.  
In summation, exploring sub-state involvement in globalized agendas such as 
democracy promotion or international development, awareness must be kept of the key 
influencing role played by nationalist parties. Sub-states’ potential to develop 
innovative responses to transnational challenges which may have alluded states and 
other international actors also hold potentially relevant considerations with regard to 
the “backlash” explored in chapter 1. Consequently, an exploration of sub-states as 
democracy promoters may produce insight into innovative techniques which may be of 
value to the democracy promotion policy community. Furthermore, there is a clear 
indication that transnational networks, international organizations, and globalized 
policy discourses are a major influence upon sub-state motivations and methods in the 
same fields, and merit further investigation and particular attention in this project.  
The final section of this chapter will turn to paradiplomacy theory and the attempts to 
construct a framework for understanding how and why sub-states engage in 
international activities.  
2.8 Paradiplomacy theory  
The various types of paradiplomacy have been explored, and valuable insights drawn 
from the literature as to the strategies and motivations of paradiplomacy that help 
ensure that this project’s understanding of sub-state democracy promotion relates to 
the existing scholarship. Nonetheless, the first, but in particular the second research 
question, of how to better understand sub-state democracy promotion, remain 
outstanding. The project still requires an analytical framework, and a means by which 
sub-state democracy promotion can be understood, while still remaining relevant to the 
two literatures covered in this, and the previous chapter. The following section again 
turns to the sub-state literature, this time to explore their attempts at theorising and 
explaining paradiplomacy.  
82 
 
2.8.1 Early paradiplomacy scholarship 
The term paradiplomacy can be traced to Soldatos (19901) and Duchacek (1984; 1986; 
1990), who first looked at the diplomatic activity of subnational units. The term was an 
abbreviation of ‘parallel diplomacy’ and though accepted by many, was also rejected due 
to the implication that the activities did not run contrary to states’. Duchacek (1990) for 
example noted the variation in form and intensity of the activities which also ran 
contrary to the state’s policies at times. Like Soldatos, Duchacek attempted to develop 
an analytical concept to meet the growing involvement of sub-states in international 
affairs. He moved away from Soldatos’ early, ‘parallel’, depiction suggesting that 
paradiplomacy may at times conflict with the central state and involve activities that 
‘graft a more or less separatist message onto its economic, social and cultural links with 
foreign nations’ (Duchacek, 1986: 248).  
Building on his broader notion of paradiplomacy, he identified four categories of foreign 
action engaged in by non-central governments; cross-boundary (often co-operational 
and highly functional in nature); trans regional (contacts between NCGs2 which do not 
border each other); ‘global paradiplomacy’ (direct and deliberate relationships between 
the NCGs of separate states or between one NCG and private actors outside its territorial 
boundaries); and finally ‘protodiplomacy’ (activity engaged in preparation for 
separation or independence from the central state) (Duchacek 1986: 240). This 
typology is refined further in a later text, noting the variation and overwhelmingly 
economic or technical nature of NCGs paradiplomacy (Duchacek, 1990).  
Duchacek limits himself however to sub-states and dealings with other states and NCGs. 
Furthermore, there have, since these publications, been several notable developments 
with relation to this project. Perhaps for example, there is one possible addition to his 
typology; that of NCG involvement within transnational networks and organizations 
such as the Francophonie, the WTO, the EU or the OECD. Despite raising awareness of 
NCG international relations and its nature, Duchacek is sadly limited and dated in any 
attempt at explaining the form that the paradiplomacy of sub-states takes.  
                                                        
1 Though published in 1990, the chapter of the same name is based upon a paper  presented at the annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC in 1986 which influenced 
Duchacek’s work (see Aguirre, 1999: 186). 
2 Duchacek uses the term non-central governments (NCGs) rather than sub-states. 
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Soldatos’ (1990) later contribution which agrees with Duchacek’s potentially 
contradictory nature of paradiplomacy offers a list of determinant conditions. Both 
domestic and external factors are cited as key variables, important insights which would 
be echoed by later scholars. However the attempt falls short of “explaining” the activities 
as such. It doesn’t provide a generalizable theory, and leaves several factors rather 
unexplored. The contribution and ‘personality of leaders’, ‘historical and cultural 
ingredients’, ‘socio-political climate’ ‘important geographic position and resources’ 
(Soldatos, 1990: 51), are all mentioned as further possible factors affecting the form 
paradiplomacy takes without being incorporated into the theoretical framework for 
explaining paradiplomacy. There is little detail regarding how important they are as 
factors, and how they impact upon what the sub-state does, and how their structuring 
relationship with the sub-state’s agency can be analysed. The chapter also suffers from 
the experience of the following decades which saw the instances and types of 
paradiplomacy being witnessed expand. Nonetheless, the research suggests that several 
factors, both internal and external, structure the ability of sub-states to engage in 
paradiplomacy. 
Others have attempted to expand the types of actors and activities involved with 
paradiplomacy during this early phase. James Der Derian (1987), possibly the closest to 
an international relations paradigm to approach the topic in its infancy, sees 
paradiplomacy as non-governmental in nature. It involves celebrities like Bob Geldof or 
leaders of civil society groups such as Jessie Jackson and the Pope using ‘media-
diplomacy’ to communicate ideas and values when ‘techno-diplomacy’ has failed states 
(Der Derian, 1987: 202-203). Der Derian’s aim however is to deconstruct diplomacy 
while simultaneously developing or reconstructing more useful paradigms of diplomacy 
(1987: 5). The discussion of the term opened the possibilities and acknowledged the 
potential extent of sub-state (and non-state) diplomacy beyond state-like behaviour, 
however any contribution to explaining paradiplomacy as a set of actions proved 
ultimately unfruitful. In Aguirre’s view (1999: 202); 
Though offering new and interesting insights about marginal and, 
sometimes, abnormal forms of late twentieth century “diplomacy”, this 
postmodernist discourse was unable to focus on the main target of the 
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enquiry: the contemporary nature and meaning of the NCG international 
involvement, as such. 
Beyond these attempts, what we receive from the early paradiplomacy literature is 
rather descriptive. This is by no means useless; indeed we have, due to Duchacek and 
his contemporaries, a firmer notion of what paradiplomacy looks like, what strategies 
and motivations are involved. The study of paradiplomacy continued however, with a 
growing focus on empirical studies, accounting for the changes, but also converging on 
key variables. 
2.8.2 Convergence upon key variables in recent literature 
Blatter et al. (2008) claim that the more recent case-study heavy literature on 
paradiplomacy lacks either any, or at least a consistent theoretical framework. Lecours 
also suggests that; 
…this literature suffers from two major weaknesses: the first, and most 
important, is the absence of a general theoretical perspective that can 
explain how regional governments have acquired international agency, and 
what shapes their foreign policy, international relations, and negotiating 
behaviour; the second is a lack of focus on constructing general analytical 
frameworks that can guide the study of paradiplomacy (Lecours, 2002: 92). 
While the review of the paradiplomacy literature to this point has assisted in the 
contextualization of any empirical findings the project may make, it has still not 
provided an analytical framework, and a means by which the second research question 
may be answered, and sub-state democracy promotion understood.  
One reason for an absence of focus on building theory might be that much of the already 
limited literature on sub-state international activities has been presented and framed as 
supporting arguments of broader theories. Hocking (1993) and Der Derian (1987) for 
example, use paradiplomacy to challenge conventional understandings of diplomacy. 
Kuznetsov meanwhile notes that there may be as many as eleven dimensions to the 
paradiplomacy scholarship, each focussing on different but specific variables or factors 
(Kuznetsov, 2015: Chapter 4). With so many alternative approaches to studying 
paradiplomacy, a consistent analytical framework might be an unrealistic expectation.  
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Hocking argues that we have moved into a ‘postdiplomatic’ age ‘beyond diplomacy’, a 
complexity which raises in Hocking’s opinion, a key problem for any attempt to develop 
a theoretical framework for explaining sub-state international activity;  
Generalizations concerning NCG international activities and interests have 
been shown to be unsustainable. Not only is this because each federal system 
is unique – which clearly it is – but also because, within federal states, NCGs 
demonstrate differing characteristics and resources (Hocking, 1993: 199). 
For Hocking we must move away from the state/non-state paradigm in order to explain 
and incorporate the activities of sub-states. His work is concerned with the “processes 
which are rendering the boundaries demarcating state and non-state actors far more 
permeable” (Hocking, 1993: 199), and wishes to develop an understanding of states and 
sub-states (for him, NCGs) alongside each other. If anything, he suggests a move away 
from treating sub-states and states as distinct unitary international actors, as this would 
emphasize conflict between them and central governments, which is for him is an 
exception to the observed relationship and an obfuscation of the hybrid nature of NCGs 
(Hocking, 1993: 199). For him, sub-states and states are to be understood alongside 
each other.  
However he does concede that certain elements condition NCG international activity in 
the event of NCGs finding their interests at variance with those of the central 
government. These are important insights and they can be understood as the key 
variables regarding how and why sub-states engage in international activities; 
These include the basic constitutional arrangements of a given political 
system and the opportunities that they provide for international activities; 
bureaucratic and political attitudes at the centre, the local resources 
available to sustain an international strategy and, by no means an 
inconsiderable factor, the degree of interest possessed by international 
actors in the affairs of a constituent unit in a federation (Hocking, 1993: 
200). 
In a later text, Hocking suggests that these multi-level factors which seem to condition 
and explain the form sub-state international activity takes are interlinked; “The 
motivations for specific modes of NCG international activity needs to relate domestic to 
international forces and the interactions between the two” (Hocking, 1999: 22). In this 
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respect, even Hocking concedes to a multi-level structuring of opportunities for sub-
states to engage in paradiplomacy.  
Soldatos (1990) and Daniel Latouche (1988) also tentatively point to similarly multi-
level explanatory factors when attempting to offer a more nuanced method of studying 
subnational foreign policy; 
To make sense of the foreign initiatives of subnational actors…we should 
realize that we are operating at the margin of both the domestic and the 
international spheres, a location where what is “inside” and what is “outside” 
becomes difficult to assess.  
To understand Quebec’s foreign policy, we must take into account not only 
the internal articulation of its own state-building process (and the specific 
configuration of forces which gives it life) but also its position within the 
overall Canadian statist space. We must consider Quebec’s federal and 
regional components, the place of Canada within the international system, 
and the evolving nature of this system (Latouche, 1988: 34) 
Hans Michelmann also highlights very similar multi-level factors which for him explain 
the foreign relations of federated entities. For Michelmann the constitutional definition 
and allocation of competences; the intergovernmental relations; the capacity and 
willingness to be involved internationally at the regional level; the political context 
regionally and state-wide; and the opportunities presented by the EU and transnational 
networks are all highlighted as key structural factors conditioning the sub-state’s 
capacity to engage internationally (Michelmann, 2007: 4-7). Keating also (1999: 6-10) 
emphasizes the reliance of sub-states on structured opportunities to engage in 
paradiplomacy.  
There is a convergence by scholars around a range of variables present at several levels 
that must be considered alongside any understanding of the international agency of 
sub-states. The domestic level in particular, the constitutional make-up, nature of the 
intergovernmental relations, are seen to structure the sub-state’s ability to engage in 
paradiplomacy (see Duchacek 1984; 1990; Hocking 1993; Kuznetsov 2015: 52; Soldatos 
1990; Requejo 2010). But, as noted in a previous section, a range of authors also point 
to the impact of nationalist parties (see Kuznetsov, 2015: 110; Lecours and Moreno, 
2003; Lachapelle and Paquin, 2005: 82-85; Paquin, 2004), and others to external factors 
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such as the EU and transnational networks (see Cornago, 2010a; Criekemans, 2006; 
Lecours, 2002). 
For some, the multiplicity of factors at various levels obstructs the capacity to build 
theory, but for others they are the basis of an analytical framework. Hocking for 
example, sees the role of and relationship with the central government – the hybrid 
nature of NCGs as “a part” of and “apart” from the state – and the complex mix of 
variables that may condition sub-state international activities as limits to the potential 
for building a generalizable understanding of sub-states as unitary or independent 
actors.  
Lecours (2002) however, suggests that the range of variables can be understood as 
factors to be incorporated into a broader framework to understand and explain the 
international activity of sub-states. In short, rather than see the complexity of factors 
and relations at multiple levels that condition the international activity of sub-state as a 
barrier, Lecours suggests it may be the very means by which we may explain that 
activity; if they can be mapped and analysed adequately.  
2.9 The Lecourian Framework 
Lecours, like other paradiplomacy scholars, concedes that both internal and external 
factors condition the manner in which sub-states may act internationally, but that they 
also ‘increasingly present opportunities for action’ (2002: 96). Lecours echoes the 
paradiplomacy literature discussed earlier by emphasizing the domestic roots of 
paradiplomacy in particular, given that so much of what sub-states can do is dependent 
upon and structured by the constitution, the capacity, the political context and role of 
nationalist parties, and other domestic factors and institutions. 
...the domestic roots of paradiplomacy involve a peculiar structure-agency 
dynamic featuring national and regional institutional settings creating the 
very possibility of sub-national units becoming international actors and 
providing opportunity structures for regional politicians seeking to project 
their regions onto the international scene (Lecours, 2002: 96). 
In being non-states operating in a state-centric international context however, the rules 
and institutions of the continental and global levels also condition the agency of sub-
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states, alongside the domestic, regional and national institutions (2002: 94-96). Sub-
states find cracks within the global rules and institutions that allow them to act, 
particularly as those structures change. But in doing so, the nature of those “cracks” also 
structures what and how they may engage internationally. 
If regional governments, which have lacked the necessary status to be 
accepted as actors in contemporary world politics, are increasingly acquiring 
an international presence, it is largely as a consequence of structural changes 
(Lecours, 2002: 96). 
Given that opportunities for paradiplomacy are structured, and must therefore be 
understood and understood by examining and acknowledging the impact of structural 
factors at various levels, Lecours argues that a ‘general theoretical approach to 
paradiplomacy cannot centre exclusively on agency’ (2002: 96). These domestic and 
external factors that condition activity he terms opportunity structures (Lecours, 2002: 
96), echoing the earlier work of Keating (1999) and the broader paradiplomacy 
literature noted in the previous section. The opportunity structures themselves are 
institutions – though sometimes loosely defined – located by Lecours at the regional, 
national, continental, and global levels, and they must be given a central role in any 
understanding and analytical framework attempting to examine and explain 
paradiplomacy; 
The understanding of the international agency of regions as deriving from 
opportunity structures, and the subsequent need to address the importance 
of structures in the domestic context of paradiplomacy, calls for an approach 
which explicitly gives theoretical importance to political institutions 
(Lecours, 2002: 97). 
They are, for Lecours, the multiple variables present at several levels that must be 
considered if paradiplomatic activity is to be understood. Importantly however, the 
opportunity structures themselves do not determine or cause political activity. Rather, 
there is still a requirement for political forces to take advantage of those opportunities 
in order to initiate activities. Specifically, the political agency comes in the form of 
‘regional politicians seeking to project their regions onto the international scene’ (2002: 
96), most commonly through the government of the sub-state. The opportunity 
structures are key therefore in understanding how, and even why, sub-states engage 
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internationally. But there is still, in keeping with the majority of paradiplomacy theory, 
a role also for agency from the sub-state.  
Due to the need to adopt an approach that gives theoretical emphasis to opportunity 
structures, as well the agent-structure dynamic, Lecours suggests that new, and 
specifically historical institutionalism emerges as a ‘great source of theoretical insight’ 
(2002: 97). Historical institutionalism focuses on the role of institutions as key 
intervening variables conditioning agency. In this case, the role of opportunity 
structures in conditioning the international agency of sub-states.  
Lecours has constructed an analytical framework for examining and explaining 
paradiplomacy. In mapping the opportunity structures present at various levels with 
which sub-states engage with, Lecours provides identifiable variables and focal points 
to examine. The historical institutionalist perspective meanwhile, provides a means of 
understanding the agent-structure relationship, and the manner in which the 
opportunity structures condition the agency of the sub-state. It is an analytical 
framework, a means by which paradiplomacy can be examined and explained while 
giving due regard to the key factors that are thought to influence sub-state international 
activity. Such a framework is not without its issues and implicit assumptions, and these 
are explored in chapter 3. But it is the most advanced analytical framework for 
understanding paradiplomacy in a manner which supports the broader findings and 
conclusions of the scholarship, and accounts for the complexity sub-states’ international 
actorness.  
2.10 Conclusions  
This chapter explored the paradiplomacy scholarship, a literature which is not 
immediately helpful for our purposes. There is very little engagement with democracy 
promotion, and the little there is, is not framed in the same context as the IR debate on 
the same topic or supported by any detailed empirical explorations. In answering the 
first research question, the problem of understanding sub-state democracy promotion, 
the paradiplomacy literature has not attempted to understand sub-state democracy 
promotion. Nor have the possible implications of understanding the activities of sub-
states been fully explored. This is not a direct criticism, only to state that the work is yet 
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to be done, despite some suggestions as to the suitability of sub-states as democracy 
promoters, and the ongoing struggle of practitioners and IR scholars as they grapple 
with the ‘backlash’.  
Nonetheless, there are important insights that will help contextualise and inform the 
empirical contribution of this project, and aid in the construction of an analytical 
framework to answer the second question, and better understand sub-state democracy 
promotion. For this, and more reasons outlined in chapter 3, the project adopts this 
analytical framework as the basis of a means for understanding sub-state democracy 
promotion.  
Globalization and the post-Cold War security context for example, are important factors 
that have coincided with a marked proliferation in paradiplomatic activities. Much of 
this activity has been “located” on the border of the domestic and the international – 
pursuing the internationalized aspects of their domestic competences. Economic 
paradiplomacy is “front and centre” for most Western sub-states, involving a 
depoliticized, and instrumental engagement abroad to promote trade and investment. A 
second layer of activities make use of further ways in which sub-states can engage, such 
as the ability to sign treaties. Educational, cultural, and scientific exchanges or 
partnerships have proliferated  as sub-states “hook up” to global policy networks and 
other international partners. Importantly, the constitutional and legal authority, as well 
as the sub-state’s capacity to engage internationally plays an integral and structuring 
role, enabling paradiplomacy to be conducted and state-like or non-state-like strategies 
to be pursued. Political paradiplomacy meanwhile, is distinguished as an activity that 
seeks to affect socio-political change in another country; the type of paradiplomacy 
most likely to involve the promotion of democracy.  
The role of nationalist parties in developing the paradiplomacy of sub-states is well 
documented and argued to be a key consideration. The construction and consolidation 
of a distinctive identity through international activity is also motivation for nationalist 
parties in government. Indeed, nationalism and the presence of nationalist parties must 
be a key consideration for this project, viewed as a potentially important variable to 
explore, if it is to relate to the paradiplomacy literature. Further key considerations 
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relate to sub-states’ potential for bypassing difficult political contexts, and their 
adoption and alignment to global norms and practices through a process of 
transnational communication. Consideration of these issues during the empirical 
investigations will ensure the project relates to the leading paradiplomacy scholarship.  
A review of paradiplomacy theory, and attempts to explain activities have concluded 
that there has been a convergence on various domestic, and external factors that 
combine to structure paradiplomacy. Andre Lecours’ multi-level analytical framework, it 
is argued in the next chapter, offers the most advanced means of understanding of sub-
state international activity. The challenge for the third chapter however will be to ensure 
that the framework also allows adequate consideration of the themes and key factors 
associated with democracy promotion, highlighted in chapter 1, and the further issues 
of transnational communication which emerges as potentially significant with regard to 
engagement with globalized practices and discourses such as democracy promotion or 




Chapter 3: The Analytical Framework 
This chapter will detail Lecours’ multi-level analytical framework and the modifications 
made in order to account for specific democracy promotion themes identified in chapter 
one, and the further factors raised in chapter 2.  
It will begin with a discussion and slight modification of Lecours’ multi-level framework 
of opportunity structures. Historical institutionalism will then be presented as the 
theoretical perspective that will be adopted in order to examine Lecours’ framework, 
and a discussion of the conceptual tools to be operationalized will follow. The chapter 
will then outline the justification for a comparative approach, and present the three 
cases selected for this project. Finally, the data sources and research themes will be 
discussed. 
3.1 The multi-level framework of opportunity structures 
Lecours’ framework is rooted in the belief that; paradiplomacy is a ‘phenomenon whose 
explanation involves considering both internal and external variables’ (Lecours, 2002: 
110). His framework consequently seeks to map and take account of those variables 
present at different levels.  
Following from institutionalist thought, and mirroring the repeated claims made by 
paradiplomacy scholars before him, Lecours identifies the institutions that should be 
considered as key variables in any analysis and explanation of paradiplomatic activity. 
These institutions or institutional contexts give rise to opportunities for domestic 
agency – often sub-state politician or governments in this case – to engage in 
international activities. These institutional contexts are termed ‘opportunity structures’. 
They need not always provide opportunities, and may indeed constrain or restrict 
opportunities for paradiplomacy. Contained within the ‘opportunity structures’ 
however are the key variables that are argued to influence paradiplomacy – how it is 
conducted, when and even why. Historical institutionalism provides the theoretical 




Lecours’ framework is a theory only of paradiplomacy, and only so far as it claims the 
opportunity structures to be the key determining factors. There are currently no 
hypotheses or theories of sub-state democracy promotion specifically to test. The 
framework therefore is a map of key variables or ‘opportunity structures’ that require 
consideration when attempting to understand how, when, and why paradiplomatic 
activity develops. It is an inductive means of developing explanations, a precursory step 
to theorising, hypothesizing and further refinement. Only in concluding the thesis and 
analysing findings from empirical cases therefore, can the thesis begin to offer 
hypotheses regarding sub-state democracy promotion specifically. 
3.1.1 Variables and ‘opportunity structures’  
Lecours, drawing on the work of other paradiplomacy scholars, identifies ten 
institutions or institutional contexts that can, but not always, operate so as to give rise 
to opportunities for agents3 to engage the sub-state in paradiplomatic activity. These 
potential opportunities he terms ‘opportunity structures’. 
...the domestic roots of paradiplomacy involve a peculiar structure-agency 
dynamic featuring national and regional institutional settings creating the 
very possibility of sub-national units becoming international actors and 
providing opportunity structures for regional politicians seeking to project 
their regions onto the international scene  
... 
However, this salience of domestic variables does not mean that the 
structures of international politics are irrelevant. On the contrary, the 
international institutional context is equally as important in turning regions 
into international agents capable of multilateral negotiation (Lecours, 2002: 
96-99). 
Lecours outlines how internal and external institutional contexts – the key variables of 
paradiplomacy – combine to structure paradiplomatic activity. In order to understand 
how, when, and why paradiplomatic activity develops therefore, the ‘opportunity 
structures’ must be the focus of analysis alongside their impact on agency. Contained 
within the ‘opportunity structures’, and located on four different levels therefore, are 
the ten key variables that require consideration with regard to paradiplomacy. 
                                                        
3 For Lecours, and the paradiplomacy scholarship in general (even if somewhat implicitly), the agency 
comes from regional politicians and sub-state governments. 
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The first two levels, the regional and national levels, concern the domestic context that 
structures opportunities for paradiplomacy. These, are, at the first level 1) the capacity 
and powers of the sub-state to engage abroad, and 2) the local political context. At the 
second, national level, further variables include 3) the formal division of competence 
with regard to foreign policy, 4) the intergovernmental relations (IGR), 5) 
representation at the state level, as well as 6) the state’s foreign policy agenda. These 
opportunity structures contain the domestic variables and institutional settings that 
structure opportunities for paradiplomatic activity (Lecours, 2002: 96-99). 
The continental and global levels meanwhile involve factors beyond the immediate 
control of either the sub-state or central state, the external variables and institutional 
settings that work so as to construct opportunities for paradiplomacy.  These 
opportunity structures are identified as 7) other states, sub-states and partners that are 
prepared to engage bilaterally, 8) continental institutions such as the EU and its 
committee of the regions, or 9) transnational networks that allow sub-states to become 
involved. 10) The global economy constitutes the final ‘opportunity structure’ requiring 
consideration. It should be noted again however that the framework also gives 
theoretical space for agency and its interaction with the ‘opportunity structures’, which 
is discussed in the relevant section below. 
This chapter will begin by examining the opportunity structures at the various levels. 
3.1.2 The Regional level 
Two variables that require consideration are located at the regional (the sub-state) 
level; the political party system or domestic political context, and the formal powers and 
institutional capacity of the sub-state. With regard to the party system, and in keeping 
with a tranche of paradiplomacy studies, nationalist, regionalist or ethnolinguistic 
parties are seen as driving forces behind the activities, expansion and continued 
development of paradiplomatic activity (Lecours, 2002: 101-102). Indeed, 
paradiplomacy is seen to be most advanced in cases where nationalist parties are strong 
and their presence identified as a key variable.  
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The institutional capacity and formal powers possessed by the sub-state meanwhile set 
very specific boundaries regarding what can or cannot be done. Capacity to engage in 
international activities is related to the resources available, and the degree to which a 
government can operationalize and put those resources – essentially expenditure, 
personnel, and expertise – to work in pursuit of international activities. 
3.1.3 The National level  
Four aspects of the national level require consideration with regard to paradiplomacy 
(2002: 102). Firstly, the constitution and its explicit definition of where competence lies 
for international activity can set clear boundaries for what can or cannot be done 
without legal ramifications. Ambiguity or a lack of clarity also contributes to the 
creation of opportunities for international activity (see also; Fry, 1988: 57-58). 
Education may be defined as a sub-state competence for example, however without 
reference to where the responsibility lies for transnational educational partnerships, a 
case may be made in favour or against the sub-state taking a lead in such activities.  
In such instances, the second key aspect comes into particular focus; the 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) between the central state and the sub-state. These 
relations may be conflicting or cooperative in nature and may have considerable 
consequences for any disputes over jurisdiction and legislative competence. IGR often 
define any ambiguities in constitutional competences. Furthermore, they may act as a 
means of disciplining or establishing informal or semi-legal, but nonetheless “hard” 
rules surrounding what the sub-state can or cannot do. 
Thirdly, but also a further aspect related to IGR, the sub-state’s representation at the 
central state level with regard to foreign policy may also generate opportunities for 
international activity. Flemish sub-states for example, lead Belgian delegations on 
international issues where they have competence. But where there is no representation 
or input into the state’s foreign policy such as in Canada; ‘regional leaders have no 




The final variable on the national level to consider is the state’s foreign policy agenda. 
For Lecours;  
If a state’s foreign policy is heavily geared towards high diplomacy and 
military issues, the involvement of regional governments is less probable 
than if it deals with traditional ‘low politics’ matters such as culture, the 
environment, the economy, and so on (Lecours, 2002: 102-103). 
This latter aspect may be of interest in the case of democracy promotion for if the 
practice is of particular concern to the central state then we may in Lecours’ eyes expect 
not to find sub-state involvement.  
3.1.4 Continental level  
Supra-national institutions at the continental level also construct opportunities for 
paradiplomacy and allow sub-states to bypass the central institutions (Lecours, 2002: 
103). Continental institutions act to encourage or allow regions to become 
internationally active over subjects and policy fields within and even outside their 
legislative competence (Lecours and Moreno, 2003: 275). Institutions such as the 
Committee of the Regions within the EU have created opportunities for sub-states to 
extend their influence beyond national borders. Free-trade areas and other economic 
institutions meanwhile allow sub-states to  
…jump directly into the continental and global economy. In other words, 
free-trade continental regimes have the immediate consequence of shifting 
economic power upward, as well as a subsequent one of shifting economic 
power downward (Lecours, 2002: 103). 
3.1.5 Global Level  
The global level consists of three variables to consider as opportunity structures. Firstly, 
other states create opportunities for sub-states to engage internationally, either directly 
with them, or alongside them. States for example sometimes seek relationships with 
regions. France looks to develop partnerships with Quebec for example, thus “pulling” 
sub-states into international and diplomatic activity. Similarly sub-states sometimes 
target other states or sub-states and develop ‘a web of inter-regional relations’ which 
builds up the international agency of regional governments (Lecours, 2002: 104). 
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Secondly, international organizations open several channels for sub-state involvement 
in their broader projects. Organizations such as the Francophonie or the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) accept various forms of regional or sub-state membership 
and open channels for engagement internationally.  
Finally the global economy and demands of a free-trade agenda across the globe require 
consideration as a creator of opportunity with its accompanying “upward and 
downward shifts of economic power” (Lecours, 2002: 104). For Lecours, the region 
becomes an economic centre and a unit in and of itself with a consequent responsibility 
falling on the (sub-state) government for economic development and engagement with 
the global economy. This in turn creates a “demand” for international economic activity 
(Lecours, 2002: 104). 
3.1.6 Adjustments 
Chapters 1 and 2 have explored the literature on democracy promotion and 
paradiplomacy more broadly, highlighting in turn, key themes and factors that must be 
considered if the study of sub-state democracy promotion is to remain relevant. In 
answering the second research question, and in attempting to better understand sub-
state democracy promotion, it is important for such factors to be incorporated into the 
analytical framework, in order for the understanding to relate to the broader 
scholarship. 
Within the democracy promotion literature explored in chapter 1, there is an emphasis 
on a dominant global discourse shared by promoters worldwide. Scholars such as 
Schraeder (2002: 234) have commented on the establishment of democracy promotion 
as an international norm by the turn of the 21st Century, while Abrahamsen’s (2000) 
exposition of a dominant development discourse is a key factor in understanding 
international development. A normative order, reinforced by powerful discourses and 
established practices has built up around promoting democracy and international 
development. Notable also within the sub-state literature examined in chapter 2 
meanwhile is the issue of transnational communication of ideas, norms, and even 
practices. The policies and practices of sub-states are claimed to have been influenced 
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heavily by global discourses. These notions must therefore be accounted for and 
examined as part of the empirical explorations of this project.  
The Lecours framework does allow a focus upon transnational networks and 
organizations, but not explicitly for the discourses and norms that transcend those 
networks and organizations. In addressing this challenge, global norms regarding 
promoting democracy and international development will be considered as an 
opportunity structure, to be examined like any other, as a structuring factor, 
conditioning the opportunities for sub-states to engage in democracy promotion.  
Locating this institution on the framework proves challenging due to its own multi-level 
nature. While the norm is constructed and disseminated globally, its salience and 
understanding can be examined at the global, domestic, and certainly with regard to this 
project, the regional levels. 
The project adopts the an analytical framework that takes account of the complex agent-
structure relationship concerning paradiplomacy. Furthermore, in making adjustments, 
the framework may account for key structuring factors thought to condition democracy 
promotion, allowing it to relate directly to the broader scholarship concerned with 
democracy promotion. Consequently, the framework is theoretically in a position to 
better understand sub-state democracy promotion than the hitherto unconnected 
scholarship on democracy promotion and paradiplomacy have been.  
Table: opportunity structures 
Domestic/internal opportunity structures International/external 
opportunity structures 
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3.2 Historical Institutionalism 
An historical institutionalist perspective is integral to the framework, enriching the 
analysis in two important and relevant ways. Firstly, historical institutionalism also 
defines institutions and institutional settings as the key variables conditioning political 
activity. It consequently offers an appropriate means of analysing how the variables in 
this case – also institutional settings – relate to the paradiplomatic activity in question, 
in this case the promotion of democracy. Secondly, the perspective offers insight and a 
means of analysing the complex agent-structure relationship that characterises 
paradiplomatic activity.. The following section outlines the key concepts related to the 
perspective, notably its understanding of agency, path dependency, and institutional 
dynamism. Some background regarding new institutionalism is provided before 
detailing the specific, historical institutionalist strand adopted in this project. 
3.2.1 New Institutionalism  
New-institutionalists are “new” inasmuch as they reject “old” institutionalism, largely 
for viewing it as being overly descriptive to the extent of being parochial (see Macridis, 
1955). New institutionalists incorporate a variety of new methods into their work; from 
the innovative techniques of behaviouralists and constructivists, to the historical 
method, and formal legal studies. The targets of these new methods are still institutions, 
albeit with a looser definition. Indeed, new institutionalism is still tied to the same core 
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belief and key ontological claim that institutions are the key intervening variable in 
political activity.  
In making use of the new techniques however, they have developed more dynamic and 
sophisticated means of explaining and generating theories regarding why political 
activity takes the form it does. These explanations are based more on the interplay 
between institutions and actors and the consequent conditioning or restriction of 
activity to particular paths.  
The institutions in question are defined as ‘formal rules, compliance procedures and 
standard operating practices that structure relationships between individuals in various 
units of the polity and the economy’ (Hall, 1986: 19-20). Peter Hall goes on to claim that 
new institutionalism can also focus on less formal organisational networks and 
regulatory practices which condition behaviour in institutions.  This loosening of the 
definition of institutions is echoed by John Ikenberry’s (1998: 222) broader view of 
institutions as the ‘normative social order’, or more recently by Fioretos, Tulia, and 
Sheingate (2016: 6) ‘as the rules, norms, and practices that organize and constitute 
social relations’. In this sense, institutions can be more than simply laws, they can be the 
broader “rules of the game” with regard to party competition or the IGR that appear in 
the framework. 
New-institutionalists in general contend that outcomes or activities are structured by 
institutional contexts (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 941); fittingly similar to the manner in 
which paradiplomacy and the international agency of sub-states is understood. In this 
sense, the actor’s agency is an important aspect, though understood slightly differently 
by various branches of institutionalism. Common between them however is the belief 
that despite pursuing their own interests, actors can only act within the margins of that 
institutional context and the “rules” that are constructed by them (Hay and Wincott, 
1998). Consequently; ‘…the outcome of a political process reflects as much the 
institutional context as the preferences of the actors involved’ (Bursens and Deforche, 
2010: 159).  Understanding and explaining the activities of actors therefore involves 
exploring the agent-structure relationship.  
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Nonetheless, in adopting a new institutionalist approach, implicit assumptions are 
adopted which must caveat any understanding or theory resulting from the 
employment of the framework. The understanding will inevitably be based upon the 
premise that the institutions “mapped” by Lecours (and added to in this project) are the 
key structuring factors for the agency of the sub-state. Any theory that is constructed 
will reflect this; it will be found that sub-states’ democracy promotion is conditioned by 
the institutions mapped out. The “finding” will be in explaining “how” the agent-
structure dynamic plays out with regard to the institutions identified. The limitations 
such an approach places upon the work will be with regard to relating the 
understanding deriving from the framework to deterministic or rigorously deductive 
theoretical perspectives that emphasize other variables; Marxism and class for example. 
While this may appear a limitation and restriction to the investigation of the activity, it 
is nonetheless a position that allows the project to reflect current paradiplomacy 
scholarship.  
3.2.2 Historical Institutionalism and the agency-structure dynamic 
Although the core of new institutionalism can be defined and ‘pointed to’ (see 
Immergut, 1998), there are three main strands within new institutionalism; rational 
choice, historical (see Steinmo and Thelen, 1992), and sociological institutionalism (see 
Hall and Taylor, 1996). The framework calls for the adoption of a particular form of 
new-institutionalism and related methodological tools and concepts, namely historical 
institutionalism. The historical institutionalist approach also holds a particular 
conceptualization of agency that differs from other forms of new-institutionalism. 
Historical institutionalism’s approach lies between the rational choice focus on 
institutions’ impact on strategies and agency (see Steinmo and Thelen, 1992: 8-9), and 
the sociological institutionalist focus on preference formation, the construction of 
interests, and of identity (see Hall and Taylor, 1996), which often has the 
‘…disadvantage of taking the focus away from political institutions’ (Lecours, 2000: 512-
513). For historical institutionalists; ‘not just the strategies but also the goals actors 
pursue are shaped by the institutional context’ (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992: 8). Both the 
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actions of an actor, and its identity are for the historical institutionalist, products of a 
symbiotic relationship with the institutional structure.  
For historical institutionalism, actors are purposeful, with strategies that they pursue 
through and conditioned by the institutional structure. But it is not a perfect, calculus-
like relationship; that would imply that institutions “cause” outcomes. Rather, 
‘...historical institutionalists tend to see political actors not so much as all-knowing, 
rational maximizers, but more as rule-following “satisficers”’ (Steinmo and Thelen, 
1992: 8). Actors follow rules and norms as much as, if not more than they strategize 
about maximizing self-interest. Those institutions establish the ‘rules of the game’ over 
time. When the rules have been set, actors tend to follow those rules unless the 
institutions are or have changed. Conforming to those rules is understood through the 
process of path dependency, explained below. 
While historical institutionalists see that the strategies and actions of actors are 
conditioned by institutions, they also claim that their goals and identity are at least in 
part, shaped by those institutions and their rules (see Hall, 1992; Weir, 1992). 
Objectives and strategies of actors are sometimes formed, and often conditioned by 
their relationship with the institutions.  
As will be explored in more detail below, actors also shape institutions. In taking 
actions, establishing, and constantly re-writing the ‘rules of the game’, particularly 
noticeable over time, historical institutionalists argue that actors change the nature of 
the institutions themselves. The institutional structure is dynamic and, over time, 
changing, often as a result of agency.  
First, structure and agency are conceived of as comprising not a dualism but 
a complex duality linked in a creative relationship... Such a formulation 
emphasizes institutional innovation, dynamism and transformation, as well 
as the need for a consideration of processes of change over a significant 
period of time (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 956). 
This symbiotic relationship calls for an historical contextualization of the institutions 
themselves if the actions and indeed identity of actors are to be understood. Temporal 
factors condition the actions and impact upon the construction of actors’ goals that in 
turn change the institutions. The framework calls for an historical institutionalist 
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approach and the next section therefore explores the conceptual tools available as a 
consequence. 
3.3 Methodological tools and concepts 
Historical institutionalism offers a more innovative and historically contextualized 
explanation of political activity. A rich toolkit of concepts is available with which to 
examine the Lecourian framework, and understand sub-state democracy promotion.  
3.3.1 Path Dependency 
The concept of ‘path dependency’ places the activity in its historical context. At its core 
is the belief that ‘institutions really have a logic of their own’ (Lecours, 2009: 9), and 
when actors interact within the institutional context, the outcomes (and the institutions 
themselves) are conditioned by the paths and rules established previously by the 
institutions. Positive feedback from following the established rules encourage further 
adherence (see Arthur, 1994).  
With path dependence, each step in a particular direction makes it more 
likely that a unit will continue to follow that same direction. Over time, it 
becomes harder and harder to reverse course (Mahoney, Mohamedali and 
Nguyen: 2016: 82). 
Activities within the institutional context follow paths of behaviour which have ‘stuck’ 
over time and which ‘lock-in’ other actors who “have little choice but to act within the 
margins of the pathway” (Bursens and Deforche, 2010: 159).  
The path will also influence future changes; ‘cumulative commitments on the existing 
path will often make change difficult and will condition the form in which new 
branchings will occur’ (Pierson, 2004: 10-11). As Hay and Wincott, influenced by Tilly 
(1994) state;  
...the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory of 
change up to a certain point itself constrains the trajectory after that point; 
and the strategic choices made at a particular moment eliminate whole 
ranges of possibilities from later choices while serving as the very condition 
of existence of others (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 955). 
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Path dependency helps explain continuity of action. Even when actions are not of 
particular interest, or that even contradict the interests or aims of actors, they can be 
explained by the tendency to follow the rules of institutions, and of being path 
dependent.  
Operationalizing this concept will involve tracing the historical process of engaging in 
democracy promotion and international activity more broadly in order to reveal the 
‘paths’ which have been set within the institutional context. It is a very rich and specific 
discussion of the historical context. Consequently the case-specific constitutional and 
legal history of the sub-state becomes important for understanding the domestic 
structuring of paradiplomacy over time. Such a concept aids the understanding of why 
certain activities are conducted as well as understanding continuity of activity. 
3.3.2 Critical Junctures 
Critical junctures are crises or key turning points that lead to profound change in the 
structural context. It is particularly applicable with regard to understanding 
institutions, and their development in the longer term.  
...moments of structural indeterminacy and fluidity during which several 
options for radical institutional innovation are available, one (including 
possibly institutional re-equilibration) is selected as a consequence of 
political interactions and decision-making, and this initial selection carries a 
long-lasting institutional legacy (Capoccia, 2016: 101). 
As Capoccia hints at, they are periods where the decisions and actions of actors are key 
in creating new, or even re-establishing the key institutions that go on to impact agency 
and set the “rules of the game” in the future; and ‘there is a substantially heightened 
probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest’ (Capoccia and 
Kelemen, 2007: 348).  For historical institutionalists they are dramatic focal points that 
help explain changes in political activity and the consequent rules and paths upon which 
actors become dependent. They are key formative periods therefore, and the activity 
and choices of agents at such periods will shape and (re-)construct the institution and 
the consequent “rules of the game”. They are very dramatic conceptualizations of the 
symbiotic relationship between the actor and the institutional structure. They are also 
however, as detailed in the next section, only one way in which institutions change.  
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3.3.3 Institutional Dynamism 
Accepting that change happens is a particular challenge for historical-institutionalists 
who conceptualize institutions as ‘sticky’ and change-resistant structures (see Conran 
and Thelen, 2016: 51-52). Dramatic critical junctures are easier to explain than periods 
of longer, gradual change. The power of ‘path dependency’ as a concept is somewhat 
challenged if the ‘rules’ can change slowly over time. In addressing this challenge 
however, historical institutionalism becomes a more robust means for explaining why 
political activity takes the form it does.  
Krasner’s ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model (1984: 223-246) argues that institutions 
explain activity until those institutions break down at ‘critical junctures’ but are then 
reconstructed by socioeconomic and political forces. However, this is efficiently 
presented by Thelen and Steinmo as an inadequate explanation, that institutions shape 
politics until they don’t, then politics shape institutions (1992: 15). This is not to argue 
that critical junctures are not possible as institutions develop, only that they cannot be 
the only explanation for institutional change.  
Historical institutionalists emphasize instead the gradual but constant interaction 
between institution and actor. The latter is considered as both object and agent of 
history (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992: 10), but institutions are also considered both 
structuring forces and objects of ongoing contestation (Conran and Thelen: 2016: 60-
61). 
More specifically, change occurs in (and through) the same time inter-
relationship between strategic action and the strategic context within which 
it is conceived and instantiated, and in the later unfolding of its intended and 
unintended consequences (Hay and Wincott, 1998).   
Changes in the socioeconomic or political context of an institution can affect the salience 
of an institution (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992: 16). Shifts in the socioeconomic or political 
balance of power can lead to new groups pursuing new or different goals through the 
institutions. Elections for example allow for the possibility of a new political party and 
new interests to be pursued through government institutions. Exogenous shocks are 
cited as a third source of dynamism which can effect change in the context of the 
institution. Finally, actors within the institutions can change their behaviour and 
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strategies. These sources of institutional dynamism can themselves initiate further 
means of change; 
Changes in the meaning and functioning of institutions (associated with 
broader socioeconomic and political shifts) set in motion political struggles 
within but also over those institutions that in fact drive their development 
forward (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992: 17). 
3.4 Research Themes 
The Lecourian framework, its modified multi-level “map” of opportunity structures, and 
the accompanying historical institutionalist perspective through which the framework 
will be analysed, represents the analytical framework that will help better understand 
sub-state democracy promotion. It goes further than IR perspectives in accounting for 
the complexities of paradiplomacy. Further strengthening the framework however will 
be the thematic focus of the empirical investigation, concentrating on themes 
highlighted throughout chapters 1 and 2 as being integral to democracy promotion and 
to paradiplomacy. This section will briefly recap those research themes.  
The framework itself focuses upon the relationship between agency and structure, the 
latter identified by the framework, and former implicitly taken as the sub-state. The 
structuring impact of the variables identified by the framework will be a central 
component of the understanding and a core theme. These include not only the domestic 
structures, but also the continental and global structures. However, broader themes, 
specific to democracy promotion will allow the understanding to relate to the academic 
literature.  
In keeping with several IR perspectives, the motivation and therefore the nature of the 
agency is a central theme. Exploring notion of (sub-)national interests and the 
possibility that promoting democracy contributes to the pursuit of those interests will 
relate to core IR understandings of democracy promotion. The relationships between 
donors and clients, governments and practitioners, can be also be investigated by 
examining the key agency at play, as can the influence and appropriation of global 
democracy and development norms. Finally, when exploring the nature of the agency, 
and drawing on the sub-state literature, the presence of nationalism and its impact 
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upon the sub-state’s agency must be a key consideration, as well as issues of 
transnational communication of norms.  
In concluding the project, a comparative chapter will construct the understanding of 
sub-state democracy promotion according to the Lecourian framework, and based on an 
historical institutionalist reading of the data; tracing path dependencies, and identifying 
institutional changes. The understanding will also be guided by the broader research 
themes identified, framework, and based on the empirical data. Following this 
understanding, the third research question may be directly addressed, and specific 
interventions may be made with regard to the democracy promotion and 
paradiplomacy literatures.  
3.5 Concluding remarks and research questions 
In addressing the first research question, it has been noted that the democracy 
promotion literature explored in chapter 1 revealed an absence of concern for sub-
states and consequently, perspectives for understanding sub-states and their 
paradiplomacy. In turning to the paradiplomacy literature in chapter 2, the review of 
the scholarship revealed both the lack of focus or account for democracy promotion 
activities, and a disconnect between studies of paradiplomacy and sub-states, and the 
broader IR discussions. Currently, sub-state democracy promotion is not adequately 
understood by either body of literature. These are currently the problems of 
understanding sub-state democracy promotion, and the answer to the first research 
question. 
This chapter meanwhile has sought to detail, in theory, the answer to the second 
research question and the a means better understanding sub-state democracy 
promotion. The Lecourian framework maps the structural factors claimed by 
paradiplomacy scholars to be key in conditioning the paradiplomacy of sub-states. 
Historical institutionalism and its conceptual toolkit, as Lecours argues, offers a ‘great 
source of theoretical insight’ (2002: 97) into the complex agent-structure dynamic 
within that framework. Combined with the multi-level framework of opportunity 
structures and thematic focus drawn from the relevant literatures, it offers the most 
advanced means by which the paradiplomacy can be investigated. The framework 
108 
 
provides a means of understanding and understanding the complex agent-structure 
dynamic purported to characterise paradiplomacy. Furthermore, the framework is 
flexible and modifiable, allowing it to take account of factors claimed to structure 
democracy promotion and international development.  
Combined, the newly adjusted framework offers a means of understanding sub-state 
democracy promotion in a manner that takes account of the complex agent-structure 
relationship, the paradiplomacy scholarship’s emphasis on structuring factors, as well 
as the structuring factors claimed by democracy promotion scholars to influence the 
activity. Such an approach offers much more than the existing and unsuitable means of 
understanding sub-state democracy promotion; a means of better understanding sub-
state democracy promotion 
It remains for the project to engage with the third research question; ‘In what ways will 
this new understanding contribute to the knowledge of sub-states and democracy 
promotion?’  In order to answer this question, the project must first make use of the 
analytical framework adopted and to construct a better understanding of sub-state 
democracy promotion. With that understanding, the final research question may be 
approached.  
The remainder of this chapter will therefore engage with the practicalities of that 
understanding, and the operationalization of the analytical framework. The following 
sections will therefore argue for a comparative, most different case study approach in 
order to generate data to better understand sub-state democracy promotion.  
3.6 Case study selection 
This project will examine three case studies for three main reasons. Firstly, and perhaps 
most pertinent considering the exploratory nature of the project, is the need to generate 
relevant empirical data in order to apply the Lecourian framework. Secondly, original 
case studies will allow for the focussed collection of data required for the 
implementation of the analytical framework. Finally, political phenomena, events and 
activities may be clarified and the understanding of them refined when compared with 
similar or different cases where the same activities and events arise, a comparative 
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approach will produce a richer understanding. If researching politics is seen as ‘a 
process of shifting focus from the level of particular pieces of information to the general 
level of theory and hypotheses’ (Burnham, Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2008: 72), 
then a comparative approach assists with generalizing and building those theories. 
Relationships between independent and the dependent variables can be established, 
and a more nuanced understanding can be gained. The consequent understanding will 
be that much more robust and valuable, and a more rigorous answer to the third 
research question. 
3.6.1 Small N, MDSD, and variables 
As outlined in a later section, extensive analysis of the case-specific academic literature 
together with primary data sources such as relevant grey literature, and interviews with 
key personnel will generate the specific data required for analysis and implementation 
of the framework. The depth and quantity of qualitative data required for analysis 
however leads to a common trade-off between the depth of research and number of 
cases. The project therefore adopts the “small N” method which allows for a “deeper” 
focus on cases. Small N approaches are also ‘used to uncover causal paths and 
mechanisms and assess specific mechanisms identified in theories’, also understood as 
‘process tracing’ (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 172). The volume and depth of data from 
such an approach allows the historical institutionalist concepts to be operationalized, 
and to apply the analytical framework to understand the democracy promotion of sub-
states. Given the limit on numbers of cases however, the selection of cases is 
consequently a particularly important aspect of the project.  
In seeking cases that touch upon as much of the broad spectrum of sub-states as 
possible, the adoption of a ‘most different system design’ (MDSD) method emerges as 
most suitable. The MDSD method seeks to compare cases with few common factors 
other than the dependent variable, the activity or phenomenon to be explained; in this 
case, sub-state democracy promotion. The MDSD allows for an exploration of a broader 
range of independent variables and factors emphasized by scholars, highlighted in 
chapters 1 and 2 as being of salience with regard to either democracy promotion or 
paradiplomacy, and identified in Lecours’ framework.  
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Little is known with regard to the nature of sub-state democracy promotion, and there 
are clear weaknesses of selecting cases based upon the dependent variable (see 
Burnham, Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2008: 93; Geddes, 2003). In order also to 
explore the range of different independent variables therefore, and their impact upon 
the democracy promotion of sub-states, cases will be selected based upon these 
independent variables. This will allow for the comparative conclusions to account for 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables. In this case, following 
the review of paradiplomacy scholarship in chapter 2, we may identify the independent 
variables as the factors that scholars have emphasized as key to explaining 
paradiplomacy, specifically the domestic factors that condition paradiplomacy. 
Lecours own emphasis is upon domestic institutions – the constitutional set-up, legal 
provisions, and IGR– as powerful structuring factors with regard to paradiplomacy. 
These are, as noted again in chapter 2, echoed by many paradiplomacy scholars. A 
further key factor purported by Lecours and other scholars, also discussed in chapter 2, 
is the presence and influence of nationalist parties. Selection of cases will therefore be 
primarily based upon these factors, what are viewed for the sake of selection as 
independent variables. Specifically, these are; the structure of the sub-state, and the 
presence and influence of nationalist parties at the sub-state level.  
The structure of the sub-state refers to four factors. Firstly, the constitutional set-up 
allocates legal competence for international affairs. The legal authority, and legitimacy 
to act internationally in various realms of foreign relations can derive from the 
constitutional settlement, and are seen as key structuring factors. Secondly, the often 
related factor of the resources available to the sub-state for engaging in paradiplomacy. 
Often this will involve a budget and freedom to spend money internationally and 
personnel or expertise available. Combined, these factors represent the level of 
empowerment characterising the sub-state with regard to paradiplomacy. ‘The more 
power a regional government has, the better it is positioned to act beyond national 
borders’ (Lecours, 2002: 102).  
The broader, less formal structure of the sub-state in the realm of paradiplomacy 
derives from the nature of the IGR between the central and the sub-state, and 
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constitutes the third and fourth criteria for selection. IGR in some sub-states can be 
conflicting, while others more cooperative. Where IGR conflict with regard to areas of 
foreign policy, it can drive the sub-state to develop its own engagement and 
paradiplomacy (Lecours, 2002: 102). The last aspect of the sub-state structure, also 
regarding the nature of the IGR, concerns the level of representation of the sub-state in 
central state level institutions. Where there is none, what Soldatos (1990: 47) called 
‘institutional gaps’, it is theorised that ‘...regional leaders have no direct influence on 
foreign policy and may decide to develop their own’ (Lecours, 2002: 102). 
The final independent variable, and key factor within the Lecourian framework that will 
be used to select cases is the presence, success, and strength of nationalist parties at the 
sub-state level. 
Some further factors of salience with regard to paradiplomacy can also aid in the 
selection of cases as secondary independent variables. While not emphasized as a key 
factor, the central state’s foreign policy, specifically in this case its involvement in 
promoting democracy, is a structuring factor for Lecours, as is membership of 
supranational institutions such as the EU. These secondary variables will also be used to 
inform the selection of cases. 
3.6.2 Cases selected 
From these variables, and by plotting at various ends of the spectrums, the following 
cases are selected; Flanders in Belgium, Maryland in the USA, and Wales in the UK. 
These cases cover a broad range of the independent variables. The specific 
characteristics of each case will be outlined in the relevant chapter, but they will also be 
summarised here. 
Flanders has been identified as the most empowered sub-state in the world with regard 
to paradiplomacy. It is ‘The most permissive constitutional regime is in Belgium, where 
regions and language communities have full external competence in matters under their 
purview’ (Keating, 1999: 11). Broad powers are explicitly referred to in the constitution 
through the in foro interno in foro externo principle roughly stating that any competence 
over an issue internally is accompanied by a competence for that issue externally. The 
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right to sign treaties and the non-hierarchy principles also ensure that Flanders is the 
sole legitimate actor in a range of fields. Formal IGR allow for input and indeed for 
Flanders to lead Belgian delegations to the EU and abroad in areas of competence (see 
Criekemans, 2010b: 91-93). A fully-fledged international affairs department also 
received the additional competence and budget for international development following 
a further constitutional reform in 2000. Finally, the nationalist party, though relatively 
weak at the time of the reforms of  1993 (which essentially established Flanders in its 
current form), has grown to a position of prominence, if not dominance of the regional, 
indeed national political context. The N-VA entered into coalition government in 
Flanders in 2004, 2009, and 20014, and at the Federal level in 2014 also.  
With regard to the secondary variables, Flanders does have privileged access to the EU 
as a leader of Belgian delegations in areas of competence. Belgium however is not 
distinguished as a particularly influential or major promoter of democracy abroad.  
The second case selected is Maryland in the USA. Representing another end of the 
spectrum compared to Flanders, Maryland is constrained in the international realm by 
its domestic structure, with a minimal nationalist presence. The US Constitution is 
vague with regard to the division of international competence between the Federal and 
State level. Treaty-signing is prohibited, broader activities are not explicitly referred to, 
and there is no concurrent list of actual powers and competences (Kincaid, 1999: 111-
112). Authority for international activity has ‘rested largely on constitutional 
interpretation, political practice, historical tradition, and intergovernmental comity’. 
(Kincaid, 1999: 112). These elements of the sub-state’s structure have constrained 
Maryland and other US states to functional or economic international actors, with the 
Federal government clearly defined, even if not explicitly in the Constitution, as the 
legitimate international actor with regard to political activities. 
Relations with the central government are argued to be such that they do not encourage 
States to engage in primary strategies and paradiplomacy. ‘Central structures that 
provide for a formal representation of territorial units, as is the case in the United States 
with the Senate, do not create as favourable conditions’ (Lecours, 2002: 102). 
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The territorial-political identity of the state meanwhile is weak at best, and has not 
manifested itself as a political force in the form of a significant nationalist party. While 
not enjoying membership of the EU, US states do offer a further aspect which justifies 
selection in that they are constituent parts of arguably the most prominent democracy 
promoter in the world. Democracy promotion has become a defining feature of US 
foreign policy over the last century or so (see Bridoux and Kurki, 2014: 121-126; 
Carothers, 1999: 5). 
Finally, Wales offers an insight into the ‘other’ possibilities. A constituent part of a 
Unitary as opposed to a Federal state, Wales holds no formal capacity or competence in 
international affairs; ‘...the United Kingdom Government is responsible for international 
relations. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs is responsible 
for the foreign policy of the United Kingdom’ (UK Government, 2013: 47). However, ‘In 
the United Kingdom, relationships between central and sub-state governments are 
highly partisan and governments are suspicious of anything that might give opposition 
forces a platform’ (Keating, 1999: 12). Nonetheless, through the flexible and a largely 
informal IGR with the UK government, Wales has managed to secure limited 
international engagement with global partners beyond economic and co-operational 
paradiplomatic activity (see Royles, 2010). There is a distinct national identity, though 
the nationalist party, Plaid Cymru, has only ever shared coalition government with the 
dominant (and strongly unionist) Labour Party on one occasion (2007-11).  
With regard to the secondary variables, Wales again exhibits ‘other’ possibilities within 
the categories. The UK is a member of the EU but its government leads on all 
delegations, while Wales must lobby its own government, internally for influence and 
access to Europe. The UK meanwhile is a prominent democracy promoter through both 
its international development programmes and the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy. But its involvement does not match that of the USA’s. 
The three cases provide an opportunity to explore the relationship between the 
independent variables and sub-state democracy promotion. While the variables are not 
‘hard’ or quantifiable, through the comparative approach, the data should allow for 
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relationships between the variables to be recognized and incorporated into the 
understanding of sub-state democracy promotion.  
3.6.3 Generalizability and comparability 
...good case studies are nearly always situated in a comparative context. They 
address theory or issues that have wider intellectual relevance, use concepts 
that are applicable to other contexts, and may even seek to make inferences 
that apply to countries beyond the original case (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 
205). 
Halperin and Heath essentially emphasize the importance of generalizability in 
comparative case studies. Indeed the generalizability of the studies selected are key in 
order to make broader claims regarding sub-state democracy promotion, and for the 
understanding to be “better” than currently available. In selecting most different cases, 
the project immediately seeks to cover a variety of sub-state, far more generalizable 
than similar cases of a particular type; the approach can emphasize similarities, and 
examine a range of relationships between the independent variables and the dependent, 
as well as the differences between cases. The discussion chapter will highlight 
commonalities and differences between the cases, ensuring that the understanding of 
sub-state democracy promotion is grounded in the data. Ultimately therefore, the 
generalizability of the findings are also based on the comparability of the cases 
themselves. Comparability is of further importance in that it lends rigour to the 
research project. 
To ensure comparability, the three cases will be dealt with as uniformly as practicable, 
and the data collection method will be replicated. Cases have been selected based on a 
common framework. Key themes have been highlighted and will guide the three 
empirical explorations. Similar documentation will be investigated in each case. A 
common interview script will provide the basis for interview, and personnel from 
similar positions will be interviewed in the three cases. A common time frame is used 
for the three cases, namely the post-Cold War period; a period already identified as a 
key phase in the development of democracy promotion as a practice. The comparability 
and generalizability of the project lends rigour to the research project, allowing it to 
make claims and interventions with regard to the existing literature. 
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3.6.4 Data sources and research methods 
Finally, the validity of the case studies, and ultimately the comparative conclusions and 
understanding constructed in chapter 7 will also be reliant upon the data sources used 
as a basis for analysis,. The project will draw from primary and secondary sources, as 
well as semi-structures interviews. The data sources available are mainly qualitative, 
however some quantitative sources such as budgetary and financial reports, voting 
patterns will support the exploration.  
The preliminary data collection will involve literature reviews of the secondary and 
such primary documents that are available. These will include academic, legal and 
constitutional literatures, constitutional documents and their surrounding explanatory 
notes and memorandums or concordats; political party manifestos, key speeches, policy 
literature. Legislature-based, and public debate through the media will also support the 
analysis of the political context surrounding the activities. The central and sub-state’s 
key foreign policy speeches, policy literature, and announcements will also assist. Policy 
and regulatory documents of the supra-national political or economic institutions will 
also contribute to building a firmer and more rigorous understanding of the Lecourian 
framework.  
The second phase of data collection will involve the collection of new, primary data. 
Unpublished and internal documents can assist in filling holes that the preliminary 
phase could not. Meanwhile, semi-structured interviews with key personnel involved 
with sub-state democracy promotion offer a key source of particularly relevant data. 
Interviewing personnel who are ‘in the game’ of democracy promotion offers a great 
level of freedom to explore specific issues of actor-institution relationships, or the inter-
actor relationships and competitions within the institutional context, or other aspects of 
the themes where other sources are not available, applicable or suitable. The multiple 
techniques and sources of data used for this project will strengthen its rigour, and offer 
a ‘thick’ description of hitherto under-researched topics.  
With the framework in place, and cases selected, the following three chapters will 
explore the cases in order to generate data for a comparative conclusion; the basis for 






Chapter 4: Flanders 
This first of three case study chapters will examine the democracy promotion activities 
of Flanders since the major reforms of 1993. The case studies are a means of generating 
data which will provide the basis for a better understanding of sub-state democracy 
promotion and answering the project’s third research question. The Lecourian 
framework’s emphasis on domestic structures of the sub-state, and their use within this 
project as key independent variables, necessitates a rigorous initial exploration. This 
will be followed by detailed examinations of democracy promotion activities engaged in 
by Flanders before a concluding section which will relate specifically to the Lecourian 
framework and offers a understanding of Flemish democracy promotion.  
4.1.1 Belgium and Flanders 
The Kingdom of Belgium was created in 1830 after secession from the United Kingdom 
of the Low Countries. Bridging Latin and Germanic Europe, its heterogeneous linguistic 
and cultural make-up has become a defining feature giving rise to, and then recognized 
in, the constitutional and federalization reforms since the 1970s. Around 60% of the 11 
million inhabitants live in the Northern region of Flanders with a little over 10% living 
in the capital, Brussels and the rest in the Southern, Walloon region. Economically, the 
two main regions experienced contrasting fortunes during the second half of the 20th 
century; 
...while Wallonia had been the industrial heart of Belgium, the decay of the 
post-war coal and steel industries shifted the bulk of socio-economic policy-
making to Flanders... [Flanders] was more successful in attracting foreign 
direct investment and in developing medium-sized enterprises or service 
industries (Swenden, 2005: 189). 
Indeed, such economic, as well as cultural divergence between the Dutch speaking, and 
strengthening service economy of Flanders, and the French-speaking, declining heavy 
industry economy of Walloonia have been placed at the root of the 35-year 
federalization process (see Deschouwer, 2012: 38-40).  
1970 saw the first of five major state reforms with the others in 1980, 1988, 1993, and 
2001. Each reform deepened and institutionalized the federalization, while also 
devolving powers (see Deschouwer, 2012: 38-44). With the important exception of a 
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particularly brutal colonial legacy in the Congo and Great Lakes region of Africa (see 
Hochschild, 1998), Belgium has not weighed heavily on the global political scene in 
comparison to the UK or US and is not considered a major democracy promoter. 
4.1.2 Governance structures in Flanders 
The dyadic character of the modern Belgian system, and its broader legitimacy, derives 
from the federalization into communities and regions (Swenden, 2005). Modern 
Belgium consists of a double federated system of communities – Flemish, French and 
German-speaking; and regions – Flemish, Walloon and the Brussels Capital region. A 
considerable amount of legislative and administrative competence is placed in the 
hands of the Communities and Regions. The constitutional reforms have led to Belgian 
communities and regions, and Flanders in particular as both a community and a region 
combined, becoming some of the most administratively and legislatively competent sub-
states in the world (Keating, 1999: 11).  
With regard to the formal powers and capabilities of Flanders, most are explicitly 
referred to in the constitution. It is this national level therefore – the construction and 
make-up of the Belgian state as a whole – that structures for Flanders so many 
opportunities to engage in international activity. The 1970 constitution created a 
federal system and the notion that governance should be shared amongst the federated 
entities. Bursens and Deforche (2010: 162) argue that successive reforms also ‘locked 
in’ key principles which, along with its competences, define the nature of Flemish 
foreign activities. 
The in foro interno in foro externo principle was constitutionally enshrined in 1988 and 
extended to the regions in 1993. It legally requires the various federated entities of 
Belgium to take international responsibility for any domestic competences they hold. 
Effectively establishing Flanders as sovereign within their competences both 
domestically and internationally.  
They are under no form of political tutelage by the federal government in 
jurisdictions belonging to them alone, including the international aspects of 
those jurisdictions (Bursens and Massart-Pierard, 2009: 96).  
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Closely associated with this principle, and facilitating its realization is the authority 
granted to federated entities to conclude treaties both on their own accord and 
alongside the federal government (‘ius tractati’) and to send their own representations 
abroad (‘ius legationis’) to bilateral or multilateral posts. Flanders’ ius legationis and ius 
tractati have enabled extensive engagement at the global level in pursuit of the 
functional as well as political objectives of its foreign policy. Firstly, its ability to 
conclude treaties has enabled a strategic approach to its bilateral relations; between 
1993-2008, Flanders concluded 27 bilateral treaties (Criekmans, 2010b: 88); these 
were the foundation stones of the Central Eastern European Programme and the Chile 
partnership. Secondly, the ability to send representations has enabled engagement with 
multilateral organizations such as the ILO, UNAIDS and WHO for example and the 
development of the ‘dual-membership’ both as Flanders, and through Belgium’s 
membership.  
The non-hierarchy principle, meaning that federal and regional laws have equivalent 
status, was introduced during the reforms of 1981. No one level of government is 
‘above’ another. This principle emphasizes the need for federated entities to be active 
internationally in their respective policy fields. The federal state could not 
retrospectively ‘trump’ the Regional or Community legislation to bring it into line with 
international treaties or multilateral decisions for example (see also Bursens and 
Massart-Pierard, 2009: 98). The principle establishes and protects the sovereignty of 
the constituent unit within the allocated field of competence but also encourages and 
drives the relatively strong, formal level of IGR to ensure coordination and prevent 
infringement on each other’s competences. 
Indeed, IGR has emerged as a key cog in the Belgian set-up. Extensive, formal 
institutions have been constructed in order to coordinate the international affairs of the 
federal and federated entities of Belgium. Beneath the overarching ‘Consultation 
Committee’ and the Interministerial Conference for Foreign Policy, sit a collection of 
smaller committees and working groups constantly coordinating foreign activity and 
ensuring that no infringement takes place (see Criekemans, 2010b: 49). Such 




The solution developed for this potential conflict is as follows; the Belgian 
Regions and Communities do enjoy maximal autonomy so long as the 
coherence of the foreign policy of the federation does not come in jeopardy 
(Criekemans, 2010b: 50). 
By the completion of the 1993 reforms, Communities in Belgium had become 
responsible for the fields of education, culture, media, language and some healthcare 
while the Regions were given legislative and administrative competence over industrial 
policy, transport, planning, the environment, agriculture, trade and employment. As 
both a Community and Region, very little by now is outside the scope of the Flemish 
Government both domestically or internationally. Indeed; ‘[b]oth Flanders and Wallonia 
now conduct a foreign policy which ranges across all their (internal) policy domains’ 
(Criekemans, 2010b: 46). The federal level has meanwhile remained in control of social 
security, justice, home affairs and defence. Crucially, with regard to this project, the 
Hermes agreement of 2000 (realised in the 2001 state reforms) also paved the way for 
the devolution of the competence and budget over international development, and clear 
responsibility for what this project has termed political paradiplomacy.  
This constitutional set-up;  
...is an exceptionally original solution which offers the Belgian Communities 
and Regions the possibility to develop both their own geopolitical priorities 
and [sic] their own functional interests and accents in foreign policy, as long 
as the coherence of the foreign policy of the federation is not threatened 
(Criekmans, 2010b: 44).  
The 1988/1993 reforms can therefore be understood as a critical constitutional 
juncture and a key factor in the development in Flemish foreign policy (see Bursens and 
Deforche, 2010: 162). It created not only the legal opportunity and means, but also the 
constitutional imperative to develop international activities. In short, they made 
Flanders the legitimate actor in foreign affairs for many fields. However, while 
establishing a constitutional responsibility and role, the reforms did not define the 
personality of the newly federated units; what activities the Flemish government would 
engage in, and which values it would align to.  
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4.1.2 Flemish nationalism 
With regard to nationalist parties, the Volksunie (VU) Flemish nationalist party broke 
through in 1954 and grew to share power by the late 1970s only, with growing 
competition from the far-right nationalist Vlaams Blok, for its fortunes to decline after 
its spell in office. Its eventual demise in 2001 occurred after entering Patrick Dewael’s 
(1999-2001) Liberal-led coalition government (van Haute and Pilet 2006: 299). 
Regionalism was seen to be on the decline in Belgium during by the late 1990s, 
particularly in Wallonia, but with Flanders following the trend (Deschouwer, 2009: 559-
560; 2012: 138). The Volksunie’s successor however, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-
VA), experienced astonishing electoral success in the space of a decade, not least due to 
the efforts of its charismatic leader, Bart DeWever (see Rochtus, 2012), and had by 2015 
been a partner in Flemish government on three occasions (2004, 2009, 2014), holding 
the foreign policy brief twice (2004 and 2014), and even entered the Federal 
government coalition in 2014. 
4.1.3 International affairs in domestic politics 
Despite the government’s competence and freedom to pursue paradiplomacy of all 
kinds, international affairs has not emerged as a contentious battlefield between the 
rival political parties of Flanders. This may reflect the perception of foreign affairs as an 
issue of relatively low importance amongst the electorate. A former senior government 
advisor reflects upon the situation;  
Of course people know about Europe. But when you look at the debates, it’s 
mostly about domestic policy... In the public sphere, no there’s no discussion 
about it... There is no very strong popular demand on a distinctive Flemish 
international policy. I do not think that is the case. I believe that it is very 
much stronger in for instance Quebec or even Scotland or Catalonia than it is 
in our case... i 
Nonetheless, Flanders and its government has been compelled to engage internationally 
in support of its domestic economy. One long-serving senior civil servant sees the 
nature of Flanders’ economy as the justification for a significant focus upon the 
economic dimension of international affairs;  
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...we are basically an export nation, Flanders counts for about 83% or 84% of 
the Belgian exports, we live from our exports that really remains the most 
important element of our economy with also our big ports like Antwerp and 
Zebrugge and Ghent. So it’s quite important for us to be quite active in that 
field and that’s why we have really a substantial network of trade 
commissioners everywhere in the world. We have a  network of more than 
70 trade commissioners and we have representatives in about 100 different 
places.ii 
Much of Flanders’ international activity is indeed functional and economic in nature, 
responding to this domestic demand and the need to access globalized policy fora in 
relation to other domestic portfolios. But despite not registering as a major issue on the 
domestic scene, foreign policy beyond the functional or economic has proved an 
important field for some political parties and consequently for Flemish governments.  
4.1.4 Establishing Flemish foreign policy (1993-1999) 
Central to the government’s approach from the outset has been the desire to ‘insert’ 
Flanders onto the international stage, not just for economic reasons. As one senior 
cabinet member recalls;  
...the aim was to put Flanders on the map. This I will not say was the only 
rationale, but in fact it was a point because we know, certainly in that period 
and also before and probably today as well, that [in order] to deepen 
relationships, there is an aim to be put on the map. And why to be put on the 
map? Because it has ramifications in the cultural setting between, in this case 
Flanders and other nation states and regions. But also the economic, it can be 
helpful to show that it’s possible that a small region after all, may contribute 
to the better relationship, to tangible projects and so on. That was the reason 
why in this context also we were may I say, developing this central European 
fund [Central and Eastern European Programme] where the idea of 
partnership was essential.iii 
In establishing the criteria for bilateral engagement shortly after the 1993 reforms, Luc 
Van den Brande’s Christelijke Volkspartij (CD&V)4 government effectively defined and 
established the rules of the international game and placed the principle of ‘inserting’ 
Flanders at the heart of the government’s approach. The guiding principles for 
international relations and the criteria for relations between Flanders and other 
partners were set out in the 1995 ‘Policy Note’ on foreign affairs, the formal political 
                                                        
4 Christian People’s Party at the time, by 2001 it had changed to Christen-Democratisch 
en Vlaams (CD&V) 
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guidance of the minister to the department (Criekemans, 2010b: 52). The justifying 
criteria for foreign relations were guided by this ‘concentration policy’, outlined in nine 
points;  
1. common language, culture and history; 
2. geographic proximity; 
3. (potential) intensity of economic and trade relations; 
4. parallel vision on and involvement in the construction of the European 
integration project; 
5. similarity of state structure (federalism); 
6. attachment to democracy and human rights; 
7. (the need for support and cooperation, and) the possibility for Flanders 
to develop solidarity actions in a meaningful way; 
8. strategic location and international impact; 
9. willingness to recognize Flanders as a (full-fledged) partner. 
(cited in Criekemans, 2010b: 52) 
Though over two decades old, the guidelines are “...still implicitly used as a beacon and 
policy-tool to guide political choices” (Criekemans, 2010b: 53), and are still very 
familiar to departmental staff responsible for international activities. As one long-
serving senior civil servant in the department claims; 
...these things have been constantly rephrased in other words but basically 
you will find them quite solidly present over several political generations 
through governments of the last two decades.iv 
Indeed, the Flemish Government coalition agreement of 2014 reiterated the same broad 
objectives, though streamlined to five key points; 
We will implement an autonomous, mature and professional Flemish foreign 
policy that (1) works to profile Flanders abroad in an individual and targeted 
manner, (2) focuses on international enterprise and targeted economic and 
public diplomacy, (3) has an effective and more direct voice in the EU, (4) 
adopts an active and focused policy with regard to its neighbouring countries 
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and a multilateral approach and (5) strives for development cooperation 
(Government of Flanders, 2014:182). 
Officials at the department responsible for international activity perceive that these 
themes form the strategic heart of Flemish foreign policy even if they do not refer to 
them explicitly as any kind of Flemish (sub-)national interest.  
An attachment to democracy and human rights as well as the need for support and 
cooperation with Flanders in developing meaningful solidarity are two central points 
that have morphed into the 2014 commitment to development cooperation. The 
willingness to recognize Flanders as a partner as well as the (potential) intensity of 
economic partnership are also key guiding principles to this day. Finally, and still at the 
heart of Flemish policy as it was at the outset, is the determination to profile and insert 
Flanders onto or into the world, to ‘put Flanders on the map’.  
Flemish foreign policy was defined at a very early stage. The institutionalist concept of 
path dependency is useful in explaining the longevity of this policy approach, remaining 
as it has done, practically unchanged for over twenty years. Without a significant period 
of institutional dynamism, nor a critical juncture to force a major revision, official 
Flemish foreign policy has remained constant.  
More importantly perhaps, it was the Van den Brande’s government that also initiated a 
range of innovative and at times large international activities that would run for a 
decade or more. The CEEP and bilateral relations with Chile and South Africa are 
explored in detail below, and are a testament to the determination of the CD&V 
government to match rhetoric with action. 
4.1.5 Foreign policy from 1999-2016 
The liberal and nationalist-led administrations of the 2000s can be characterised by 
their organizational focus, and political disinterest in the realm of foreign affairs when 
compared to the CD&V government of the 1990s. The Liberal-led government of Patrick 
Dewael (1999-2003) looked only to emphasize the economic benefits of foreign affairs 
(detailed in the section on the CEEP below). The NVA’s approach to foreign affairs 
meanwhile, involved of a ‘verticalization’ of governance structures (see Criekemans, 
2010b: 44), and the establishment of FICA to coordinate the newly devolved 
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international development programmes. No new activities were initiated beyond the 
development programmes, and officials claim they were left to look toward 
contributions to multilateral organizations such as the ILO in order to fulfil their core 
missions, rather than a Van den Brande style initiation of bilateral, distinctly Flemish 
schemes.v  
Even when the NVA government did engage in a new activity, and although FICA 
launched its international development programmes, it’s political lead was not 
forthcoming. FICA was to established after competence over international development 
was devolved following the Hermes agreement of 2000. Its mission was to ‘...to help 
close the North-South gap, promote sustainable development in the South and realise a 
just, peaceful and prosperous international community’ (FICA, 2012: 4). Until its 
incorporation into the department under the 2014-19 government, the agency acted as 
an intermediary body to administer programmes and implement the broad 
development strategy which is developed at the departmental and ministerial level.  
FICA however enjoyed a significant degree of freedom with regard to beyond the broad, 
political instructions passed on by successive governments in policy notes. This derived 
mainly from a) the requirement of the department to meet the broad, politically 
established objectives (the five broad points outlined above); and b) the concurrent 
relative disinterest in foreign policy of politicians in the government. The department 
was to work toward objectives, but without much ministerial interest in how the 
objectives were pursued. As one foreign affairs official states; 
...the fact that the government is not always that aware of the way we work 
but they lay down the general principles, we do have, as an administration, a 
sort of space to see how that would best be implemented. We always, always 
ask for the agreement of the government, but we do the suggesting.vi 
The major international vision was established by the CD&V, and has remained as 
ingrained guiding principles within Flemish foreign policy since. The NVA have not 
altered the core strategic objectives of Flemish foreign policy which had been laid by the 
Van den Brande government. Despite a prominent presence in government, the NVA did 
not expand the foreign affairs of Flanders, and the ambitious activities initiated by the 
CD&V during the 1990s were, as will be noted, were left to expire by NVA 
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administrations. What is striking in the Flemish case is the enthusiasm of the first, CD&V 
government after the 1993 reforms, the longevity of their strategic approach, and the 
relative disinterest of the nationalist party in developing foreign activities. The strong 
nationalist presence would theoretically increase the sub-state’s likelihood of engaging 
abroad. But although economic paradiplomacy dominates government foreign policy, 
re-emphasized by the Liberal administrations of the 2000s, Luc Van den Brande’s CD&V 
government established a clear path and set of rules, as well as a range of activities 
during the 1995-1999 period. Inserting Flanders onto the global stage, developing 
economic ties, and a commitment to democracy and development are core strands of a 
consistent foreign policy which has existed since the first statement in 1995, despite a 
loss of enthusiasm and decline in distinctive activities and projects during the 2000s. 
This analysis reveals that institutional capacity and constitutional competence act as 
institutional structures setting Flanders as a particularly powerful and legitimate 
international actor. A strong nationalist party has frequently held power. Official and 
well defined processes of IGR exist that also facilitate Flemish input into Belgian foreign 
policy even when the sub-state doesn’t hold competence. Belgian membership of the EU 
and an export economy theoretically offers opportunities and motivations for engaging 
abroad, while Belgium itself is not a significant democracy promoter.  
This chapter will proceed by exploring three specific activities in detail; the Central and 
Eastern European Programme; the bilateral relationship with Chile; and Flanders’ 
international development assistance programme.  
4.2 The Central and Eastern European Programme (CEEP) 
Interviews indicated that even before the 1993 reforms, Flemish politicians had 
conceived of the post-soviet Central and Eastern European countries and their 
transition to market economies and liberal democracies as being worthy of the 
assistance of Flanders’ Government.vii The Central and Eastern European Programme 
(CEEP) came to fruition from this early, moral desire to assist the region during the first 
post-93 Flemish Government led by the Christian Democrats and Minister-President, 
Luc Van Den Brande. The programme coordinated, supported, and enhanced the 
combined bilateral relations with Central and Eastern European states. Until its 
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conclusion in 2008, it occupied a position of prime importance within Flemish foreign 
policy; ‘Over the past fifteen years, cooperation with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe has been one of the priorities of Flanders’ foreign policy’ (Departement 
internationaal Vlaanderen, 2009: 6). After brief overview of the pertinent opportunity 
structures, this section will firstly present an account of the programme and its 
development before discussing its motivations. 
4.2.1 Structural context 
The newly acquired powers to conclude treaties and formalize bilateral relations 
between Flanders and other actors, and the willingness of Central and Eastern 
European states to engage with Flanders created the opportunity for the CEEP. The first, 
post-1993 government led by the Christian Democrats’ willingness to engage in such a 
programme proved the key, initial impetus. This was a ‘new’ activity for a sub-state; 
broad and very political, being involved in changing the governance regime of half a 
continent. The government’s agency within the new structural context in capitalizing on 
the opportunities – not a requirement of the new competences – brought the 
programme into being. 
A further key factor facilitating Flanders’ engagement in such a programme was the 
global political context. The Flemish Government’s own evaluation of the programme 
explicitly recognizes the importance of a stabilized global political situation played in 
allowing Flanders to engage internationally in such a political manner; 
The accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries to NATO led to 
the filling of the security vacuum which had arisen following the end of the 
Cold War, to the stabilization of the region and to the integration of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe into Western security structures. It 
must be acknowledged that NATO’s enlargement to the East contributed to 
the realization of the objectives of the Programme [author's translation] 
(Departement internationaal Vlaanderen, 2009: 20). 
 
While the CEEP was possible due to the constitutional empowerment of Flanders, the 
global political and security context was equally pertinent in facilitating and creating 
opportunities for engagement and democracy promotion. 
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4.2.2 The CEEP 
Flanders' programme for assisting the transition of Central and Eastern European 
countries from Soviet communism ran from 1992-2008. In total, it spent Euro97.5 
million, funding 350 organizations, implementing 737 projects, in 18 countries 
(Departement internationaal Vlaanderen, 2009: 13). It financed and co-financed 
projects run by Flemish organizations in partner countries.  
Flemish organizations would submit proposals to the Government in order to be 
considered for financial, or other support. Proposals were approved by an advisory 
committee which from the start included members from the partner country – an 
element of local ownership and control over projects long before the democracy 
industry turned to such mechanisms.  
Activities were financed in a broad range of fields, mainly economic cooperation, but 
also projects in areas such as environment, health, socio-cultural work, infrastructure, 
consultation, education and governance. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia were the initial partners but in 1995 the Baltic States and Romania were 
incorporated, in 2001 Bulgaria and Slovenia became involved and in 2005 several 
Balkan countries became partners (Departement internationaal Vlaanderen, 2009: 5). 
4.2.3 First phase 
The programme itself can be split into two distinct phases. The initial phase (1992-
2000) is one of freedom and a broad, sometimes unconnected and unevaluated range of 
programmes. The department's own evaluation report concedes that; ‘This is mainly the 
result of the decision from the outset to choose a very broad thematic programming 
[author's translation]’ (Departement internationaal Vlaanderen, 2009:  19). The breadth 
also reflected the fact that the projects were based on the bilateral treaties with the 
various partner states with some variation between them. 420 projects were initiated 
during this phase, spending 2.5b BEF (Vanden Berghe, Van Alstein and Neeb, 2004: 6). 
Some of these projects promoted democracy and sought to reform governance 
practices. Unfortunately, detailed breakdowns of individual projects were not kept by 
the Flemish government at the time the research was undertaken. 
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One example of the programmes running would be the support to reform the Polish 
healthcare system along the lines of the Flemish model of intermediate health insurance 
organizations. These organizations provide the insurance services to Flemish 
individuals, but also play an important role in the governance decisions relating to 
healthcare and in influencing decisions regarding the administration of services.  
In Poland the Christian Health Insurances with the support of the Flemish 
government founded the first Health Insurance, which offers a ‘third way’ in 
Polish healthcare next to outdated public health and the unbridled freedom 
of private healthcare (Vanden Berghe, Van Alstein and Neeb, 2004: 6-7).  
The attempt at exporting this model had, by the early 2000s, faced difficulties where it; 
...was clear that the time is not yet ripe for mutual insurance companies in 
Poland. The patient is still living with an old way of thinking, where 
healthcare was free [author’s translation] (Skrzypiec-Sikorska, 2002: 68).  
Nonetheless, a distinct attempt at developing a dialogue between private service 
providers, governance institutions, and broader society went hand-in-hand with the 
support offered to the attempts at reforming the healthcare system (see also Descan, 
2002).  
As a senior civil servant recalls; 
...the government at the time made the assessment that we could help to 
make these kinds of transitions by engaging our own intermediate bodies, 
and to connect them to these new interlocutors in Central and eastern 
Europe. So the programme in essence tried to mobilize our universities, our 
trade unions, our local economic development boards, our whatever. What 
we call the intermediate organizations.viii  
It can be seen as an example of the explicitly stated attempt at ‘promoting Flanders as a 
democratic model of society [author's translation]’ (Departement internationaal 
Vlaanderen, 2009: 18). More specifically, the democracy projects at this time, and the 
‘democratic model of society’ in question, can be characterised by an attempt to develop 
or export the Flemish concept of overleg, meaning cooperative, consultative, or 
concerted decision-making.  
Within Belgium, legislative and policy emphasis is placed upon the importance of social 
dialogue and ‘overleg’ and manifested through the work of the Federal Public Service 
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Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue (see Federale Overheidsdienst 
Werkgelegenheid arbeid en Sociaal Overleg, 2015), which promotes the continuity of 
this social-governance model. The importance of consultation and cooperation between 
the central and periphery actors, specifically governance structures and society, in 
decision making is stressed and cultivated. As far back as 1948, Belgian law enforced 
the creation of employment councils within businesses employing over 100 persons in 
order to engage and consult with governance structures on issues of employment and 
social policy.  During the first phase of the CEEP, the governance assistance within the 
programme involved a similar focus on fostering consultation, overleg and dialogue 
between intermediate bodies and the governance structures.  
Furthermore, it was evident from conversations with staff members involved with the 
programme that they were aware of their own, distinctive contribution. In the words of 
one senior civil servant;  
How do you, as a trade union, how do you negotiate with government on 
draft legislation, on say labour standards? We have a strong tradition of both 
employers organizations and trade unions being fairly closely engaged in 
policy preparing and dialogue with government... And also these elements of 
our socio-economic model; we call it in Dutch an overleg economy. It’s 
concerted policymaking. These points have been put forward as something 
that we could contribute in their process of transition.ix 
Flemish practitioners were aware that developing overleg was a distinctly Flemish or 
Belgian approach to supporting democracy. It is perceived within Flanders as an 
essential element, key to the success of the Belgian system. As one senior diplomat 
claims; 
The key principle in our system, if we want to keep it credible and workable, 
the key principle, the cardinal principle is overleg –that’s an important word. 
The Dutch word for concertation. It’s not coordination and it’s more than 
communication. It’s between dialogue and... concertation in order to come to 




4.2.4 Second phase 
The second phase can be characterized by a turn to the EU for guidance and lead, a 
decision which can be traced to Patrick Dewael’s Liberal-led coalition government 
(1999-2003). Before conducting a review, a policy decision had been taken to 
deliberately align the programme to the EU’s approach to the region. Its criticism of the 
CEEP was that it was;  
...not preceded by a thorough analysis...there was no clear picture of the 
exact needs in the region and that the strategic objectives had been 
insufficiently translated into specific or measurable objectives...All of this 
meant that the policy was not sufficiently adjusted to react to the evolutions 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Vanden Berghe, Van Alstein and Neeb, 2004: 
11). 
In its consequent ‘policy note’ to the department, the Government set the direction of 
travel for the second phase, declaring that; 
More so than has hitherto been the case, it [the CEEP] will be better aligned 
with the EU framework. Bilateral cooperation will be linked and dependent 
on the willingness to cooperate with the partner countries within the EU 
programmes [author’s translation] (Dewael, Sauwens, and Anciaux, 2000: 
30). 
The continuation of the programme by the Liberal-led coalition, characteristically 
ambivalent toward international activities,xi was justified by the potential economic 
benefit of offering support. 
...these countries have significant growth potential economic and trade 
cooperation. Assistance to these countries for the development of their 
democratic and social structures, assisting in the improvement of their 
environment, and sharing their scientific and cultural wealth, offers 
undeniable advantages for Flanders [author’s translation] (Dewael, Sauwens, 
and Anciaux, 2000: 29).  
More specifically, the EU membership of the partner countries became an explicit 
objective and the accession criteria set out in 1993 at Copenhagen provided a means of 
determining the kinds of projects funded and providing a means of evaluating progress. 
The ten candidate countries became the priority partners. With regard to the new 
emphasis in of the project; 
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More specifically, the emphasis was placed on preparing the countries 
involved for accession by means of training programmes, training civil 
servants and experts, transfer of knowledge with regard to legislation, 
supporting the adoption of the European acquis communautaire, 
contributing to the development of a democratic midfield, propagating 
ecological objectives and solutions, supporting the free market economy by 
means of training, promoting cooperation with Flemish SMEs, etc. (Vanden 
Berghe, Van Alstein and Neeb, 2004: 15). 
Elements of the more organic or Flemish focus on overleg persist in this period, 
however there is a clear slant toward EU standards and objectives.  
During this second period, the changes in administrative organization are also 
noteworthy. The decision to move the administrative duties from the Economic to the 
Foreign Affairs department allowed for a more strategic approach and the possibility of 
utilizing other international avenues in pursuit of the CEEP’s goals. It is notable for 
example that by 2004, the programme’s management had developed a ‘fixer’ role. It had 
begun aligning Flemish organizations with larger, mainly EU funding pots such as the 
PHARE and TACIS programmes or using the work conducted through Flanders' 
cooperation agreement with the International Labour Organization to meet the 
objectives of the CEEP.xii The multilateral relations of the Flemish Foreign Affairs 
department were utilized to complement and support the pursuit of CEEP objectives 
which extended beyond the economic.  
The consequences of such a development however was a more pronounced alignment 
with those organizations’ practices, objectives and evaluation criteria. Measurements, 
indices and the definitions of success were adopted from the established global 
practitioners. indices such as the 'World Governance Indicator Dataset' from the World 
Bank; Freedom House’ 'Press Freedom Indicators'; the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development's 'Transition Indicators' would later be adopted and 
used to evaluate the democratization of these societies (Departement internationaal 
Vlaanderen, 2009: Part II). This is the means by which the initial criticisms of the 





It is claimed that the original conception for a comprehensive programme for 
supporting post-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe came from an altruistic, moral 
desire to support the partner countries as well as the domestic-level links that already 
existed. As a senior member of the Cabinet at the time recalls; 
...together with the secretary general and some friends of my cabinet team, 
we were saying, just like that; ‘we have to do something’...We have to do it, it 
was our responsibility, our duty to do something. You have to notice that 
already before, in the period of Jaruzelski and Wałęsa, there was an 
important Flanders movement from the Christian Workers’ Association, A-
CV at the time, there was a lot of people, city by city, all kinds of associations 
contributing, going with trucks to, at that time mostly to Poland.xiii 
This moral motivation is reflected in the wording of the official policy note at the time 
which referred to the ‘...moral duty of Flanders to contribute to the changes in Eastern 
Europe’ [author’s translation] (Nota voor de Vlaamse Executieve, 1992: 1).  
As the programme was developed however, a broader range of motivations were 
explicitly outlined in official publications of the government and coalition agreement 
during the programme’s early stages. It was declared by the Government that Flanders 
had a ‘...duty to assist the process of democratization and economic reform policies, the 
support of which is an essential condition for political stability...[author’s translation]’ 
(Departement internationaal Vlaanderen, 2009: 17). Also identified however was the 
more self-centred motivation, and now explicit objective to ‘put Flanders on the map 
[author’s translation]’ (Departement internationaal Vlaanderen, 2009: 17). From the 
earliest stages of planning therefore, the Flemish government had moved from the 
‘moral’ motivation to a more instrumental and strategic intervention of supporting 
economic and democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe as a means of 
inserting itself onto the international stage and into a global economy.  
The alignment of the CEEP to the strategic objective of placing Flanders on the 
international stage is not difficult to spot. Within a decade of the programme, scholars 
had already begun claiming that; ‘Flanders saw conducting policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe as an opportunity to set itself up as an internationally acceptable partner’ 
(Vanden Berghe, Van Alstein and Neeb, 2004: 4). David Criekemans (2010b: 53-54) also 
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claims that a key objective of the programme was to bring Flanders into contact with 
the new governments of Central and Eastern Europe.  
Interviews with senior civil servants and members of that period’s Cabinet suggest that 
the CEEP was also, at least in part, an attempt at concerting and constructing the 
domestic understanding of Flemish society. As a senior member of the cabinet during 
the CEEP's formative years recalls; 
...in fact I prefer to use ‘to put Flanders on the map’ [rather than 'nation 
building']...the first purpose was certainly not to go for extra nation-building. 
It was more to innovate, and it is not just about the central level that we had 
to incorporate but on all kinds of levels...the idea [was] that improved 
institutional, constitutional legitimacy could and would lead in fact to 
empower the people of Flanders and the Flemings. But it is not so easy to 
make sharply the dividing line between what you call nation building and 
may I say, positioning in a broader world.xiv 
The CEEP was a means of putting Flanders on the map in the eyes of Flemings as well as 
the world. There was also an emphasis upon the perceived economic benefit for 
Flanders.   
For Flemish trade and industry it is advantageous to be present on the 
growth markets in Central and Eastern Europe. For this it is important that 
in the countries in question there is an open and fully-fledged free market 
economy that offers opportunities for increasing economic traffic between 
Flanders and the partner countries and vice versa. Political stability is a 
requirement for Flemish trade and industry to invest in the region, whilst the 
creation of welfare in the region will result in increasing sales markets (Nota 
aan de Vlaamse regering, 2001: 11, cited in Vanden Berghe, Van Alstein and 
Neeb, 2004: 14).  
The importance of the economic benefit was reflected initially by the locating of the 
CEEP’s management within the economic development portfolio of the Flemish 
government. The attempts to work in conjunction with ‘Export Flanders’ to develop the 
trade relationship further reinforces the importance of the economic dimension of the 
programme. Furthermore, the Liberal coalition’s policy note, discussed above, made the 
economic dimension explicitly clear.  
The perceived economic and political benefits were clear motivations for the CEEP. 
However, the data also suggests that the two motivations were mutually supportive. It 
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has been suggested for example that the economic benefit was a means of cultivating 
legitimacy for the broader, political foreign policy of the Flemish Government;  
From the operation of the programme, and the specific methods of 
cooperation emphasized by its rules and regulations, it can be deduced that 
tapping into international opportunities for Flemish organizations and 
businesses created a domestic support for a Flemish international policy and 
can probably be deduced as an implicit objective of the programme in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This can be inferred from the obligation to 
involve a Flemish [civil society] partners alongside the [government] 
promoter [author’s translation] (Departement internationaal Vlaanderen, 
2009: 19).  
The attempt to cultivate domestic support for the international activities can be more 
than inferred to explain the method of delivery chosen for the project. According to civil 
servants responsible for the design of the programme, it was a deliberate and political 
decision by the government to involve Flemish organizations. As a senior civil servant 
recalls;  
I think my government at the time thought that by engaging all these kinds of 
intermediate organizations [from Flanders], they would offer quite a 
platform of support for Flemish international action... So by engaging and 
inviting all these, it was now and then about provinces or local authorities, 
schools, trade unions, companies, employers’ associations, so the living 
forces of society were engaged and participating in the programme which 
gave the programme in itself quite some social support. From that 
perspective, the Flemish government’s international policy was very well 
supported by society. Maybe not by individuals but by society, and there was 
quite some consensus about the meaning, and the objectives, and the profits 
that it would make over time to this part of the world.xv 
The activity itself, through its design and implementation, was simultaneously 
constructing its own legitimacy, and legitimacy for the broader notion of Flanders as an 
international actor. Economic legitimacy was combined with the political goal of 
inserting Flanders more generally onto the international stage. These notions were 
mutually supportive and the government certainly recognized both economic and 
political benefits.  
The Flemish Government was also not simply constructing legitimacy through 
discourse; talking of the notion of Flanders as an international actor to a passive 
domestic audience. Rather, the CEEP went further and ‘made’ the domestic audience the 
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very agents of that activity. An arguably more direct means of constructing the notion 
of, and legitimacy for Flanders as an international actor; ‘constructing through action’.  
The reform of the programme in 2001 further clarified the objectives of what was also 
becoming an increasingly coordinated and centrally managed programme. The political 
lead moved toward prioritising the economic benefit, leaving the political or democratic 
component of the CEEP to increasingly emulate the EU norms. Supporting the accession 
process in the partner countries became a focal point for planners not only because of 
the benefit to the partners seeking EU membership, but also as it was deemed that their 
membership ‘offers opportunities for Flanders to weigh more heavily on the European 
agenda in future’ (Nota aan de Vlaamse regering: 2001: 11 cited in Vanden Berghe, Van 
Alstein and Neeb, 2004: 14). The programme had been identified by the Government 
itself as a means of becoming not only an internationally acceptable partner, but one of 
a specific kind; an internationally acceptable European partner; a more specific 
‘insertion’ onto the international stage. The influence of the broader, continental norms 
and objectives are a clear influence at the reform phase of the programme.  
4.2.6 Concluding remarks 
The CEEP was political paradiplomacy, a project which saw international cooperation 
for democracy and economic reform in another country as a means of inserting 
Flanders as an acceptable international actor. It was also an opportunity for the 
government to project particular values – aligning explicitly with both the EU and the 
great liberal internationalist causes of the age. This was coupled with the strategic 
coordination across departments to ensure benefit for both the partner state’s, as well 
as Flanders’ economy. Ingrained in this project are both democracy promotion 
programmes as well as a very particular understanding of the role of ‘democracy’ as a 
means of ensuring political stability and healthy economic conditions.  
Nonetheless, the actual assistance offered is rather distinctive in early phases, with a 
focus upon social dialogue and overleg; what Flemish practitioners perceive as 
something they ‘do well’. It is the adoption of global norms and practices, specifically the 
EU’s criteria for programme selection and evaluation, that erodes or diminishes the 
space for a distinctive, ‘Flemish’ focus within the democracy assistance.  
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With regard to opportunity structures the generous constitutional empowerment of 
Flanders as an international actor in a variety of fields created opportunities for a 
Flemish government. The willingness of the Central and Eastern European partners to 
engage, and the dampening of the security context were also key global factors 
facilitating the programme. Agency meanwhile came from an ambitious CD&V 
government seeking to insert Flanders immediately after the 1993 reforms.  
4.3 Bilateral relations: the case of Chile 
Luc Van den Brande’s post-93 government also established two, long-lasting bilateral 
partnerships involving development and governance support. This section explores 
relations with post-Pinochet Chile.  
The partnership was based upon a bilateral treaty with Chile, signed in October 1995, 
after the demise of the Pinochet regime (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 
2005: 3). Much like the original conception of the CEEP, it can be seen as a general 
assistance programme involving technical and scientific exchanges or specific support 
in fields such as education which also involves the support of democracy. Given the 
much smaller budget, the evaluation and monitoring demands were lower. The 
programme of projects was developed from initial visits by Flemish staff and politicians 
and in consultation with Chilean officials. Though wide ranging, the programme 
included explicit programmes designed to support the development and sustainability 
of democracy in Chile.  
The particular global circumstances and turns of fate also serve as a facilitating context 
for the initiation and nature of the cooperation. The fall of Pinochet’s military 
dictatorship of Chile coincides with the constitutional reform process in Belgium 
culminating in the 1993 agreement bestowing upon the federated entities the rights to 
conclude treaties and send representations, creating the opportunity for bilateral 
relations. Concurrently, the demise of the bipolar geostrategic context in the early 
1990s served to dampen the security context and depoliticise much of the extra-




The time in which Flemish international policy was set-up or born is a very 
special one. It is the early 90s, we’ve had the collapse of the Soviet Union on 
the one hand, we’ve had Southern Africa being freed from Apartheid in the 
same period; we’ve had the transition from Pinochet Chile towards 
democracy almost the same time. And this new Flemish government 
acquiring new competences and given the, I don’t know how many state 
reforms, decided to go international. Whether they looked East or South in 
the world, this was so prominently on the international agenda that the 
Flemish government engaged these kinds of big transitions that took place. 
And if you would grab the policy notes from these years, you would read that 
support for young democracies is an objective that is often repeated and 
articulated quite explicitly. Be it in Europe, Africa, Latin America or 
whatever, thematically it was important at the time.xvi 
4.3.1 Democracy Promotion 
The democracy assistance programmes attempted to develop the links between 
governance structures and society, with a separate and specific emphasis on the 
indigenous, Mapuche communities in Chile. Once again, we may note an emphasis on 
the concept of overleg, and upon fostering social inclusion and mediation between 
society and the governance structures. It must be noted however that the Chile 
partnership received nowhere near the expenditure or scrutiny of the CEEP. This 
contributed to the largely free hand which Flemish staff enjoyed.  
The decision to emphasize social inclusion was a deliberate one, aimed to combat the 
perceived excesses of the neoliberal governance model imposed during the military 
dictatorship. As a senior official of the programme notes; 
If you reduce democracy to its procedural and legal and constitutional 
elements, that’s one way to see to it that you have fair and free elections 
every now and then. It’s very important but the whole story is about 
democratic society. So depending on where you enter in the democracy 
debate, I think some programmes may have been inspired by this desire to 
support social inclusion after a period that was, under the General Pinochet, 
very, very neoliberal. To keep democracy sustainable, I think there is a 
certain degree of social inclusion that you need to have. So it was about 
democracy but less explicit. It was explicit in that we would support a young 
democracy to be sustainable but not that we would think of ourselves as best 
to learn and to demonstrate how democracy should be organized.xvii 
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Indeed, the democratic deficit created by the neoliberal governance model is noted as a 
primary motivating factor for the programme’s democracy assistance element. The final 
report of the partnership states;  
During the 17 years of Chile's dictatorship, the government was dedicated to 
the preservation of the regime through repression and creating a favourable 
investment climate for foreign companies. The ‘policy’ was not to do much 
more. The first democratic governments after 1989 therefore had their 
hands full with the restoration of civil rights and fostering an economy that, 
despite everything had fallen into the doldrums [author’s translation] 
(Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 2005: 27). 
Clearly, the approach and thinking behind the particular model or aspects of democracy 
being promoted were contextualized with regard to the partner in this case.  
Nonetheless, Flemish officers recall no clear plan or strategy for the partnership and 
were largely left to develop the programmes on an ad hoc basis, building upon their 
expertise and the experience derived from visits and negotiations with Chilean officials. 
Once programmes were decided upon however, there was little if any Flemish 
governmental opposition or involvement. Indeed, as one officer recalls;  
Yes because, let’s say on the political side, they gave us carte blanche I can 
say. We still had to go to our minister and to our cabinet and say ‘look, these 
are the projects we want to do’ but then we presented the project with all the 
pros and not too many cons. And then, especially our first minister, Van den 
Brande, he was of course the one who signed the agreement from ’95 to ’98, 
he was very in favour of working together with Chile. He was never opposed 
to proposals. Then we had quite some money to work withxviii. 
The Fundacion Frei’s projects, run from 2003-2005, spending Euro101,090, offer an 
illustration of the type of democracy assistance involved in the partnership. Its goal was 
to engage in the; ‘Capacity building of local actors to achieve better local democracy in 
Chile, focusing on municipalities with a significant presence of Mapuche communities 
[author’s translation]’ (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 2005: 27). The project 
involved the training of local officials and supporting the establishment of public 
consultation exercises. A key achievement claimed by the project is; ‘the creation of 
communication channels and the 'practice' of basic democratic reflex [author’s 
translation]’ (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 2005: 27).  
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Social inclusion, improving the responsiveness of governance structures and a 
particular focus upon indigenous peoples characterise the nature and focus of the 
democracy assistance present within the Chile partnership. Encouraging overleg and an 
attempt at fostering the basic democratic reflex involving consultation and mediation 
between governance structures and society represent a deliberate attempt on behalf of 
Flemish officials to undo the perceived damage inflicted by the imposition of a 
repressive, neoliberal regime.  
Flanders’ assistance to democracy was of a particular kind; with the emphasis again on 
overleg and social dialogue, and an attempt to pull the partner back from what was 
deemed the excesses of the neoliberal governance regime.  
4.3.2 Motivations 
The motivation for the Chile partnership is less clear from the data sourced, and as 
Criekemans (2010b: 54) notes;  
The choice for Chile as a ‘bridge head’ into Latin America is however quite 
peculiar. Some observers question whether the “nine criteria” had anything 
to do with Chile becoming an important Flemish partner. 
The relevant criteria would be the prerequisite of the partner’s attachment to 
democracy and human rights (criteria 6); the potential for Flanders to develop 
solidarity actions with the partner in a meaningful way (criteria 7); and more loosely, 
the willingness for the partner to recognize Flanders as a fully-fledged partner (criteria 
9).  
Project officers of the time however emphasise the moral obligation to assist countries 
such as Chile as a motivation, particularly at that specific time; shortly after the fall of 
the military dictatorship and as the Chileans attempted to reinstate their democratic 
institutions and practices.xix Many interviewees also emphasized cultural and personal 
contacts between the two partners.xx Following the coup in 1973, many Chileans 
emigrated, thousands to settle in Belgian and Flemish cities such as Antwerp. Their 
involvement with the Christian Democrats over the following decades would result in a 
host of personal contacts between politicians who would, by the early 1990s, come to 
govern in the Flemish and new Chilean governments (see Hendrickx 2004: 31). Indeed 
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several members of the post-Pinochet government, as many as eight to the recollection 
of some,xxi were graduates of Flemish Universities. Other coincidental events such as the 
presence and coverage by Flemish journalist Maurice De Wilde, of the coup in 1973 
raised the profile of Chile within Flanders.xxii These connections are offered as the 
facilitating basis of the relationship and are explicitly referred to in the Government’s 
official report and justification of the Chile-Flanders partnership (Ministerie van de 
Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 2005: 10).  
In inserting itself onto the world stage, assisting the liberal revolutions in South Africa 
and Chile provided a means of both being involved in the key countries during the 
1990s, and to align with similar values and concerns, and portraying Flanders as an 
actor of a specific, liberal kind. Commitment to democratic advancement was, after all, 
an explicit criteria of partnership and, for cabinet members of the time, a ‘prerequisite 
for cooperation’.xxiii Indeed, in all three major bilateral programmes, all of which grew in 
scope and size with time, the targets were all ‘hot’ during the 1990s; post-soviet Central 
and Eastern Europe, South Africa and Chile. As a project officer recalls; 
I think they wanted to make a very strong statement because the two, 
especially from ’95 to 2000 and something, the two countries we were 
working together the most were Chile and South Africa. Both countries, one 
with Apartheid, Chile with a military dictatorship, so they were very, very 
young democracies and I think this was really an opportunity. Or let’s say, 
the Flemish government decided we have to help these democracies to 
develop into more mature countries with all the things that are for us, very 
normal. With all the being a state that’s working good, where citizens can feel 
safe and to be a more prosperous country. I think there was a really big... 
moral obligation.xxiv 
What better demonstrations of such a commitment to these globally great liberal 
internationalist causes that by assisting the transitions of Chile, South Africa and post-
soviet Europe? Inserting a specific, liberal-democratic Flanders onto the international 
stage, it could be argued, proved an important motivation and objective that the explicit 
criteria for bilateral relations and economic cooperation laid down originally. The 
democracy promoted however was neither evaluated nor monitored closely. The 
existence of the partnership itself appeared to satisfy government officials and political 
leaders. The specific governance support meanwhile was of a particular kind, again 
stressing the concept of overleg and social inclusion, particularly of excluded groups.  
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The constitutional set-up again acts as a key opportunity structure, and the willingness 
of global partners to engage bilaterally with Flanders further facilitated the endeavour. 
It could be argued that the global, liberal internationalist zeitgeist influenced the nature 
of the Flemish cooperation, focussed as it was on themes of democracy and 
development. The Flemish government, again the CD&V immediately after the 1993 
reforms, wielded the key agency that initiated the partnership. This was an agency and 
determination to initiate a relationship that was not echoed by later governments, even 
nationalist, whose political input and lead for the partnership was at most, minimal. 
4.4 Development Cooperation: South Africa, Malawi and 
Mozambique 
Flemish development assistance has its roots in the bilateral relationship established 
with South Africa following the collapse of the apartheid regime. However, following on 
from the Hermes agreement of April 2000, the Belgian Regions received a measure of 
competence and associated budget for overseas development assistance. The NVA’s 
Geert Bourgeois held the governmental portfolio at the time of the transfer of 
competence, and selected the countries of Mozambique and Malawi as partners. By 
2006 the Flemish International Cooperation Agency (FICA) had been established, an 
arms-length delivery body which was later incorporated into the Department for 
Foreign Affairs under the 2014-19 government. The constitutional empowerment built 
on the freedom to conclude treaties with other states, and the FICA become the key 
agency directing and developing the projects. These emerge as key opportunity 
structures facilitating and conditioning the Flemish development cooperation.  
It is argued in this section that, since the early period, in the absence of a political lead 
beyond the selection of partners, FICA have deliberately emulated the international 
development industry in their objectives, norms, and practices. Flanders has become a 
development donor just like any other. 
4.4.1 Choosing partners; ‘it’s a political decision’ 
The selection of partners as the partnerships were being set up was a functional one, in 
line with the international practice of targeting least developed countries (LDCs). The 
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decision not to select the Congo or the Great Lakes region – which given Belgium’s 
legacy, was a potential alternative – can also be seen as a practical one due to the 
perceived potential challenges of the volatile political context of the region. As a senior 
civil servant claims; ‘I think we would be fooled around with constantly because the 
situation is that complex, we would not understand’.xxv   
However there is also a political element to the decision. This is admitted by 
department staff and development practitioners. In not selecting the Congo, the Flemish 
government was distancing itself from both the Belgian Federal Government (which is 
very active in the region) and the colonial legacy. As one long serving civil servant 
explains; 
Congo has always been a Belgian colony. We do not look at ourselves as 
being as Belgian as the Belgium government... It was about the Catholic 
church, it was about French-speaking 'haute finance' of this country engaging 
in its economic agenda, it was partly the story of our Monarchy. These things, 
they live in our collective memories but to draw an agenda for now? As a 
new and emerging micro-donor? Why the hell would we say ‘let’s start in 
Congo?’xxvi 
Or in a FICA staff member’s more candid assessment; ‘it’s a political decision’.xxvii This 
distancing and differentiation also contributed to the department's other explicit 
objective of 'putting Flanders on the map'. Using development assistance to differentiate 
Flemish activity from that of the Belgian Federal government is an attractive strategy 
for the nationalist party particularly. One N-VA government advisor suggests; 
[Federal development assistance is concentrated in] ...Rwanda and yes Great 
Lakes which are in fact francophone countries. But that’s traditional Belgian, 
or Federal development policy. And then you have the Flemish development 
policy which is more focused on Southern Africa. Maybe no coincidence that 
you want to have a counterweight, in countries which are Anglophone, or to 
shift the focus away from this traditional Central African development 
policy.xxviii 
It could also be argued that the ability of sub-states to differentiate themselves and 




Some rather political, historically connected sentiments that make it the wise 
thing to say let us go to the Southern Part which is more easy, take a fresh 
start from zero, in Malawi they have not ever heard from us before.xxix 
Flanders, due to its distinctiveness, or at least it’s difference from Belgium, has in 
Flemish officials’ eyes been at least somewhat able to detach itself and its assistance 
from a political past and a colonial legacy which can form a complicating and 
obstructive basis for development assistance. Kincaid’s claim of sub-states’ ability to 
engage more effectively in politically sensitive contexts may be worth recalling in this 
instance (Kincaid, 2010: 27), although the reason for doing so is more solipsistic, or self-
centred.  
4.4.2 FICA 
During the post-2000 period where Flanders held competence in the field of providing 
international development assistance, policy has technically been the responsibility of 
the Foreign Affairs department (DiV or Internationaal Vlaanderen at various times). Its 
implementation meanwhile has been the responsibility of FICA since its establishment 
in 2006. Nonetheless, in practice, FICA would be tasked with the actual drawing up of 
the broad strategy for international cooperation in relation to the policy notes provided 
by the minister. The department would then attain approval from the minister before 
engaging in its delivery, as well as preparing the more specific development assistance 
strategies for individual countries; the Country Strategy Papers (CSP). Flemish 
government involvement in the development of the strategy has been very rare and 
approval for FICA’s proposals always forthcoming. In practice therefore, FICA has 
played the key role in designing, developing and implementing international 
development policy since 2006. 
Established in April 2006 as a government funded intermediate organization, FICA was 
located between the department and the deliverers of assistance, with a complement of 
around 29 members of staff.xxx Following a reorganization of the foreign affairs 
department in 2014 however, the agency was incorporated into the government 
department and directly accountable to the minister. Staff members however have 
remained within the same division of the department, many of whom have professional 




The five duties of FICA are; 
1. bilateral cooperation with partners in the South 
2. support to activities and actions of indirect actors 
3. cooperation actions via multilateral organisations 
4. enhanced public support and awareness raising 
5. emergency relief and humanitarian aid 
(FICA, 2012: 5) 
Development assistance is provided through bilateral support programmes, support to 
indirect actors and through multilateral organizations. The direct and indirect bilateral 
cooperation accounts for between Euro9-12m of annual expenditure from 2006-2013 
(DiV, 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; Internationaal Vlaanderen, 2010; 2011; 2012; Flemish 
Department of Foreign Affairs, 2014: 10). Bi-multi assistance (Flemish funding for 
specific ILO or UNESCO projects in the partner countries through trust funds) accounts 
for a further Euro12.5m by 2013, although this strategy of funding Flemish involvement 
with multilateral organizations such as the ILO is a recent development.xxxii Multilateral 
expenditure varies widely from Euro1.5m to almost Euro12m annually due to the 
expenditure often being counted within the ‘bi-multi’ line. The agency is also 
responsible for raising awareness of development assistance in the ‘North’ (mainly in 
Flanders) as well as coordinating the provision of emergency relief and humanitarian 
aid (FICA, 2012: 5). Overall, ODA expenditure plateaued at around Euro50m by 2009-
2012. This represents a notable increase from the Euro8.2m budget in 1995 for the 
South African and Chilean partnerships (Verbeke and Waeterloos, 2010: 7).  
Most interesting is the success achieved by FICA in protecting their budget, particularly 
during a period of budgetary austerity. It has already scored a success in the symbolic 
adoption of the 0.7% of GDP expenditure goal, the global norm regarding the amount 
for a state to be spending on international development aid. The avoidance of cuts to its 
budget, even as the bilateral and CEEP programmes were being wound down, suggests 
that the activity itself is valued above bilateral relations or other international activity. 
The justification offered often has a moral tone and portrays international development 
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as a particularly valuable activity. One civil servant suggests that domestic public 
opinion values the activity more than other kinds; 
...I think a big factor is that public opinion values more development 
cooperation because it comes more in the news and it’s morally higher than 
bilateral relations. Development cooperation is ‘helping poor people’ or 
‘helping poor states and countries’, ‘helping to get them better’. Bilateral 
relations no. But the funny thing is, in our bilateral relations with Chile, one 
of the big issues has been to work with the groups with the most problems. 
But it’s not conceived like that by the public opinion because they don’t 
know that.xxxiii  
Political forces concurred with the moral virtue of involvement with a great liberal 
cause such as international development. A former government advisor suggested it 
was a symbol of Flanders’ solidarity and its attempt to meet its explicitly stated foreign 
policy goals, and to cut such assistance would undermine the symbolic value of the 
activity; 
Yeah, that’s also a symbol of solidarity. In the past we always said we should 
spend 0.7% of our budget to development policy. We didn’t reach that, it was 
part of that. If we now would cut back on that part of a goal we did not even 
reach, if we would go back on that; that would give a bad impression... So it’s 
a matter of solidarity, symbolic also. You cannot afford yourself to cut your 
solidarity with the so called third world, or the developing world.xxxiv 
FICA, though technically subordinate to the government department and minister, has 
led the government’s international development policy. Development as an activity is 
firmly established, understood, and protected as a moral or altruistic endeavour, though 
this understanding is based on popular conceptions. Key norms such as the 0.7% GDP 
expenditure have been institutionalized and political influenced minimized. In its role as 
the institution guiding and developing policy and practice, isolated from much political 
involvement, it has looked to the development industry in order to adopt and emulate 
norms and practices of a ‘good development practitioner’. The details of this emulation 
is explored in the following sections that focus on the Country Strategy Papers, and the 
specific democracy or governance projects. It is argued that FICA has coordinated the 
way in which Flanders understands, and ‘does’ international development. 
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4.4.3 Country Strategy Papers (CSP) 
CSPs are designed every four years (2008-1012 and 2012-2016). They are the broad 
policy framework for the projects in specific partner countries and are in theory 
developed alongside the government of the partner country who provide FICA with the 
information regarding the country and nature of programmes required. The advantage 
for Flanders is a lighter workload and less need to identify areas for assistance – the 
partner supplies this. However in practice, this may not always prove possible as the 
capacity of the partner may be lacking.xxxv  
Closer examination of the CSPs and the related work in the partner countries reveals a 
determination on behalf of FICA to emulate and adhere to the norms and practices of 
the wider development assistance community. Explicitly stated on the department’s 
website is its determination to ground Flanders’ development assistance in global 
practices and norms;  
In order to be a modern and reliable donor, it is essential that the Flemish 
policy regarding development cooperation is aligned with the international 
development agenda. In the partner countries, attention is devoted to the 
political, economic and social developments. Internationally, the Flemish 
Department of Foreign Affairs keeps track of the specialist conferences, in 
particular those regarding aid effectiveness (Paris 2005, Accra 2008), the 
financing for development and the Millennium Development Goals. The 
developments within the region of Southern African (SADC) are also closely 
monitored. The Cotonou Agreement, the EU-Africa Strategy and the EPAs 
that are being negotiated between the EU and the Southern African Regions 
(SADC) deserve special attention in this respect. The large themes from the 
international trade policy (Doha Development Round, Aid for Trade, market 
access) are often oriented to increasing the capacity of enterprise in the 
South. Harmonisation with initiatives regarding international enterprise is 
also important in this context. 
The Flemish Department of Foreign Affairs (DiV) keeps track of international 
trends and developments in the field of development cooperation and 
translates them into useful policy recommendations.  
(Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs Website, 2015)  
The determination to emulate the global practices and norms is also openly admitted by 
the departmental staff responsible for developing the strategies;  
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…we have tried to live up to the standards as set by the international 
community, be it first the Paris declaration or whatever was following. 
Trying to comply to the standards of the international community for 
member states. And that’s how we operated.xxxvi 
FICA’s annual reports also consistently reiterate the agency’s determination to emulate 
norms and practices such as contributing to the realisation of the MDGs and ‘an efficient 
implementation of international cooperation and to that end applies the international 
consensus on good donor practice’ (Flanders International Cooperation Agency, 2012: 
7). Put in a broader perspective, Flanders’ policy is to fully align its international 
cooperation programmes with the development cooperation policy of the EU.  
More specifically the CSPs anchor its development policy to the key principles, practices 
and goals of the European development community; 
3.1. Principles of cooperation: Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action 
 
Flanders’ programme of cooperation with South Africa aims to contribute to 
the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals in South Africa and to 
align with the Medium-Term Strategic Framework 2009-2014 of the South 
African Government. Both governments commit themselves to undertake 
their cooperation within the framework of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda of Action (2008) and the Fourth High 
Level Forum in Busan (South Korea, 2011). 
(Internationaal Vlaanderen, [no dateA]: 14) 
Regular reviews of the implementation of development cooperation in partner 
countries form the basis for further development and improvement of the programmes. 
The Joint Medium Term Review of the programmes in Malawi declares that it...  
...was also conducted in view of the Principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonisation mutual responsibility 
and result-based management (Internationaal Vlaanderen, 2012b: 7).  
Progress in aligning Flemish assistance with the Paris Declaration for example are 
utilized as a specific indication of the overall success of the partnerships;  
3.3 Progress with regard to the Paris Declaration 
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...out of 12 indicators, Malawi met five and made progress on four indicators. 
Performance on alignment has been generally good while progress on 
harmonisation has been limited (Internationaal Vlaanderen, 2012b: 10). 
The Declaration has even provided the reasoning and the means by which specific 
programmes are selected and commissioned. Mechanisms to improve the accountability 
and governance such as the Aid Management Policy; Debt and Aid Division; Aid 
Management Platform; and Public Sector Investment Programme, were all implemented 
as a part of the Malawi Government’s framework for the Declaration of Paris and to 
improve compliance and alignment with the Paris agenda (Internationaal Vlaanderen, 
2012b: 10). Key pillars of the global development community, its practices and norms 
such as the Paris Declaration, the MDGs or the Accra agenda are consistently utilized as 
yardsticks by which Flanders measures and defines the success of its assistance.  
Likewise, with regard to the pulling of funding or even attaching a ‘negative linkage’ to 
the assistance, Flanders again looks to the industry. While funding has been postponed 
and redirected into ‘neutral’ accounts to protect from corruption, no funding has, as of 
yet, been pulled from partners. However, democratic and human rights concerns have 
sparked consideration of such action, as a senior FICA official claims; 
There have been discussions for instance in Mozambique...the last elections, 
there have been lots of problems with the results, these elections there are 
problems again but the last elections and there have been lots of talks with 
the Embassy because one of the smaller parties, I think the MBM have been 
complaining that the elections have not been free and fair.xxxvii  
However, FICA turn to global actors in development for the lead with regard to pulling 
funding – specifically the EU. The same FICA official stated; 
The EU has been coordinating the reactions of the donors in Malawi and 
there the decision was not to pull back so we haven’t pulled back, we decided 
not to do it. If the EU would have done it, then we would have stopped our 
aid as well.xxxviii 
With regard to development policy therefore, there has been a deliberate and explicit 
attempt to fully integrate into the “industry” and its norms and practices.  
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4.4.4 Good Governance and Democracy 
Democracy occupies an important role in the CSPs’ stated aims; ‘...it is the Flemish 
Government’s ambition to contribute to a prosperous and democratic world through its 
partnerships’ (Flemish Government, [no dateC]: 12). Indeed, civil servantsxxxix and 
politicians claim that a commitment to democracy is a necessary precursor to the 
receipt of Flemish assistance; ‘We would never have given something when it was not 
coupled with respect for human rights and democracy’.xl  
As a measure of its role within the entire assistance package, between 12-18% of FICA’s 
budget is spent on governance related projects annually (Flemish Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014: 16). Democracy and more specifically, good governance also 
occupies an important and explicit position in the strategy and is understood as the 
means of facilitating the implementation of broader development programmes; 
Good governance is central to the successful implementation of projects and 
programmes. It entails proper management of public finances, better service 
delivery, mutual accountability and the participation of the beneficiaries in 
delivery processes. Capacity building will have to be dealt with in all 
initiatives, benefiting all stakeholders involved in the implementation, 
including programme management teams, service providers and final 
beneficiaries (Flemish Government, [no dateA]: 17). 
The types of democracy or governance programmes that are commissioned often aim to 
facilitate the implementation of broader development programmes as seen with the 
South Africa Provincial Legislatures Support Programme which ran from 2009-2011.  
The South Africa Provincial Legislatures (SAPL) Programme is a capacity 
building program with nine provincial governments regarding their 
legislative duties, government structure and their function as 
representatives of the people. The focus is on assisting the provincial 
government in the institutionalization of a gender agenda and to develop 
HIV-AIDS policy and also focuses one on strengthening cooperation between 
local and provincial governments, and the training of provincial legislature 
members, chief whips and staff working on legislation and financial 
management [author’s translation] (Internationaal Vlaanderen, 2011: 33). 
Receiving a subsidy of Euro300,000 from the outset and a further Euro120,000 in 2011,  
the EU’s Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA) were 
commissioned to implement the programme.  
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However, more explicit and specifically governance-only programmes are also funded, 
such as the Local Governance Policy Unit which operated in the Free State for a decade 
which involved; ‘Capacity building for municipalities in the Free State by educating 
councillors and managers with the aim of improving the management and development 
of their territory’ [author’s translation] (Internationaal Vlaanderen, 2011: 33).  
FICA also co-funds more explicit democracy promotion vehicles such as the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) operating in South Africa on four-year funding 
cycles. Established in 1995 as a partnership between Black Sash, the Human Rights 
Committee and the Institute for Democracy, the organization (an NGO since 2009) 
provides a range of monitoring services.  
 PMG aims promote the link between government and civil society 
organisations so that disadvantaged people on the ground are made 
aware of the programmes available to them.  
 Government officials and their political heads recognise 
“accountability as a norm” in the implementation of their 
programmes for small enterprise development, sustainable 
smallholder agriculture and food security. 
 PMG aims to provide a link in the provincial-national chain with 
National Treasury at the helm. 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2012: 2) 
The PMG is a far more explicit programme for supporting and developing South African 
democracy than the less explicit good governance schemes aimed to facilitate other 
initiatives. Notably, it could be understood as an agency which looks to develop the 
consultation, cooperation and connections between government, provincial or regional 
government and civil society – an attempt at developing overleg in South Africa.  
Digging a little deeper however, attention could also be drawn to the particular focus of 
the attempts at promoting overleg and its seeming targeting of the specific link between 
government and businesses in particular – especially small enterprises and the 
smallholder agriculture sector. The National Assembly Committees which the PMG 
proposes to monitor with the funding from FICA are Agriculture; Economic 
Development; Trade and Industry; Rural Development and Land Reform; as well as the 
provincial Land and Environment and Economic Development committees. If the 
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overleg is developed anywhere, it is in relation to business and the governance 
structures.  
In comparison to South Africa however, which is understood by the Flemish 
government to be more developed, the development programmes in Malawi and 
Mozambique, both LDCs, are more elementary in nature. The CSPs here acknowledge 
the central role governance plays in the facilitation and implementation of development 
programmes and corruption and governance issues are identified as key challenges in 
the countries (Internationaal Vlaanderen, [no dateB]: 8). The strategy focuses 
programming on support for the agriculture sector and food security but acknowledges 
the need to place emphasis on governance issues within those sectors; 
Within the frame of Malawi’s development priorities and the support to the 
agricultural and food security sector, major emphasis will be put on gender, 
climate change and good governance in the 2014-2018 programmes, as 
recommended in the Joint Mid-term Review on development cooperation 
between Malawi and Flanders (Internationaal Vlaanderen, [no dateB]: 23). 
As FICA staff suggest, governance and human rights programmes are conducted in 
order to support the implementation of development programmes in the agriculture 
and food sectors. Governance is considered ‘transversal issue’ alongside gender and 
climate change. For example;  
Governance is a transversal issue... I think because we are working with and 
paying the salaries of those technical assistants which are involved in the 
health sectors so we contribute to governance but that is at the 
administrative level. Then there is the issue of human rights. Last year 
[2013] our government funded a seminar in Malawi on economic, cultural 
and social rights in Southern Africa, with the focus on food security. So the 
seminar was dealing with the issue of the right to food.xli 
Governance and democracy has come to occupy an important part of Flemish 
development assistance, fully integrated into the global industry. There is little 
discernible difference or distinctiveness within Flanders’ development assistance 
compared to other state donors in the field. Flanders is largely, just another donor. 
4.4.5 Human Rights 
The Flemish Government also claims it has; 
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...the ambition to integrate human rights as a cross-cutting theme in its 
international relations. This shows Flanders’ commitment to being a 
solidarity-based federated state, within as well as beyond its borders... Better 
respect of human rights by all states contributes to the development of a 
more democratic, more peaceful and safer international order.  (Flanders 
Department of Foreign Affairs, 2015a). 
Clearly viewing the promotion of rights through a liberal lens, the Flemish Government 
promotes and supports human rights with the explicit intention of supporting the 
infrastructure of democracy in partner states. The conceptualization of human rights 
can be discerned from the Government’s policy document intended to inform and guide 
the development of programmes. Four themes form the core of this policy; respect for 
the physical integrity of people; anti-discrimination; the rights of children; and the right 
to decent work (Departement Internationaal Vlaanderen, 2015: 22).  
Again, international conventions and what may be termed pillars of global human rights 
policy are consistent reference points for Flemish human rights policy. The UN’s 
Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as Flanders’ own Action Plan on the Rights 
of the Child (itself developed in reference to the UN Convention), explicitly anchor the 
approach to promoting child rights (Departement internationaal Vlaanderen, 2015: 26). 
The Government emphasizes the activities that are in-line with its stated policy and the 
global conventions and norms such as it attempts at ‘...urging partner countries to ratify 
and convert the international acquis in the area of the rights of the child’ (Departement 
internationaal Vlaanderen, 2015: 25). Not only does Flanders emulate the norms of the 
global human rights community, but it then actively propagates them. 
There is also a focus within the policy upon the rights of indigenous and non-sedentary 
peoples for example, echoes a similar approach evident within Flanders’ bilateral 
programme with Chile. However, even this specific focus defers to the European 
Commission with regard to constructing policy; 
In line with the ten fundamental community principles on the integration of 
the Roma (European Roma platform, 2009) and as part of the “national 
strategy for the integration of the Roma” as requested by the European 
Commission, the Government of Flanders has drawn up an action plan for 
Central and Eastern European (Roma) migrants (Departement 
internationaal Vlaanderen, 2015: 25). 
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The activities engaged in to support and promote human rights are cross-cut into 
broader development cooperation such as the promotion of gender rights alongside 
healthcare development programmes or even specific programmes such as the ‘Forum 
Muhler’ run project to improve the human rights and gender situation in Mozambique. 
The project aims to; 
•improve the quality of provision of services to victims of domestic violence 
against women by monitoring the implementation of the law on this subject 
•improve female rights, more specifically women’s right on safe abortion 
•reinforce the organisation in the field of monitoring and evaluation 
(Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs, 2015b) 
FICA has played a central and key role in developing Flemish international development 
policy and practice. It has done so without political lead or interference beyond the 
selection of partners. In doing so, it has adopted the norms and practices of the 
international development industry. The CSPs and specific projects take a lead from 
international guidance, while governance and human rights, also based on international 
definitions and practices, have emerged as integral, cross-cutting elements of Flanders’ 
development programmes. Flanders has deliberately aligned its international 
development programme to global industry norms, practices, and standards. In turn it 
has institutionalized and become a practitioner and propagator of those global 
development norms. 
Clearly the devolution of competence for international development was a key 
opportunity structure allowing the Flemish government to engage in the activity. But 
global development norms, FICA, and its emulation of those norms and practices go a 
long way to explaining how the activity was conducted. The Flemish government is the 
key agent in initiating the activity meanwhile, but FICA’s management is also crucial in 




4.5.1 Opportunity structures of Flemish democracy promotion 
Drawing on the Lecourian framework, this section will summarise the opportunity 
structures and their relationship with promoting democracy in the Flemish case. The 
revised framework posits eleven key variables that work so as to construct 
opportunities for agency at the sub-state level. This section will discuss the opportunity 
structures. The latter sub-section addresses the agency of successive Flemish 
governments, arguing that the nationalist party was not the source of the agency behind 
Flemish democracy promotion.  
While there was some pre-existing association with Chile, there was nothing that 
marked the domestic political context as one that structured incentives or opportunities 
to engage in the promotion of democracy abroad. While the nationalist NVA has come to 
dominate Flemish politics since the mid-2000s, its dominance has not been 
accompanied by a focus within political debate upon democracy promotion, or even 
international affairs more generally. 
The powers and institutional capacity of the Flemish government proved crucial 
however. Whether by use of its block budget to allocate substantial funding to the CEEP, 
restructuring departments to serve the management of international affairs, or the 
establishment of FICA, Flanders has shown itself able to resource and sustain 
substantial international activities. 
The constitutional definition of competence makes Flanders the legitimate actor in 
international affairs in the devolved fields. Consequently, Flanders is obligated to 
engage internationally in the realm of international development, and has the legal basis 
for developing democracy promotion programmes such as the CEEP or within its 
bilateral relations. After all, ‘...Belgian constituent units enjoy fully legitimate and legal 
direct access to the international stage’ (Bursens and Massart-Pierard, 2009: 97). Along 
with the institutional capacity, this opportunity structure is key in creating 




Interestingly, due to the government’s decision to initiate its democracy programmes as 
Flanders, not as a part of Belgium, the intergovernmental relations or its representation 
within state foreign policy were not relevant for structuring opportunities. They did not 
either however, prove a means by which the central state could restrict or halt the 
Flemish government from engaging in its democracy activities, nor influence their 
nature. It should be noted however that Flemish activities did not run against Belgian 
foreign policy. 
Supra-national political and/or economic institutions and international organizations 
played only a limited role, much later in the lifespan of the CEEP. Norms and practices 
were emulated or adopted from the EU’s democracy programmes following a reform in 
the early 2000s. Much like involvement as part of Belgium, any involvement with EU 
programmes would diminish the CEEP’s capacity to simultaneously ‘put Flanders on the 
map’, and Flemish distinctiveness would be less explicit. 
Naturally, the willingness of Flanders’ partners to cooperate, sometimes explicitly for 
the development of democracy, has been key in creating opportunities for democracy 
promotion. Importantly also is the particular time-period, during the dampened 
security context of the liberal revolutions in the 1990s, within which the partners 
opened themselves to Flanders. Indeed, the Flemish government freely admit to the 
global security context being key in their own literature (Departement internationaal 
Vlaanderen, 2009: 20). This could be contrasted perhaps with the vexed security 
context surrounding the Arab Spring, and notable reluctance from Flemish governments 
to engage in the region during the late 2000s. 
The transnational communication of global industry norms proved important in the post-
reformed CEEP as officials aligned its projects to established democracy promotion 
practices. But it is in the field of international development that the adoption, emulation, 
and propagation of industry norms and practices has proved particularly marked. They 
are key to understanding how Flanders engages in international development.  
For Flanders’ promotion of democracy, it is evident that the capacity of Flanders to 
engage abroad and its constitutional imperative to do so are key opportunity structures 
for its government. The norms and practices of the development industry proved 
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important also in understanding how democracy is promoted more implicitly through 
Flanders’ development work. Meanwhile, the global political context is acknowledged as 
a key facilitating factor for partners to engage with Flanders, and in democracy related 
activities.  
 4.5.2 Agency 
The key political agency in the Flemish case can be clearly identified as the successive 
governments of Flanders. However, the international agency fluctuates. There was 
clearly a period of intense activity and effort to define the international role of Flanders, 
its policy, and establish its activities soon after the 1993 reforms. The desire to ‘put 
Flanders on the map’ emerges as a consistent and explicit motivation for engaging in the 
democracy promotion activities. With the exception of official development assistance, 
the key foreign activities beyond economic paradiplomacy were initiated by the Van den 
Brande government. The later governments of Flanders did not attempt to develop 
similar projects. The CD&V led government of Luc Van den Brande defined and set the 
path for Flemish foreign policy. Even after the devolution of competence for 
international development, beyond partner selection, the policy and practice was left to 
FICA. Without a political lead, it looked to the global industry as it emulated, practiced, 
and propagated common, global norms and practices.  
The broad principles of Flemish foreign policy have remained largely untouched. The 
data suggests that international activities are not high on the domestic political agenda, 
and there have not been major efforts to diverge from Van den Brande’s core strategic 
objectives. Nor has the domestic political context given any impetus or compulsion to 
develop or even discuss international activities, despite the frequent presence of a 
nationalist party in government.  
The instrumental agency in the Flemish case was the Van den Brande government 
during the period following the constitutional reforms and effective creation of the 
modern Flemish sub-state in 1993. The government at the time pursued and 
institutionalized an explicit strategy of inserting Flanders onto the global stage. The 
CEEP had clear economic advantages, while the early Chilean and South African 
partnerships had a moral grounding, but these activities, engaging in the great liberal 
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internationalist causes of the age, had clear and acknowledged domestic benefits for the 
government in constructing, defining, and institutionalizing Flanders’ international 
identity and actorness.  
4.5.3 Understanding the democracy promotion of Flanders 
In the Flemish case there are instances of explicit attempts to promote democracy 
abroad, most notably through the CEEP, by supporting Chile’s transition, and more 
implicitly through its international development programme. While partly an attempt to 
support the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, the CEEP is also an 
explicit attempt to establish market and economic ties with partners. The CEEP can also, 
along with the Chile and development partnerships, be seen as attempts to ‘put 
Flanders’ on the map. This included not only the linking of companies and the markets 
but also the governance of those markets and the broader economic thinking. More 
importantly, particularly in selecting the liberal internationalist causes of the age – 
supporting post-Pinochet Chile and engaging in international development – Flanders 
has attempted to insert a particular notion of Flanders onto the map. Indeed the CEEP, it 
is argued, was a means of constructing an international character and garnering 
domestic support for the notion of Flanders’ place on the international ‘stage’ or of 
‘putting Flanders on the map’.  
The CEEP, as with the bilateral relations, was initiated during a very early, formative 
period of Flanders’ post-1993 existence. With time however, political lead and interest 
evaporated, while management of programmes drifted toward the EU and industry 
norms and standards until finally the programme came to an end. In adopting those 
norms and practices however, project selection criteria, and evaluation methods and 
indices for the CEEP, the distinctly and perhaps ‘organically’ Flemish approach to the 
activities are dropped. These had been most notable in the form of attempts to develop 
and operationalise the concept of overleg within partner countries. The audience 
meanwhile, by being made the practitioners of the CEEP, were organizations within 
Flemish society.  
The Chile partnership, facing much less scrutiny than the CEEP, was allowed to pursue 
its own approaches in an ad hoc fashion until its eventual demise. Once more, social 
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inclusion and overleg was present in the activities, but a drift toward European or 
international institutions, norms, or practices was not witnessed.  
The development industry meanwhile is understood as a key factor in explaining how 
and even where the Flemish development assistance work is conducted. In the absence 
of a political lead or desire for variation, FICA explicitly sought to emulate the industry 
practices and adopt its norms which in turn involves the implicit promotion of 
democracy. Indeed there is little if anything to distinguish Flanders from any other state 
donor.  
Generally, for the most empowered and free-to-act case, a notable shift has taken place 
toward globally prevalent practices. This shift is reflected in the governance reforms 
relating to international activities, from the concentrated power of Luc Van den Brande, 
through a process of departmental verticalization and gradual alignment to and 
adoption of broader global norms and practices, and finally toward the emerging new 
government departments such as FICA that explicitly and deliberately aim to ensure 
that Flanders’ engagement is as closely aligned to the industry as possible. 
Clearly the constitutional set-up and associated budgetary control for the broad 
competences of the Flemish government has been very facilitating of Flemish 
international activity. The global political context of the 1990s is also acknowledged as a 
key factor in Flanders’ ability to develop, in the form of the CEEP, an explicit and 
independent international cooperation programme that included significant elements of 
governance and democratic support. Specifically, the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
dampening of the security context, and the ‘opening’ of Central and Eastern European 
societies (and economies), facilitated the foray onto the international stage without the 
risk of a backlash or responses to their interventions. The stark contrast with the 
diminishing emphasis on independent and bilateral activity in the second decade of the 
Flemish government supports the notion that the global political and security context 
impact the opportunity for independent or bilateral political activity.  
The nationalist party however, did not drive the early, and most prominently and 
independently Flemish activities such as the CEEP or the Chile partnership. The CD&V 
party at the time was the regional political force concerned with defining Flanders’ role 
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in the world. ‘Putting Flanders on the map’ was one of the core and earliest priorities of 
Flemish foreign policy – its (sub-)national interest. The construction of a particular 
notion of Flemish international actorness is not necessarily the domain of nationalists 
alone, but rather at least a shared motivation and conditioning factor of Flemish foreign 
policy.  
In understanding Flemish democracy promotion we may note that there is a (sub-
)national interest, which is to project Flanders onto the map, particularly during the 
period after the 1993 reforms. Structurally, there are clear opportunities for the 
Flemish executive to pursue that (sub-)national interest, particularly within the 
international political and security context of the 1990s. In doing so, and in attempting 
to ‘put Flanders on the map’, the government has attempted to project a particular 
notion of Flanders, engaging with the great liberal projects of the age – supporting 
democracy and development in Central and Eastern Europe, post-apartheid South 
Africa, post-Pinochet Chile, and sub-Saharan LDCs.    
The Flemish governments have attempted not only to project Flanders onto the map by 
engaging in these projects, but to contribute in a distinctive manner, by emphasizing 
overleg. This desire diminished somewhat with time, manifesting itself in a distinctly 
less enthusiastic view of bilateral activities that are explicitly Flemish in nature. The 
diminishing political interest in these activities have coincided with the move toward 
the democracy and development industries for a lead in how and where the activities 





Chapter 5: Maryland 
This second of three case studies explores the democracy promotion activities found in 
Maryland, US. It will generate data for a comparative analysis and better understanding 
of sub-state democracy promotion, the basis for answering the third research question. 
It will begin with an overview of the domestic structures highlighted by the Lecourian 
framework, followed by an exploration of instances of democracy promotion. It will 
argue that though devoid of agency in political matters, and not understood as a 
democracy promotion actor, Maryland nonetheless acts as an opportunity structure for 
broader democracy organizations that subcontract its officials and knowledge in service 
of broader democracy promotion programmes.  
5.1.1 USA 
Though inhabited for 15,000 years and colonized by European powers using African 
slave labour for almost 300 years, it was not until the late 18th century that the North 
American continent could claim a globally accepted independent nation state. After a 
war of independence rejecting British monarchical and aristocratic rule, thirteen 
colonies – what would become the founding states – declared independence and formed 
the United States of America. Following the revolution and during the 19th Century 
particularly, the United States’ expansion westward to the Pacific coast involved the 
incorporation of former French, Mexican, Texan, Spanish, more British, and American 
Indian territories which would in turn become US states. By the turn of the 20th Century, 
45 states had been admitted and a further 5 by 1959, including the only two without a 
land border with another US state; Alaska and Hawaii. The rapid economic and 
demographic growth of the US and the states during the latter half of the 19th and early 
20th Centuries have strong links with the territorial expansion, immigration from 
Europe, and mainly African slave labour.  From its origins, states have played a key role 
in the constitutional and international history of the country. The domestic and extra-
domestic development and growth of the United States is intimately tied with the states. 
US States predate and themselves formed the centralized, federal government as 




Throughout its history however, the relationship between the federal and state 
governments has evolved considerably, with the general tendency toward increasing 
centralization of power. Disputes between federal and state levels over legal and 
political sovereignty came to a head during the Civil War, when secessionist states were 
decisively defeated and a more powerful federal level emerged (see McPherson, 1988). 
Banking institutions and reforms further strengthened the federal government’s 
position, and during the early 20th Century the presidential terms of Franklyn Roosevelt 
involved the New Deal. The huge federal work and welfare programme in response to 
the economic depression significantly increased the power of the federal government. 
Federal grants were channelled to through the state administrations for specific, 
economy-stimulating ends. Further enlargement of federal programmes during the 
1950s and 1960s again increased the federal government’s domestic power, however, 
as arguably with the New Deal, the state and particularly their Governors’ role was 
strengthened by the control given to them of the federal aid (see Elazar, 1966). 
The only significant exception to the tendency toward centralization and empowerment 
of the federal level at the expense of states, is the more recent, New federalism. Ronald 
Reagan’s move to provide block grants rather than funnel specific and tightly defined 
funding programmes through the states is a prominent example such an approach. 
Control of block rather than specific grants placed state executives in stronger and more 
flexible positions (see Conlan, 1998). 
5.1.2 Maryland and its governance 
Beyond the constitutional set-up, each state is unique in its demographic, historical, 
economic, and cultural DNA. Any attempt to identify a “typical” state, representative or 
all others, is doomed once the detail is delved into. Maryland however exhibits a range 
of demographic, economic and cultural characteristics that it shares with many other 
states. Sitting around the “halfway up” line on the East coast of the USA, the huge 
Chesapeake bay dominates the geography of the Eastern half of the state while a strip of 
land extends westward, ever-narrowing inland toward the Shenandoah valley. It 
borders Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia, and three quarters of the 
District of Columbia – itself former Maryland territory. The western, mainly agricultural 
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land gives way to commuter towns and the I270 technology corridor around 
Washington while moving north west will unveil the outer districts, then the 
metropolitan area of the large city of Baltimore. The Eastern, coastal region is less dense 
in population and where the capital and centre of governance, Annapolis can be found 
on the Chesapeake Bay, at the mouth of the Severn River. Maryland’s population of 6 
million is overwhelmingly located in and around Baltimore and Washington.  
Politically, until 2016, only two Republican governors have been elected since Nixon’s 
controversial vice-President, Spiro Agnew resigned amidst a scandal in 1973. 
Electorally, Democrats collect healthy support in the heavily urbanized counties in 
Baltimore and around Washington, while the Republicans tend to perform well in the 
less populous, but more numerous rural and coastal counties. There are no notable 
nationalist parties, nor a particularly distinctive sub-national identity playing into the 
politics at either state or federal level. 
Unlike the dual federalism of Belgium or the asymmetric devolution of the UK, the US’s 
federal constitution confers identical powers upon each state. Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the 
constitution define US federalism and the responsibilities of states. The Tenth 
amendment establishes a reserved powers model by stating that any powers not 
granted to the federal government are within the states’ competence. The states are 
structured around the three branches of government; the executive, judiciary and 
legislature. Nebraska aside, states are bicameral, with an upper (Senate) and lower 
house (House of Representatives/Delegates or Assembly). The executive branch 
consists of an elected Governor who is accompanied by a range of other directly elected 
officials and a cabinet of departmental secretaries (however, states have the freedom to 
organize the executive departments in any way). There are significant constitutional 
similarities between the states and, despite some notable peculiarities, the study of a 
single state’s experience is more generalizable in the US’ case than, for example, Wales 
is in the case of the UK. 
5.1.3 International Affairs 
Increasing global interdependence between actors and policy communities often cited 
as an explanation for the growth and involvement of US states in economic, and what 
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chapter 2 referred to as co-operational paradiplomacy (see McMillan, 2012: 4-5; Fry, 
1998: 12-26; Kline, 1999: 134). The general theory is that an increasingly globalized 
and interconnected world has dragged the states into the international arena, and their 
executives have been presented with opportunities to engage abroad. Many domestic 
competences include an internationalized dimension such as economic development, 
education, tourism, and the environment that justify and demand state engagement. 
Indeed the internationalized elements of Maryland and other states’ domestic 
competences have indeed been pursued un-controversially for several decades.  
The basis for doing so derives from a loosely worded constitution, and the concurrent 
interpretation of that constitution. The US constitution prohibits states from engaging in 
binding agreements through Article 1, Section 10, which states that ; ‘No State shall 
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation’. The section proceeds to list further 
limitations on what states can engage in internationally. Kline (1996: 330) argues that 
this constitutional clause places a ‘hard’ boundary that excludes states from dealing 
with foreign entities. But as Kincaid has claimed, the constitution is more vague 
regarding international competence beyond this initial constraint. Authority for 
international activity has ‘rested largely on constitutional interpretation, political 
practice, historical tradition, and intergovernmental comity’ (Kincaid, 1999: 112).  
Importantly, activities are not specifically referred to in the constitution, and there is no 
concurrent list of powers and competences, leaving a potentially ambiguous legal 
setting. IGR thus plays a key mediating role, giving specific meaning to the ambiguous 
legal setting – establishing what is, and what is not “in the rules”. Consequently, debates 
exist concerning the ‘coercive’ (see Kincaid, 1990) or ‘cooperative’ (see Elazar, 1966) 
nature of US IGR, possibly because both conceptualizations apply to different forms of 
paradiplomacy. IGR are for Sager (2002) cooperative in the realm of the economy, 
because the federal and state levels often pursue similar objectives.  
Bud Federal politicians also restrict other activities of states such as making political 
statements (though with the potential for recourse to the courts or the 
Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee and State Point of Contact (see Conlan 
and Sager, 2001)), a notion highlighted with regard to the ‘Burma Law’, explored in 
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detail in this chapter. It is ‘...up to politicians and foreign relations experts to determine 
the line of constitutionality for state and local government’ foreign relations activities’ 
(McMillan, 2012: 70), and states have consequently been given the freedom to pursue 
interests internationally, but prohibited by politicians and IGR rather than through 
official legal mechanisms, from engaging in certain activities. ‘In short, the US 
Constitution envisions limited state international action subject to the consent of the 
Congress as the superintending authority acting on behalf of all the states’ (Kincaid, 
1999: 112). As noted, this issue and Maryland executive’s inability to engage in political 
paradiplomacy is explored in detail later in the chapter. 
McMillan (2012: 4-5) claims that Reagan’s New federalism, the shift to block grants to 
states, and the associated freedom to spend that money as executives wish, was a key 
factor in facilitating this international involvement. Furthermore, the lengthier terms 
established for governors also allowed for longer term planning and more ambitious 
policy programmes (MacMillan, 2012: 31-32). States have thus developed their capacity 
to engage internationally since the 1980s in particular (see also Kincaid, 1999: 111). 
Further claims regarding motivations for paradiplomacy concern Governors’ political 
leadership as a source of ‘...inspiration for state international activities’ (Conlan and 
Sager, 2001: 22). Their personal involvement has been identified as a key factor in 
explaining why US states ‘go international’ (Kincaid, 1984). According to Conlan, Dudley 
and Clark’s (2004: 197) survey of legislators, personal policy concerns of individual 
governors, even the desire to promote democratic governance at times, play a 
significant role in motivating involvement abroad.  
Governors are in practice however, overwhelmingly focussed on economic interests in 
the international arena. McMillan claims that the competitive regional political context 
narrows the focus of Governors. The need to create jobs; the actions of, and competition 
from other states; pressure from business and interest groups; US national policy; and 
pressure from the electorate are all factors encouraging Governors to engage 
internationally in support of the economy (McMillan, 2012: 49). Federal encouragement 
for state involvement in economic paradiplomacy has also been noted (see Kincaid, 
1984). Indeed, drawing on accounts of US state paradiplomacy (Fry, 1998; Kincaid 
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1999; Kline, 1999; McMillan, 2012), it is clear that states engage in economic and co-
operational activities, but little else. McMillan (2012: 14-16) goes so far as to distinguish 
between foreign policy and foreign affairs, the latter being largely economic related, and 
the former being more ‘political’ in nature, and not the realm of states. With regard to 
political paradiplomatic activities, promoting democracy or engaging in international 
development for example, there are barriers obstructing US states.  
Specifically, the IGR disciplines and restricts state involvement in political 
paradiplomacy. Those states in turn are self-disciplined, and avoid such activities to 
reinforce the sovereignty of the federal government; ‘...the large majority of [US state] 
activities seek to advance their US state’s relationships with national and subnational 
governments in a way that does not challenge constitutional authority’ (McMillan, 2012: 
15).  
5.1.4 Maryland international affairs 
In Maryland specifically, the Office of Secretary of State (SoS), answerable to the 
Governor, is responsible for international affairs, and its International Division offers 
the Maryland executive the capacity to engage internationally. The Division attempts to 
play a coordinating role to; ‘foster global awareness and increase the level and 
consistency of open dialogue and exchange between Maryland's citizens and 
institutions and their international counterparts’ (Maryland Secretary of State, 2015). 
While specific departments deal with the internationalized aspects of their respective 
portfolios, the bulk of the International Division’s work is in managing the ten Sister 
State Programs (SSP) and administration duties for the Subcabinet for International 
Affairs. The latter institution, created in 2001 to advise the Secretary of State on 
international issues, quickly fell dormant and was only revived in 2015 by SoS, John C. 
Wobensmith.xlii  
The SSPs are longstanding partnerships with provinces and states around the world. 
Their stated goals are overwhelmingly cultural or economic; to foster partnerships 
between businesses and cultural or educational organizations in Maryland and the 
Sister State (Maryland Secretary of State, 2015a). The SoS does not see a role for itself in 
developing Maryland’s engagement internationally beyond the economic, cultural or 
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educational sphere. This is not to claim that these spheres of activity are not in 
themselves political, but that officials and representatives have made a distinction 
between such activities and other involvement in perhaps more overtly or explicitly 
‘political’ issues. 
As with the constitution, the political context within Maryland does not create typically 
expected opportunities to engage in political paradiplomacy. There are no nationalist or 
identity-based parties competing, and the only incentives to engage abroad are 
economic. The initial review of the domestic structures therefore, suggest that the 
state’s agency will be constrained to economic or co-operational paradiplomacy, both 
by the IGR that manage the constitutional ambiguities, and the political context. While 
there are opportunity structures for paradiplomacy, there are limits to the nature of 
that paradiplomacy; there are no opportunities for political paradiplomacy, or 
incentives for regional actors to challenge the existing structures.  
By way of concluding the introductory section, we may review the opportunity 
structures in the case of Maryland. Its institutional capacity is potentially strong with 
the freedoms allowed by Reagan’s new federalism reforms. No nationalist parties exist 
however, nor any notable territorial identity. Constitutional competence is unclear in the 
realm of international relations but is clarified through the disciplining IGR. The IGR are 
informal and offer no official input into US foreign policy. While not a member of 
continental organizations, the responsibility and expectation to engage internationally to 
benefit the domestic economy theoretically offers opportunities and motivations for 
engaging abroad, though not necessarily to promote democracy. The US  meanwhile, is 
the most significant promoter of democracy across the world. 
This chapter will now explore the lack of agency wielded by state executives in the 
realm of political paradiplomacy, detailing key incidents that appear to have established  
firm rules barring state agency in the realm of political paradiplomacy or engaging in 
the promotion of democracy. It will then explore instances of democracy promotion that 
nonetheless involve Maryland organizations and officials. Specifically, this chapter will 
look at the National Guard’s State Partnership Program; the National Conference of 
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State Legislature’s activities; the University of Maryland’s ‘Maryland-China Initiative’; 
and finally, federal programmes such as the Congress funded Open World Program. 
5.2 State legislation and economic sanctions 
A key finding, corroborating the existing academic literature, is that the IGR work to 
restrict the sub-state’s international agency, and Maryland is unable to engage in 
political paradiplomacy, in pro-democracy gestures, or politicising their own legislation. 
The use of domestic legislation and economic sanctions highlights this issue. 
The use of legislation by states to establish economic penalties that will harm anti-
democratic countries – negative linkages – has a history and arguably, quite an impact. 
Instances date as far back as the mid-1970s as states applied human rights laws to 
penalise international businesses (see Kline, 1999: 115). Symbolic resolutions 
condemning the human rights violations abroad had been passed before but largely 
ignored until they were explicitly coupled with economic sanctions (Howard, 2004: 
186). One of the most prominent examples of such coupling, and a juncture in the 
development of state paradiplomacy it is argued, would be Massachusetts and its 
‘Burma Law’ in 1998.  
Duplicating similar sanctions placed by some states on the governments of South Africa, 
Cuba and Nigeria in previous years, the law limited access to state procurement 
contracts for any company that did business in Burma (Myanmar) (see Fry, 2009: 302). 
Political and liberal motivations are claimed to lie behind such actions.  
The law’s official objective, as noted in a U.S. district court ruling on 4 
November 1998, was “solely to sanction Myanmar for human rights 
violations and to change Myanmar’s domestic policies.” The court decision 
quotes Rushing in the bill’s legislative history as specifically identifying the 
policy objective as “free democratic elections in Burma” (Kline, 1999: 118). 
Here, regional forces manipulated the capabilities of the state legislature to penalise 
Burma or, in democracy promotion parlance, to attach a negative linkage. Specifically, 
individuals such as the Bill’s sponsor, Byron Rushing who; ‘almost single-handedly 
pushed a Myanmar sanctions bill through the Massachusetts legislature’ (Greenberger, 
1998: A20). The notable aspect of the Burma Law was the contradictory silence of the 
169 
 
federal level with regard to human rights issues in Burma. Massachusetts was not 
“going along” with federal policy, it was declaring a policy position where the federal 
government had none. In making innovative use of procurement legislation, the sub-
state or individual members, were legally able to engage in international democracy 
promotion and attach negative linkages to harm anti-democratic countries, to the 
chagrin of the federal level.  
The federal level was pushed into action and passed sanctions of their own. After the 
filing a suit against the state, the US Supreme Court ruled in favour of the National 
Foreign Trade Council, stating that the federal government’s sanctions effectively 
superseded the state’s law; which was therefore not able to be enacted.5 The response 
of the federal level set an equally clear precedent, that this action from states would not 
be allowed in future, unless Congress changes its position (see Stumberg and 
Porterfield, 2001: 202-204). 
Indeed, IGR continue to play a key role in disciplining the sub-states since the Burma 
Law. One long-serving Maryland state senator recalls an attempt to pass a bill, after the 
Burma Law, to denounce harmful business practices in Nigeria and Ghana that attracted 
federal attention; 
It was sailing along. At that time, I think at that time Clinton was in, two 
assistant secretaries of commerce from the federal government showed up 
in my committee with the President of the Senate and they were really upset 
about it. They’d heard that Amnesty International had come to testify on the 
bill, and the bill was sailing right through. All we were going to have was a 
statement, a proclamation saying, you know ‘do not do this’. But anyway, that 
was stopped... it was as if the president of our Senate was afraid of what the 
federal government was going to do and he just said to the committee chair 
that ‘you’ve got to shut this bill down, it can’t go’..xliii 
As claimed, the sensitivity and disciplining approach of the federal level has a 
considerable impact on the state’s capacity to display agency in the realm of political 
                                                        
5 Despite never technically being enacted, the Burma Law is nonetheless credited with many successes 
such as the disengagement of at least 116 multinational companies, 67 of them US from Burma; the 
spurring into action of the Clinton administration which went on to ban 11 products of Burma where 
child-labour was used; and the resulting media visibility gained from the incident (Stumberg and 
Porterfield, 2001: 179). It could and is claimed therefore, that such activities have impact. 
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paradiplomacy. This path has been institutionalized, and successive generations of 
federal representatives reinforce the rules. 
Very clearly, if we really step over bounds, the feds will come right down. We 
don’t have to remind them, they watch to make sure of their prerogatives. 
Even our Maryland members to the Congress will watch to protect their 
prerogatives and their territory... They become very, very jealous of their 
prerogatives.xliv 
Furthermore, with the exception of personal cases, often regarding immigration or visa 
issues, no significant lobbying of state legislators or the SoS was witnessed with regard 
to Maryland senators and the promotion of democracy abroad.xlv 
The Burma law of 1998 has shaken the federal level into a watchful enforcement of the 
convention that political foreign policy is their prerogative. It could be viewed as a key 
juncture that led to a closing through the IGR of that path for states to influence 
democratic conditions in other countries through their own domestic powers. Certainly 
in the eyes of legislators and governors in Maryland, there is no longer a role for the 
state to act in the manner others did with regard to South Africa, Nigeria or Burma.  
5.3 National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) 
This section will outline the democracy promotion involved in the National Guard’s 
(NG) State Partnership Program (SPP). It will argue that though a state asset, it is 
subcontracted by, under the control of national level organizations. It is a means by 
which national level organizations can accomplish their own strategic goals. 
The Maryland National Guard (NG) is a rather unique structure in being an armed force 
subordinate to the state’s Governor; a rare example of a sub-state military force and 
through its activities, promotes democracy abroad. As a state, not federal asset, the 
National Guard is technically under the control of the executive. Specifically, the 
Adjutant General, subordinate to the Governor, retains ultimate control of the Guard 
and wields the freedom to activate personnel in response to disasters or in the name of 
homeland defence.  
The National Guard Bureau (NGB) coordinates between the various forces and liaises 
with the federal level. Though autonomous, the relationship between NG and the federal 
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level is a warm one; the federal government foots the bill for the Guard and the 
Pentagon provides nearly all the equipment (Howard, 2004: 181). The National Guard 
are also as committed as any other branch of US armed forces to the National Security 
Strategy. 
As well as operating alongside US armed forces in combat theatres, National Guard 
personnel have also been deployed in support of US foreign policy missions. Since 1992, 
through SPPs, long-term partnerships have been established between a particular 
state’s National Guard and a partner country’s armed forces. The SPPs consist of 
National Guard led military-to-military, and occasionally civilian-to-military or civilian-
to-civilian projects aimed at developing civil-military relationships, and the democratic 
accountability of military forces around the world (Howard, 2004: 191). Maryland’s 
National Guard maintain two SPPs. The Estonia SPP was amongst the first to be 
established in April 1993, while the Bosnia-Herzegovina partnership was formally 
initiated in January 2003. 
5.3.1 Historical development 
The origins of the SPPs are to be found in the political and security context of the Baltic 
and Central and Eastern Europe following the demise of the USSR, and the manner in 
which US policymakers perceived and reacted to that context. Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau, Lt. Gen. John B. Conway’s letter of January 2nd 1992, offering the services 
and personnel of the National Guard to the US military, was warmly received by Gen. 
Colin L. Powell. The latter’s response of 24 January states; ‘We are currently in the 
process of enhancing our military-to-military contacts with these republics with the 
intention of helping them create a responsible military force within a democratic 
society’ (cited in Boehm, 2014: 2). From the start, the broad strategy for engagement 
was set and the NG’s role would be aligned with its aims to develop democratic society 
in partner states and construct strategic alliances.  
The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) – an EUCOM body established in 1992 for 
coordinating with the National Guard and partner countries’ defence ministries and 
armed forces – funded the SPPs in its initial phase as a means of supporting efforts in 
post-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe. The National Guard Bureau also provided a 
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$1m funding line to support SPP’s activities (Howard, 2004: 182), allowing them to 
expand a little beyond the strict military-to-military programmes allowed for by the 
JCTP funding.  
The JCTP identified the Guard as an actor with particular beneficial characteristics 
within the political context. ‘At the time, it was believed [a] reserve component 
personnel would present a less aggressive posture to the new Russian Federation’ 
(National Guard, 2014: 2), an early attempt to capitalize on the geopolitically removed 
understandings of sub-states and their assets.  
Specific activities are explored below, but with time, the SPPs were expanded beyond 
former Soviet Europe and beyond a particular role within the political situation of the 
early 1990s, into a consistent element of US strategic partnerships. As a senior officer 
explains; 
It may have been the spark that started the fire but SPP’s grown beyond that. 
It’s grown to developing nations and our desire spread democracy. But really 
to ally ourselves with those nations, to develop partnerships with those 
nations so that’s why it’s spread into Africa, all through Europe, South 
America, Asia. That’s why it’s spread as far as it has, because of the influence, 
because of the partnerships that we want to develop with those countries. 
Positive, and good partnerships with those countries.xlvi   
As of 2015, there were 65 SPPs in operation around the globe, the majority in Europe 
and South America (22 each). Once again, the broader national and global contexts must 
be acknowledged when understanding the SPP’s proliferation. The changing security 
contexts around the globe during the 1990s, more allowing of a softer approach by the 
US would be one consideration. Another would be president Clinton’s 1994 National 
Security Strategy which set out a more liberal approach to foreign policy focusing on 
partnerships and ‘democratic enlargement’ (see Bouchet, 2013: 159-177) which, 
coupled with the perceived success of the existing SPPs, opened a space for an 
expansion of the programme.  
The SPP was thus well-positioned to expand on the established tradition of 
military-to-military cooperation among NATO allies to now include the 




In expanding, the core mission was not modified, as can be witnessed within policy 
documents dating from 2004 while the Bosnia-Herzegovina SPP was being developed. 
The SPP’s tactical role in a broader strategy of democratization and alliance-building 
was consistent; 
Maryland also has been selected to partner with Bosnia-Herzegovina in part 
because of the success with Estonia. Maryland will have a key role in this 
international initiative to foster democracy, encourage market economies, 
and promote regional cooperation and stability. The partnership program 
emphasizes civil and military cooperation with civil control of a professional 
military (Maryland Military Department, 2005: 18). 
Another major benefit and key facilitating condition for the military planners at EUCOM 
was that the National Guard were not an extra expense having, in effect, already been 
paid for by a separate federal funding line. Recognised as low-cost, high-impact 
programmes, they are much appreciated by EUCOM and commanders. 
Constituting nearly a quarter of the 1,281 total EUCOM events, at a modest 
cost of $2.8 million (2.2 million euros), the SPP is arguably one of the most 
cost-effective security cooperation tools ever implemented by the U.S. 
military (EUCOM, 2013: 6). 
For Admiral Stavridis, the EUCOM Commander since 2009, ‘The State Partnership 
Program is, dollar for dollar, my best EUCOM investment’ (EUCOM, 2015). The SPPs’ 
projects have been valued contributions to, and nestled within, the US, EUCOM and 
NATO’s broader strategic approach to Central and Eastern Europe and later the world. 
The SPP is indebted therefore to the national level military and foreign policy factors, as 
well as the particular global security context after the Cold War, to facilitate the 
establishment of the partnerships. Its foreign operations are also paid for by national 
organizations and the broad scope of its activities largely decided by those levels of 
command. 
5.3.2 Strategy 
This latter point regarding the place of the SPPs within a broader strategy is key to 
understanding their democratic contribution. The central and explicit focus of the SPPs 
has been the development of familiarization and interoperability between US and 
partner armed forces. There are no explicit or measurable programmes that contribute 
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to the development of democracy and, taken in isolation, the SPPs’ democratic 
contribution is difficult to analyse or measure. In developing familiarization and 
interoperability however, the SPPs facilitate the sharing and learning of knowledge 
regarding the role of a military within, and subordinate to, a civilian and democratic 
government. Taken as a part of a broader, multi-level strategy of engagement, 
communication and cooperation with partner countries therefore, the SPPs play a key 
role at the individual level. To take a military analogy, the SPPs are tactical level 
activities that contribute to the broader operational and strategic goal of supporting the 
development of democracy. As a senior officer explains; 
One of the things we stress in the military is that you nest your plan. So 
there’s a strategic plan, there’s an operational plan, and there’s a tactical 
plan. Each one of those is nested but it’s at a different level. So when you get 
to SPP, we have our goals, but one of our goals isn’t stated as supporting 
democracy – it’s stated in different ways. We have different goals. Now when 
they support up that ladder, does what we’re doing here at the ground level 
with SPP, even though we [also] have a strategic scope, does what we’re 
doing support those democratic goals of NATO, of EUCOM commander? Does 
it support the goals of that ambassador, of that embassy and our country? 
Yes, you bet. So what we’re doing at the ground level does support those 
higher level goals.xlvii 
Or in the programme’s official language; 
The program demonstrates, perhaps more than anything else, the 
importance of trust in international relations. By linking U.S. states with 
designated partner countries, the SPP promotes access, increases military 
capabilities, improves interoperability and enhances the principles of 
responsible governance. It helps to prevent states from failing and 
contributes to a stable Europe. It supports the broad national interests and 
international security cooperation goals of the U.S. by engaging partner 
nations through military, socio-political, and economic conduits at the local, 
state and national levels. All of these functions support NATO efforts 
(EUCOM, 2013: 5).   
Democracy, and the employment of the SPPs in support of its development within 
partner states, is also clearly and explicitly conceived of as a means of fostering trust 





“On the ground”, the SPP consists of events, exercises and training activities with 
representatives from both sides of the partnership present. The key objective is to 
develop the concepts of familiarization and interoperability. The former refers to the 
mutual understanding of each other’s armed forces capacity, responsibilities and 
limitations. The latter involves developing the capacity of the partners to cooperate in 
operations, again involving a deeper cultural as well as technical understanding of each 
other’s armed forces. At the SPP level, as noted, the overriding and explicit objective is 
not to promote democracy, but rather a military one; 
We call it a ‘crosstrain’. It’s making sure you can interact with someone else. 
So that if I go to war with you [as an ally], we both are speaking the same 
language, we use similar tactics, so that we can work together on the 
battlefield if you will. That’s a big reason that we do what we do, so that we 
can work together if we ever need to. That’s one of many goals but I’d say 
that’s the top reason we do what we do.xlviii 
The broad area of activities are decided after consultation with the partner team and 
the embassy, then the National Guard will develop its plan alongside the partner armed 
forces. All personnel involved in the activities are national guard from Maryland, with a 
few, rare exceptions where the expertise or specialist must be found from another state. 
While activities have branched out beyond the military, the partnership does not 
involve establishing relationships for businesses; ‘We are not in the practice of putting 
business relationships together’.xlix 
Events normally last around a week, involving either 3-9 guests training with a 
company, brigade or larger force in Maryland. The SPP also involves teams of specialists 
going to the partner country to work alongside Estonian or Bosnia-Herzegovinian 
forces. There are around 50 engagements per year with the majority held in the partner 
country. While the technical knowledge being exchanged is military, the level of contact 
is personal.  
What comes from it? The relationships, the close partnerships, and those 
relationships again span from a soldier on the ground all the way up to the 
general officer level. They all have those relationships and they’re all 
cultivated. One of the things that the State Partnership really does is 
facilitate, to put those people at all those different levels together. So that 
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they can cooperate and familiarize and become interoperable with each 
other.l  
The Guard have engaged with military authorities, working to develop the relationships 
with and respect of democratic civilian authorities. It is claimed that;  
Learning to work with and respect the authority of civilian authorities has 
been a major accomplishment for the Kaitselut [sic], an accomplishment 
directly linked to its strong ties to the Maryland guard (Howard, 2004: 191).   
The rapid change from a USSR dependent military force to one which was considered 
representative of the Estonian population, subordinate to its civilian government, has 
been hailed as a mark of success (Boehm, 2014: 19). 
In other cases, some National Guard activities have expanded along the margin of that 
core mission. Two programmes were started with the aid of the NGB funding line; 
GUARDEX and the Minuteman Fellowships. GUARDEX were two week annual training 
sessions with a designated guard units, a form of military exchange programme.  
Minutemen Fellowships were also a form of exchange programme but also involved 
state and local government officials and non-military missions (Howard, 2004: 182). 
The SPPs have also drawn on a range of further funding programmes such as the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar programme), environmental programs and 
other department of defence security assistance programmes. ‘The extra guard money, 
however, is critically important for the success of the SPP because it lets the guard fund 
and program nonmilitary events’ (Howard, 2004: 183). It must be noted however that 
these nonmilitary events were complimentary activities, alongside the core of the SPP, 
not a shift in focus.  
Some have become involved in mentoring troubled youths and supporting Mayors of 
sister cities and their attempts to develop the provision of services in a democracy.  
SPP guidelines therefore call for gradually shifting partnership 
responsibilities to civilian authorities at the federal and state level once the 
military phases of each state partnership have been completed. Apart from 
the NGB, however, it is not clear whether any federal officials – from either 
the State or Defence Department – are given the states much guidance or any 
funding to continue their partnerships once the maturation stage ends 
(Owens and Eid, 2002: 160). 
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This latter claim is more relevant however to other SPPs. The Maryland Guard SPPs 
have remained overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, military-to-military in nature.  
Howard has argued that the SPPs could be developed further and more should be made 
of them as valuable tools for supporting the transition to democracy, specifically 
because of their ability to draw from state-level expertise. 
In many of these program areas, states are ideal models for transitioning 
democracies, for it is the state governments, not the federal government, that 
have experience providing the public services that their partners are now 
exploring (Howard, 2004: 184). 
Former Colorado Governor Bill Owens and his cabinet member, Troy Eid also claim that 
the SPPs can; ‘...serve as a model for other democracy-building initiatives’ (Owens and 
Eid, 2002: 162). In the case of Maryland at least, this seems to be an overestimation of 
the democratic contribution of the programme. This is not to say that Howard’s 
argument doesn’t hold, only that in Maryland’s case, the democracy-building initiatives 
outside military-to-military programmes have not been as extensive as in other states.   
Speculation from these authors regarding the potential development of the SPP 
obscures its limitations however. Firstly, the authors omit in their presentations of the 
SPPs’ virtues, the fact that the programmes are merely the tactical element of a much 
broader operational and strategic approach to the partner countries and region. To 
disconnect the SPP from everything else would be to deprive the activities of the 
broader partnership between the US and NATO, and the partner. SPP works, or is 
understood to work, because of its place within a broader partnership.  
Furthermore, the authors fail to take into account that the SPPs benefit or suffer from 
the same limitations and barriers as the national military forces. The SPP is understood 
as a US asset, despite being technically under the state and governor’s jurisdiction.  
...we’re a military to military organization and we fall under the political 
barriers that a University may not... But no, are we going to have that direct 
relationship with a country like China when we don’t have that kind of 




Ultimately, the SPPs exist due to national level resources, political decision, and 
strategic planning. They and the NG are effectively resources to subcontract in support 
of broader organizations that promote democracy. What the SPPs offer is a particular, 
non-aggressive military partnership that seeks to foster trust and democracy and a 
force with which to engage in that partnership that is not imbued with the same 
symbolic political meaning as the US military. 
Partners must already or potentially be strategic allies of the US. In this sense, the SPP is 
not a more effective substitute to the federal or national level programmes and 
organization. It can only complement them, albeit in the eyes of military planners in a 
manner that presents a less aggressive posture. 
With regard to the sub-state executive’s engagement with the National guard, there is 
little to suggest that the involvement is much more than symbolic. The Adjutant General 
(TAG) is normally a two-star General in command of the state’s military forces and is 
subordinate to the Governor. The SPP’s contribution is recognized, and indeed 
celebrated by state governments through the TAG. As Maryland’s TAG, Major General 
James A. Adkins claims;  
Through the State Partnership Program,  we are able to truly make a 
difference to fledgling democracies. Our service members’ experiences with 
the program pay dividends when our units deploy in support of overseas 
contingency operations (EUCOM, 2013: 29). 
It has also been claimed that the involvement of states, via the SPPs, helps generate 
political support from within the US for the federal government’s international 
democracy building initiatives; 
...the SPP helps generate grassroots political support at the state level for U.S. 
democracy building abroad. Companies and entrepreneurs in Colorado and 
many other states are closely watching the progress of NATO enlargement as 
a proxy for predicting future market stability and privatization in Central 
and Eastern Europe (Owens and Eid, 2002: 165). 
However, the involvement of the Maryland state executive at least, despite the 
competency for the National Guard, is very limited. A clear division exists based on the 
understanding that the military officers hold the expertise. As a senior officer explains, 
perplexed by the suggestion; 
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Well, could they [influence National Guard activities]? Yes I guess they could, 
but why would they? Do they understand the requirements of that country? 
Who understands that best? Probably that ambassador and team in that 
country. And somebody who understands that maybe even better would be 
that commander, the centralized European commander if you will. And 
supporting this is our team, our general. So would you want to become 
embroiled in that? Probably not.lii 
National Guard activities rarely, if ever, draw media attention and are even less likely to 
register as issues in public discourse amongst politicians and the public. Politicians 
don’t seek to influence the Guard’s activities. As one state senator states – also puzzled 
by the suggestion that the Governor would seek to use the NG to pursue alternative 
objectives; ‘you’d think the federal government wouldn’t ask unless they really had 
need and I guess you’d consider it almost an honour that you actually can help’.liii 
Maryland’s executive wields no agency with regard to the National Guard’s 
international activities. Its competence over the National Guard, outside disaster and 
emergency relief roles, is close to ceremonial in nature. Influence is not wielded over 
the SPPs or the Guard’s activities when working alongside federal agencies and US 
armed forces. Nonetheless, the National Guard has shown itself to be a means of 
supporting US foreign policy through state assets. The security and political context of 
the early 1990s is key to opening the door for soft power approaches such as the SPP, 
and the perceived success of the early SPPs, coupled with national policy, justified a 
proliferation of partnerships. Through the SPP, National Guards play what is perceived 
as an important role in supporting the soft power attempts to build alliances. The 
democratic contribution of the SPP meanwhile is considered important, but must be 
taken in the context of a broader strategic approach. While it is claimed that SPPs can 
develop beyond their current scope, there is little data to suggest that this has been the 
case to a large extent in Maryland and the partnership remains overwhelmingly 
military-to-military in nature.  
The Guard personnel play a key part in the development of projects and the actual 
transfer of knowledge to the partner. However the political agency at any, particularly 
the broader, strategic level of the SPPs’ work is not forthcoming from state level forces. 
Rather, national level agency from the federal government and its military structure is 
the key consideration. The Guard is merely a regional level opportunity structure for 
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those political forces at other levels. The democratic contribution of these state assets 
are therefore explained more by national and global structures or agency than those at 
the region, state level.  
 
5.4 National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
The NCSL represents the 50 states, their legislatures, and staff. Created by merging 
three organizations in 1975, the NCSL has grown to an organization employing around 
150 staff members committed to three core missions that aim to;  
 Improve the quality and effectiveness of state legislatures. 
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 Promote policy innovation and communication among state 
legislatures. 
 Ensure state legislatures a strong, cohesive voice in the federal 
system. 
(NCSL, 2015) 
An important aspect of the NCSL’s work is the sharing between the states of governance 
related good practice and technical knowledge. In this sense, and with the NCSL as a 
hub, the states have consistently promoted democracy and developed democratic good 
practice between themselves since at least 1975. The organization also has a lobbying 
arm, located in Washington D.C., that aims to promote the interests of state legislatures 
in the federal legislature. Also located in DC is the organization’s international division, 
of most interest to this project.  
The organizational history of the NCSL’s international work is not documented, but 
long-time staff members recall a formalization of an exchange-based relationship with 
Germany in 1988 upon the request of the Germans, who declared an interest in sharing 
good practice and exploring ideas regarding federal governance. With funding from the 
State Department initially, the international division – a small unit comprising by today 
of two full time members of staff  –  was established to coordinate such relationships. To 
complement the division’s work, an international committee was established for 
members of the NCSL as a means of exploring trade promotion, export, import and 
other economic related international issues. By 2010 however, it was deemed that a 
separate standing committee was required for economic related international issues 
and a new, Task Force on International Relations was established for members to 
explore a range of non-economic international issues. Its mission is to; 
 Review NCSL activities with international governments, including 
subnational governments; 
 Provide a forum for the exchange of ideas on international activities;  
 Coordinate and support other NCSL policy activities with an  
international focus; 
 Exchange ideas with international counterparts regarding public 
policy and institutional matters; 
 Cooperate with other international legislative organizations; and  
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 Investigate whether there are resources from the US Government, 
foreign governments or foundations to support expanded 
international cooperation between legislators, legislative staff and 
their counterparts in other national/subnational governments.  
(NCSL, 2015a: 1) 
Most of these objectives involve the promotion or sharing of democratic good practice 
in some form or another.  
The task force explores and attempts to make use of federal, foundation or foreign 
funding to support international cooperation between state legislature staff or members 
and their foreign counterparts. The international division administers the work of 
bidding for funding, developing the programmes, and coordinating volunteers. The 
organization also involves itself with other multilateral organizations and networks of 
sub-states based around the world.   
5.4.1 Contracting 
There is no guiding strategy for the task force, which works in an ad hoc fashion based 
on the decisions of its voluntary membership. Nevertheless, staff claimed that there 
were some broad “rules” that have emerged over time relating to the types of partners 
and work the NCSL would engage with. Firstly, a desire to develop relations and share 
experiences with federal states and sub-states prioritises certain partners. Secondly, 
they are characterised by the desire to promote democracy. As one senior staff member 
claims; 
Well certainly democracy promotion would be one [guiding principle]. We 
think our system is a good one so we want to promote democracy, and we 
think that comes through in everything we do, in all of the international 
activities, no matter who we’re talking to.liv 
With regard to partners, NCSL has been involved in a range of international 
programmes that promote democracy such as the Legislative Education and Practice 
Programme. It has also worked alongside the NDI, IRI, and USAID on technical 
assistance contracts, providing specific, expert element to their programming around 
the world. In working alongside other international and transnational organizations and 
networks, the NCSL has also been involved in sharing democratic good practice with 
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Germany’s Partnership of Parliaments, Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with 
Foreign Countries, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, The Arab 
Interparliamentary Union, Brazil’s Uniao Nacional dos Legisladores e Legislativos 
Estaduais, and the Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (NCSL, 
2015a: 2). The relationships with the associations are often based on memorandums of 
understanding developed by the task force that set terms or themes for cooperation. 
The sharing of democratic good practice is a core element of these memorandums, as 
witnessed again in the most recent MoU under development between the NCSL and the 
Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies; 
 
Considering that the Conferences: 
... 
Recognize the importance of strengthening interinstitutional relations 
toward mutual understanding and exchange of experiences, while 
acknowledging mutual peculiarities and differences, in the recognition of 
common traditions and cultural values as well as in the respect of the 




Carry out a cooperative understanding to share, between United States and 
Europe, knowledge, experiences, information, ideas, procedures and best 
governance practices aimed to convey the distinct nature of each political-
institutional experience of the respective Conferences; consolidating 
multilevel governance systems allowing a constructive dialogue 
instrumental to the improvement and growth of the institutional and 
legislative activity of each member... 
(NCSL, 2015c) 
The contracting work of the NCSL meanwhile, is the result of the international division 
staff bidding for, and winning tenders and Requests for Proposal (RfPs). Consequently, 
in this regard the NCSL plays a client role to the democracy or development institutions’ 
and the State Department’s donor role. The nature of this relationship varies depending 
on the donor. USAID for example hold an Indefinite Quantity Contract with the NCSL 
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which ensures that, while never a prime contractor, NCSL can be ‘used’ by USAID for the 
provision of ‘expertise’, without the need to go to tender.  
 
The IRI and NDI on the other hand subcontract through RfPs, often as part of a larger 
projects with their partners. The NCSL does enjoy a privileged position in the tendering 
process as a ‘Peer Organization’ of the NDI, officially recognized as a provider of;  
...research, technical assistance and opportunities for policymakers to 
exchange ideas on state-related issues” and an “effective and respected 
advocate for the interests of state governments before Congress and federal 
agencies (NDI, 2015).  
IRI do not offer the NCSL such a position but do make use of the NCSL as a source of 
expertise (see IRI, 2015).  
The NCSL looks to only work alongside parliaments when seeking NDI, IRI, or State 
Department contracts.lv In this sense, they are selective clients who remain close to 
their own ‘rules’ when engaging on behalf of others. This is an important provision for 
their bidding for work and reflects the core principles that govern the NCSL’s 
engagement. 
5.4.2 Technical assistance and legislative exchanges 
Once awarded, the NCSL’s main method of working is through the technical assistance 
or legislative exchange programs. The activities involve the use of state legislature staff 
and elected members imparting their knowledge and expertise, or in the case of 
exchanges, visiting or hosting delegations from partners. The staff and members are 
brought in on a voluntary basis to host the workshops and seminars. Volunteers come 
from all states and the groups for specific workshops can be from the same state, a few 
states or a range. A grant would typically fund a series of workshops, each running for 
between 7-20 days over the course of a few years. The workshops are very much a 
mutual learning exercise during the early stages of a partnership. Over time however, 
the workshops develop into specific explorations of particular issues and challenges. As 
one officer explains; 
You have to determine the capacity of the legislature. I mean, a lot of it at the 
beginning is doing an assessment and figuring out what the capacity of the 
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legislature is and where they are. We did a workshop with staff of the 
National Assembly [of Mozambique] and also did one with MPs and staff. 
They focused on member-staff relations, human resources and establishing 
the legislative staff as a non-partisan staff, one that is knowledgeable about 
the institution and there for the institution itself. We also worked a little bit 
previously on budgetary issues. The workshops kind of progress and over 
time the relationship gets stronger and our counterparts are more open to 
delving into more detailed work.lvi 
The NCSL’s work within the NDI’s programming in Kosovo (2009-2012) provides an 
insight into the nature of sub-state involvement. As a provider of the ‘expertise’ for the 
Kosovo Assembly Strengthening Programme (KASP), the NCSL, and consequently sub-
state staff and members, have been on the ‘front line’ of US efforts to promote and 
develop the democracy there.  
KASP supports the Kosovo Assembly following Kosovo’s recent declaration 
of independence, in which the Assembly is navigating a transition from 
international tutelage toward reliance on its own domestic capacity. The 
program assists the Assembly in shaping its behaviour to be driven by 
domestic interests and constituencies. Our work is being carried out through 
technical workshops, mentoring, the creation of operation manuals, and 
issue expert resources during the three-year program (NCSL, 2015b). 
From 2009-2012, the legislative strengthening activities consisted of the 
implementation of the Kosovo Legislative Staff Management Institute; ‘...a three-phase 
executive management training program for senior staff designed to enhance excellence 
and professionalism’ (NCSL, 2015b). The Institute aims to develop professionalism as 
well as the skills of the executive management of the Assembly together with the 
explicit objective of  ‘Advancing the role of the Assembly as a vital institution of Kosovar 
democracy’ (NCSL, 2015b). The institute consisted of three 2.5 day workshops held 
between 2010 and 2011 which emphasized a “learning by doing” approach, taking 
advantage of the immediate practical experiences of the staff that volunteer.  
The NCSL sees itself as an ideal promoter of democratic good practice internationally 
claiming;  
Topics like transparency in government, accountability, ethics and citizen 
involvement have become the cornerstone in efforts to fortify links between 
legislatures and constituents. U.S. states provide an excellent example of 
decentralization, from which emerging democracies often draw lessons from 
and examine when establishing institutional norms within their own 
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governing structure. Our federalist system is widely studied, and touted 
because, in principle, government entities that ae closest to the people are 
more responsive to those they represent (NCSL, 2015a: 1).  
Consequently, NCSL staff are enthusiastic about the contribution of US states to the 
broader efforts to promote democracy across the globe. As an official claims; 
Our system of democracy is such that we think it’s a good system, we think 
that the way the intergovernmental system is structured works. That’s not to 
say that we don’t have tensions between the states and the federal 
government but, pretty much, it works. And we’re happy to share that 
information with other countries, particularly developing countries where 
they may be struggling to figure out exactly how their system should work.lvii 
Although individual grants may be awarded for specific projects such as the KASP, and 
notwithstanding the NCSL’s focus on parliaments, the organization’s task force works to 
ensure that the technical assistance and legislative exchange programmes that are 
established revolve around certain themes. 
Our technical assistance activities emphasize transparency, accountability, 
oversight, skills development and legislative management, all key factors in 
promoting representative democracy with our parliamentary counterparts 
throughout the world and encouraging relationships between the citizenry 
and their government (NCSL, 2015a: 2). 
These are the elements that staff themselves suggest are strengths of the organization’s 
members and US states in general. The technical assistance and legislative exchanges 
draw contributions by a range of legislative staff on a variety of topics. As part of the 
Mozambique-U.S. Legislative Program in 2011 for example – a three year programme of 
workshops – a senior manager of the Fiscal and Policy Analysis Office of Maryland’s 
Department of Legislative Services provided expert knowledge and advice on fiscal 
analysis and budgetary scrutiny – topics that were decided upon based on the 
Mozambique Assembly’s stated needs and goals (NCSL, 2011). The US-South Africa 
Legislative Program meanwhile relied upon representatives from Colorado, Illinois, 
New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as NCSL experts and 
the deliverers of the programme. The two year programme involved firstly, the 
introduction of democratic concepts to the South African provincial legislatures such as 
independent ethics commissions, legislated ethics policies, codes of conduct for staff 
and MPs, and the function of ethics committees. After introduction and training during 
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the South Africans’ US Study Tour, a follow-up visit was conducted by the NCSL experts 
(sub-state staff and elected members) to South Africa in order to monitor the 
implementation (see also NCSL, 2011b). 
The NCSL has provided technical assistance in over 35 countries (NCSL, 2015d). It has 
also conducted legislative exchanges with a range of countries including Algeria, 
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, Zambia and Zimbabwe (NCSL, 2015e).  
Although the NCSL is conditionally tied to the requirements and broad topics of the 
funding received as well as the demand of the donor, its involvement still revolves 
around parliaments and certain themes. Within that context, their practitioners are 
presented with a freedom to lead and develop their programmes. The NCSL works to 
ensure a particular focus on their ‘expertise’ in transparency, accountability, oversight 
and contact between citizen and government. Furthermore, this expertise derives from 
volunteers and their immediate practical experience. In developing the delivery of their 
knowledge within the various forums with partners, the NCSL’s practitioners are taking 
the control of the message, and to an extent, the content away from their funders; the 
NDI, IRI, USAID or the State Department. 
The national level opportunity structures are the key considerations. Both the NCSL itself 
as a coordinating institution that bids for contracts, and the national level democracy 
organizations such as USAID or NDI, are key facilitators. Agency is also located at the 
national level, in the international division’s pursuit, and democracy organizations’ 
subcontracting of democracy programmes. The only agency on the region level comes 
from the individual legislature members and staff that volunteer with the programmes. 
Maryland’s executive has no agency in this case.  
5.5 The Maryland China Initiative 
In short, the Maryland China Initiative (MCI) offers expert governance training for 
senior Chinese officials. It receives privileged treatment from federal bodies and 
generous funding from China. The practitioners, the governance experts in question are 
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Maryland state officials and other volunteer staff from the state legislature who are 
subcontracted by a university department to provide governance assistance. Through 
the MCI, US governance practices have been promoted and shared with Chinese officials 
with very little scrutiny, attention, or controversy due to the depoliticized nature of the 
initiative; through a University, using functional or technical sub-state expertise. The 
level of strategic control and involvement in the MCI by both Chinese and US 
governments marks its governance programme out as much more than a university 
department offering a course involving Maryland state expertise; it is a proxy, and a 
more acceptable vehicle to exchange and promote good democratic governance 
knowledge. 
The University of Maryland (UMD) itself can claim an important role in the history of 
US-China relations. Not only central to the first US-China Sister State relationship in the 
1980s, but also as the host of the Ping-Pong Diplomacy matches in 1972 which preceded 
a thaw in Sino-American relations. The MCI itself meanwhile was one of the first 
university departments to establish a Chinese government-approved training 
programme for officials during the 1990s, and in 2004, the location for the first 
Confucius Institute in the US.  
The MCI (by today the Office of China Affairs, but for clarity, referred to here as the MCI) 
claim officially to have been founded in 1996 by the former US Ambassador to China, 
James Lilley to ‘strengthen institutions, advance knowledge of best practices, and 
facilitate collaboration between American and Chinese professionals working in the 
public interest’ (UMD, 2015). Officials working to develop the MCI from its early days 
however claim a more serendipitous genesis. Beginning through the Sister-State 
relationship with Anhui province in the early 1980s, ties developed and deepened 
through evolving business links. Quite separately, an endowment from a wealthy 
Taiwanese group established the Institute for Global Chinese Affairs, launching UMD as 
a centre for Chinese study and a suitable institution for the Chinese government to 
locate its governance training base. Initial training programmes were provided for 
officials from Anhui and then Hunan Provinces before the Chinese Government 
approached with the aim of establishing a more permanent training centre at UMD. 
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5.5.1 Content, candidates, and funding 
Regardless of origins, Chinese officials wield a large degree of control over the broader 
aspects of the MCI’s training. Topic as well as candidates for the MCI’s programmes are 
selected by the Chinese Foreign and External Bureau and provincial training directors. 
The MCI or even the US federal government’s role in these decisions was minimal. As an 
MCI official claims; 
From the Chinese side, this is controlled by the central government and the 
Administration for Foreign and External Affairs [sic]. They control it – and 
control is the right word – they control the use of central training 
programmes and the use – as we’d be considered within the Chinese system 
– of experts. This is not an education programme run by an University. Our 
job was providing expert knowledge... 
...they make sure that we understand what they want and that they’re 
satisfied that we’ve “got it”. Then in a couple of months someone from the 
Foreign Experts Bureau comes out and says “these are the ones we’ve picked 
for you”. So this is very bureaucratized.lviii 
The Chinese control over the MCI’s training derives from its funding – all from the 
Chinese government. Only a single series of programmes stand out as exceptional in 
that they were funded by the US government. China’s membership of the World Trade 
Organization required substantial reforms to be implemented prior to ratification in 
December 2001. From 2000, officials recall a focus on specific programmes preparing 
China for membership. Foot safety emerged as a significant issue where expertise was 
sought externally and MCI became a key provider of that expertise to Chinese officials. 
The WTO related programmes aside, the centre is very much a Chinese training centre, 
located in Maryland and making use of Maryland governance expertise. Nonetheless, the 
US federal government plays a key role in facilitating the partnership through generous 
visa allowances and lowering costs. Federal officials worked alongside the MCI and 
China to secure educational visas and lower costs to the Chinese. As a long serving 
official claims; 
...we weren’t going to charge the Chinese these outrageous silverbed rates 
that the university charges corporations or other people. No, no, no. We were 
going to treat them as contracts, like special contracts exempt from the 
bureaucracy on the federal government and the state government. This was 
really critical. It absolutely could not have happened without these 
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exemptions from the bureaucracy. So we worked at a high level throughout 
and everybody wanted this to happen. 
The people at the federal State department viewed this as ‘us doing outreach’ 
or diplomacy in a way they couldn’t.lix 
Enthusiasm and support for the MCI’s work therefore existed from all three partners – 
the US federal government, the UMD itself, and the Chinese. This control and strategic 
involvement in the MCI by the Chinese and US federal government supports the notion 
that the MCI is a structure or a means of sourcing experts and practitioners of 
democratic governance, used by the US and China, and much more than simply a 
university department offering a course. 
This project does not explore the recipient aspect of these projects, but a fair 
assumption, given the continued support from the Chinese would be that they were 
sufficiently happy with the training provided. Officials claim;  
They consider us one of the top training places in the US. One of the places 
they feel absolutely secure in sending their people to because they know 
they’re going to come here and they’re going to get rigorous training 
programmes that are focused on the topic that they’re supposed to be 
focused on.lx 
Two aspects to the MCI’s work are seen to be particularly useful for the US federal 
officials also. Firstly, the MCI had a freedom from diplomatic positions to discuss 
weaknesses of US social, economic and political life as well as the strengths. ‘The State 
Department people just can’t say bad things about the United States and how we 
screwed up. They don’t have anything in their programme to talk about slavery for 
example’.lxi Secondly, the MCI is depoliticised and removed from the geopolitics of Sino-
American relations. The programme is considered overwhelmingly technical in nature, 
making use of experts and practitioners removed from the political context, talking only 
of day-to-day practices and understandings of governance and economic management 
with a candour not possible for a diplomatically burdened federal representative.  
We talk only about the United States. We never engage in discussions about 
US-China relations. That allowed us to be very candid actually but also to be 
very candid about things we do very well. Our federal system – there’s so 
much decentralization, so many functions decentralized form the federal 
level – and our non-governmental organizations, we spent a lot of time 
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talking about those kind of things. We never talked about military or 
security.lxii 
The practitioners, such as the Maryland staff, are defined as ‘technical experts’ who 
were removed from the geopolitics and symbolism of US-China cooperation. Together, 
these elements allowed the MCI to provide a training to China that the federal 
organizations couldn’t, in a manner and with a candour they couldn’t offer anyone, 
particularly China.  
The MCI’s programmes are explicitly governance related and concerned with imparting 
and teaching Chinese officials about the building blocks of US democratic governance; 
civil service ethics, transparency, scrutiny and auditing, rule of law, e-governance and 
state-federal and state-citizen relations. Nonetheless, the work was never put in a 
political context;  
We never brought in political terms. Never do. Our job was to be experts. We 
brought in experts. We brought in peers, always. We worked very hard to 
make it a peer relationship.lxiii 
In short; ‘Everybody wanted to keep this low-key because it was working too well’.lxiv  
The participants from China were, from the beginning, prominent and potentially very 
senior. 
Those early years were six-monthly programmes for mid-career executives 
but they were going to be moving on. They were in most cases taken out of 
their positions for a year, spend four months in China then six months here, 
then two months at an University there. 
Everybody took this very seriously. These were life-changing events, they 
went on to be Ambassadors to other countries, to the UN, to the embassy 
here and to ministerial positions. Some of them are in really, really high 
positions now.lxv 
Since 1996, the MCI claim to have trained over 10,000 mid- and upper-level executives 
from 7 central government agencies (departments) 8 different Provinces, 5 municipal 
governments and a host of universities (UMD, 2015a). Of the 16 participants in a 3-
month Public Administration programme in 2009 for example, every participant was 
either a Deputy Director, Mayor, Vice-Secretary General, Vice Chief Executive, Director 
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or Vice Chairman of Provincial or City governmental departments (Maryland China 
Initiative, 2009a).  
5.5.2 Governance and public management programmes of the MCI 
Initially, 60 individuals were selected from all executive levels in China for a 6-month 
training programmes in public management and public policy. Documentation detailing 
the early years, from around 1997 to 2000, is unavailable. More recent documents and 
interviews suggest that the longer, 6-month programmes were cut to 2-3, 3-month 
programmes and around 20 shorter, 1-3 week programmes per year for Chinese 
government officials at the turn of the century (Maryland China Initiative, 2012; 2013). 
Officials claim that the broad themes have remained consistent even if the details and 
focus has changed to keep pace with technical changes within those fields, and in 
response to the demands of specific groups.  
The more recent menu of courses is very broad. Programmes have focused on a range of 
topics in four main fields; environmental protection and natural resources; higher 
education; public administration; and special programmes. The latter two categories 
involve the majority of the governance and democracy related topics. Within these 
fields, courses would include teaching sessions on performance management, regional 
and national governance, community planning, social insurance and social services, 
human capital management, rule of law, philanthropy development, prosecutors and 
judges in the American legal system, e-governance, and ‘soft power diplomacy’ (UMD, 
2015a). While there is a substantial amount of governance teaching, much is focused on 
the juncture between government and economic or business management. 
While the UMD offers a core set of courses, each programme is designed to meet the 
specific needs of the Chinese officials through a discussion and consultation process 
before students are selected or sent. As well as specific areas of teaching, potential visits 
to central or state government departments, businesses or other organizations are 
discussed and agreed upon as part of the programme.lxvi The volume of federal, state, 
private and NGO organizations and departments that are within close proximity 
enriches what UMD can offer and must be considered a key factor in explaining why the 
MCI exists in College Park, MD; ‘it’s called our unfair advantage, being where we are. The 
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latest propaganda trope from our marketing people is that we are the public research 
university of the nation’s capital’.lxvii 
5.5.3 “Show and tell” 
The delivery of the courses is based on a “show and tell” method involving both 
classroom and ‘in the field’ teaching. Lectures, normally by staff from across the 
university detailing theory and conceptual background to the various fields make up the 
“tell” aspect. Concurrently, professional visits to government institutions, organizations 
or companies are undertaken – the “show” – to impart first-hand experience and 
knowledge to the visitors. As a designer of the programme explains; 
This programme is designed to do training here where you can not only tell, 
but you can show. So our food safety [programme], again, it’s a lot of show. 
We spent at least two weeks in the Mid-West. Not only on farms but all 
aspects of the food system. Literally from the field to the plate. All through 
the process. They not only heard about the government and the regulations 
and expectations was, they were in farms, in places, saw inspectors.lxviii 
The model for the show and tell approach came from the technical systems component 
of the Marshall Plan which brought European business people and manufacturers to the 
US on similar, “show and tell” visits to companies and mentors following the Second 
World War. The approach was initially proposed by individuals – who would later go on 
to develop the MCI – as a means of assisting the post-Soviet transition in Russia to a 
democratic liberal-market society. The approach was not adopted then however, 
“trumped” as it were by the development thinking of the time. As a designer of the 
method recalls; ‘I had a series of meetings, mostly in Paris with the OECD where some of 
these debates were taking place and I was just shot down by the neoconservatives and 
free market and the ‘let the markets do it’ people’.lxix 
The “show and tell” approach has evidently been considered successful since 
implementation in UMD however, given the consistent and continued support from, and 
use made of it by China. MCI officials acknowledge however, that the model is not 
suitable for a broader roll-out. Attempts have been made to offer similar programmes 




It’s their own rules. They’re organized to hire me, or somebody like that, to 
go over and do training over there. They don’t want anything in their own 
country...It’s not that the people in development didn’t understand what I 
was talking about, but their own regulations can’t provide for this.lxx 
With regard to the shorter courses, a recent 9-day public administration course for 
example involved 10 lectures and 8 professional visits. Lectures covered topics such as 
budgeting and auditing, professional ethics of civil servants, private real estate 
development law, affordable housing finance, and performance auditing. Visits 
meanwhile were undertaken to the Consumer Product Safety Commission and US 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. But also to the Governor’s Office and 
the Maryland General Assembly for the ‘show and tell’ aspect of the training (Maryland 
China Initiative, 2015: 2-3). Providing such a course has required a large network of 
staff and practitioners to be involved and willing to impart their knowledge on behalf of 
the MCI who in turn are little more than a node or play a coordinating rather than an 
educating role. 
A longer-term, 3-month Public Administration programme in 2009 meanwhile 
consisted of 71 lectures and 27 visits. Lectures were provided by university staff and 
industry practitioners such as IMF consultants, CitiBank’s vice president or assistant 
vice president of the federal Reserve bank of Richmond. A different topic was explored 
for each of the first 14 weeks with the majority economic related aspects of public 
administration (the last 4 weeks were devoted to personal research projects). These 
included weeks devoted to planning, budgeting and auditing, trade policy, business 
administration, industry and technology as well as public communication, work safety 
and environmental management. A third of the trips were to sub-state institutions; 
either directly to Maryland departments, to neighbouring sub-state (D.C. or Virginia), or 
to related sub-departments of Maryland in Prince George’s County. The other trips were 
to federal departments, private companies or institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF (Maryland China Initiative, 2009).  
With regard to the specific use of Maryland state expertise, it is claimed that their use is 
common within the programmes the MCI run. Such specific records are not kept but 
senior university officials claim; ‘I would say that a third to a half of the programmes 
probably have some sort of an element where somebody form the state of Maryland is 
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coming to talk to them. I mean it’s fairly common for that [to happen]’.lxxi The MCI, as 
coordinators of the programmes, will contact the state governmental departments to 
request a session with an employee and the group of students. The sessions themselves 
are either lectures or discussion seminars where the official will impart their knowledge 
and experience without any guidance or training from the MCI. The officials are 
considered the “expert” and are left to develop the session themselves.  
5.5.4 Concluding remarks 
Considering its reach, the MCI is an impressive programme, delivering training in US 
governance practice while, making use of sub-state expertise. The focus of the 
programmes themselves, decided by the Chinese and developed by the MCI, are 
concerned overwhelmingly with economic or business related governance. Nonetheless, 
issues of transparency, e-governance, rule of law, efficacy of local and regional 
government provision of social services, and the ethics of governance are core aspects 
of what the MCI offer.  
It is claimed by officials that the MCI’s training is something the federal level cannot 
engage in without political difficulty. As a university department, the MCI can provide a 
depoliticized training programme for Chinese officials. The support from the federal 
level within the US as well as the continued use made of it by Chinese officials, strongly 
suggests that the MCI is an acceptable proxy for both. Nonetheless, funding and 
programme development from China and, more directly, the state officials that conduct 
the training sessions and seminars are an essential elements in the MCI’s ability to offer 
the programme and in explaining its form. Furthermore, in delivering the training, sub-
state officials are imparting their own interpretations of the concepts and themes taught 
– without federal or even MCI direction or training.  
The federal government, and Chinese funding and control are key facilitators and 
opportunity structures for the programme, and the UMD itself. As a democracy 
promotion vehicle, it is a private venture, deriving from the agency of the UMD rather 
than the sub-state’s governance structures. However, the knowledge and content of its 
governance training derives from the sub-state legislature staff who take part. It is their 
knowledge and expertise that is subcontracted for the delivery of the democracy 
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promotion. In this sense, it is sub-state knowledge, and Marylandian democracy that is 
being promoted, albeit with foreign funding, federal consent, and through a partly 
public-funded university.  
Agency meanwhile comes from the national and global level also, as well as locally from 
the individual staff members working with the MCI. The Maryland executive however, 
again, displays no agency. 
Equally important to consider perhaps is the alternative method of delivery that 
characterises the training – through Marshall Plan style, “show and tell” programmes. If 
the MCI’s work is a success, then the ‘show and tell’ method must be understood as a 
key component of that success.   
5.6 Federal organizations, state expertise 
Maryland legislature staff have also been utilised by federal and national level agencies 
to provide governance expertise on their behalf, to democracy partners. The direct 
utilization of individuals is less formal than the subcontracting agreements and 
contracts held with the NCSL, and involvement is on an ad hoc or an “on demand” basis. 
Occasionally the Maryland SoS’s Office is also contacted to coordinate visits or pass the 
request for assistance or experts on to the various state departments.lxxii  
Individuals and groups are also brought to Maryland by the IRI, NDI, the State 
Department programmes such as the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), 
or Congress’ Open World Programme, explored in detail below. These are often part of 
broader informational or fact-finding visits to the US. Visits are often coordinated 
through, and passed on from, the Maryland State Department.  
In these instances, legislature staff give presentations, hold semi-formal seminars and 
discussions with the visiting dignitaries or staff. Occasionally there are requests for the 
Department of Legislative Services to host a group for a day, providing a range of 
sessions. Reasons for the federal organizations using the sub-state experts are often due 
to similarities between Maryland and the partner in demographics, geography, economy 
or more specific, single issues like urban planning.lxxiii All interviewees acknowledged 
the importance of the proximity of Annapolis or Baltimore to Washington D.C. An hour’s 
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drive from the federal headquarters makes Maryland, and to a lesser extend Virginia 
and Pennsylvania, ideal locations from which the federal organizations can source the 
sub-state ‘expertise’. USAID’s Rule of Law Institutional Strengthening Program similarly 
makes use of Maryland’s, as well as Virginia’s legal systems and officials, often due to 
the proximity to Washington D.C. (see USAID, 2015). 
The IVLP is for example, administered in Maryland by the World Trade Centre Institute 
(WTCI). The IVLP is a State Department programme involving the hosting, across the  
US, of thousands of visitors; 4,661 international leaders from 192 countries in 2014 
with Maryland hosting 653 of those (Global Ties, 2013: 2). Visitors are hosted by 
volunteers within Maryland and other states, then meet counterparts in whichever 
industry or profession they may be involved with to share best practice. Visitors are 
also introduced to governance practices and departments or are themselves 
parliamentarians or public servants who share best practice with Maryland 
counterparts. WTCI’s role is in linking the visitors to the network of volunteer hosts and 
in connecting visitors to businesses, organizations and government officials with whom 
they will share good practice. WTCI makes particular use of the ‘Global Ties’ network of 
such volunteers.lxxiv 
Topics of discussion are frequently concerned with the legislative process, staff 
organization and development, state-federal relations, legislature-executive relations, 
and budgetary scrutiny. But there is no suggestion of message tailoring or attempts by 
the federal organizations to direct the content of the sessions. The state “experts” are 
treated as such, and are left to provide what is considered technical information to the 
partners. As a senior departmental official states; 
No, they don’t give us any directive as to what the message should be. 
They’re usually looking for us to provide some technical information either 
about the legislative process or certain things that we do... So no, I don’t 
think we get any real directive in terms of ‘please say this’ or ‘don’t say that’. 
No it’s more a matter of ‘these are the areas that they’re interested in and can 
you provide them with an itinerary’... I’ve never been told by any handler, 
NDI, NCSL or IRI to ‘hey, you can’t say this or you can’t say that’.lxxv  
Less frequently, legislature staff are invited to join projects abroad with the IRI, NDI, 
and State Department, again as ‘experts’ to provide specific, technical knowledge. Again, 
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little if any information about the involvement on behalf of federal organizations is 
recorded by the relevant department or staff. Consequently it is difficult to quantify or 
evaluate the volume or success of such endeavours. Trips have included an IRI visit to 
train Iraqi parliamentary staff (taking place in Jordan). Maryland research staff were 
invited to join the delegation and provide an introduction to the state legislature’s non-
partisan research service. Considered “technical” advice by the IRI and the staff 
themselves, Iraqi partners were exposed to;  
...three days on how, when you get a request from a member, how do you 
structure the research, how do you put it in a format that is easy for them to 
understand, to read and digest quickly. What kind of sources do you use, 
what analytical tools and so forth.lxxvi 
On an ad hoc and informal basis, federal bodies have been making frequent use of sub-
state officials and their expertise in their democracy promotion efforts. Records of 
involvement are rarely, if ever kept at the sub-state level however, and a precise 
quantification of sub-state involvement would require an extensive trawl through 
federal agency programme details.   
5.6.1 Open World Program 
A specific example of a federal level programme making ‘use’ of sub-state officials is 
explored in this section, namely the US Congress funded Open World Program (OWP). 
The OWP is an exchange programme funded by the US Congress and administered from 
the Library of Congress. Starting as a means of enhancing mutual understanding and 
cooperation with Russia in 1999, it was soon enhanced to incorporate the Ukraine, 
Balkan and then Central Asian countries – all of which are former Soviet states. Once 
more, while a federal level funded and controlled programme – though in this case the 
legislature – the deliverers and practitioners of governance and democracy sessions 
administered by the Open World Program, are all located in sub-state departments and 
organizations.  
The official aims of the programme have remained consistent since its inception and 
are;  
To enhance understanding and capabilities for cooperation between the 
United States and the countries of Eurasia by developing a network of 
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leaders in the region who have gained significant, firsthand exposure to 
America’s democratic, accountable government and its free-market system 
(Open World, 2015). 
The aims are fleshed out a little more by officials of the OWP; 
To create a network of young emerging leaders. We have about 24,000 
people in our network who have exposure to the US form of federalism, and 
we also count on our delegates when they go back to either rise in their 
profession, to take on projects that were inspired from their programme, 
maintain contacts with their professional colleagues, prepare for visits form 
their hosts. We just want to make sure that dialogue continues after the 
programme, progressive dialogue.lxxvii 
The programme is a mix therefore of democracy promotion, cultural diplomacy and 
economic connections in terms of aims. Indeed, despite the State Department 
recognising the OWP as a democracy promotion programme, officials regard their work 
as an ‘exposure programme, a colleague-to-colleague programme’;lxxviii 
Some have referred to our programmes as study tours, and we consider this 
to be an exchange of information and ideas. People are not here for lectures, 
this is not a training programme, it’s for people to learn about each other’s 
systems. Colleague-to-colleague.lxxix 
Indeed, officials suggest that their work complements the democracy promotion 
foundations due to the nature of their work and method of delivery. Furthermore, the 
use of  the State Department as well as other democracy promotion foundations such as 
the NDI, IRI and the NED to nominate candidates for the programme offers a further 
complementary element.  
The OWP is funded mainly by Congress, but also by other agencies co-financing projects, 
and private donations; $8m, $1 and a little over $175,000 respectively in 2013 (Open 
World, 2013: 30-31). Congress also, via a Board of Trustees with members from both 
houses and the Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, develop the 4-year 
strategic plans. The strategic plan sets the objectives for its work. The main changes 
since 1999 have been the expansion in partners. The 2012-2015 strategic plan also 
called for a focus on young leaders leading to the administrators to target, and increase 
the numbers of delegates under 30 years of age to 35% (Open World, 2013: 4). The 
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programme keeps costs very low with volunteers hosting delegates and conducting 
sessions. Consequently, OWP is able to bring over 150 groups every year.  
Like the State Department’s IVLP programme, the administering officials are 
coordinators, linking nominated delegates who arrive in the US for the exchange, with 
volunteer hosts and professional visits during their time in the US. Democracy 
organizations, namely the NDI, IRI, and USAID are often consulted, alongside US 
embassies in partner countries, in OWP’s attempts to identify suitable delegates. The 
OWP is thus deeply rooted in national level discourses and strategies, even if the 
practitioners are state level officials. Following the candidate selection process and visa 
vetting, the Open World Leadership Centre (administering unit based in the Library of 
Congress), call for proposals from voluntary organizations to host the visits. 
Programmes are selected based on their suitability for the delegates and their fields of 
interest and thematically vary widely from governance to business or NGO sector. 
While in the United States, delegates take part in tailored, in-depth 
exchanges in themes of interest to Congress and of transnational impact, 
including human-trafficking prevention, government and court 
transparency, nuclear nonproliferation, and environmental protection. Most 
Open World hosting programs examine the role that legislative bodies play 
in these issues and in democracies, and provide opportunities for the 
delegates to share their expertise with their U.S. counterparts and host 
communities (Open World, 2015a). 
Officials are confident that delegates receive an experience of US democratic culture 
more generally, based on their immediate experiences with volunteer groups who host 
and run their programmes. Democracy and governance play an important role in all 
programmes even if not necessarily a central one; ‘we figure, through our programmes, 
everyone sees transparency, accountability, how people make government 
accountable’.lxxx Sessions are conducted with the Maryland’s state departments and 
their officials taking a lead.  
In the view of officials, delegates are exposed to a particularly American democratic 
culture; 
Politics is local. Self-determination. People are responsible for their actions 
and this is basically it. People should not wait for government to do 
something for them and this is what they see on the local level.lxxxi 
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Another identified the agency of individuals and the role of volunteerism in the 
provision of social services as defining features of the democratic experience visitors 
receive;  
One of the real key components that our folks take away with, the sense of 
volunteerism and being involved in your community. We’ve just hinted at 
that but they see a lot of rotary clubs, they see a lot of organizations aimed at 
helping handicapped. In those countries, if you are handicapped in the past, 
you basically stayed in your apartment and you were shut in or you were 
sent to an institute. Same as orphans.  
If we expose people to American families and local communities, the 
volunteerism, then we can expect them to go home wanting to change, 
wanting to improve. But we’re not saying ‘our system’s right’ [or that] ‘your 
system’s wrong’.lxxxii 
Open World visits are carefully tailored and officials make use of expertise and 
volunteers from all 50 states. States offer different strengths however; Colorado and 
California are ideal for groups interested in water management while South Dakota 
seems to excel in youth volunteering groups. Maryland meanwhile offers a breath of 
expertise due to its demographic, geographical and economic character. Baltimore is 
seen and used as a centre of media and press expertise.lxxxiii The University and 
biotech/technology corridor of the I270 offer further locations to locate visitors. With 
regard to governance however, Maryland’s non-partisan legislature is seen as a 
particular strength. Finally, programmes with regard to the rule of law are often located 
in Maryland, due in part at least to the expertise and enthusiasm of District Court Judge 
Richard D. Bennett for the programme.  
As an example of a specific visit, a rule of law related programme brought a delegation 
from Turkey in 2012; 
The group had a first-hand look at the common U.S. judicial procedures of 
plea bargaining and warrant acquisition while at the U.S. courthouse. A tour 
of the Maryland State Police DNA, Gun and Drug lab followed, and the 
delegation visited police facilities and their staff. Discussions covered the 
importance of procedures in prisons and methods to reduce violence in jails 
(Open World, 2013: 15). 
With regard to the international reception of the programme, despite an increasingly 
fraught global political context in its partners’ region, officials claim that due to being a 
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legislature programme, partners are less resistant; ‘That’s one of our strengths in Russia 
actually, is that we’re not tied to the executive branch policies. We’re non-political, 
we’re in the leg[islature] branch’.lxxxiv Officials also claim that the programmes are ‘non-
political’.  
We’re trying to do what the Russian leaders want too. They want to expose 
their people to Western systems with no brainwashing and no pontification, 
no standing on a pedestal. We might be a city on a hill, but it’s a rough hill 
with rocks on it.  
We’re so non-political in Russia. We do social networks, hospitals, hospices, 
trafficking, environment, energy, agriculture. The things that are non-
political that help build communities and societies. lxxxv 
The OWP is heavily reliant on volunteers. No guidance or training is imparted upon the 
sub-state volunteer experts however and consequently, the content of the OWP is 
dependent upon the individuals subcontracted to support its delivery. There is 
evidently an attempt to coordinate and ensure that the Open World programme is 
complementary of the broader democracy organizations’ work with particular partners. 
Nonetheless, broad generalizations regarding the ability of federal bodies to impart a 
consistent or deliberate message or tone to their democracy promotion is called into 
question if the actual, person-to-person contact involves sub-state officials in this 
manner.  
With regard to opportunity structures, we must again note the importance of the 
national level democracy organizations. While it is Marylandian democracy that is being 
promoted, it is through channels and partnerships established by national level 
organizations that it is done so. Furthermore, the key agency comes from those national 
level organizations and the decision to source expertise and knowledge from the states. 
The only agency from the local level involves the individual volunteers, though there’s 




5.7.1 Opportunity structures for Maryland democracy promotion 
In the Maryland case, opportunities for the state to engage in the promotion of 
democracy were not structured by the institutional contexts and key variables 
identified in the Lecours’ framework. Conversely, opportunity structures in Maryland 
largely work to restrict its executive from engaging the state in international democracy 
promotion. 
There is no nationalist presence in Maryland, and no significant desire on behalf of its 
politicians to engage in paradiplomacy for any reasons beyond economic or co-
operational. Unlike Flanders, there was no desire to put Maryland on the map, its role 
and actorness long since defined and established, with no desire to change that at the 
regional level. The domestic political context did not structure opportunities to engage in 
international democracy promotion.  
The vague constitutional allocation of competence is given specific meaning by strict and 
disciplining IGR which limit the types of activities that US states can engage in. The IGR 
operate in such a way as to restrict the states from crossing into political 
paradiplomacy, guarding the sovereignty of the federal government in the international 
realm very jealously. Though there have been periods where the structures could 
change, such as with regard to the Burma Law, the central state restricted and re-
emphasized the limits of state involvement abroad. There is still space within the set-up 
however for both economic and some co-operational paradiplomacy. Maryland’s powers 
and institutional capacity, though more developed since Reagan’s move to block grant 
funding, cannot be mobilized to promote democracy abroad.  
Representation within state foreign policy did not emerge as a pertinent factor with 
regard to Maryland’s executive, but, as discussed in the next section, was of key 
importance in structuring opportunities for individuals within the Maryland state 
institutions. There was room for individuals motivated to promote democracy to engage 
in such activities abroad through State Department, Congress, USAID or other such 
activities initiated by central state organizations.  
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Supra-national political and/or economic institutions and international organizations did 
not structure opportunities for Maryland, but did for broader organizations such as the 
NCSL that then drew on expertise from Maryland. Likewise, the willingness of partners 
to engage in democracy activities was more pertinent for the broader organizations that 
subcontracted Maryland officials, as were the emulation of industry norms, the central 
state’s foreign policy, and economic contexts.  
Like Flanders, the security context at particular periods was also a key conditioning 
factors, again for other actors that made use of Maryland officials. The demise of the 
Soviet Union, alongside Clinton’s less confrontational approach to foreign policy proved 
key factors that led to the construction of an opportunity for the National Guard to play 
a role in democracy promotion. Sino-American relations meanwhile are such that it may 
be acceptable for Chinese officials to source depoliticized sub-state “technical expertise” 
as an alternative to the unpalatable relations at the state-to-state level. 
Ultimately the opportunity structures do not work so as to allow Maryland’s executive 
to engage the state in democracy promotion activities abroad. The role of other actors 
and broader US foreign policy however, does structure situations where the 
subcontracting of depoliticized knowledge is a viable or even preferred option for those 
actors. Thus Maryland can be viewed as an opportunity structures for their democracy 
promotion activities 
5.7.2 Agency 
The Maryland case sets a challenge, to think differently about the role of agency in sub-
state democracy promotion. The sub-state executive has the potential, given their 
resources and technical and legal competence, to become international democracy 
promoters like Wales or Flanders. But with opportunities for political paradiplomacy 
closed by the IGR, the sub-state executive cannot engage in democracy promotion 
activities. However, its staff, using distinctly Marylandian knowledge and expertise can 
be subcontracted, and is sourced by national and global forces, and mobilized in order 
to promote democracy.  
205 
 
The key agency therefore is located at the national and global levels, and not within the 
sub-state governance structures. National level democracy organizations have turned to 
sub-states in an attempt to bolster their democracy promotion activities. In other cases, 
global partners have been happy to source or learn from the expertise of Maryland 
legislature staff.  
Equally pertinent is the agency of the hundreds and even thousands of individuals who 
have volunteered to support the national and global organizations and contribute to the 
promotion of democracy. In this sense, Maryland state staff and their knowledge is more 
of an opportunity structure for national level organizations to subcontract that 
knowledge. Within the Lecourian framework, the sub-state itself is an opportunity 
structure for national level agency. 
5.7.3 Understanding the democracy promotion of Maryland 
Agency from the governance structures with regard to political paradiplomacy is absent 
in the Maryland case. There were no domestic political forces attempting to develop the 
agency of the sub-state and enter into activities promoting democracy in the name of 
Maryland state. Maryland does not engage in the promotion of democracy as an actor. 
Constitutional rules are ambiguous but their understanding is clear; that political 
international relations is a realm for the federal government. There has been no 
opportunity for, and no agency from the governance and executive structures of the 
state. We may not therefore refer to Maryland state as a democracy promotion actor.  
Maryland’s officials have however been utilized as tools by the broader democracy 
promotion industry. When used, they bring their distinctive Maryland experience to the 
promotion of democracy on behalf of other partners. Furthermore, they enable the 
development of democracy promoting organizations and activities that engage with 
difficult partners – too difficult for the central state. In the Maryland case, personal 
agency was of paramount importance and the willingness of Maryland officials to 
engage in projects voluntarily, on behalf of other organizations was a key element.  
Maryland’s expertise is valued and used by federal level democracy organizations. The 
expertise is considered different to what other sources can provide as it derives from 
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the practice of democratic governance on the sub-state level. We can even begin to 
identify the model or at least the aspects of democracy promoted by Maryland, and 
sourced by the democracy organizations. Themes of transparency, scrutiny of 
legislation, accountability, and oversight are consistent areas where Maryland officials 
are involved in imparting their knowledge and expertise.  
Individuals interviewed were consistent in their suggestions that the states were ‘good 
at’ the themes they were frequently contracted to develop with partners. Indeed some 
even suggested that states were the best or even only locations where such knowledge 
could be acquired or taught. The officials were, in fact, the only people who could teach 
these technicalities of democratic governance. In the words of one legislature staff 
member; 
...there’s no real college course in how do you draft legislation. In law schools 
there is some, but again, we train, we really train them on the mechanics of it 
all. How you use our software to draft. Same for budget analysis and for 
fiscal; there’s training that goes on. Once they’re trained, then they should be 
able to impart that and how they do their work without any trouble.lxxxvi 
Unfortunately, without a more ambitious project to collect and record the experiences 
of the hundreds or possibly thousands of individuals who have, over the past decades, 
engaged in such volunteerism, it is difficult to present a more precise notion of their 
understandings of democracy beyond the themes within which they are contracted to 
engage.  
Turning to the democracy and federal organizations, and networks that make use of 
Maryland democracy promotion, it is more difficult to claim that those organizations are 
promoters of a specific model of democracy, at least not deliberately. There is little 
control over the Maryland officials or their message ‘in the room’ with partners, and no 
attempts to manipulate them beforehand. This is not to claim that Maryland democracy 
promotion does not run along similar or even exactly the same lines as other models of 
democracy being promoted. Nor to suggest that it isn’t possible to identify a relatively 
coherent model amongst US promoters. But it is to claim that any coherence between 
the Maryland democracy promotion elements within the programmes, and the broader 
programmes themselves, are more coincidental than deliberate. 
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Understanding Maryland’s democracy promotion is consequently more difficult than 
the other cases as the sub-state has not been mobilized as an actor. Beyond economic 
matters, Maryland does not pursue foreign policy goals through international activities. 
Its (sub-)national interests are not therefore pursued through foreign policy or by 
promoting democracy or engaging in international development. There is no agency 
from the sub-state’s executive structures. Indeed, there was no evidence of even a 
desire to do so, or a conception of how it would be possible, even if desired. Agency 
came from individuals who, as officials and experts in sub-state governance, are sought 
by national level democracy organizations for their unique knowledge. The medium is 
always dictated by those subcontracting organizations, as are the broad themes of the 
knowledge that Maryland officials will transfer.  
While Maryland democracy promotion is not an activity for the state, it is a resource 
“tapped into” and used by the broader industry. Doing so offers many advantages to that 
industry, from being able to bypass political obstructions, to providing a specialized 
knowledge of democratic governance. Maryland’s staff in this sense, can be understood 





Chapter 6: Wales 
This last  case study chapter will examine the democracy promotion activities of Wales’ 
new governance institutions after devolution in 1997. It will generate data for a 
comparative analysis and better understanding of sub-state democracy promotion, the 
basis for answering the third research question. Once more, and in keeping with the 
first two cases, the domestic structure emphasized by Lecours will be examined by way 
of introduction. The chapter will then explore specific instances of democracy 
promotion. Beginning with the executive, then moving on to the legislature which, 
unlike the other cases, emerges as a distinct actor. The chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of the democracy promotion activities of Wales, how they are understood 
through the Lecourian framework, and a brief understanding of Wales as a democracy 
promoter. It will argue that Wales has promoted democracy in a variety of ways, both 
implicitly and explicitly, but is also, like Maryland in the previous chapter, a source of 
knowledge and subcontracted expertise for broader democracy promoters.  
6.1.1 Wales, devolution and ‘inclusive democracy’ 
Wales’ incorporation into the English, later United Kingdom dates back many centuries, 
but the persistence of an element of exceptionalism to the governance of Wales has 
proved a defining feature throughout its political history. From the Acts of Union, 
through Oliver Cromwell’s addressing of the Catholic question, to the continued debate 
regarding constitutional reform and devolution; Welsh society and culture has 
consistently exhibited different, exceptional aspects to the rest of the Kingdom(s). It’s 
not quite the same. In turn, this has warranted different, exceptional treatment in its 
governance. During the period of administrative devolution to specifically Welsh, ‘sub-
departments’ of state – the manner in which the exceptionalism was accounted for and 
addressed by the Westminster government during the 20th century – a firm principle, 
well established was succinctly articulated; 
Time and again we were made to realise that the problems of administration 
in certain fields were different from those in England and that there was 
therefore a clear and unmistakable need to secure for Wales a different 
system of administrative arrangements to deal with these special problems 
(Council for Wales and Monmouthshire, 1959: Para. 13).  
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Welsh exceptionalism had, albeit reluctantly, become an accepted principle of 
governance within the Westminster government. Executive devolution and a 
democratization of the functions of the Welsh Office (a department of State established 
in 1964 to coordinate governance in Wales) was rejected at a referendum in 1979  after 
it ‘...exited a conservative reaction inimical to institutional reform and stimulated the 
widespread hostility of organised interests’ (Jones and Wilford, 1983: 218). Crucially 
however, the referendum ‘...failed to resolve the issue of Welsh devolution’ (Jones and 
Wilford, 1983: 222), not only because, as those authors suggest, referendums rarely 
decide matters once and for all, but due also to the inescapable fact that administrative 
devolution was to continue and proliferate over the next two decades.  
Over its final 20 years it [the Welsh Office] developed into a multi-functional 
ministry carrying out the majority of non benefit-related, revenue raising 
and social security government functions in Wales (Deacon, 2002: 39).  
This latter period of intensified administrative devolution during the 1980s coincided 
with a period of crisis for the British state; a time of exclusive party government, of a 
highly centralized state and few if any effective checks on that executive (Hirst and 
Barnett, 1993: 6). This was particularly seen to be the case in Wales when Conservative 
Ministers administered policy through the centralized Welsh Office, without the backing 
of an electoral majority in Wales. A tight grip of dubious legitimacy was seen to be kept 
on the wider governance and policy structures of Wales through friendly appointments 
to quasi autonomous non-governmental organizations (QUANGOs) which by the 1990s 
had come to administer and develop policy for large sections of the public sector in 
Wales. The British state’s governance in Wales was facing a crisis of legitimacy. This 
crisis gave an opportunity firstly for executive devolution to be placed back onto the 
political agenda if it were presented as a potential solution to the crisis (Morgan and 
Mungham, 2000), and secondly to construct a new political climate (see Chaney, Hall 
and Pithouse, 2001). 
6.1.2 The new, ‘Welsh’ democracy and crisis of legitimacy 
Devolution was re-understand by its proponents within the Labour party which by 
1997 was the UK’s governing party. The new devolution was to embody values and 
themes which would offer a solution to the governance crisis – what was dubbed the 
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‘democratic deficit’ present in Wales (Osmond, 1995). Its proponents pressed claims 
that devolution would establish a ‘new, more inclusive and participative democracy in 
Britain’ (Welsh Office, 1997: 3). A referendum on these proposals, held in September 
1997, was proposed by the then new, Labour UK government. The electorate were in 
favour of the proposal by 559,419 (50.3%) to 552,698 (49.7%) against, a margin of only 
6,721 (0.6%) with a 50.1% turnout; ‘little short of a miracle’ (Morgan and Mungham, 
2000: 195).  
With such a small mandate, the lack of legitimacy dominated public attitudes toward the 
new institution (see Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004: 37; Scully and Wyn Jones, 2016: 
516). The institution’s legitimacy would be seen to be tied to the extent to which a ‘new 
democracy’ could be realized. Consequently, the development of ‘inclusivity’ goes hand 
in hand with the development of the institution; 
To generate a sense of legitimacy for the National Assembly...The success or 
failure of this task seems to largely depend on the ability of those involved in 
the devolution process to turn the rhetoric of inclusivity that has 
characterized Welsh politics since the 1997 general election into reality 
(Wyn Jones and Trystan 1999: 90). 
Although central to the arguments in favour of devolution, there had been little, if any 
critical engagement with the concept of ‘inclusive democracy’ during the first, 
referendum-winning phase;  
Nor was their pre-devolution utterance ever accompanied by a systematic 
attempt to unpack what these desirable ideas might mean in practice or a 
forecast of the tangible benefits they might bring (Chaney, Hall and Pithouse, 
2001: 3). 
Pre-referendum, inclusivity was an ideal or a value, espoused by the proponents of a 
‘Yes’ vote. Post-referendum, the designers of devolution would be pressed to make good 
on the promises, particularly considering the razor-thin majority.  
The further development of the concept of ‘inclusive democracy’ and its realization 
would therefore play a key role in constructing the legitimacy of the institution and the 
new form that democracy would take in Wales. Extensive efforts were made by 
Secretary of State, Ron Davies to crystalize and articulate its values. The National 
Assembly Advisory Group (NAAG) was established just three months after the 
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referendum. It may have been more of a symbolic than substantive part of the 
development of the inclusivity agenda, as the political context and continued hostility 
toward devolution form within the Labour party itself forced Ron Davies to keep a firm 
grip on the direction of the concept (see Chaney and Fevre, 2001). Nevertheless; 
The membership was drawn up in such a way that every item of the agenda 
of inclusiveness could be checked off: political pluralism, gender, geography, 
pressure groups, business and trade unions (Chaney and Fevre, 2001: 28). 
Following the referendum therefore, ‘inclusivity’ was fleshed out; 
It came to signify liberal concerns about fostering democratic participation, 
respecting pluralism, advancing equality, ending marginalization, 
reinventing a Welsh culture that is meaningful and embracing to all citizens, 
and developing a new mode of politics that is consensual and less adversarial 
(Chaney and Fevre, 2001: 31).  
Welsh democracy and devolution was therefore not a simple transfer of functions to a 
democratically elected executive. It was predicated upon, and legitimized by the extent 
to which it produced a specific, more ‘inclusive’ form of democratic governance in 
Wales. The extent to which the discourse and institutions of Welsh devolution have 
gone to embody and manifest the values of ‘inclusivity’, reflects the need to generate 
legitimacy for the broader concept of Welsh devolution.  
6.1.3 Institutionalizing ‘inclusivity’ 
Alongside the conceptual development, early steps were taken both to quantify and 
measure progress towards this ‘inclusivity’ (Chaney and Fevre, 2001: 31-32), and to 
institutionalize the values of the new democracy in the GOW Act 1998 and broader ‘set-
up’ of the new devolved structure. However, it was also a consensus settlement to 
appease those still hostile to devolution within the Labour party. The resulting 
institution has been characterised as a having a ‘strange anatomy’ (Rawlings, 2003a) 
but also one which was also designed to develop with time (Rawlings, 2003b: 3). With 
regard to powers, only specific secondary legislation in 18 fields – not foreign policy – 
could be passed by the body with the emphasis therefore on effective policymaking 
rather than legislation. The innovation of the Act came in the detail, and the attempt to 
develop and institutionalize inclusivity. 
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An element of proportional representation was introduced to the electoral system in 
order to foster cross-party support. Section 107 of the Act placed a statutory duty on the 
institution not to act contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 
115 required the Assembly to consult with businesses on the impact of its functions. 
Clauses 48 and 120 placed a statutory duty to ensure equality of opportunity, a legal 
institutionalization strengthened with the establishment of the Standing Committee on 
Equality of Opportunity and an Equality Policy Unit within the Assembly.  
Further statutory duties to promote bilingualism and sustainable development were 
enshrined in the act. Openness was pursued through the practices of the new institution 
with cabinet minutes being published as well as extensive documentation of the 
proceedings – all bilingually. Parties were invited by the Secretary of State to work 
toward gender balancing in their candidate selection processes. Efforts were extended 
to fostering inclusivity within civil society by establishing bodies such as the All Wales 
Ethnic Minority Association (AWEMA) to coordinate and assist ethnic minorities to 
engage with the policy process.  
Even the GOW Act 1998 itself originally conceived of a single body corporate (HMSO, 
1998), sharing the responsibility for governing Wales through the consensus generated 
by the new politics, and supported by the contribution of a civil society revitalized by 
inclusive devolution (Royles, 2007:2-3). At an early stage, some elements of this more 
‘inclusive’ democracy have arguably been realized, as in the field of gender parity for 
example (see Betts, Borland and Chaney, 2001). But other elements such as the notion 
of a more consensual political culture quickly failed to materialize (see Balsom, 2000: 
35), as the underestimated influence of Westminster parliamentarianism dragged the 
infant institution toward a more adversarial, British model of practicing politics (see 
Rawlings, 2003b).  
6.1.4 De facto and de jure reforms, 2000-2007 
The early years of the infant institution was a period of complex turmoil, difficult to 
introduce in brief, but important to the consequent constitutional reforms. The body 
corporate ideal failed to materialise in practice, not least due to the oppositional and 
‘Westminster-like’ nature of the party-political setting (Rawlings, 2003b), and the then 
213 
 
First Secretary6, Alun Michael’s ‘cautious and centralist, a very personal or “hands-on” 
style of management’ (Rawlings, 2003b: 5). Having achieved a bitter and dividing 
victory for leadership of the Labour party and the Assembly (see Flynn, 1999), but failed 
to achieve a majority in the 1999 elections, Michael’s unpopular leadership fell victim to 
party politics, and his resignation was forced by a threat of a vote of no confidence in 
February 2000.  
Replacing Michael was Rhodri Morgan who quickly moved the institution, with cross-
party consensus in the form of a review of procedures (see NAfW, 2002; Chaney, Hall, 
and Pithouse, 2001: 13) along its constitutional trajectory toward a de facto, but not de 
jure, government and opposition model (Rawlings, 2003b). A Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition ‘Welsh Assembly Government’ (WAG) from 2000-2003, and a Labour majority 
administration from 2003-2007, faced a Plaid Cymru led opposition. Meanwhile, an 
empowered and well-resourced Office of the Presiding Officer (akin to a “speaker of the 
house”), strengthened the independence of the legislature from the WAG. 
Following independent reviews and consistent political pressure for reform, the 2006 
Government of Wales Act was drawn up and enacted following the 2007 election (and 
consequent establishment of the second coalition government, this time involving 
Labour and the nationalists, Plaid Cymru). The Act legally separated the executive and 
the legislature and created the ‘Commission of the Assembly’ as a body to lead and 
manage the latter alongside the Presiding Officer. This creation brought to an end the 
period of extensive control wielded by the Presiding Officer over the legislature’s 
resources which had lasted since the de facto reforms of 2000. The establishment of a 
Commission also led to a formalization of the legislature’s activities; objectives and 
strategies designed by the Commission and published publically in the name of the 
Commission as opposed to being decided by the Presiding Officer.  
The key development during the Third Assembly (2007-2011) was the holding of a 
referendum and a move to ‘Part Four’ of the GOW Act 2006, which bestowed primary 
legislative powers upon the institution. The 2011 referendum itself produced a 
resounding ‘yes’, by 517,132 (63.49%) votes to 297,380 (36.51%) with a 35.63% 
                                                        
6 The role would later be called ‘First Minister’ 
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turnout. In the eyes of First Minister Carwyn Jones, an old man had come of age. 
Crucially for the institution, its legitimacy had been solidified through popular 
referendum. 
6.1.5 IGR 
The democracy promotion activities examined in this chapter were established during a 
period characterised by a lack of consistency, personal relations, and ad hoc approach to 
IGR. Several perceived weaknesses and inadequacies have been highlighted with regard 
to the IGR in this period (see House of Lords, 2002; NAfW 2002).  
The Richard Commission in particular, established by the Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition in 2000 after the collapse of Michael and the corporate body, offered a 
comprehensive exposition of IGR. It concluded that they were characterised by a lack of 
understanding among Whitehall officials of the complexities and variation regarding the 
constitutional settlement; the lack of consistency in the manner in which various 
Whitehall departments dealt with the WAG; and the dependence upon goodwill and 
personal relations (Richard Commission, 2004: 146–147).  
Some have been more blunt, suggesting that Wales and Whitehall had in this period; 
‘...barely made it to having “functional” intergovernmental relations, given the level of 
disengagement of most departmental ministers and their senior officials’ (Trench 2008, 
225), while others highlight the ad hoc nature of the relations (Royles and Wyn Jones, 
2012: 255). As will be noted, the flexibility and ad hoc nature on the one hand enables 
central government to maintain a controlling grip on the devolution settlement (see 
Swenden, 2006). On the other, as detailed in the case of Wales for Africa, it can allow for 
compromises where agreement can be established (see Royles and Wyn Jones, 2012). 
The IGR in the Welsh case present both opportunities for, and potential constraints 
upon the development of paradiplomatic activities. 
6.1.6 Foreign affairs  
Welsh international activity did not begin with the advent of devolution. The Welsh 
Development Agency’s (WDA) remit permitted international visits, promotional activity 
and the marketing of Wales as a location for business since 1976, while the Wales 
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Tourist Board also acted internationally in pursuit of its specific remit. The Welsh Office 
took a lead in lobbying the EU policy structures, developing relations with other nations 
and regions around the globe both informally, and through six Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOUs). International activity was conducted through civil society; 
Dolen Cymru Lesotho’s development links; historical cultural links with the Patagonia 
region; Cymru-Cuba and Wales Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign links and, as will be 
discussed below, a scattered host of smaller development and aid projects between 
communities in Wales and communities in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Thomas, 1998: 377). 
John Davies (2007: 671) meanwhile, argued that the genesis of a Welsh ‘foreign policy’ 
can be traced to the 1982 Mercator Programme, fostering language, media, publishing, 
and cultural networks; a Welsh attempt to develop the bilingual agenda internationally.  
While not strategically coordinated therefore, Welsh international economic and co-
operational activity existed and there were structures present for the pursuit of a 
variety of activities. The new devolved settlement would reflect and enable the 
continuation of Welsh international activity rather than reforming  or starting afresh 
Wales’ international role in foreign affairs.  
The rules dictating the conduct of foreign affairs of the Welsh Government meanwhile 
has, since the start, been set by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which details 
in the form of ‘soft law’, the conventions and rules for officials in Cardiff and London 
with regard to functions not specified in the legislation. Within the MoU, the Concordat 
on International Relations states quite clearly where the competence lies;  
...the United Kingdom Government is responsible for international relations. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs is responsible 
for the foreign policy of the United Kingdom...The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) promotes the international interests of the 
United Kingdom and all its constituent parts (UK Government, 2013: 47). 
Provisions exist for Welsh input into UK foreign policy and EU relations however, 
allowing for a continuation of pre-devolutionary practices. The Assembly, and latterly 
its government would also develop and support international activities beyond and 
exceptional to those specified by the MoU and concordat on international relations. 
They are detailed below, but their development can be characterised and understood as 
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a continuation and development of pre-devolutionary activities rather than anything 
born of the new structures.  
The key difference however is that the activities have become more strategically 
coordinated, better supported, and resourced following devolution. Crucially, 
devolution established the Welsh Government as a key actor in Wales with the legal 
basis, the resources, and opportunities to facilitating the continuation of pre-
devolutionary international activities, both economic and co-operational. The 
incorporation of the functions of QUANGOs such as the WDA for example, have 
strengthened its capacity to become this actor, and activities have also proliferated with 
time as MoUs and economic cooperation agreements have been signed with various 
regions and states (see Royles, 2010). There is also a single instance of political 
paradiplomacy in the form of its international development programme, discussed at 
length in this chapter.  
The WAG was not the only actor created and empowered by the move toward a 
government and opposition model. The reform led to the creation of a separated, 
operationally independent and well-resourced Office for the Presiding Officer (PO). 
Though with no pre-designed or institutionalized role in international affairs, the 
Presiding Officer himself would prove instrumental in shaping the office into an explicit 
promoter of Welsh democracy both domestically and internationally. Specifically, the 
PO directed the work of the International Relations Team (IRT). The IRT also supports 
Assembly Members in their broader international activities such as exchanging 
knowledge and sharing good practice with other legislative organisations (NAfW, 
2014a); supporting the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association’s branch within the 
Assembly; engaging with the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly; and participating in 
the Conference of European Regional Legislature Assemblies (CALRE).  
The devolution settlement itself therefore restricts all but a continuation of pre-
devolutionary international activities – economic and co-operational paradiplomacy. 
Insofar as constitutional powers for international activity therefore, devolution is not a 
direct critical juncture – the rules were not reformed. It is a key event however in that it 
has created and empowered new actors who have been endowed with the resources 
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and an international infrastructure – the capacity to become international actors. 
Offices, staff, contacts and other resources enabled it to act in various fields outside 
Wales.  
6.1.7 Regional politics and nationalist parties 
The post-devolution political context in Wales has been dominated by a Labour party 
struggling to achieve a majority, with coalitions becoming a common feature. Party-
competition between Labour and their rivals, particularly the nationalist party, Plaid 
Cymru (Plaid) who performed strongly in 1999, has been dominated by debate 
regarding the reform of the devolution settlement, shunting Wales along its 
constitutional trajectory. Plaid have been a consistent and major presence within the 
political context, though not the dominating and governing force witnessed in the case 
of the NVA in Flanders. 
After a strong performance by Plaid in 1999, Labour’s counter-punch was manifested by 
an adoption of a new and distinctive, soft-nationalist rhetoric and position and a 
‘rebranding of the Wales Labour Party as “the true party of Wales”’ (Wyn Jones and 
Trystan, 2001: 18). It also involved attacks on Plaid as inward-looking or xenophobic 
nationalists (see Wyn Jones, 2014: 73), which was aided by a toxic immigration debate 
during the early 2000s (see Brooks, 2006; Edwards, 2016). Plaid’s recovery in the 2007 
elections resulted in a coalition deal with Labour for their first and only term in 
government. The 2011 elections, set to the backdrop of a conservative UK government, 
pushed the party to third place, and Labour into a minority administration.  
Successive governments have concentrated largely upon the economic and cultural 
aspects of international relations with a few key exceptions. Firstly, the development 
and launch of the Wales for Africa programme is discussed in detail in this chapter. 
Secondly, the Labour-Plaid coalition government changed its tone, placing an emphasis 
on highlighting international successes such as its representation at the EU (see BBC 
Website, 2008b), but itself presided over a decrease of funding and withdrawal of 
investment into international economic ventures. Generally however, international 




Wales’ government has some flexibility in its budget, and some institutional capacity to 
engage internationally. There is a nationalist party, that has enjoyed limited electoral 
success, sharing power on one occasion. Wales has no constitutional competence in the 
realm of international relations, though some pre-devolutionary activities, particularly 
economic have been allowed to continue, and the IGR remain semi-formal and flexible 
enough to accommodate such exceptions. There is no official input into UK foreign policy 
but the UK is a member of the EU. The UK promotes democracy and the activity is part of 
its foreign policy agenda. 
This chapter will now explore the democracy promotion activities of the executive and 
legislature in post-devolution Wales.  
6.2 The Welsh Government 
This section will explore the activities of the WAG (Welsh Government after an official 
change of name in 2011). A notable aspect of the WAG’s engagement internationally has 
been its reluctance to involve itself in political matters. This restraint will be examined, 
followed by a detailed exploration of the Government’s ‘Wales for Africa’ programme; 
an international development programme that has, over its lifetime, grown to 
incorporate the norms and practices of the global development industry, in turn 
contributing to the promotion of good governance and democracy abroad.  
6.2.1 Government restraint: ‘a serious partner in pursuit of our legitimate work’ 
The executive has been presented with numerous opportunities to engage in “soft” 
democracy promotion through its diplomacy. Opportunities arise for the WAG to align 
with particular values, to condemn the non-democratic actions of other states and 
regions. Furthermore, bilateral relations with states ‘regressing’ on their democratic 
development offer an opportunity and potential justification to attach ‘negative 
linkages’ to its development aid. In each case however, the executive has refrained from 
engaging in political paradiplomacy due mainly to the strict rules of devolution – well 
observed by all – backed by the particular intergovernmental relations.  
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There is a growing confidence among civil servants regarding the legitimacy of Wales as 
an international actor in pursuit of its domestic interests. They are however, very clear 
in drawing the boundaries of competence for international activity; 
We don’t have responsibility for foreign affairs. The responsibility for foreign 
affairs is not devolved and that remains with the UK government and 
Ministers are very keen to observe that delineation of competence. What we 
do have devolved to us is economic development and a whole series of 
domestic policies. And it’s in relation to that that we have the opportunity to 
act externally in pursuit of our economic interests and in pursuit of our 
domestic policy interests where they have an international dimension .lxxxvii 
This strict demarcation is emphasized time and again by Government staff and by 
Ministers; 
...we take our cue from the Government of Wales act – the GOW act is the 
legislation which defines the limits of devolution and responsible 
government demands that we recognize the GOW act and that’s what 
Ministers here are very keen to do... 
...Ministers here have been very conscious of the need to not go beyond our 
competence and in my experience they’ve not wanted to go beyond our 
competence.... 
...[it’s the] Ministers here that take a decision on where to draw the line but 
based on their clear understanding of the legislation... lxxxviii 
Nationalists, as Lecours and Moreno (2003) propose, see great value in international 
activity, perceiving it as a means of pursuing core objectives.  Indeed, as one Plaid 
official claims; 
People know of Wales through rugby because we’re treated on a par with 
other rugby playing countries. If we’re treated on a par with other countries 
in other fields as well then it improves the national standing of the country 
and knock-on effects to trade and cultural and other links as well. That of 
course, being a nationalist party, we support and other parties presumably 
don’t.lxxxix 
However, when in government as part of the One Wales coalition Government with 
Labour from 2007-2011, Plaid still observed the strict demarcation of powers and 
respect the primacy of the UK government in the realm of political diplomacy. As a 
government advisor of the period suggests; 
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There had been much discussion before we came into government and while 
we were in government regarding China relations, and the obvious tensions 
that arose from China in terms of human rights in China, and what the Welsh 
Government should be saying about these things, if anything, while on visits. 
I remember those discussions and I remember a recognition that it was 
important that it be raised but that there was some feeling that 'well that 
would be the role of the Government in Westminster', the Welsh 
government's role was, more or less, to actively create business relations...xc 
The above statement was made in relation to Chongqing province in China with whom 
the WAG had signed a Memorandum of Understanding and a ‘cooperation agreement’ 
with regard to economic development. In 2008, pressure mounted from human rights 
campaigners such as Amnesty International for the WAG to condemn abuses in 
Chongqing (see Shipton, 2008; Williamson, 2008). A decision was made not to condemn 
the abuses and a deliberately obtuse response offered by the government; ‘The question 
of whether to engage with China or ignore China is one that people in politics and 
business in the Western world have pondered for over 50 years now’ (BBC Website, 
2008). In arriving at such a response, the WAG, at the political level, deliberately 
prioritized the economic relationship and relinquished the opportunity to express a 
particular set of human rights values internationally. The WAG, regardless of which 
political colour, prioritises its economic paradiplomacy, and chooses not to risk 
relations with political statements.  
Another incident where pressure was placed on the Government to express a political 
or democracy-related international statement, involved the passing of anti-homosexual 
legislation in Uganda in 2014, with which Wales was engaged in a development 
partnership. Pressure was placed on the Government to criticise and consider 
withdrawing its development support if the Ugandan government pressed forward with 
its anti-homosexual legislation (see Brooks, 2014). The Welsh Government had decided 
not to adjust or review the partnership with Uganda – deliberately not attaching what 
the democracy promotion literature would refer to as a ‘negative linkage’ to their 
international assistance. The First Minister, only after a long silence with regard to the 
legislation, felt the need to make reference to the matter during his visit. The reference 
it finally made however was an expression of UK Government policy, not the 
independent view of the First Minister or Welsh Government;  
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...the First Minister made remarks about human rights in the context of a 
speech he made in Uganda and the way in which he did that, the tone and the 
style and the message was by agreement with the UK government because 
we recognize that it is for them to provide the line to us.xci 
Similarly, even when pressured and when a viewpoint is expressed in Welsh public life, 
the Welsh Government will not make statements contrary to the UK Government’s 
position on international matters. In a park, yards from the First Minister’s private 
office in Cardiff sits a monument to the Armenian victims of Ottoman atrocities in 1915. 
The cross, the rondel and the commemoration plaque upon the monument, unveiled by 
the then PO, Dafydd Elis Thomas, are in Welsh slate with a tri-lingual inscription 
reading; ‘In memory of the victims of the Armenian Genocide’. However, when 
repeatedly called upon by Armenian and Turkish communities to recognize or deny the 
atrocities as a ‘genocide’, the Welsh Government takes instead the UK Government 
terminology of ‘atrocities’, and refuse to recognize a genocidal element to the atrocities.  
In a domestic setting however, such as during First Minister’s Questions sessions at, the 
Welsh Government has no aversion to invoking the normative value of its contributions 
around the world in fields such as international development where Wales has a 
‘legitimate’ space to act; 
As far as we are concerned, we take the issue [of international development] 
—[Interruption.] He can try to shout as much as he wants, but I will tell him 
this now: let him go to Uganda to tell people there that he would take 
funding away from them. Let him go to tell people in Uganda that he would 
scrap the Wales for Africa programme. Then he can go to tell people in Wales 
how ‘dynamic’ he is to take money away from some of the most worthy 
projects anywhere in the world. Is that not typical of the Tories? They never 
change (NAfWb, 2014). 
The remark was made in response to Conservative party calls to abandon the 
development work being undertaken in the Mbale region of Uganda. 
The understanding of the devolution settlement is a clear factor in explaining the 
decisions of Welsh officials and Ministers to consistently refrain from making political 
statements or politicizing their broader activities. The Memorandum of Understanding’s 
Concordat on International Relations between the two institutions states; ‘...the United 
Kingdom Government is responsible for international relations’ (UK Government, 2013: 
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43). The strict interpretation of competence in fields such as foreign policy and 
diplomatic statements severely restricts the Welsh Government’s capacity to promote 
democracy through “soft” measures such as diplomatic statements. Furthermore, the 
strict line does not allow the Welsh Government to politicize its development 
programme by attaching negative linkages without breaking the established rule that 
such activity is the domain of the UK government alone.  
Reinforcing the strength of the ‘rules’ surrounding political paradiplomacy is the nature 
of the intergovernmental relations. Breaking the “rules” and politicizing Welsh 
paradiplomacy would be seen by officials as opening a ‘potential can of worms’,xcii not 
with regard to the international reaction but in relation to the UK government’s 
reaction. The relationship operates on a quid pro quo basis, depending at best, on a 
mutual respect for the principle of ‘non-intervention’ in each other’s competences 
established by officials. Wyn Jones and Royles go further, suggesting that ‘[i]n the 
international realm, at least, the central state is clearly guarding its prerogatives 
jealously’ and that the intergovernmental relations are a means of guarding the UK’s 
prerogatives, securing and ‘disciplining’ as well as facilitating activities (Wyn Jones and 
Royles, 2012: 266). Data from this project supports this interpretation of Welsh IGR, 
and emphasises the structuring role they play with regard to paradiplomacy.  
Nonetheless, there are very few, if any instances of Westminster interference, 
“warnings”, or coercion. If disciplining the sub-state government is the aim then there is 
also an element of self-disciplining on behalf of Welsh officials present. Path 
dependency is a useful concept if we seek an explanation; the UK government has 
always led on political activity internationally and devolution was no critical juncture or 
mediating event with regard to the rules of international competences. Political 
statements by the Welsh executive are therefore avoided or, at most, simply reflect the 
UK government’s position on matters. 
In this sense, UK democracy promotion is at least officially and explicitly, the domain of 
the central government, and its associated institutions. The disciplining nature of the 
intergovernmental relations and the adherence of the government to the rules reinforce 
the strength of technically soft-law and IGR. Wales is denied agency with regard to 
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promoting democracy and the realm of political international relations; a realm guarded 
by the central government.  
6.3 Wales for Africa (WfA) 
The Welsh Government has an international development programme, launched in 
2006, which has come to emulate the practices and approaches of the global community 
of development practitioners and consequently, begun to implicitly promote good 
governance and democracy. The ambiguity of the devolution settlement and flexibility 
of the intergovernmental relations have enabled the Welsh Government to secure 
justification within the strict rules of foreign policy to establish the programme. The 
historical context surrounding its genesis and the implications of the legal basis upon 
which it was constructed, has a direct impact on the activities funded by the 
programme. 
6.3.1 Legal and motivational basis 
Before the AMs sat for the first time, there were suggestions that the Assembly could 
support the plethora of existing community development links and diaspora 
communities and contribute more overtly to overseas development (Thomas, 1998: 
377). This case for Government support of the existing, pre-devolutionary ‘grass roots’ 
development organizations achieved cabinet support through individuals such as Sue 
Essex, Jane Davidson and ultimately the then First Minister, Rhodri Morgan.xciii UK level 
DfID Ministers, Labour’s Hilary Benn and Gareth Thomas, made up the essential 
Whitehall element of the political consensus supporting the initiative (Royles, 2010: 
157).  
Extensive efforts were made, facilitated by the good relations between the governments 
(both Labour) to justify firstly the legal basis for the programme, but also that it would 
“add value” to the UK’s development work. In short; ‘WAG would not have been able to 
pursue ‘Wales for Africa’ were it not for the agreement of the UK government, and in 
particular the Department for International Development’ (Wyn Jones and Royles, 2012: 
260-261). After ‘wading through legislation’ and every particular action checked with 
lawyers to exploit the devolution settlement, the concept of ‘mutual benefit’; ‘became 
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central to justifying WAG’s actions...’ (Wyn Jones and Royles, 2012: 260). The activity 
was permitted so long as Welsh practitioners were also benefitting from the 
partnerships. 
The unique legal solution which enables the programme also shapes and conditions the 
activities that are possible. Funding cannot be directed outside of Wales, thus the 
development groups and programmes in Wales are in receipt of any funding or support. 
Community groups and the public sector in Wales become the recipients, not 
organizations based abroad. Programmes must also be monitored to ensure ‘mutual 
benefit’ to the developer as well as the developed. In this sense, the Welsh international 
development scheme differs from the Flemish, which is much more state-like. It also 
allows, or arguably forces the Welsh programme to develop more innovatively. 
While IGR are normally the barrier for the Government, where consensus can be built 
the ambiguity of the devolution settlement can be exploited to enable the WAG to 
engage in broader paradiplomatic activity. That consensus need not be dependent upon 
coexistence either – UK Ministers suggest that in a policy field which is outsourced and 
not politicized, such a proposal would be welcome by a UK Government of any colour.xciv 
As noted, the explicit motivations for the programme, expressed by the Government 
ministers of the time, were rooted in a desire to assist the grassroots development 
partnerships. However it has also been argued that there is a distinctly domestic, party-
political motivation behind the Wales for Africa programme. Royles’ exploration of the 
programme uncovered ‘suggestions that competition between Welsh Labour and Plaid 
Cymru initially influenced this policy’ (2010: 159). Interviews suggested that WfA 
allowed the Labour Government to project an outward-looking, progressive, 
internationalist personality. Strategically, this was to coincide with their depiction of 
their main competitors, Plaid Cymru, as inward-looking nationalists, an effort aided by a 
language-migration row within the nationalist party during the same period (see 
Brooks, 2006; Edwards, 2016; Wyn Jones, 2014: 73). For Labour, an international 
development programme was an ideal means of projecting a particular personality, not 
only internationally, but to a domestic audience. 
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6.3.2 Strategy and development over time 
The broad strategic objective adopted by the WAG for its development programme was 
of contributing to the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the “in” 
concept of development while WfA was being developed. The Gleneagles G8 and ‘Make 
Poverty History campaign provided the “mood music” (see Welsh Assembly 
Government, 2004: 21). Strictly speaking however, there was no detailed strategic plan 
mapping out the steps to achieving the objective. WfA is not a holistic approach to 
international development, it is a grant administration programme aimed at supporting 
and meeting the needs of Welsh civil society. In the words of one senior civil servant; 
‘we’re not on a mission. We are what we are, we seek to encourage more people to do 
more, of better quality’.xcv WfA aims to encourage the contribution of Welsh civil society 
to meeting the MDGs by supporting with funding, training, promoting, sharing best 
practice and building the capacity of NGOs (Welsh Government, 2014b). A means of 
helping Welsh civil society and the WAG to “do” development.  
Even by 2016, after a review of the programme prompted by the UN’s move away from 
MDGs toward Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the strategy remains vague and 
broad in focus. The aim was refined to focus development programmes in the following 
fields; ‘Health and wellbeing’, ‘Climate change and the environment’, ‘Lifelong learning’, 
‘Sustainable livelihoods’, ‘Involving the most marginalised groups’, ‘Supporting cultural 
exchanges among individuals’, and ‘Creating innovative solutions for communities living 
in poverty’ (Hub Cymru Africa, 2016). Few instances of development partnership will 
fail to fall into at least one of those broad categories. 
This strategic vagueness is deliberate for three reasons. Firstly, the WfA team retains 
control of the project – ultimately deciding upon the projects being funded and the 
direction the programme takes. It is recognized amongst the development community 
that this control allows a strong hand when the WfA management negotiates funding 
within the broader department.xcvi The vagueness also allows the programme to fund 
and support the broadest range of activities. Indeed it is claimed that simply helping 
Welsh civil society to “do” development is the true aim of the programme; Rhodri 
Morgan once described the programme’s aims to a Committee as no more than ‘few 
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drops of water—that is, public funding—and encouraging the civil society efforts that 
are already ongoing.’ (NAfW, 2010). Finally, the “vagueness” enables the programme 
management to pursue the original, political objective of WfA; to align with and 
articulate particular values, of being ‘outward-looking’ global citizens (Royles, 2010: 
158), a notion still articulated in the literature to this day (Wales for Africa, 2013). 
Although the political context of the early 2000s has moved on, the future direction and 
development of the programme has rarely been (re-)articulated, and no political lead 
has been forthcoming. By the Third Assembly of 2007-2011, interest in the programme 
had waned. Just one debate was held in plenary while cabinet interest in the 
programme had almost disappeared. As a senior government advisor notes; ‘...it came 
up [in cabinet meetings], but not in any proactive way. It was just one of those 
programmes that went along’.xcvii Or in the words of a long-serving official;  
It’s supportive, but I’d say, throughout my time, it’s a nice thing the Welsh 
government does, but it doesn’t really challenge us... There has been a 
tendency, because it’s been nice, Assembly Members and their communities 
are doing nice things, it’s quite interesting. But it hasn’t gone much beyond 
that. It’s a nice programme, doing good stuff. But it’s never really grown.xcviii 
The lack of strong political leadership of the actual programme however, particularly 
since the departure of Sue Essex and Jane Davidson from the Welsh Government, has 
left the programme’s future development rather unguided but still relatively 
unrestricted due to the deliberate vagueness of the original design. The particular 
historical context of the programme’s formulation, its deliberate vagueness, coupled 
with the absence of any re-articulation of objectives or political lead, has left the specific 
programming in a normative void for much of its existence – arguably open to influence 
by global norms and practices. It is argued here that from this void, the programme 
officials have looked to the global norms and practices of the development industry, 
adopting and incorporating them over time.  
In practice, WfA programme offers grants to ‘Community links’ – the grassroots 
development projects run largely by volunteers. The grants support the activities as 
well as further training and development. WfA also fund the International Development 
Hub (Hub) which administers the grants, organizes training, and supports the 
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development of ‘community links’. These are discussed below, arguing that the Hub has 
encouraged and directed the ‘links’ toward international practices and norms. These 
practices involve the promotion and development of good governance within the 
partner country. Unknowingly and implicitly, the Welsh executive has become a 
promoter of democracy on a relatively low or localized level of society, the community 
level at which WfA operates; bottom up rather than at the state-wide promotion.  
6.3.3 ‘Community Links’ 
Over 150 Wales–Africa community development links have been supported which 
represents, along with health board links to communities, the bulk of the WfA 
programme. WfA seeks to support the links though grant funding and training, based on 
the notion that Welsh practitioners – businesses or volunteer groups for example – 
benefit from the development link. The experiences they gain from working in Africa on 
the work of the partnership also satisfies the legal requirement to ensure mutual gain. 
The specific ‘community links’  strategy is vague in its aims, claiming as it does that its 
mission is to support charitable, learning, partnership and development links (Wales for 
Africa, 2013: 10) – again, broad fields incorporating a wide variety of activities.  
The links are located at a local level, effectively groups of volunteers from communities 
in Wales who run a small, very specific project with partners in Africa. They are located 
within civil society or alongside region or district government and consequently rarely 
engage with central state governments due to their size and focus.xcix Furthermore; 
The devolved initiatives have encouraged interaction with African countries 
at a level below that of governments. Although the depth of linking initiatives 
varies, many solid and dedicated relationships have been built up between 
communities, civil society and parliamentarians in Wales, Scotland and their 
partner countries, resulting in a network of familiarity built on personal 
relationships. This is in sharp contrast to UK-wide involvement in African 
development, where engagement often only occurs at a governmental level 
(Anyimadu, 2011: 16). 
With a vague strategic objective and similarly broad and accommodating strategy to 
meet them, no activities are strictly forbidden or discouraged; WfA could support 




6.3.4 Governance and democracy support 
Nonetheless, the community links quickly began implementing governance related 
projects. Specifically, 88 organisations within the Wales for Africa scheme are 
contributing towards the MDG for gender equality, some of whom engage in projects 
that include a focus on democratic and community participation (Owen, 2010: 21). 
Organisations are also involved in projects which provide support to campaigning and 
advocacy movements (Owen, 2010: 31). Some, such as ‘Positive Women’, look to 
empower women in Swaziland aim to contribute to ‘significant social change’, doing so 
by working directly with women, as well as through advocacy programmes (Positive 
Women, 2016; 2016b).  
Beyond the explicit democracy and human rights programmes, broader projects also 
engage with governance structures in the partner country. One development 
practitioner claims that promotion and development of new governance practices 
begins in order to facilitate the original development activity. The establishment of an 
ambulance service to take pregnant women to hospitals for the births for example, 
necessitates the implementation of new governance practices with the local health 
authority. As an experienced practitioner claims;  
Some of this happens inadvertently. They strengthen local government 
accountability to people, but it isn’t something they’ve set out to do, it isn’t 
the main purpose of the project. The main purpose of the project is that 
women reach the hospital quicker.c 
Other groups also begin engaging in good governance promotion due to the sheer scale 
of their activities inevitably involving the public sector in the partner country. As the 
management of WfA concede; 
The district governments are engaged and there are a lot of governance and 
accountability issues involved in that work which we take very seriously. We 
spend a lot of time grappling with those issues and it’s difficult because 
people have a different understanding of accountability and transparency 
and governance to us, and trying to impose our levels of operating onto them 
is difficult, and trying to work with them to raise their standards of 
accountability is an ongoing challenge. I’ve got someone out there at the 




The scale of the work that necessitates engagement with local governments is reached 
as a direct result of the financial assistance offered by WfA. But alongside the funding, is 
the capacity building and training that the WfA offers the community links via the 
International Development Hub, which has coordinated the training of Welsh 
development practitioners.  
6.3.5 The International Development Hub 
The WfA funded ‘International Development Hub’ has played a key role in facilitating 
this incorporation of governance schemes by funding and advising organizations and 
their members as they develop – further integrating the programmes with global 
practices and norms. It also brings the community together at national conferences, 
coordinating the development debate. But the key activity with regard to encouraging 
the implementation of governance schemes concerns the training offered by the Hub to 
the community links. 
The content of their training is not unique or even their own, as a senior civil servant 
claims; ‘We don’t need to know what the best standards are, we just need to know who 
knows what the best standards are and pay them to come and run the course’.cii The 
Hub pays for Welsh practitioners to attend training courses run by industry experts on 
a range of topics, including governance. Through the Hub, the Welsh international 
development community is being integrated with the broader, global development 
community.  
Indeed, the WfA management see a role for themselves in developing the groups and 
projects in line with global norms, as one senior management official states; 
The community linking project does have a model of development [for 
developing the links], they have this sort of pyramid approach where they’re 
trying to move groups onwards and upwards and building the quality of the 
intervention and the nature of the partnership and for sure, governance 
issues are right in there.ciii 
PONT is one such organization which could be seen to characterise this growth and 
consequent ‘drift’ into promoting good governance. Originally applying for funding of a 
few thousand pounds, the operation has grown in size and in the funding applied for. By 
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today, the organization applies for Comic Relief, Big Lottery, DfID’s Tropical Health 
Education Trust and schemes running to around half a million pounds.  
The WfA and the Hub can be seen at the centre of the emergence of a far more coherent, 
coordinated, and informed international development policy community in Wales. A 
broader discourse of development has begun to penetrate the myriad of small 
development projects operating in Wales. One experienced practitioner remarks; 
I think they’re on some sort of trajectory...If you look at the evolution of 
organizations, I think that Christian Aid has reached a pretty sophisticated 
point and [are] big which makes things easier but if you look at PONT and 
DOLEN, they’re around the middle, then you have smaller organizations 
which are learning from the way PONT are operating.  
... 
At the beginning the only thing they want to know is how to fill an 
application form or how do you run a participatory workshop or how do you 
set up a monitoring system. I think now they’ve gone a bit deeper than that 
and asked; ‘well how do we transform the way these communities work?... 
I’ve noticed that more are having those discussions than there were five 
years ago.civ 
The empirical data in this case suggests that there is at play a process of ‘transnational 
communication’ of norms and practices. As discussed in chapter 2 with regard to other 
paradiplomatic activities (see Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer, 2008; Audet and Gendron, 
2012; de la Pena Varona and Hinojal, 2012), sub-states emulate and adopt globally 
prevalent norms and practices. The government institutionalises those norms and 
practices, and propagates them within the practitioner community. Key aspects of the 
discourse are consequently filtering into the work of local groups, hitherto unconnected 
and uninterested in broad discourses of development.  
For example, an integral part of this developing understanding of international 
development is a belief in the need for partner countries to employ solutions of their 
own, to develop a self-disciplined commitment to the governance reforms required. As 
an experienced development practitioner states; 
What I’ve noticed within the international [development] sector in Wales is 
that there’s a lot of, and I think this is normal in a growing sector, and it’s 
improved since the early years of Wales for Africa, is that the focus at the 
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start is just on what the need is. We need to meet the need. Then, ‘oh actually 
no, we notice that it’s better when you try to work on it yourselves’.cv 
Reflecting this is WfA’s characterisation of their ‘development’ community links which 
identifies ‘monitoring, evaluation and learning’, ‘public accountability’ and the presence 
of ‘Southern leadership and coordination’ as indicators of the links’ organizational 
development; 
Development links are characterised by strong African leadership that 
ensures projects are coordinated with local development priorities of 
appropriate authorities/agencies; evidenced by sound impact monitoring 
and evaluation approaches; and publicly accountable both to 
donors/supporters and to project beneficiaries (Wales for Africa, 2013: 12). 
Here we see a further institutionalization of global norms and even the discourse of 
development. 
It must be stressed again however that while seemingly in line with the dominant 
‘development discourse’ discussed in chapter 1, the activities take place at a lower, 
more local level; a distinctive aspect of the Welsh programme. Some have even begun 
referring to the model as a distinctive, communitarian approach to international 
development.  
It is about harnessing the power of community-based civil society links, 
connecting professionals such as health, teachers and environmental 
workers as well as members of the African diaspora, Fair traders and 
equality activists, to support each other on a ‘community to community’ 
basis – not just communities of geography, but communities of interest, 
knowledge and expertise. Rather than professional staff in country offices, it 
is volunteering and cooperation through direct contact with local in-country 
partners (Owen, 2014). 
But the volunteers at the more local level, directly accessing communities in developing 
countries are brought into line with the practices and norms of the global professionals. 
To summarise, the WfA programme funds activities, developed and supported by the 
Hub and the WfA team, which have drifted into the practice of promoting good 
governance through sheer size or necessity, and through the influence of the 
international development practitioner community. The broader understanding of 
development has been developed amongst the programmes in Wales with governance 
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making up an important part of the ideal; reflective of the global development 
discourse. There are both institutional and historical factors which prove key in 
explaining why WfA and the Welsh Government has “drifted” into implicit democracy 
promotion in this manner.  
The executive has, by coordinating the myriad of previously unconnected development 
programmes throughout Wales, created an epistemic community. The Hub and WfA 
have led that community toward the international development community, its 
practices and norms with the aim of improving the quality of their intervention. 
However, the unique legal set-up has an equally important distorting influence upon the 
activities resulting in Welsh international development, and consequently the 
governance programmes are being aimed at a different, lower level of the public and 
private sector in partner states. The nature of the relationship is also, on paper at least, 
different in that the “development” of the partner is of benefit to the Welsh 
programmers.  
The intergovernmental relations, mediating and re-defining the constitution and the 
institutional capacity and ability of the Welsh government to adjust its own budget, 
creating a new funding line for a non-devolved activity, are key opportunity structures. 
The agency of the Welsh government is also crucial in initiating the activity. However 
since the early days, political agency has not been forthcoming, and the activity remains 
‘just one of those programmes that went along’.cvi 
6.4 The Legislature 
This section will firstly argue that the Office of the Presiding Officer (OPO) should be 
understood as a key opportunity structure. Its establishment gave the Presiding Officer 
(PO) considerable freedom and adequate resources to pursue the democracy promotion 
activities through transnational networks. The agency of the Presiding Officer himself is 
then explored before the legislature’s own, explicit attempts to promote democracy 
abroad, documenting the specific activities. A final sub-section documents the manner 
in which the legislature is subcontracted by organizations within the global democracy 
industry .  
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The section will proceed to argue that the legislature has attempted to project and 
promote its own, distinctive model of democracy and democratic values internationally 
in an attempt to construct legitimacy for the broader devolution project and its 
associated institutions. It has also become a promoter of particular elements of 
democracy through its work on behalf of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy 
(WFD). The Office of the Presiding Officer and the legislature’s involvement in 
transnational networks have become crucial opportunity structures for doing so, while 
the agency of the PO himself is a further crucial factor. 
6.4.1 The Presiding Officer; the opportunity structure 
As noted in the chapter’s introduction, the NAfW was originally conceived of as a 
corporate body, collectively responsible for the institution’s policy, without a distinction 
between the executive and opposition within the legislature. Within this model, the 
level of autonomy and capacity of the PO to pursue his own interests and projects was 
limited. Indeed the role is barely defined and the office was restricted by the need to 
share resources with the rest of the Assembly (see Rawlings, 2003a: 111). However, the 
reforms of 2001, and moves toward a de facto government and opposition model 
proved a critical juncture allowing for the PO’s role to be redefined 
In short, the desire to establish the separateness of the Office of the Presiding Officer 
(OPO) was supported by a party political consensus and dissatisfaction with the 
corporate body model. The reform ‘was not only driven by dissatisfaction with the legal 
corset of the corporate body but also closely structured by it’ (Rawlings, 2003a: 133-
134). The legal basis for the considerable reform of the office was found in a vague but 
open-ended supplementary power; 
Supplementary powers 
The Assembly may do anything (including the acquisition or disposal of any 
property or rights) which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or 
incidental to, the exercise of any of its functions (HMSO, 1998: S.40) 
From such basis a degree of legal and operational autonomy was added to the OPO 
following the PO’s insistence for independent legal advice (Rawlings, 2003a: 134). This 
autonomy was considerably strengthened by the establishment of a “notably generous” 
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(Rawlings, 2003a: 135) and separate budget for the Presiding Officer and a doubling of 
staff complement (Rawlings, 2003b: 9). From that budget, the Education, Outreach and 
the International Relations Team (IRT) were established, and a clear definition of the 
role of the PO and his Office was made including a declaration of its maximum 
operational independence in carrying out its functions (Rawlings, 2003a: 134).  
The IRT supports the PO and Assembly Members with their international activities. It 
consists of 2 team members, the Outreach and International Team managers, and works 
closely with the Head of the NAfW’s EU Office in Brussels and the PO’s office. Its 
activities mainly involve facilitating AM involvement with transnational networks such 
as the CALRE, the RegLeg or the CPA. The team also coordinates the British Isles and 
Mediterranean Region (BIMR) Conference which is occasionally, as in May 2014, held in 
Wales. Activities are also conducted on behalf of the PO, such as coordinating visits to 
and from the legislature and other states or sub-states. In addition to the staffing 
resource, the annual budget for international activity has been around £50k (NAfW 
Commission, 2010: 2). It is through the IRT that the PO and Legislature have engaged in 
democracy promotion. 
This enhanced, far more independent office for the PO can be identified as an 
opportunity structure for any occupant who desired to exploit it for conducting 
international activity. Lord Dafydd Elis Thomas was such an occupant and 
understanding his objectives and strategies to achieve them go some way in explaining 
why Wales has attempted to project a particular model of democracy internationally.  
6.4.2 Dafydd Elis Thomas  
Elis Thomas was a former MP and a leftist leader of Plaid Cymru during the 1980s, chair 
of the language QUANGO ‘Bwrdd yr Iaith Gymraeg’ during the 1990s,  and crossbench 
member of the House of Lords when he took the PO’s post. He held a particular 
understanding of the “Welsh state” and of institutions and their role in nation-building. 
He also held specific, political objectives during his time as PO and pursued strategies 
which were open to him through the opportunity structure of the PO’s office.  
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Following a retreat from party politics during the early 1990s, he began to identify the 
emergence of a “Welsh government” – even if it was administrative, and not one which 
was directly elected by and from Wales. This was for Elis Thomas was an emergence of 
a proto-state via ‘the long procession through institutions [author’s translation]’ (Tu 
Chwith, 1996: 27);  
Within and across both languages a whole system which is part 
administrative, part policy-making, part accountable, part bureaucratic, very 
quasi democratic, constitutes the government of Wales. It is easy to point to 
the Welsh Office, a territorial department of state, with its 3,000-odd officials 
mainly based in Cardiff, and its £4 billion budget, with its 1,500 appointed 
places on nominated bodies (Elis Thomas, 1991: 60).  
His ideas on political strategy began to revolve around this conception and drift away 
from his notions of ‘community socialism’ which dominated his presidency of the 
nationalist party (Wyn Jones, 1996; see also Wyn Jones, 2007: 186-226). By the time his 
successor as leader, Dafydd Wigley came to him seeking advice on the party’s ‘game 
plan’ (Wigley, 1993: 309), Elis Thomas had moved towards espousing what Wyn Jones 
claims was a Trotskyist strategy of entryism (2007: 242-243). Elis-Thomas called for an 
infiltration by nationalists of ‘QUANGO Wales’ – the institutions of this emerging Welsh 
government – to be followed by a move to democratise them.  
The strategy suits a mind that places great value on the power of discourse in building 
the nation and the role institutions can play in constructing and articulating that 
discourse; 
For a representative democracy is only a relatively small, and largely 
theatrical part of government. And politics as sites of the language of power, 
is almost everywhere. So by not being realised, by being rejected, but by 
being a reference point for continuing the argument, the idea of not having 
an elected assembly or parliament actually leads to having more 
powers...Continually talking the national ‘language’ actually continues to 
make Wales, event by event, more ‘national’ (Elis Thomas, 1991: 60). 
Elis Thomas had already noted empirical examples of the constructors and articulators 
of such a ‘national’-building discourse, notably in the form of Wales-wide institutions 
and through their communication with the people of Wales; 
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Weekday Wales, Wales This Week, Wales on Sunday, are all mediated talking 
of and remaking of Wales. The Welsh Development Agency together with the 
Welsh Office press office and the Western Mail newspaper have been regular 
generators of ‘good news about the principality’. This is nation building, the 
role so often described by mass communication studies of emerging states in 
the so-called Third World (Elis Thomas, 1991: 61). 
It is no great surprise therefore that such an individual as Elis Thomas would appreciate 
the opportunities, particularly the operational independence, presented by the (re-
)structuring of the Presiding Officer to pursue political strategies of nation-building 
through its discursive, rhetorical and symbolic activities. 
Dafydd Elis Thomas remains open about his political objective as Presiding Officer; it 
was to construct legitimacy.cvii The pursuit of this objective was noted as early as 
Richard Rawlings’ 2001 O’Donnell Lecture; 
More recent developments confirm the rise of the Presiding Office. It has for 
example, become ever more heavily engaged in the ongoing struggle of the 
Assembly to win the hearts and minds of the Welsh people...However 
attenuated in legal powers, the Assembly should not knowingly be 
undersold! (Rawlings, 2003b: 10). 
The battle to construct legitimacy was twofold. Legitimacy firstly of the institution’s 
existence, that its standing should be strengthened; ‘in the sense that we prove that we 
are in the international community and that we’re the “new kid on the block”’.cviii The 
paper-thin majority in favour of devolution in ’97 only encouraged this objective; 
‘Obviously the majority of six thousand or whatever wasn’t legitimating enough and I 
think you have to build on that all the time’.cix  
But secondly, the legitimacy of the values and very justification for devolution – the 
values of ‘inclusive’ democracy. These themes and values are exemplified in the 
solipsistic international and domestic promotion of the very same democratic values 
which made up the inclusivity doctrine; the very basis and legitimizing discourse of 
Welsh devolution.  
Practicing, and importantly talking of the practice of multilingual governance for 
example, became an essential part of this ‘pitch’ and manifested in Elis Thomas’ 
insistence for Welsh only names for parts of the legislature’s building – ‘Senedd’, ‘Oriel’, 
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‘Cwrt’, ‘Siambr’ or ‘Neuadd’ – or his tendency to open plenary in Welsh.cx In this sense, 
the institution was being used to manifest Wales’ inclusive values. By showing and 
saying ‘we do this kind of democracy’, the legislature was symbolically and literally 
telling people that ‘this kind of democracy’ was being done by Wales. Elis Thomas was 
constructing and legitimizing Welsh democracy as a concept as well as an institution. 
This objective of legitimizing the institution and its values was mainly pursued 
domestically through the Presiding Office’s outreach and education teams travelling the 
country to publicise the work of the Assembly and encouraging participation in its 
activities; ‘The most important thing I could do was spend all the time I had going 
around Wales appertaining to the people’cxi. In this regard, ap Gareth has noted his 
employment of ‘what Kertzer calls “borrowed legitimacy”’ (ap Gareth, 2010: 46); formal 
openings of the legislature by the Queen with international dignitaries invited to bestow 
an older form of very symbolic legitimacy upon the institution. But the strategy of 
constructing legitimacy was also pursued through international activity and by 
promoting “Welsh” democracy. As will be noted in the next section, the IRT’s strategic 
objectives remain to this day, firmly in-line with Elis Thomas’ aim of projecting a 
legitimizing discourse at any opportunity, highlighted by the legislature’s willingness to 
engage with networks and partake in international showcases and events to advertise 
and promote “Welsh democracy”. 
Elis Thomas was not simply an occupant of a position within the institution, he was, 
through his office, a key actor within the institutional structures. His objectives were 
influenced by the institution itself and its lack of legitimacy. He took the newly (re-
)constructed PO’s office with the clear objective of building and establishing the 
legitimacy of the institution and its values. This was done through an explicit 
promotion, if not advertising of Welsh democracy. He held a personal understanding of 
the importance of institutions and their ability to construct and project discursive 
power. Over his tenure as PO, he also enjoyed a complete lack of opposition to his 
activities in practice or principle. The legislature consequently pursued a clearly defined 
interest, making use of the opportunities presented to engage with any and all partners 
and to be “dragged” into activity on behalf of global actors and networks.  
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The following sections will detail the explicit promotion of democracy, as well as the 
manner in which the legislature is also subcontracted by other organizations.  
6.4.3 The NAfW’s democracy promotion 
The democracy promotion activities in question developed in an ad hoc fashion until the 
Assembly Commission developed an international strategy,cxii approved and adopted 
explicitly by the legislature in 2010. Until the strategic objectives and a corresponding 
action plan was developed, activities followed the instruction of the then PO, Dafydd Elis 
Thomas. He had defined his own international remit quite broadly in the early days 
following the de facto constitutional reforms after the demise of Alun Michael. The PO 
effectively established that; ‘I could decide my own priorities as Llywydd [Presiding 
Officer]...’cxiii 
By 2010, with the Assembly Commission in place, there was a perceived need to 
formalize activity; to increase financial scrutiny and accountability.cxiv There was also a 
sense that there needed to be a ‘change of culture’ toward a more coherent and strategic 
approach which could be evaluated.cxv By 2010 therefore, a strategy coordinated the 
international activities was produced and clearly reflected the objectives; 
5.0 Strategic Objectives 
...to promote and present a positive image of Wales and Welsh democracy on 
an international stage by participating in relevant international bodies and 
establishing formalised partnerships with key internationally focused 
organisations;  
to provide the Assembly with the opportunity to gain and impart knowledge 
and understanding of international good practice, using this to improve the 
Assembly’s practice where appropriate; and  
to promote Wales and Welsh democracy by focusing on specified themes to 
be reviewed annually and linked to the Assembly’s positioning statement. 
For 2011–15 we propose to focus on the following themes:  
citizen participation;  
e-democracy;  
effective scrutiny of Government; and  
sustainable and transparent democracy. 
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(NAfW Commission, 2010: 2) 
Or more explicitly on the NAfW’s website; 
One of the Assembly’s strategic objectives is to promote Wales and Welsh 
Democracy to the wider world. Through participation in international 
parliamentary networks and engagement in bespoke programmes and 
activities, the Assembly aims to promote and exchange best parliamentary 
practice internationally; and ensure that the Assembly is positioned 
appropriately as a distinct, innovative and progressive international 
legislature on the world stage (NAfW, 2014b). 
Each of the strategic objectives aim to explicitly promote either the values or specific 
techniques of “Welsh democracy”, or to develop and share good practice in democratic 
governance. The values and techniques can be seen to reflect many of the unique 
aspects institutionalized in the GoW Act in the name of inclusivity, detailed in a previous 
section of this chapter. This strategic objective of promoting Welsh democracy has been 
recognized and incorporated into the legislature’s approach in general. The Assembly 
explicitly opens itself to any potential international partners;  
The Assembly Commission has a stated ambition to make the most of 
opportunities in the UK and abroad to promote Wales and the work of the 
Assembly and to play a part in the development of parliamentary democracy 
elsewhere in the world (NAfW Annual Report 2011-2012: 22) 
Why the legislature has adopted these specific objectives is less clear from its own 
literature and declarations on the matter. The strategy claims that strategic coherence is 
important but does not outline the reasoning behind the choice of objectives; 
Failing to deliver a unified, coherent international strategy could have a 
significant impact on the reputation of the Assembly, its relationship with 
the Welsh electorate and its international standing (NAfW Commission, 
2010: 4). 
Civil servants who worked on the strategy suggest however, that the objectives simply 
reflect the fact that since the establishment of the Assembly, the PO had consistently 
pushed the promotion of various democratic themes or techniques; the strategy sought 
to formalize and coordinate the activities.cxvi In effect, here was an instance of path 
dependency – the PO had long since set the “rules” and defined what the legislature did, 
the strategy only formalized and reflected this.  
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The democratic themes which the legislature has consistently promoted can be 
categorized as; participation of women in public life; youth engagement; bilingualism 
and multilingual governance; accessibility, inclusiveness and transparency of the policy 
process – notably with regard to parliamentary committees; and the technology and 
architecture of the parliament. These are reflective of the values of ‘inclusiveness’; the 
themes that legitimize the institution itself.  
Promoting the role and participation of women in public life and youth engagement is 
associated closely with the legislature’s second PO (2011-2015), Rosemary Butler (also 
a former DPO) who took advantage of her influence as President of the CPA and role as 
PO to advance the issue further. The theme was, on her instruction, given a prominent 
role in the 44th BIMR Conference for example (NAfW CPA, 2014).cxvii The Assembly’s 
Outreach Team actively engages with young people meanwhile with the aim of 
involving them in political debate (NAfW Annual Report 2011-2012: 21-22). Another 
central theme to the BIMR conference, youth engagement activities such as the “vote 
2011” campaign targeting 18-25 year olds is held as exemplary practice to international 
visitors (NAfW CPA, 2014: 9).  
Bilingualism is a field in which the Assembly claims to be a world leader with an 
‘internationally recognised status as a democratically elected body committed to 
delivering innovative bilingual services’ (NAfW, 2013: 5). Simultaneous translation in 
Plenary and Committee meetings; translation of the record of proceedings; a dedicated 
in-house translation team available for AM use and support for staff; technologies 
developed in partnership with Microsoft in developing translation software (NAfW, 
2013) and the passing of an Official Languages Bill in 2012 are some defining features of 
the institution’s bilingual character – central to the ‘inclusivity’ doctrine and to the 
Presiding Officer personally.cxviii Canada, Israel and other countries and regions have 
approached the legislature for support in developing or reforming their own bilingual 
or multilingual services.cxix The theme is another which is central to the BIMR 
Conference (NAfW CPA, 2014).  
Trinidad and Tobago’s relationship with the Assembly illustrates the manner in which 
the legislature’s expertise in transparent and accessible committees is promoted as well 
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as specifically sought. The Caribbean islands initiated the relationship following an 
unproductive engagement with the Westminster Parliament. The latter institution was 
considered too large (Trinidad and Tobago elects just 41 MPs) and such a sprawling 
Westminster style committee structure seen as unsuitable as a model for the small 
islands’ legislature. Wales was considered a better fit and the Assembly’s Business 
Manager and the Chief Committee Clerk undertook a training visit upon the request of 
(and cost met by) the Trinidad and Tobago legislature. The reasoning given by Trinidad 
and Tobago, as well as being a more suitable ‘fit’, was that it was seen as very 
transparent due to its practice of consulting a broad range of witnesses during 
committee inquiries.cxx 
Finally, the architecture and IT infrastructure of the Assembly have been themes of 
great interest to delegations visiting the Assembly. The legislature has been established 
and its workings and proceedings developed with IT in mind – a natural advantage over 
older legislatures. The architecture meanwhile was designed with specific concepts of 
transparency, sustainability and ergonomics in mind.cxxi  
The legislature has sought to promote the themes in many ways; through bilateral 
engagement with other legislatures; exchange visits and showcases targeting foreign 
staff and elected officials; and a programme of welcoming “higher level” dignitaries such 
as High Commissioners, delegations of elected members and Ambassadors (NAfW 
Annual Report 2011-2012: 22). Promotional work is also carried out through other 
channels such as the transnational networks of which the legislature is a member, such 
as the British Irish Parliamentary Assembly and the CPA annual conferences (NAfW 
Annual Report 2011-2012: 22). Exhibitions and seminars have also been hosted during 
international events such as the Canadian Parliamentary Seminar (NAfW, 2011). The 
Assembly itself hosts international events, showcasing “Welsh democracy” and the 
NAfW itself hosted and developed the 44th British Isles and Mediterranean Region 
(BIMR) Conference in 2014. The Conference theme was ‘Equality of Access to 
Democracy’ with a specific focus on women in public life, youth engagement and 
bilingualism (NAfW, 2014a).  
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The targets or recipients vary from advanced Western democratic countries such as 
Australia, Canada or Denmark; “young” democracies such as the Czech Republic, Russia 
or Brazil; developing countries such as Lesotho; regions such as Flanders; and 
institutions such as the British Council (NAfW Annual Report 2011-2012: 22).cxxii Some 
targets are strategic, such as the regular invitations to delegations from the countries 
scheduled to take the presidency of the EU while others initiate the relationship 
themselves as seen in the case of Canada, or Israel who have for example sought 
assistance in specific fields such as bilingual and committee services.cxxiii 
Thematically, the democracy promotion remains close to the politics of inclusivity. 
While the legislature acts using its own resources and contacts, it is also presented with 
the opportunity to do so by global partners and networks; opportunities which it takes. 
One such opportunity is through the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) 
which is explored in detail in the following section. 
6.4.4 CPA 
The CPA is a prominent example of the legislature’s democracy promotion. The CPA 
Wales branch’s establishment in 1999 (NAfW, 2016b), was desired by some elected 
memberscxxiv and never opposedcxxv nor was it a controversial decision.cxxvi  Wales’ links 
with Lesotho provided the basis for a long-term partnership for the branch and series of 
activities which primarily involved support for the parliamentary structures between 
2005-2011.  
Work and study programmes formed the core of the link’s activities ‘with the purpose of 
delivering a training seminar to staff and Members of Committees at the Lesotho 
Parliament’ (NAfW CPA, 2011: 5), making use of staff and AMs’ expertise and a total 
budget of £36,587.25. Personal links with the UNDP and Dolen Cymru were used to 
facilitate the visits, design the content of the training programmes and make contacts 
(NAfW CPA, 2011). 
Several visits were conducted including a ‘Post Election Seminar’ involving sessions on 
‘Parliamentary Democracy’ and ‘Ethics and Accountability of Members of Parliament’ 
(NAfW CPA, 2011: 4-5). However;  
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Little is known about the outcome of this seminar due to the fact that no post 
visit report is known to exist and the Member involved did not respond to 
requests for information in relation to the visit (NAfW CPA, 2011: 25). 
Such problems regarding lack of evaluation and reporting appear to be a consistent 
theme with the democracy assistance activities of the CPA proving an important factor 
in the demise of the link.cxxvii In November 2008 for example, the Vice President of the 
Lesotho Senate visited the Assembly for a study visit, “primarily for the purpose of 
observing the roles of Presiding Officer and Deputy Presiding Officer” (NAfW CPA, 2011: 
6). However, not only is there no formal post visit report known to exist but; 
There are no records or reports to indicate what the benefits of the visit 
were, or how the visit may have led to the improvement of parliamentary 
practice in Lesotho. There is no record of the Vice President spending any 
time with the Presiding Officer or the Deputy Presiding Officer, which 
appeared to have been a key, if not  the central, purpose of his visit (NAfW 
CPA, 2011: 27). 
The retrospective legacy report remains a rare record of the link and concludes by 
emphasizing the difficulty of evaluating the programmes.  
For individual politicians in the domestic setting however, it is claimed that the link has 
proved a success. For Mike German for example;  
We have had the deputy leader of Lesotho’s upper House here working with 
us, we have trained committee clerks and chairs of committees, and we are 
giving assistance to the legislative framework in Lesotho by helping their 
legal workers (NAfW, 2009). 
Overall, the legislature has proved a consistent promoter of democratic themes and 
techniques since its inception. The legislature itself seeks to promote and showcase 
“Welsh democracy” bilaterally with foreign delegations but also through transnational 
networks when given the opportunity with domestic structures and personal links 
exploited. It is directed to do so by its PO and later its strategy and occasionally on the 
behest of others, and the activities themselves are coordinated by the legislature’s IRT.  
Over the years it has also become an institution regarded as a leader in some fields and 
its expertise sought by legislatures around the world, either due to the Assembly’s 
expertise or its suitability as a smaller and/or newer legislature.  
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6.4.5 Westminster Foundation for Democracy 
As noted, the legislature opens itself to global partners, sharing its good democratic 
practice and is willing to engage with other states and sub-states, but also with 
democracy promotion organizations. From the legislature’s perspective, it is willingly 
and knowingly allowing itself to be subcontracted and incorporated into the broader 
democracy assistance community. Furthermore, and perhaps importantly for the 
broader understanding of sub-state democracy promotion, we may note that the agency 
of other actors is also a key factor. In this case, the agency of national level democracy 
organizations is key in understanding how a sub-state is incorporated into the 
democracy industry. 
The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) was established in 1992 by the UK 
government as an independent public body for supporting democracy abroad. It’s main 
sponsor has been the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) with the occasional 
extra funding from other partners for specific projects. It is the UK government’s 
democracy assistance tool with very close ties to the Westminster government, 
exemplified in its self-declared aim of contributing to UK foreign policy goals (WFD, 
2011: 5). The FCO also appoints its board of governors who remain responsible for  
overseeing the programming and choice of partners. Following cuts in funding from 
2010 onward, the Department for International Development (DfID) began co-funding 
their activities.  
Reflected in its expenditure is its focus is upon three key elements in society which are 
considered essential to a functioning multi-party democracy; the legislature; civil 
society; and Political Parties (WFD, 2013a: 8). With regard to its programming, its focus 
is heavily upon improving ‘engagement in political processes in weak, emerging or 
developing’ (WFD, 2013a: 3). 
A key strand of the foundation’s work is the parliamentary work programme and the 
party development programme. The establishment of the National Assembly for Wales 




The Foundation’s parliamentary work programme and its use of the Welsh legislature in 
its work illustrates the manner in which the broader democracy assistance industry has 
subcontracted a Welsh actor into the broader democracy industry. The parliamentary 
work programme accounts for around £2m of the WFD’s annual expenditure (WFD, 
2013a: 8) and; ‘...works to strengthen parliamentary capacity at national and sub-
national level. It does this through training, sharing expertise on a peer-to-peer basis 
and building institutional capacity’ (WFD, 2014). 
The Welsh legislature is utilized for several purposes, being acknowledged by the 
Foundation’s Corporate Plan as a source of ‘specialist and professional expertise’ (WFD, 
2011: 8). The legislature sees value in the experience and knowledge picked up by staff 
through the democracy workcxxviii while WFD officers attribute value to the expertise 
sourced from the NAfW; 
...we tend to tap into their expertise. It’s quite a technical thing, setting up a 
new parliament; we’ve found that experience from Wales and Scotland 
extremely useful and a lot more relevant to a lot of the countries that we 
work in than perhaps the experience here in Westminster.cxxix 
Drilling below the corporate plan’s rhetoric on privileged partnerships and specialist 
expertise, we may note several specific fields in which the expertise of the NAfW (and 
the Scottish Parliament) is sought. They are; institutional transparency and openness; 
general similarities to other new or emerging democracies; and the committee 
structures and pre-legislative scrutiny.  
The notion that transparency is an issue where the devolved legislature excels is not 
only held within the NAfW itself,cxxx but also within the WFD, who regard these 
additions to their ‘toolkit’ as ‘hugely enriching’.cxxxi As one WFD official claims; 
We can just sense these things when you walk into the buildings, they are 
open, they are transparent...that transparency is a huge issue and it’s where 
broadly the Scottish and Welsh have got it right.cxxxii 
It is manifested more specifically in the Parliament’s workings; the frequency and detail 
of its publications and also in the openness of its committee and consultation processes. 
The values and associated techniques are, as noted above, the very same that the 
legislature has sought to promote itself.  
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However, an further pool of expertise has developed and been tapped into by the WFD – 
one not promoted by the legislature itself – in the institution’s experience of an 
unicameral parliament; an experience which does not exist in Westminster. WFD 
officers see the experience as more similar to the parliaments currently being 
developed in partner countries.cxxxiii Furthermore, NAfW committee structures are also 
considered to be a lot stronger than at Westminster, in terms of their openness, 
accessibility to civil society and pre-legislative scrutiny in particular.cxxxiv  
Despite the attempts to promote the NAfW as a bastion of bilingual good practice, belief 
in any Welsh expertise in the field is not shared or even seen as important by the WFD’s 
parliamentary support programme. No reference is made to linguistic issues in strategy 
documents and enabling linguistic diversity is not considered a high priority for 
democratic institutional development. Not only do WFD officers not see the issue as 
particularly important; ‘It’s not something we bring up as a matter of course’,cxxxv but 
such institutionalization of linguistic diversity is not considered an unique ‘Welsh’ 
characteristic;  
...it’s something where the Scottish parliament [equally] has the facility for 
but don’t actually use, so I don’t think that’s something that’s uniquely 
Welsh, that you can take a unique experience form the Welsh Assembly and 
export.cxxxvi  
Specifically, the work is conducted either through funding visits by NAfW staff to the 
partner country or by financing inward study visits. Committee clerks such as Paul Silk 
with extensive experience of both the Assembly and Westminster are in particular 
demand for their expertise. 
Though not a central element of the WFD’s parliamentary work strand, the NAfW 
nevertheless has offered to ‘enrich its package’. This is particularly welcome by WFD 
officers following a period of change. The decision by the FCO to co-fund the Foundation 
and the consequent requirements they placed upon the programming to bring the work 
foundation in-line with the rest of the industry has demanded a more relevant and 
‘competitive’ package of programmes. 
... [it] makes it a lot more difficult around your programme design, your 
monitoring and evaluation, how you demonstrate and document your 
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impact, things like that... we have to get better, that we have to come on to 
the ‘level’ – again not terminology I like – of our competitors; be they NDI, be 
they the Dutch, be they the Scandinavians, the Germans, or whoever. If we 
can’t compete to their level, why would people want our support?cxxxvii 
The relevance of devolved administrations in partner countries such as Montenegro is 
proving increasingly useful in this context in that it enriches the WFD’s ‘product’. 
Another WFD partner, Kenya for example (WFD, 2013a: 10), completed a large-scale 
constitutional reform process in 2010 which devolved power to 47 counties. The UK’s 
devolved experience consequently became acutely relevant and attractive both for that 
particular partner and to the WFD’s “sales pitch”;  
...if you like it or not the WFD exists to promote a Westminster type model 
and devolution is an undeniable feature of the Westminster model. This is 
how we do government and we talk now about devolving power further... we 
can draw on our experience in the UK of setting up the devolved 
arrangements where we couldn’t do before; devolution didn’t exist, we had 
very little to share with these places. I think it’s a huge opportunitycxxxviii. 
The NAfW has offered knowledge and expertise which enhances the “package” which 
the WFD can now offer in an increasingly market-like democracy assistance community. 
What the Assembly brings in particular seem to strengthen and support the legitimacy 
of governance structures by offering good practice in transparency, accountability and 
accessibility with regard to the legislature. Its size and ‘newness’ further strengthen that 
contribution to the “package” and increase its relevance to potential partners. 
The legislature’s openness and willingness to engage with any opportunities to promote 
its democracy makes it a willing partner for any democracy promoters who wish to tap 
into their expertise. There is a growing demand of late for the specific ‘product’ that the 
legislature can offer –this “product” seems to cover the very grounds that the legislature 
is itself attempting to occupy. Techniques and practices that aim to realize the values of 
inclusiveness and strengthen the legitimacy of governance structures; openness, 
transparency and ease of engagement – arguably a success therefore of the legislature’s 
own strategies to promote such elements.  
Indeed, there is growing evidence supporting the notion that subcontracted Welsh 
democracy promotion is focused upon core principles. Another democracy organization 
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making use of the Assembly’s staff and expertise for example, is the Global Partners 
Governance foundation, ‘a social purpose company working to strengthen political 
institutions and improve the quality of political representation in countries around the 
world’ (Global Partners Governance, 2016). Using former Assembly officials, they 
espouse the benefits of devolving and decentralizing governance, claiming that such 
governance can be based on principles of accountability, clarity, and simplicity for 
citizens (Silk, 2015: 2), notions close to the inclusive model promoted by the legislature 
itself. 
However further values such as bilingualism are not recognized as either particularly 
Welsh or necessary for democracy promoters. But the “product” is further strengthened 
by the specific characteristics of Wales; its unicameral nature and specific, small size. 
This “product” and the expertise does not exist outside the sub-state UK level and the 
value of sub-states is certainly recognized by WFD staff, and increasingly the WFD’s 
strategic approach with both reference to the Assembly’s contribution in its corporate 
plan, and Welsh recognition on its board of governors. No doubt the partnership with 
DfID and the emphasis on competitiveness in the democracy market has pressured the 
WFD to enrich its own ‘product’. The international democracy industry has begun to 
subcontract the product they want from Wales, which in turn has shown enthusiasm 
toward being involved. The legislature’s methods however don’t divert from the WFD’s 
approach – its unique ‘product’ is incorporated into the larger “package” being sold.  
6.4.6 Concluding remarks 
The legislature has sought to promote and construct the legitimacy of the Assembly and 
the concept behind that institution. Consequently, and mirrored by the concurrent 
domestic ‘advertising’ of Welsh democracy, little if any strategic thought was given to 
potential targets, for the real ‘audience’ was as much the Welsh people. The specific 
elements of democracy promoted are however conceptually aligned with a more 
‘inclusive’ model of democracy – deliberately so. Participation, openness and 
transparency are indeed the themes which encapsulate the aims of the activities being 
promoted as ‘good practice’. These are also the elements which are sought by global 
partners such as the Canadians, Czechs, Trinidadians and Kenyans. While the PO’s 
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objective may have been solipsistic, there seems a broader demand for what it is 
‘selling’.  
Key to this understanding is the recognition of the constitutionally empowered and 
empowered OPO as an opportunity structure, and the agency of the PO himself, who 
established and institutionalised the rules that would remain long after his departure. 
6.5 Conclusions 
6.5.1 Opportunity structures of Welsh democracy promotion 
In the Welsh case, the constitutional and semi-legal rules of international relations under 
devolution, backed by the disciplining IGR and self-disciplined adherence, keeps the 
government from expanding its activities beyond a continuation of pre-devolutionary 
economic and co-operational paradiplomacy. Much like Maryland, political 
paradiplomacy is prevented, and the government has no opportunity to engage in such. 
With regard to international development however, the flexibility of the IGR has proved 
a means of creating some opportunities. At times the resources of the Welsh government 
have been allocated to promoting international development while at other times, the 
government is refrained from doing so. In this sense, the IGR is a key opportunity 
structure that can both constrain and enable international activity in the Welsh case, 
giving specific meaning to the constitutional and semi-legal rules, depending on context, 
and allow or restrict political paradiplomacy. 
The (re-)construction of the OPO meanwhile was a critical constitutional juncture and, 
in being part of the constitutional set-up for the legislature, a key opportunity structure. 
The legal license deriving from the reformed OPO and its resources to engage in 
international activities has allowed the Presiding Officer, a key agent, to develop the 
legislature into an enthusiastic promoter and advertiser of “Welsh democracy”. While 
supra-national political and/or economic institutions or international organizations 
failed to structure opportunities for the Welsh government, the Legislature was able to 
promote its democratic model within international fora.   
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The domestic political context, specifically the need to construct legitimacy for 
devolution in the legislature’s case, and the Labour government’s desire to project an 
outward-looking Wales, has structured opportunities and motivations for political 
forces to look to the promotion of democracy or international development as a means 
of fulfilling those objectives. The initiation of the activities reflects the time period 
where such motivations were strong, and the diminishing importance of those 
motivations also mirror a lack of interest in further developing or reforming the 
democracy promotion or international development activities. 
The partner states or sub-states with which both the government and legislature have 
engaged with meanwhile are themselves key opportunity structures, allowing for the 
establishment of partnerships. Access to the networks have also allowed, though in a 
conditioned manner, the promotion of democracy. Development norms and practices 
are crucial in understanding the nature of Welsh development assistance and how 
Wales has come to promote democracy more implicitly. It has sought to emulate, 
incorporate, and institutionalise those norms and practices within its own activities.  
Like Maryland however, British foreign policy and Wales’ representation within state 
foreign policy was of key importance in structuring opportunities for individuals within 
the legislature to promote democracy on behalf of other actors. The WFD and more 
recently, private companies have subcontracted Welsh officials, and Wales, though at 
times a democracy promotion actor, both explicitly and more implicitly through its 
development programme, is also a source of subcontracted knowledge for broader 
actors.  
Like Flanders and Maryland, the timing of the development of particular activities is a 
key context. The positive connotations of engaging in international development 
following the Gleneagles G8 and ‘Make Poverty History’ campaigns lends further 
support to the notion that the activity was, at least in part, a means of satisfying 
domestic objectives and projecting a particular ‘outward looking Wales’.  
Ultimately the opportunity structures, specifically the constitution and its mediation by 
the IGR work so as to construct opportunities and motivations for the executive to 
engage in international development, but restricting more political or explicit 
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democracy promotion. They meanwhile motivate and create opportunities for the 
legislature to promote democracy more explicitly.  The role of other actors and broader 
UK policy also structures situations where the subcontracting of depoliticized 
knowledge is an option for those actors. Wales can be viewed a democracy promoter 
and an opportunity structure for other democracy promoters.  
6.5.2 Agency 
Several actors and their agency emerge as important factors with regard to Welsh 
democracy promotion. Firstly, the agency of the government, pursuing and exploiting 
opportunities to engage, for domestic political reasons, in international activities. 
Though shaped and constrained by the strict constitutional and IGR context, the agency 
of the government was able to pursue its objective and capitalise on the opportunity to 
engage in international development. 
The PO’s personal agency is a key factor in shaping the role and activities of the 
legislature, in turn, establishing the rules and path for future occupants of the role. The 
institution itself, or rather the perceived lack of legitimacy generated by a thin majority 
in favour of devolution, was a key motivation for the PO to engage in the campaign to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the institution and associated concept of ‘inclusiveness’. 
Not only were the methods shaped by the institutional context, but the motivation to 
engage in some activities also.  
Finally, the agency of other actors, in this case a national level democracy organization, 
has also proved a key factor in subcontracting an albeit willing NAfW into the broader 
democracy industry. Welsh democracy promotion is not the result of regional agency or 
Welsh political forces alone. Other actors see the Welsh product as an useful 
contribution to their own packages, and the legislature acts as an opportunity structure 
for those agents. 
6.5.3 Understanding the democracy promotion of Wales 
The findings from the Welsh case offered a complex picture with regard to which 
branches of the sub-state have been able to engage in various types of activities. The 
executive, through the IGR that accompany the constitutional set-up, has been 
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disciplined and is self-disciplined with regard to engagement in political activities. Its 
only political engagement abroad is its international development programme, carefully 
designed so as to not break the strict, if only semi-legal, rules of Welsh international 
activities.  
Nonetheless, the international development activities are implicitly concerned with 
changing governance structures and practices in the partner country, albeit at a more 
local level where the Welsh groups tend to engage. Implicitly therefore, the Welsh 
government funds and coordinates governance reform and the promotion of democracy 
abroad. Lacking expertise and resources to develop the programme however, the 
executive has uncritically turned to the “industry” and established actors in the field of 
international development for a lead in developing the manner in which its own 
programmes are run. The donor client relationship in the Welsh case involves the donor 
directing the client toward the global industry.  
With regard to motivation, this is not a projection of influence or power, nor solely or 
even principally a means of achieving a foreign policy objective. It is argued that the 
programme aims to meet domestic political objectives by projecting a particular 
conception of international actorness under the Labour government; an outward-
looking, globally minded Wales.  
Meanwhile, the legislature, following what has been identified as a critical constitutional 
juncture, has emerged as an independent and adequately resourced institution capable 
of engaging in a particular form of explicit democracy promotion. ‘Welsh democracy’ 
itself is reflective of the values of inclusivity and its promotion involves the transfer of 
knowledge, expertise, and experience of enhancing democratic accountability, 
transparency, access, and openness.  
The domestic agency of the first PO himself, Dafydd Elis-Thomas, at a crucial and 
formative period of the institution’s existence, is considered a key factor in the 
development of the legislature’s ‘advertising’ of Welsh democracy. This reflects the 
notion that ‘...individual predilections being especially important in the small infant 
body’ (Rawlings, 2003b: 2), and is in keeping with the theoretical space that historical 
institutionalism gives to agency.  
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The PO’s early definition of the Assembly’s role internationally set the path which has 
continued into the period after Elis Thomas left his post, and even into a period where 
legitimacy is a less pressing issue for the institution. Given the lack of evaluation or 
follow-up to these programmes, one may even question whether the development of 
democracy within partners is of any real importance. This ‘promotion’ was about the 
promoter, not the product or the partner to whom it is promoted. Because its audience 
was not necessarily its foreign partners, but rather the Welsh people. Again, a means of 
projecting and constructing a conception of Wales’ international actorness, and by 
extension, constructing legitimacy for the devolution project.  
The sub-state experience of democratic governance is also something that industry 
actors are beginning to tap into and in this sense, we cannot ignore the importance of 
agency from other levels within the Lecourian framework. The WFD in particular has 
sought to capitalise on the legislature and its political parties’ experiences in a small, 
new, unicameral institution. There is also a desire to exploit and use the Welsh 
experience of attempting to develop a more inclusive and deliberative democracy. In an 
attempt to broaden and enrich the “package” on offer to foreign partners in an 
increasingly market-like environment, other actors have sought to drag a willing sub-
state into the business of promoting democracy abroad. 
While the legislature is willing to work with the industry (as doing so “fits” within the 
broader strategy), it is passive with regard to engagement with the medium or content 
of the sessions. It is subcontracted to deliver a particular knowledge, understanding and 
experience of democratic governance. In this sense, the legislature is also an 
opportunity structure for other actors. The act of subcontracting them can be seen as an 
attempt by the national level actor to innovate and develop the package; a possible 
jumping off point for further research, rather than a focus of this project. 
The opportunity structures have proved useful in guiding the exploration of the case, as 
well as assisting in the identification of key variables in the Welsh case. The 
constitutional set-up and the accompanying intergovernmental relations are key in 
restricting the Welsh government’s political engagement abroad. There is however a 
degree of self-discipline on behalf of the Welsh actors, conscious of the disruptive 
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consequences of breaking semi-legal conventions and rules. The intergovernmental 
relations have also been key in facilitating the exploitation of loopholes in the 
devolution settlement when a political consensus exists regarding Welsh involvement in 
political activities. The (re-)construction of the PO’s office however, must be seen as a 
key opportunity structure for promoting or advertising “Welsh democracy”. 
To understand Wales as a democracy promotion actor, we may draw upon categories 
identified in Chapters 1-3. There is a national interest that motivates political forces to 
capitalize upon the opportunities that are created by the structural context. However, 
the ‘national interest’ of the Welsh executive is to construct a particular conception of 
Welsh international activity that will complement the image promoted at the domestic 
level.  
But a strict, self-disciplined adherence to the “rules” of international activity suggests 
that the executive does not wish to embroil itself with the muddy waters of 
international politics. Interestingly, the executive does not hold a monopoly over 
paradiplomacy and consequently another, though not contradictory, ‘national interest’ 
has been pursued by the legislature through the PO. The attempt to construct legitimacy 
in the eyes of the domestic audience included an international projection of ‘Welsh 
democracy’.  
In both instances however, democracy promotion and international development have 
proved a means by which political actors have attempted to project and manifest 
particular values within international activities. Both also have been attempts to 
construct a particular notion of Welsh actorness in the minds of a domestic audience. 
Furthermore, both were initiated at an early stage in the institution’s existence – WfA 
during the second Assembly (2003-2007), and the legislature very soon after its 
empowerment. With time however, political interest in both activities has diminished 
and while WfA looked to the global development industry for a lead since, the concept of 





Chapter 7: An understanding of sub-state democracy 
promotion 
This project has been anchored by three research questions. The first two were 
addressed in chapters 1-3, by identifying the current problems of understanding sub-
state democracy promotion, and developing a means by which it could be better 
understood. The third research question asks ‘In what ways will this new understanding 
contribute to the knowledge of sub-states and democracy promotion?’ Using the 
approach which formed the answer to the second question, and empirical data from the 
case studies, a better understanding of sub-state democracy promotion can be 
constructed. With this understanding, the third research question can be addressed as a 
conclusion to the project. Drawing on the data from the three cases and the theoretical 
approach, this chapter will attempt to better understand sub-state democracy 
promotion. 
Before proposing the understanding however, it must be noted that it is based upon the 
core historical institutionalist assumption that the engagement of sub-states in the 
promotion of democracy is dependent upon structural opportunities and the agency of 
actors within that structural context at particular times. Rules will be constructed at 
critical periods in history and, barring junctures or periods of dynamism within the 
institutional context, actors will be dependent upon those paths that have been set. 
Institutions set the structural context and condition – not dictate – the agency of actors. 
Yet neither structure nor agency are independent of each other, rather, they share a 
symbiotic relationship. The institutions in question are those identified by the 
Lecourian framework, and examined in this project with regard to their role in the 
various cases.  
Such theoretical underpinnings will inevitably influence the understanding of sub-state 
democracy promotion presented here. However, as argued in chapter 3, in the absence 
of international relations theory, and without an equally extensive project to reform and 
adjust those theories to account for sub-state international activities, the modified 
Lecourian and historical institutionalist approach offers the most advanced theoretical 
approach for better understanding sub-state democracy promotion.  
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The historical institutionalist approach is also justified in hindsight, as in all three cases, 
both structure and agency changed with time – taking an historical approach enriched 
the understanding of those cases and drew out the ‘when’ of democracy promotion in 
particular. Both the institutional structure and domestic agency were products of their 
own past, as well as constructers of their future form. In understanding sub-state 
democracy promotion therefore, the historical context was key to understanding 
structure and agency.  
This chapter will proceed by understanding sub-state democracy promotion based 
upon comparative conclusions from the case studies, and interpreted using the 
Lecourian framework. Specifically, it will seek to understand the what, why, and when 
of sub-state democracy promotion. The key opportunity structures will be identified, 
and agency discussed and the understanding will be formed through the historical 
institutionalist perspective. Following this initial, Lecourian understanding, a broader 
investigation of sub-state democracy promotion themes will seek to enrich the 
understanding. 
The key finding is that there are three possible means by which sub-state democracy 
promotion can be understood. Opportunity structures operate in three distinct ways, 
and sub-state democracy promotion is therefore better understood in this manner. 
Different opportunity structures are at play, the relationship with agency is different, 
and consequently the how, when and why is different. It is argued here that a broad, 
general explanation of sub-state democracy promotion does not adequately capture the 
data, and a more nuanced distinction between the various types is required. The three 
types are termed explicit, implicit, and subcontracted democracy promotion. The three 
types of sub-state democracy promotion will be considered separately in the following 
discussion. 
7.1 Explicit democracy promotion 
When sub-states initiate their own activities with the specific aim of promoting 
democracy abroad,  we may refer to these activities as explicit democracy promotion. In 
short, promoting democracy is at least one of the stated aims, as well as a demonstrable 
aspect of the activity. Flanders’ CEEP, its bilateral partnership with Chile, or the Welsh 
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legislature’s activities would be examples of explicit sub-state democracy promotion. In 
engaging in explicit democracy promotion, sub-states are democracy promotion actors.  
The framework drew attention to some key opportunity structures that facilitate this 
activity. Specifically, these are the capacity of the sub-state and the constitutional division 
of competence. The IGR however can constrain sub-states from engaging in such 
activities. The global security context meanwhile was also important in facilitating 
engagement abroad in the promotion of democracy, while the domestic political context 
structures opportunities and motivations, and is discussed in the consequent sub-
section.  
The capacity of the sub-state to engage in paradiplomacy was a key factor in all 
instances. For the Flemish government and Welsh legislature, the capacity adjust and 
allocate budgets and resources according to policy priorities created opportunities for 
investing those resources into democracy promoting activities. These were key aspects 
which enabled the activity to be pursued by political forces in government or presiding 
office.  
Closely linked to the previous point is the constitutional division of competence, and the 
legal opportunity to engage the sub-state in democracy promotion activities. Flanders is 
constitutionally sovereign in many aspects of foreign affairs, and programmes such as 
the CEEP or bilateral relations were wholly legal if a Flemish government desired to 
engage in such activities. The Welsh legislature on the other hand benefitted from a 
vague and previously unimportant clause in its constitution which was redefined, 
without opposition, to justify the international promotion of its democracy. 
Opportunities were created by the constitutional set-up for explicit promotion of 
democracy.  
While the legal basis and resource capacity was also potentially present in the Maryland 
case,  strict IGR prohibited the executive from engaging in political paradiplomacy. Even 
when vague as in the Maryland case, a constitutional settlement can be given more 
precise meaning through the IGR, and though technically able to attach human rights 
clauses to its domestic legislation, US states have been refrained from doing so by the 
federal level. This finding suggests that it is still useful to make distinctions between 
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different ‘types’ of paradiplomacy, for the same IGR have allowed and facilitated 
economic or co-operational paradiplomacy. The constitution and IGR are very closely 
linked, the latter enforcing, circumventing, or giving specific meaning to the former. IGR 
is a key variable that must be understood as a structuring factor alongside the 
constitution and resource/capacity with regard to explicit democracy promotion.  
The issues of sub-state representation within national foreign policy structures 
highlighted by the Lecourian framework played less of a role in structuring 
opportunities for explicit democracy promotion. The activity by definition attempts to 
establish the sub-state as a distinct actor. Even if there is a possibility of contributing as 
part of the central state’s democracy promotion – which in the Welsh legislature’s case 
there is, via the WFD – it is not an opportunity to satisfy the objectives of explicit 
democracy promotion. It strongly suggests that promoting democracy is at most, just 
one of the aims of explicit democracy promotion – an issue discussed in detail below. An 
equally, if not more important aim is to distinguish the sub-state and its activity from 
the central state. The determination to act outside the central state’s structures for 
foreign policy is itself telling with regard to the aims of the Flemish government’s CEEP 
and bilateral relations, and the Welsh legislature’s activities. Regardless of avenues to 
influence and to take part in the central state’s foreign activities, they deliberately chose 
not to do so, and to engage independently. Indeed, a feature of explicit democracy 
promotion is the desire to act independently as the sub-state, regardless of alternative 
routes to the activity. 
The continental level structures, namely the EU, international organizations and 
associated industry norms were but minor influences upon explicit democracy 
promotion; they did not structure opportunities for sub-states to initiate activities, 
rather, they only provided a reference and source of knowledge and norms to which to 
align at later stages. Only during the second phase of the CEEP, when political interest 
from the Flemish government had waned, did its management begin to align explicitly 
to the norms, targets and practices of the EU’s PHARE or TACIS programmes. Again, this 
strongly suggests that establishing a distinctiveness with regard to the activity is an 
early aim of explicit democracy promotion.  
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Further supporting the latter notion was the finding that sub-states are somewhat 
different to other democracy promotion actors when explicitly promoting democracy. 
Sub-states do not establish intermediate foundations to manage their programmes – 
management is often “in-house”, even if the political lead and interest wanes after the 
initial establishment and initiation. The “client” is different also; either elements of the 
sub-state itself (Wales), or groups from civil society (Flanders) who are invited to 
“conduct” the democracy promotion work. This results in original and innovative 
promotional work, initially removed from the ‘industry’ standards and norms. Only over 
time does the democracy promotion move toward those norms, at the expense of 
distinctiveness; though not in all cases. Taking advantage of established continental 
opportunities and channels for promoting democracy would undermine the 
distinctiveness. Meanwhile, although they were not restricted, it must be noted that the 
explicit activities explored in the cases did not threaten or contradict the central state’s 
foreign policy.  
On the global level however, we note two further opportunity structures that allow for 
explicit democracy promotion. Firstly, the dampening security context following the 
demise of the Soviet Union and an ideologically competitive international context are 
explicitly referred to in the Flemish case as facilitating factors, creating the opportunity 
for the sub-state to engage with partners without being considered a political or 
ideological threat. Debates may continue regarding Fukuyama’s (1992) end of history 
thesis, but the data collected here suggests that the great liberal projects of the 1990s, 
promoting democracy and engaging in international development, were attractive 
activities that sub-states could, and wanted to engage in.  
Secondly, and linked to the previous factor discussed, is the willingness of  partners to 
engage with sub-states in this new international context. The openness of the Central 
and Eastern European Countries, Chile, South Africa, and all of Wales’ partners, to 
establishing relationships involving the promotion of democracy and governance 
programmes is the prerequisite for being able to promote democracy.  
In summary, the key opportunity structures for explicit sub-state democracy promotion 
are the capacity and competence of the sub-state itself, factors often mitigated or 
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constrained by the IGR between it and the central state. The opportunity for explicit 
democracy promotion, as with political paradiplomacy in general, is often withheld 
from sub-states by the central states through the constitution, backed by disciplining 
IGR. Secondly, the facilitation of international partnerships between sub-states and 
other partners is a key factor which is itself influenced by the broader global security 
and political context.  
7.1.1 Agency and motivations for explicit democracy promotion 
In the case of explicit democracy promotion, the agency of the sub-state government or 
legislature was key. Regional political forces had mobilised the governance structures 
and its resources to capitalise on the opportunities to promote democracy. The Flemish 
CD&V government was the most prominent example as it strategically directed the 
resources of the sub-state into the CEEP and its bilateral relations. The PO in Wales – 
with cross-party ambivalence if not support – also mobilised the newly empowered 
legislature to capitalise on structural opportunities to promote democracy as part of a 
broader legitimacy building project. In both cases however, the domestic political 
context was key in structuring the motivations for these actors to engage in the explicit 
promotion of democracy abroad. As a means of projecting a particular notion of 
Flanders, or to “advertise” Welsh democracy both abroad and at home. 
Worthy of note also is the timing of the establishment of these activities. The PO was 
quick to establish these activities once his office had received the additional resources 
and freedom of action, very early in its existence. The Flemish Christian Democrats 
meanwhile had conceived of the CEEP before the ink had dried on the 1993 reforms, 
and all activities in question were established during the first term (1995-1999).  
Despite changes to governments, the powers, and global political context, no further 
instances of explicit democracy promotion were noted beyond the early endeavours. 
Neither case saw significant efforts to reform or renew the activities. Political interest 
and lead for the already established activities diminished with time, leading to either a 
continuation of broadly the same activities (Wales and Flemish bilateral relations) – an 
instance of path dependency in action – or a gradual shift toward global norms and 
practices within the same industry until the eventual expiration (CEEP). Indeed, there is 
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perhaps a suggestion that sub-states do not suffer from the complications that arise 
from shifting short term priorities of democracy promoters explored in chapter 1 (see 
Carothers, 2009b; Hook, 2002); once established, there is little or no political 
interference in these activities. 
In the case of explicit democracy promotion, the key agency comes from regional 
political forces, motivated by domestic political setting, mobilising the sub-state 
structures to exploit opportunities structured by the constitution, capacity and potential 
partners (themselves reliant on facilitating global contexts at particular periods of time) 
to promote democracy deliberately, and independently of other actors. The forces need 
not necessarily be nationalists however, and the activities were established during the 
early, formative period of the sub-state’s existence. 
7.2 Implicit democracy promotion 
Implicit democracy promotion involves the sub-state’s activities inadvertently 
contributing to, or where the aims of the activities are not explicitly stated as to 
promote democracy. They are in this sense, activities that seek to affect socio-political 
change elsewhere, and are therefore a form of political paradiplomacy. But the aim is 
not explicitly to promote democracy. The development programmes of Wales and 
Flanders for example would involve an implicit promotion of democracy. Both 
programmes seek to support the development process in other countries, and not to 
explicitly promote democracy, though governance projects are demonstrably a part of 
the programmes. In engaging in implicit democracy promotion, sub-states are actors in 
the broader, developmental understanding of democracy promotion noted in chapter 1 
(see Carothers, 2009). 
Constitutional set-ups are key opportunity structures if, as in Flanders, they explicitly 
place upon the sub-state a responsibility to engage in international development. Such 
constitutional allocation of power would be expected to be accompanied by the 
allocation of resources for the job. From then, Flanders sought to engage in international 
development as a state might. 
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In the absence of a clear constitutional empowerment however, the IGR and the 
willingness to re-interpret the semi-legal rules of international activities can also 
facilitate sub-state engagement. Where that constitutional allocation of competence for 
activities is ambiguous as in the Welsh case, IGR again emerge as a key structure that 
can give specific meaning to such constitutional ambiguities. Equally important 
however was the  understanding of international development as a depoliticized 
activity that does not challenge the central state’s foreign policy. The central 
government sees Welsh international development either as an activity that is not 
political, or at the very most, an activity that does not challenge its own foreign policy 
position; perhaps even contributing to it. An important context is the period where 
international development has become a global “good cause”, with Live Eight, 
Gleneagles, and Make Poverty History dominating headlines in the Welsh case. It is 
perceived as an altruistic, more acceptable, and less controversial activity than explicit 
democracy promotion. It nonetheless became an activity – by adopting broader 
practices – that implicitly encouraged governance reform in partner countries. 
The key opportunity structure that turns development into democracy promotion are 
the global norms of the development industry for they have in all cases been 
deliberately emulated and adopted as sub-states engaged in international development. 
This process of ‘transnational communication’ reflects what other authors have noted in 
other fields (see Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer, 2008; and Audet and Gendron, 2012; 
de la Pena Varona and Hinojal, 2012), though in this case it is deliberately sought. It is in 
emulating these norms and practices of reforming governance that sub-state 
international development implicitly promotes democracy. The inclusion of global 
norms within the framework was justified by theory (see chapter 3), and also in 
hindsight by the data. The findings also emphasize the importance and influence of 
global norms, practices, and the power of a dominant development discourse in shaping 
the approaches of new actors to the field. 
Again, much like explicit democracy promotion, representation within the state’s foreign 
policy structures was not a pertinent opportunity structure as, the sub-state sought its 
own, distinctive development programme. Continental or international institutions did 
not create opportunities either, also due to the distinctiveness and independence of 
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action sought by the sub-states. The development work itself meanwhile did not 
contradict or threaten the central state’s efforts or foreign policy.  
Key opportunity structures in this case are therefore the constitutional division of 
context and accompanying resources to engage in international development. The IGR 
meanwhile can give clarity to vague constitutional settlements and facilitate or allow 
the activity. More broadly, it is difficult to understand implicit sub-state democracy 
promotion outside the context of the development norms and practices that are 
emulated and propagated by sub-states. Given the proliferation of sub-state 
involvement in development assistance (see Cornago, 2010b), this type is likely to be 
the most prevalent form of sub-state democracy promotion in the world.  
7.2.1 Agency and motivations for the implicit promotion of democracy 
The sub-state government is the key actor with regard to implicit democracy 
promotion. Motivated by domestic political contexts, regional political forces mobilise 
the sub-state’s resources to engage in international development partnerships. This was 
the case in both Welsh and Flemish cases where the respective government was 
presented with an opportunity to engage the sub-state in international development. In 
the Welsh case, the domestic political context motivated its government to seek to 
project a particular notion of Wales abroad and at home, while Flanders sought to 
emulate a particular type of altruistic, state-like behaviour. 
However, neither Wales nor Flanders demonstrated much, if any agency with regard to 
the development of the activities once established. Beyond establishing and funding the 
programmes, political involvement was minimal, and there was no sign of any attempts 
to capitalize on any broader benefits or opportunities that might arise. Though 
constrained somewhat in the Welsh case by the unique legal set-up, programmes in 
both cases were designed to emulate the international norms and practices of the 
industry, with no role for the sub-state’s government beyond approving the finances, 
and even levels of spending are influenced by the global consensus upon the 
expenditure of 0.7% of GDP. As noted, sub-state governments are hollow actors in the 
field of international development, not seeking to challenge or reform the political or 
conceptual underpinnings of the practice. Consequently, the dominant development 
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discourse is adopted, perpetuated, and even propagated further by sub-states. The 
governments want to “do” development, how it’s done is left to the coordinating bodies. 
Sub-states are in that sense, when implicitly promoting democracy, hollow actors, 
devoid of political input and engagement with the activity itself. “Doing” international 
development is objective for politicians, not “how it’s done”. For the coordinating 
bodies, the objective is to “do it well” and display best practice and adopt the 
governance projects. 
This finding may be of particular interest to scholars of international development, 
suggesting as it does, the hegemonic nature of the international development discourse. 
Associated with the powerful discourse is the equally influential belief and confidence 
that the development industry is the source of best practice. The development industry 
know how to “do” development better than anybody else and coordinating bodies take 
their lead form it. 
7.3 Subcontracted democracy promotion 
Sub-states, their legislatures and staff are subcontracted by national level organizations 
to form a part of their broader democracy packages. In Maryland, the NCSL, either on its 
own or at the behest of other organizations; the MCI on behalf of China and with federal 
support; the US National Guard as part of broader military organizations; individual 
staff members for the OWP and other democracy organizations; and the Welsh 
legislature and staff members in the name of the WFD and other democracy 
organizations, all promote democracy. The defining feature is that despite being sub-
state officials, knowledge, and experience, they promote democracy on behalf of other 
actors, not the sub-state. The national level organization is the actor, but through the 
use of sub-state personnel and knowledge, and in this case, the sub-state itself is not an 
actor. 
In all cases of subcontracted democracy promotion, the Lecourian framework must be 
shifted, for the sub-state is not an actor, and does not navigate its agency through the 
opportunity structures. Rather, the democracy organizations are the actors and the sub-
state officials an opportunity structure for them; a source of knowledge and personnel, 
and a means of promoting democracy in a particular and often different way. Indeed, a 
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characteristic of this type is that it is most prevalent where the agency of the sub-state 
executive to engage in political paradiplomacy and explicit democracy promotion is at 
its lowest, in Wales an Maryland. 
The Federal government in the US for example, saw the states’ National Guard as a tool 
to be operationalized in support of broader endeavours, and a means of better meeting 
its foreign policy during the 1990s. Its support of UMD and the MCI was also a means of 
enabling democracy to be promoted in China when its own relations restricted the 
activity. Wales’ legislature, its staff and their expertise was identified by the WFD as a 
means of ‘enriching’ their own product in an increasingly market-like environment for 
democracy organizations. Global factors and foreign policy are important, but more in 
relation to the national level organization than the sub-state being subcontracted. In 
this regard, the foreign policy of the central state is a crucial factor in understanding 
why subcontracting to the sub-state becomes a viable or preferable option, though only 
further research on the motivations of democracy organizations can fully explore this. 
Ultimately, with regard to subcontracted democracy promotion, sub-states, their staff, 
and their expertise should be understood as opportunity structures for those national 
level organizations who wish to bypass and overcome difficulties often deriving from 
the central state’s foreign policy.  
7.3.1 Agency and subcontracted democracy promotion 
In the case of subcontracted democracy promotion, agency does not come from the sub-
state governance structures. The sub-state, as a political entity, is not mobilised for the 
purposes of promoting democracy and is not a democracy promotion actor. However its 
resources, its staff, and its particular knowledge, is “used” by other actors. National level 
organizations display agency in this case; the WFD, NCSL, NDI, IRI, OWP, the State 
Department, and the national level military organizations are the actors. For them, as 
actors within their own version of a Lecourian framework, sub-states represent an 
opportunity structure.  
Sub states are a means by which democracy promotion can be engaged in.  The benefit 
of doing so, as opposed to using their own resources, concerns the ability of sub-state 
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staff and knowledge to overcome the challenges and difficulties presented by their own 
relations with a particular partner – often due to the nature of the state’s foreign policy. 
The National Guard are better placed to present a less-aggressive posture than the US 
national forces. Maryland staff are politically acceptable governance tutors for both 
China and the Federal government. Maryland staff also have the capacity to impart a 
particular knowledge, not available either in the private sector or at the national level 
organizations, and Wales can likewise enrich what the WFD offer in an increasingly 
competitive “market” of democracy support. Either way, sub-states present 
opportunities for national level actors to promote democracy in particular ways.  
Individuals at the sub-state level do however display a degree of personal agency in 
cases of subcontracted democracy promotion. Their willingness to contribute, often 
voluntarily, is an essential requirement for subcontracting. In doing so, the individuals 
surrender control of the medium, method, partner, and broader package of democracy 
being promoted. However, data suggests that, in both the US and Welsh cases, the 
individuals were still in control of their own message and knowledge.  
It has been argued in this section that there are three types of sub-state democracy 
promotion. Both explicit and implicit democracy promotion are instances where 
regional agency is key, alongside the division of competence and a globally permissive 
political context. The sub-state governance structures are mobilized and the sub-state 
can be considered the actor in these instances. Implicit democracy promotion is 
particularly influenced by global development norms, practices, and discourse as well as 
its depoliticized understanding. However a third type involves the staff and expertise 
within the sub-state being subcontracted by other organizations. In these instances, the 
sub-state acts as an opportunity structure for national level organizations and thus 
cannot be understood as a democracy promotion actor. 
7.4 Further features of sub-state democracy promotion 
By building upon the three types outlined in the previous section, by also relating to the 
prominent themes of the IR and paradiplomacy scholarship, and introducing further 
factors identified in the empirical investigation, this section will further enrich the 
understanding of sub-state democracy promotion. The section will explore further 
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aspects that add to the understanding of the what, when, and why of sub-state 
democracy promotion. The discussion will relate specifically to the prominent themes 
present within the democracy promotion literature that were identified in chapter 1, 
such as the nature and understanding of the democracy being promoted, the location, 
and method of delivery. The section will also explore key factors emphasized by 
paradiplomacy scholars, such as the role of nationalism. It will also introduce new 
factors that have emerged from the cases and the particular theoretical approach as 
being of importance to further enrich the understanding. Specifically, these are the 
critical junctures at particular times, and the historical context. Finally, the notion of 
promoting democracy as a symbolic activity, engaged in as a means of constructing the 
sub-state’s actorness is introduced as a means of understanding and understanding 
explicit and implicit sub-state democracy promotion.  
7.4.1 Sub-state democratic knowledge and expertise 
The first notable aspect characterising sub-state democracy promotion concerns the 
model or aspects of democracy sub-states promote. Sub-states explored in this project 
have frequently promoted simiar aspects of democratic governance practice. Given the 
similarity, it may be suggested that sub-states can, and have tended to promote similar 
aspects of democratic governance. In all cases there is at least a modest belief, and at 
times a deliberate advertising that the sub-state exhibits, and is therefore capable of 
promoting, particular elements of democratic governance. All three cases displayed an 
awareness of, and a willingness to promote, particular elements of democracy that were 
common to each. Themes of transparency, scrutiny of legislation and expenditure, 
accountability, and equality of access to governance structures are consistent areas 
where sub-state officials are frequently involved, imparting their knowledge and 
expertise.  
Flemish planners attempted to stamp a distinctive element to the democracy and 
governance component of the programme by emphasizing the concept of overleg; 
consultative and deliberative democratic governance, inclusive of civil society. 
Maryland practitioners offer practical knowledge of institutionalising and addressing 
issues of accountability, transparency, accessibility, and efficacy. ‘Welsh democracy’ 
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itself is reflective of the values of inclusivity and its promotion involves the transfer of 
knowledge, expertise, and experience of enhancing democratic accountability, 
transparency, access, and openness.  
However, this distinctive knowledge was not reflected within the international 
development programmes that tended to emulate standard industry governance 
projects. With time also, as the CEEP adopted the EU and industry standards, norms, 
and practices, the distinctiveness of the Flemish governance support dwindled. Sub-
state democracy is distinctive in within the explicit and subcontracted types of 
democracy promotion where sub-state officials control their message and content. But 
where global norms and practices are emulated, most notably in the field of 
international development and therefore the implicit category here, sub-state 
democracy has not proved as prominent a feature. Nonetheless, in the cases of explicit 
and subcontracted sub-state democracy promotion, we may refer to a distinctive, and 
similar democratic governance knowledge. This distinctiveness may suggest why it is 
subcontracted, an issue discussed below, as well as a potential starting point for 
fuarther research into conceptions of democracy at the sub-state level.  
With regard to the understanding of sub-state democracy promotion, it is enriched by 
noting that sub-states can and tend to, when not emulating global norms and practices, 
promote particular aspects of democratic governance. These can aspects can be 
understood as being of a more inclusive and deliberative model of democracy with an 
emphasis on citizen engagement. 
7.4.2 Location and partners 
The choice of partner and location for both explicit and implicit democracy promotion is 
heavily influenced by the way in which the opportunities are structured. The global 
level political context in particular is often the key factor dictating where sub-states 
may engage. Flanders and the Maryland National Guard found the post-Soviet opening 
of Central and Eastern Europe very accommodating. Likewise, the transition of Chilean 
society presented Flanders with a further opportunity to support democracy.  
269 
 
Importantly, the security context of the 1990s facilitated the engagement of new actors 
in the great liberal missions of the decade. An existing domestic connection was present 
in Flanders (with Chile) and Wales (with Africa) which may be worthy of note with 
regard to the choice of partner, but there are equally, if not more significant connections 
with other potential partners. The global international development community’s 
consensus on LDCs meanwhile has been an important factor in the choice of both 
Flemish and Welsh partners.  The national level organizations that subcontract may also 
dictate the location and partner of all subcontracted democracy promotion.  
7.4.3 Method of delivery  
How sub-state democracy promotion is conducted can be conditioned by both internal 
and external factors. Explicit democracy promotion in particular is characterised by 
original methods of delivery as the sub-states seek to establish anew their programmes. 
Flanders’ CEEP was originally a whole-of-society approach using organizations from 
Flemish society, designed by the government department when engaging with a 
transitioning society while the engagement with Chile was developed in partnership. 
Meanwhile, the Welsh legislature has developed its own form of delivering their 
knowledge to partners; “showcasing” through their tailored visitor programmes. Sub-
states are sometimes able to develop their own distinctive mediums for transferring 
knowledge.  
However, the medium and form of delivery is also and often influenced by structures 
outside the sub-state. The Welsh legislature was restricted to the rules of the networks 
through which they promote their democracy. The Flemish CEEP was increasingly 
brought into line with the broader European engagement with the same countries.  
With regard implicit democracy promotion through development assistance, we see not 
a conditioning of the form the sub-state activities take, but a self-disciplined attempt by 
the sub-state governments to adopt and emulate the norms and practices of the 
industry; to become a good development partner. In both cases of international 
development, the sub-state explicitly sought to incorporate the industry’s practices and 
their norms into their own projects. Both also propagated the development discourse 
amongst either the practitioners (Wales) or more generally through regional level 
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education programmes (Flanders). Sub-states are enthusiastic proponents and 
practitioners of the global development discourse, rarely if ever challenging the its 
associated practices or norms.  
Subcontracted democracy promotion meanwhile, is entirely dependent upon the 
organizations sourcing their expertise with regard to methods. Partners are selected for 
their knowledge which fits within the contracting organizations’ broader package. The 
sub-state governance structures are not involved, and the individuals that are 
subcontracted wield little if any control over the method or the broader context in these 
instances.  
7.4.4 Nationalism? 
Several scholars claim that paradiplomacy contributes to the pursuit of core nationalist 
objectives, namely the construction and consolidation of a distinctive identity as an 
international actor (Kuznetsov, 2015: 110; Lecours and Moreno, 2003; Paquin and 
Lachapelle, 2005: 82-85). Paradiplomacy offers a means of defining and articulating a 
‘national interest’ and potentially achieving a degree of political-territorial mobilization 
(Lecours and Moreno, 2003; Keating, 1997: 708; Paquin and Lachapelle, 2005: 84; 
Lecours, 2008: 3). The cases illustrated that explicit and implicit democracy promotion 
do present opportunities to construct a distinctive identity and projecting a (sub-
)national interest, indeed this was the Flemish government’s explicit goal. 
Subcontracted democracy promotion however, distinctive by the lack of agency or role 
for the sub-state, cannot be seen to contribute to those nationalist objectives; the sub-
state is not mobilised in the same sense. 
Data shows however that nationalist parties are not the most enthusiastic initiators of 
explicit or implicit democracy promotion. State-wide parties also seek to explicitly and 
implicitly promote democracy, indeed have shown themselves to be more enthusiastic 
in doing so. In Flanders, the Christian Democrats (CD&V) in government pioneered the 
sub-state’s foreign policy and activities, not the nationalist parties such as the 
Volksunie, who never topped 9.3% of the vote in Flanders. Nor did their successors, the 
NVA, who did not stand until the 2004 Flemish elections, seek to initiate new explicit 
democracy promotion activities. Furthermore, as the NVA grew into a credible and 
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genuine competitor for government, and largest party by the late 2000s, political 
interest in international affairs was diminishing. The NVA (nor Liberal party) looked to 
develop Flanders’ international activities further, with the exception of emphasizing the 
economic benefits. 
In Wales meanwhile, the unionist Labour party was particularly keen to develop an 
independent and distinctly Welsh international development programme, not the 
nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. Both Welsh Labour and the CD&V, it is demonstrated in 
the respective chapters, developed these activities to project a particular image of the 
sub-state, and at least partly because of the perceived domestic impact it would have. 
Non-nationalist political parties have proved the most enthusiastic explicit and implicit 
promoters of democracy.  
On the one hand, the data suggests that the role of nationalism in “pushing” the 
development of paradiplomacy within a sub-state is at least more nuanced. Unionist, 
state-wide, or non-nationalist parties in government have enthusiastically engaged in 
explicit democracy promotion, sometimes more so than nationalist parties in 
government. It suggests not only, as others have argued (see Keating, 1997; 2013: 158; 
McEwen and Moreno, 2005), that governments in devolved territories engage in 
stateless nation building, but that unionist and non-nationalist governments do so too. 
There are “soft-nationalists” at the sub-state level, who also see a sub-state or sub-
national identity as a focus for solidarity, and attempt to appeal to and cultivate that 
solidarity. It’s notable for example that the two instances noted are Wales and Flanders, 
where (stateless) national identities predate the governance structures, and there was 
an existing basis from which to cultivate such solidarity. 
On the other hand, the nationalism argument is unsatisfactory and contradicted by the 
empirical data. In the Flemish case in particular, it was noted that the NVA’s interest in 
developing paradiplomacy in 2004 or 2014 (when holding the portfolio), was relatively 
low in comparison to the CD&V’s from 1993-1999. Moreover, in both Welsh and 
Flemish cases, after an initial flurry of activity, interest in establishing new activities, or 
even maintaining active programmes, waned. This finding suggests there is a temporal 
factor that merits consideration.  
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7.4.5 Post-juncture period 
Critical junctures are important concepts for historical institutionalists, and the concept 
opens the way to an alternative explanation as to why democracy promotion activities 
are initiated. Junctures are periods where institutions, and the rules and paths they 
structure are reformed. Within these periods, the decisions and actions of actors are key 
in re-shaping the institutions that go on to impact the paths and set the ‘rules of the 
game’ in the future (see Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 348). A notable correlation exists 
in the cases studies between critical constitutional junctures and the period where 
democracy promotion activities are initiated. It is argued here that the period following 
the constitutional junctures represent key opportunities to define the character of the 
sub-state following a change in its institutional nature. 
A key factor with regard to why Maryland doesn’t seek to engage in the promotion of 
democracy (or indeed any political activities abroad), may concern the constitutional 
status, and broader “rules” of the sub-state’s paradiplomacy. A founding colony of the 
USA, Maryland predates the central state as a political, geographic and constitutional 
entity. Its international role, its actorness, is already defined, and there is no trace of any 
effort at the domestic level to (re-)construct or change that actorness for any reason. 
According to historical institutionalist theory, it will take a critical juncture or a period 
of institutional dynamism for the role and rules of Maryland’s engagement to change.  
Such periods of dynamism can be identified during the 1990s when attempts were 
made to reform or redefine states’ international roles, most notably with the 
Massachusetts Burma Law and later with human rights related statements in the 
Maryland legislature. But these efforts were stopped by the federal government. The 
rules were rewritten and US states’ international role was redefined, or rather clarified. 
Politics was not something that states engaged in internationally. Maryland has 
consequently been deprived of opportunities to become a democracy promoter, 
explicitly or implicitly. 
Individuals within Maryland are explicitly pursuing the promotion of democracy 
abroad. But they do not seek to mobilize the governance structures to do so. There are 
established avenues for the promotion of democracy, through the extensively developed 
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federal structures and democracy organizations, or the civil society organizations that 
work alongside federal programmes. Their engagement is far more instrumental – 
preoccupied with the activity itself – not with changing what Maryland does, or (re-
)constructing its actorness by seeking opportunities to engage in democracy promotion.  
Both Wales and Flanders meanwhile, developed and engaged in explicit and implicit 
democracy promotion during an early, and formative period of the sub-state’s existence, 
shortly after the critical constitutional junctures of devolution. The CEEP, Chile and 
South African bilateral programmes were initiated during the mid-first term of the first 
post-1993 government. The Welsh government began developing its international 
development programme at an early stage as a reaction to the 1999 election result, to 
be launched during the second Assembly term. The legislature’s efforts to promote the 
concept of “Welsh” democracy was also initiated at a very early stage in the new 
institution’s life once the PO’s role was redefined – itself identified in chapter 6 as a 
critical constitutional juncture. In all cases, the international character or actorness – 
what the sub-state could or did do, or which values it was aligned to – had not been fully 
defined. Explicit and implicit democracy promotion activities, at least in part, defined 
that international character at an early, more ambiguous stage. During such periods, in 
keeping with institutionalist notions of critical junctures, the newly established rules of 
international activity were yet to be clarified. Maryland’s actorness in contrast, has been 
far more clearly defined within a long established federal system. 
In short, here was a relatively blank canvass upon which political forces could, given the 
opportunity, project an image of what the new sub-state did around the world and what 
kind of international actor it was. Maryland’s canvass has been coloured for centuries, 
by its own past, by the actorness of the 49 other federal states sharing the same 
constitutional and legal structure, and by the process of clarification following attempts 
at revising the rules of paradiplomacy during the 1990s. In Wales and Flanders, the 
rules of paradiplomacy either facilitated explicit or implicit democracy promotion 
(Flanders), or were open enough to mediation (Wales). For Wales and Flanders, 
promoting democracy explicitly and implicitly have been a means of influencing the 
rules of international activity. A means of constructing and establishing their own 
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actorness at a key, formative period of their existence. It may even be noted as a 
distinctive phase in the evolution of the institutions. 
7.4.6 When do they, and when can they promote democracy? 
Coinciding with periods where Flanders and Wales engage in international 
development and democracy promotion, global level developments make democracy 
promotion and development particularly attractive means of constructing actorness. 
There is a notable correlation between the expansion and development of sub-state 
democracy promotion and the demise of the Soviet Union. The initiation of explicit and 
implicit democracy promotion activities coincide with both the immediate period after 
the constitutional and political empowerment of those sub-states, and this particular 
global security and political context.  
As well as the demise of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Pinochet and Apartheid regimes 
led to a far more acceptable political context where Flanders could lend support to Chile 
and South Africa. Here was an opportunity for Flanders to join the great liberal crusade 
of the 1990s, helping to bring democracy and market capitalism to new areas of the 
world. Far more difficult would be any attempt to do something similar post-Arab 
Spring, in difficult, perhaps volatile political contexts and in a time of constrained 
budgets at home.  
With regard to international development, the G8 in Gleneagles, the Make Poverty 
History campaign, and Live Eight were the background to the development of both the 
Wales for Africa programme and the establishment of FICA. Africa was a global focus for 
the development industry at a time when the designers of Welsh and Flemish 
development assistance looked to that industry as it developed its own international 
development programme. The particular period of international development history is 
a key consideration when attempting to understand the Flemish and Welsh 
programmes.  
The historical domestic context also heavily influenced, if not explains the motivation 
for explicit democracy promotion. The political context surrounding the institutions of 
devolution in Wales during its formative years were important considerations. The 
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question of legitimacy hung ominously for its supporters, and a strengthening and 
construction of further legitimacy, beyond the flimsy democratic majority in its favour, 
was an important motivation for key actors within the institutions in those early years. 
The desire to construct legitimacy has been shown to be a key motivation for the first 
Presiding Officer of the Assembly, Dafydd Elis-Thomas. The political context and nature 
of the structuring institutions themselves at particular periods are key factors, not only 
in conditioning the activities of political forces, but also in conditioning their 
motivations and objectives; as historical institutionalism claims, a symbiotic 
relationship between the actor and structure.  
Finally, to repeat a point regarding the critical constitutional juncture and status of the 
“rules” of the sub-state’s paradiplomacy, both Flanders and Wales began developing 
their international activities during the very early years of their existence as new 
political entities. This was a period where their actorness was not clearly defined, either 
by constitution or convention. At that time, both executives (and the legislature) looked 
to take advantage of the ambiguity surrounding the rules of paradiplomacy, and 
construct their actorness by engaging in explicit and implicit democracy promotion. 
Maryland meanwhile in the same period was constrained by both its constitution and 
its conventions regarding international activities. It was not able to engage in explicit or 
implicit democracy promotion.  
Since this formative period, neither Wales nor Flanders have engaged in any attempts to 
redefine their actorness in the international realm. Indeed, political interest and lead in 
the explicit and implicit activities waned and vanished once the activities were 
established. This is a strong suggestion that the activities had achieved their aims once 
established, regardless of the democratic or developmental state of the partner country.  
What is evident from the historical institutionalist approach therefore, is that particular 
periods are more conducive to sub-state democracy promotion than others. The post-
Soviet 1990s and the depoliticization of development are key factors that exist at a 
particular period. This period coincides with the early, formative period of the then new 
Flemish and Welsh sub-states, themselves a particularly conducive period for 
establishing and influencing the rules of paradiplomacy. This was a period where the 
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rules of international activities were not set in stone, where regional political agency 
could influence and define what the sub-state did internationally, and construct the 
international actorness of the sub-state. 
The Lecourian, historical institutionalist approach therefore argues that sub-states 
engagement in democracy promotion is often structured by factors at regional, national, 
and global levels. Both the location and method of delivery for example are often factors 
that are heavily influenced by external factors. Why an when they do so however is not, 
as is theorised elsewhere, due to the presence and agency of nationalist parties, the data 
does not support such a claim. Rather, it is argued that a combination of agency and 
opportunity to define the international character, or actorness of the sub-state at key 
periods in history, and their existence, explains why and when sub-states explicitly or 
implicitly promote democracy. The next section further explores this understanding by 
presenting the concept of “constructing actorness” as a means of understanding explicit 
and implicit sub-state democracy promotion. 
7.4.7 Constructing actorness 
By engaging in explicit and implicit democracy promotion, Wales and Flanders have 
been able to define through activity and association, the type of international actor they 
are. Explicit and implicit activities are a means by which the sub-states can define their 
actorness and nature as international actors. These activities were particularly useful 
means of doing so when that actorness was ill-defined, and the rules ambiguous – 
during a formative, post-juncture period of the sub-state’s existence. 
It should be stated again however that explicit or implicit democracy promotion may 
satisfy a number of motivations. Attached to the attempts to construct the actorness are 
sometimes, as witnessed in the CEEP, attempts to link harder economic interests to the 
activities. “Inserting” Flemish companies into the developing markets of Central and 
Eastern Europe was certainly a beneficial aspect of the aforementioned activities, 
benefits that were designed and planned for alongside the governance support. This 
was not the case however in Wales or to any significant extent with other Flemish 
activities such as the Chile partnership. Explicit democracy promotion can nonetheless 
satisfy several motivations, beyond that of constructing actorness. This section focusses 
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however upon the construction of actorness as at least one motivation behind 
promoting democracy. 
By making a decision to promote democracy, sub-states are constructing an element of 
their own actorness. Sub-states are deciding themselves which activities they will 
pursue, and which they will not. They are defining the character of their international 
engagement and aligning implicitly or explicitly with values associated with the 
activities in which they engage. Constructing actorness is not a case of performing a role 
or living up to a preconceived notion of what the sub-state should be and how it should 
act. Rather, is a more formative or precursory part of the process – the establishment of 
that role, the writing of the rules, and the construction of the conception of what the 
sub-state is, and what it does internationally. Explicit and implicit democracy promotion 
are ways in which the sub-state’s actorness can be constructed and defined; a means by 
which the sub-state can demonstrate what it does and what type of actor it is. 
For this reason, the timing of these activities – during a formative period with fewer 
preconceptions or established roles or rules, is a very important factor. It is by its 
nature, a critical juncture where rules can be established. The luxury that the political 
forces responsible hold, nationalist or not, is that they may, opportunity allowing, select 
and design their own actorness. Those forces may attempt to define what type of actor 
their sub-state is internationally, what it does and what values it reflects in its foreign 
policy.  
Furthermore, the choice of activities can also be understood within this context. The 
activities chosen allow the sub-state to align to particular values; democracy and 
development. The CEEP allowed Flanders to align to the great European project of 
integration and democracy of the 1990s. Its bilateral partnerships with Chile and South 
Africa allowed it to claim a role in the headline liberal revolutions of the decade. Wales’ 
legislature could place the notion of ‘Welsh’ democracy alongside other legitimate 
democracies. Its government meanwhile was able to align with the outward-looking, 
globally empathetic values of the international development movement, and the Make 
Poverty History campaign. Flanders also, alongside Wales, drew on and aligned to the 
internationalized conceptualizations of development to ensure legitimacy in the field 
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when practicing, The choice of activity is telling with regard to the kind of actorness the 
sub-state is attempting to construct.  
The governments need not embroil themselves in the murky waters of international 
politics, signing arms-treaties with human-rights abusers, or doing deals with terrorists. 
They may opt for the depoliticized, uncontroversial, and uncritically celebrated 
activities of international development, or the promotion of democracy; the great 
crusades of 1990s liberal internationalism. Flemish and Welsh activities were 
deliberately selected so as to construct the most positive image of their actorness both 
internationally and, importantly, domestically. Over time, there has been less agency 
and political involvement in attempting to push the sub-state into certain activities and 
construct a particular actorness. This supports the suggestion that after the formative 
period, after the actorness had been constructed, there was no need for further 
involvement. The activity had served its political purpose, but had also established a 
‘path’ upon which future governments and POs were dependent.  
7.4.8 Democracy Promotion as a symbolic activity 
Not unconnected to the notion of engaging in an activity in order to gain legitimacy from 
others in the community, is the notion of ‘symbolic politics’. Some authors have 
suggested that sustainable development policies, legislation and regulation are more a 
case of being seen by a particular audience to perform a particular role than any 
constructive engagement with the field (see Blu hdorn, 2007; Baker, 2007; Newig, 2007). 
Strategies can be rhetorically committed to particular aims but the implementation of 
policy is nevertheless ‘lacking in bite’ (Blu hdorn’s category B) or simply not designed to 
tackle the problem; being seen to try to tackle the problem is of more political value to 
the policy-maker than actually tackling the problem (category A); the practice of making 
empty rhetorical commitments. The real aim of policies deriving from the practice of 
symbolic politics is not to impact effectively upon the field, but rather it is more 
strategic and political; to exhibit a commitment on behalf of the policy-makers to a 
particular ideal. It is claimed for example that ‘contemporary environmental policy is 
much more a performative process than a leverage to tackle the roots of environmental 
crisis’ (Audet and Gendron, 2012: 41-42). This thesis argues that the promotion of 
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democracy can also be understood as a similarly performative process, its real aim 
being to construct a particular notion of the sub-state’s actorness. It can be seen 
As a tool of political integration and mobilisation, i.e. a tool for creating a 
sense of unity and community among a group of people and for providing 
them with a shared narrative about their current situation, their political 
goals and their collective political agency… (Blühdorn, 2007: 255). 
This concept presents sub-state political paradiplomacy in a new light, but is not far 
from established theories. Both Lecours (2002: 100) and Criekemans (2006: 16), as 
noted in chapter 2, claim that sub-states align to transnational networks in order to 
define their international role, while Keating, (1997: 702) hints toward similar notions 
regarding the use of paradiplomacy to consolidate notions of the nation at home. The 
claim here is that, during a key formative period, alignment to particular values and 
activities by ‘performing’ the role of democracy promoter and international 
development donor, are also means of constructing their international role and 
actorness.  
Supporting this notion is the absence of engagement with key agendas. Over time, 
political interest and lead was dropped with regard to the CEEP, bilateral relations, the 
WfA, and Flanders’ development programme. Sub-states also emulate global norms and 
practices, but fail to engage constructively or critically with the agenda, and becoming 
‘hollow’ actors. Even when, in the absence of expertise, sub-states develop original and 
arguably successful practices and means of engaging in international development or 
the promotion of democracy, with time and exposure, both Wales and Flanders sought 
to shed as much of that originality in an attempt to emulate the established norms and 
practices. This was particularly apparent with regard to international development, but 
also in the development of the CEEP over time. Engagement with the activity and 
agenda is not prioritised, but emulation of norms and practices – performing the role as 
best they can – is a strategic priority for much explicit and implicit sub-state democracy 
promotion.  
Sub-states, at key, formative periods of their existence, have attempted to engage in 
explicit and implicit democracy promotion, at least in part, in order to align with 
particular values and identity as an international actor. The choice of activity reflects 
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the desire to align with certain values and the construction of a very specific 
international actorness befitting the liberal internationalist zeitgeist at the time of their 
inception. As with sub-state alignment to transnational networks, it is a form of 
symbolic performance rather than a constructive engagement. The aim is to project a 
favourable image of the sub-state, to define through activity what the sub-state does 
and what values it projects, and to influence the notion of its international character. To 
construct its own actorness.  
7.5 Concluding remarks: How, when and why do sub-states 
promote democracy? 
By way of conclusion to the chapter, the following paragraph will summarise how, when 
and why sub-states promote democracy.  
Sub-states promote democracy. By engaging in explicit or implicit democracy 
promotion specifically, sub-states are democracy promotion actors, much like other 
actors established within the academic literature. In being subcontracted however, sub-
states are not actors, but are key to understanding the contracting actor’s democracy 
promotion. In applying the Lecourian framework, further analytical claims have been 
made with regard to the key opportunity structures and key factors that relate to the 
how, when and why of the three types of sub-state democracy promotion.  
The key opportunity structures with regard to how sub-states explicitly promote 
democracy are the constitutional competence and institutional capacity of the sub-state 
to engage in political paradiplomatic activity. The IGR can mediate or give specific 
meaning to ambiguous constitutional arrangements. In Maryland for example, though 
not specified or detailed in the constitution, the IGR have established and reiterated 
over time, a clear rule that sub-states do not engage in political paradiplomacy. But 
where the sub-state has the capacity and competence, agents may wish to take 
advantage of the opportunity. The willingness of partners to engage was also crucial.  
The post-juncture period, shortly after constitutional reform and decentralization of 
competence emerged as a key period for explicit democracy promotion. In this period, 
coinciding with key historical periods where the global political context was particularly 
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facilitating, sub-states are seen to initiate their engagement in explicit democracy 
promotion.   
The latter point relates directly to the motivations, and the “why” of explicit sub-state 
democracy promotion. It is argued that sub-state governments – not necessarily 
nationalist – at these post-juncture periods, seek to engage in democracy promotion at 
least in part, as a means of constructing a particular notion of the sub-state on the world 
stage. It is a symbolic activity that projects a particular notion of the sub-state as an 
international actor to both international and domestic audiences. Doing so addresses 
domestic political objectives and motivations.  
With regard to implicit democracy promotion, the constitutional competence and 
institutional capacity to engage in international development are key opportunity 
structures. The IGR again give particular meaning or clarify ambiguous constitutional 
settlements. However, it is through the adoption and emulation of the global norms and 
practices of international development that sub-states develop and engage in activities 
that promote democracy and good governance abroad. In being perceived as a non- or 
less political paradiplomatic activity, IGR have been more accommodating of 
governments that have sought to stretch an ambiguous constitutional settlement (as 
witnessed in the Welsh case).  
The two cases of implicit democracy promotion explored in this project were both 
initiated during the early 2000s, a period where international development was 
particularly valorised. This was also a period where the global political context did not 
restrict international development activities. Again however, the activity was also 
initiated shortly after competence was devolved. 
Like explicit democracy promotion activities, initiating international development 
activities is motivated at least in part by domestic political concerns. It is argued in this 
thesis that implicit democracy promotion through international development is a means 
of constructing and cultivating a particular notion of the sub-state as an international 
actor. It is also a symbolic activity that projects a particular notion of the sub-state 
internationally and domestically.  
282 
 
Though there are similarities between explicit and implicit democracy promotion, when 
sub-states are subcontracted by other actors, they must be understood differently. In 
such cases there is no agency at the sub-state level, beyond that of the individual 
officials that work on behalf of other actors. Rather, the unique knowledge and expertise 
of officials at the sub-state level offers other actors a means by which democracy 
promotion can be conducted in a manner which is more suitable to the context and 
challenges they face. The sub-state’s knowledge and officials are opportunity structures 
for broader democracy promoters.  
The understanding presented in this chapter already goes some way to addressing the 
third research question. Both paradiplomacy and the democracy promotion literature 
benefit from this better understanding of sub-state democracy promotion. There is now 
a comprehensive account of the hitherto ignored phenomenon of sub-state democracy 
promotion, and a detailed account of how, when and why sub-states promote 
democracy. Such an understanding acts as a reference point, and a source of discussion 
and further research in order to refine the understanding of both paradiplomacy and 
democracy promotion. The final chapter will discuss the implications of this better 
understanding of sub-state democracy promotion for the sub-state, and the democracy 




Chapter 8: Implications 
This chapter will address the third research question directly by detailing what studies 
of sub-states and of democracy promotion gain from a better understanding of sub-state 
democracy promotion. Essentially, this chapter will explore the implications of the 
research for the broader academic literature and policy community. 
Firstly, sub-states’ ability to bypass the political problems of central states is examined. 
Their role as sources of knowledge for national level organizations is then discussed, 
and the role that their knowledge and expertise plays within broader democracy 
promotion packages. A brief section details the emergence of sub-state democracy 
networks. The implications and challenges raised by the research for the theoretical IR 
literature more broadly is examined. A section will then explore the implications for 
paradiplomacy scholarship,  before addressing the final research question directly by 
way of conclusion. Though not an explicit aim of the project, a brief section will also 
outline possible implications and practical considerations for practitioners. Throughout 
the chapter, possibilities for further research will be highlighted.  
First and foremost, sub-states are democracy promoters. For the academic literature to 
omit them and their activities is to present an incomplete description and explanation of 
this international activity. By detailing the activities of sub-states, the project therefore 
makes an immediate contribution . Furthermore, the analysis offered in this chapter can 
from some early hypotheses  which further research can test and build upon. These are 
noted before proceeding to detail the project’s broader implications.  
8.1.1 Hypotheses for future research 
For sub-states to engage in explicit democracy promotion they not only require the 
capacity and competence to do so, but require freedom from central state constraints. It 
is also argued that such activities are open to sub-states only at particular periods when 
the international security context is calm. Motivations, meanwhile, are rooted in 
domestic political concerns, and a desire for the domestic political groups in 
government to present a particular image of itself globally, something that the activity 
of promoting democracy offers to do. 
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With regard to implicit democracy promotion, it may be hypothesized that once, more 
constitutional competence the capacity to engage in development programmes. 
However, due to the depoliticization of international development, the strict 
constitutional framework can be bypassed through IGR to allow the activity. So long as 
global development norms and practices are emulated by sub-states however, 
governance programmes will be pursued and democracy promoted. Once more, the 
activity is pursued for domestic political purposes, namely as a means of nation-
building and defining the sub-state. 
8.1.2 The advantages of sub-state democracy promotion 
As implicit and explicit democracy promoters, sub-states have demonstrated the ability 
to distance and detach themselves from disadvantageous political-historical issues that 
impact their central governments. With regard to international development for 
example, Flanders was able to avoid association with Belgium’s colonial legacy, shifting 
its focus away from Central Africa where their presence may have been as much of a 
hindrance to the development efforts in the region. By framing their development as 
distinctly Flemish, FICA were further able to distance themselves from a colonial legacy 
that could potentially cause difficulties within a development relationship. 
But it is with regard to the subcontracting of democracy promotion to the sub-state 
level that the potential advantages of sub-states becomes clear for other actors.  The 
UMD’s use of Maryland officials to provide governance training to Chinese officials was 
a means to bypass a difficult political relationship between the USA and China. 
Maryland’s status as a de-politicised source of knowledge – more practical and less 
ideological than national level democracy organizations – was a more palatable solution 
to both the federal government and the Chinese government.  
The National Guard meanwhile offered the Federal government a more palatable tool 
for conducting the then new, less aggressively postured foreign policy relationships 
with the then newly independent Central and Eastern European states. The suitability of 
the Guard was such that they have become a tool to be used to establish security 
relationships with 76 states around the world (National Guard, 2016).  
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Such findings provide empirical support for the tentative assertions of paradiplomacy 
scholars that were outlined in Chapter 2. Kincaid’s claims that sub-states can contribute 
where the central state may find an activity or relationship ‘politically embarrassing, 
diplomatically awkward, or legally impossible for the nation-state government to do so’ 
(Kincaid, 2010), are supported by the activities of Flanders and Maryland. Further 
claims that sub-states can ‘open doors in unofficial ways that would be awkward or 
impossible for the US government to do officially’ (Kincaid, 1999: 128), is another claim 
which is now supported by empirical data from this project.  
Engaging with sub-state democracy promotion may therefore be of normative value for 
scholars of democracy looking to address the ‘backlash’ against the practice (explored in 
chapter 1), and to revitalise the practice. In the face of obstructive political contexts and 
scepticism of Western interests and motivations behind promoting democracy, sub-
states emerge as potential proxies, or can on their own accord, circumvent the state-to-
state difficulties. Further research could examine these possibilities, and their broader 
applicability.  
8.1.3 Sub-states as sources of democratic knowledge and expertise 
In subcontracting democracy promotion to sub-states, national level organizations are 
not only sidestepping potentially difficult political issues, they are also making use of a 
specific democratic governance knowledge. When democracy promotion scholars talk 
of the WFD’s or the NDI’s democracy promotion, the project has demonstrated that the 
knowledge being transferred includes the expertise, experience, and governance know-
how sourced from sub-states. This democratic knowledge has not replaced the broader 
content or the model of democracy being promoted, but it has been demonstrated in 
this project that it is a hitherto ignored component.   
This finding raises a further question; Why do democracy promotion actors subcontract 
sub-states and their practical knowledge of democratic governance, with a particular 
focus on access, accountability, transparency, and deliberation? While it has not been 
the central aim of this project to focus on questions relating to other actors, in returning 
to the established scholarship on democracy promotion, we can suggest that ‘sub-state 
democracy’ may be one further aspect of the industry’s evolution.  
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Returning to the initial exploration of democracy promotion in chapter 1, Kurki has 
identified that alongside the liberal democratic ideals being promoted by the industry, 
‘extra-liberal’ elements are  also present within the broader “package” promoted (Kurki, 
2013: 217-218). For Kurki these elements include projects that place an emphasis on 
social democratic concepts such as equality and participation. Sub-state democracy – its 
focus on accessibility, equality of access to governance structures, transparency, and 
accountability – fits this box without contradicting the market-liberal model. Sub-states 
can provide the ‘extra-liberal’ expertise. 
8.1.4 Sub-states constructing democratic legitimacy 
However, in exploring the role of sub-state democratic knowledge within the packages 
of national level organizations, and in understanding the nature of democracy promoted 
by sub-states, it could be tentatively argued, based on the understanding in chapter 7, 
that sub-states offer more than an ‘extra-liberal’ element to the industry, and also offer a 
legitimacy building component to their packages.  
Lack of legitimacy of new democratic structures is central to the backlash theory 
introduced in chapter 1; the democracy being promoted is not ‘deep’ and lacks 
legitimacy (Diamond, 1999: 65). Concurrently, the declining legitimacy of democratic 
regimes is a broader theme, even in established democracies (see Dalton, 2004; Hay, 
2007). The sub-state knowledge being subcontracted to supplement democracy 
promotion meanwhile, is drawn from experiences of legitimizing either new democratic 
governance structures, or those that do not benefit from a broader national legitimacy 
as in the US case. Emphasis is placed on facilitating engagement and participation in the 
governance structures. Even for instrumentalist theorists of democracy, the function of 
participation is at least; 
...solely a protective one; the protection of the individual from arbitrary 
decisions by elected leaders and the protection of his private interests. It is 
in the achievement of this aim that the justification for the democratic 
method lies (Pateman, 1970: 14). 
While others claim explicitly that citizens attribute legitimacy to political systems if they 
are given the means to participate in the political process (Smismans, 2004: 73-74), 
officials from sub-states, new or long established, themselves refer to the concepts that 
287 
 
they promote as the source of their own legitimacy. They appeal to the accessibility, 
accountability, transparency, and ease of access of their governance structures for 
citizens as sources of legitimacy.  
In Wales, “Welsh democracy” was deliberately designed to emphasize the legitimacy of 
the new governance regime following a tight referendum. The new governance 
structures were presented as being more inclusive – thus more legitimate than the older 
structures which are criticized for their lack of inclusion. The concept of overleg and 
consultative policy formation underpins and legitimizes that broader Belgian system, 
consultation. As noted in chapter 4, the consultative nature of the Belgian system 
facilitates policy divergence at the sub-state level, but enough coherence at the federal 
level to function internationally (see Criekemans, 2010b). Similarly, the US model 
emphasizes the legitimacy of states, being closer and more accessible to its citizens, and 
the centralization of only specific aspects of governance at the federal level. In each of 
these cases, staff have practical experiences of attempting to institutionalize and realise 
the concepts that construct legitimacy and can perhaps even be considered the experts 
at constructing democratic legitimacy. 
Sub-state knowledge certainly fits the ‘extra-liberal’ component of democracy 
promotion outlined by Kurki. But it may be more important to the efforts of the industry 
to adjust to the backlash against its practices, and the attacks against the legitimacy of 
newly democratized regimes. Sub-states, and consequently their officials, are to 
different extents, the experts at building and embedding legitimacy. Sub-state 
democracy in particular is utilized as a complementary component of democracy 
promotion which builds and deepens the legitimacy of the new democratic structures. 
This claim is a speculative theory however and could be supported and developed by 
further and more explicit research into the motivations of the national organizations for 
using sub-state democracy within their broader packages. 
8.1.5 The sub-state democracy networks  
A further finding from the empirical component of the project is the noting of a growing 
community of sub-state networks that share as well as promote their democratic 
knowledge. National (though internationally active) networks such as the NCSL and 
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continental networks such as the CALRE and REGLEG facilitate the sharing and 
exchange of good democratic governance practices between their members. Utah learns 
from Maryland, Wales from Flanders. Data suggested also that these networks are 
increasingly involved with each other in sharing and developing good democratic 
governance practices. The NCSL are establishing MoU with, and are learning from the 
CALRE for example. 
There are two broad implications deriving from this finding. Firstly, further empirical 
research is required to map the networks and establish which are involved in the 
sharing of good democratic governance practice, how much, and how it is done. 
Secondly, more analytical work would be beneficial in an attempt to understand the 
nature of the exchange of knowledge. This may be of particular value to the democracy 
promotion literature, overwhelmingly focused on democratic transitions and 
developing states, given that the networks in question are involved in the exchange of 
knowledge between “developed” democracies. Why and what do developed 
democracies share with regard to democratic good practice? 
8.1.6 International Relations Theory 
The empirical findings of this project also hold implications and challenges for some 
aspects of IR theory that relates to democracy promotion, which will be presented in 
this section. These implications only build on the challenges identified in chapter 1 
regarding the explanatory capacity of the existing perspectives once sub-state activities 
are recognized.  
Firstly, the notion that a state holds or expresses an unified and coherent national 
interest is problematized by the existence of constituent parts of that state pursuing 
parallel, contrasting, or even conflicting interests through its own international 
activities. In this particular context, it immediately challenges realist assumptions 
regarding the motivations for democracy promotion. Realists must also accept that sub-
states are at best exempt and at worst threaten the viability of some core assumptions 
regarding international relations. Most notably, sub-states do not inhabit an anarchical 
international world; their agency with regard to democracy promotion, as 
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paradiplomacy scholars have long argued more generally, is structured by laws, 
constitutions, and broader rules.  
With regard to their interests, while there was a suggestion of economic interests 
playing at least a supporting role in motivating and justifying Flanders’ CEEP, it is 
argued that hard or even soft power interests do not drive sub-state democracy 
promotion activities. It is argued that domestic concerns dominate the motivations of 
sub-state forays into international activities such as democracy promotion and 
international development; the construction of actorness or the projection of a 
particular conception of the sub-state onto the international stage for the benefit of the 
domestic constituency. Furthermore, if democracy promotion and international 
development activities are symbolic means for sub-states to construct actorness, it may 
act as a basis for further research to explore the extent to which it is also the case for 
states and other actors.  
This is not to suggest that realist theory cannot absorb sub-states, only that it does not 
do so at the moment. Indeed, a realist perspective may be modified to accommodate and 
applied to sub-state democracy promotion, but that sub-state international interests at 
least in part concern the construction and understanding of the sub-state itself, 
particularly during a key, formative period in its existence. Incorporating this interest 
may contribute to the rethinking and revision of the notion with regard to states; that 
they also see promoting democracy in part as a symbolic activity (see Chandler, 2007; 
2009) 
Sub-states may also provide a fruitful area of study for liberal internationalists as they 
construct and maintain knowledge-sharing network, and cooperate with partners 
without seeking hard power advantages. Indeed, their enthusiasm to adopt and (more) 
consistently propagate the great liberal causes of promoting democracy and 
development may mark them out as potentially important actors. The National Guard 
emerged as an ideal organization within Clinton’s liberal internationalist foreign policy 
for example, while the UMD and Maryland state officials were able to engage in the 
sharing of democratic good practice with China. Unburdened by hard power political 
imperatives, sub-states are free to focus on liberal internationalist priorities without so 
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many compromises. They are potentially more consistent liberal internationalist actors. 
Only further analysis of their activities will enrich such an understanding of their role. 
For critical perspectives, the instinctive analysis will look to their role in pushing the 
market model onto their partners; are sub-states simply a more palatable means of 
spreading the same market-liberal democracy? There is certainly a market element to 
Flanders’ explicit partnerships and the focus of some Maryland officials’ work with the 
MCI and other organizations is overwhelmingly concerned with economic governance. 
However, this is more about “inserting” the sub-state into, and capitalizing on existing 
or emerging market elsewhere in the world than about the spread or establishment of 
those markets. Furthermore, this would be to focus on one aspect of a few activities that 
promote democracy, and attribute a single motivation across the board. Motivations, as 
discussed at length, are much more than economic for the sub-state governments. There 
is no significant analysis of the motivations of the hundreds, perhaps thousands of US 
state officials who volunteer for the various organizations sourcing their expertise, 
except that they are contracted because of their democratic governance expertise, not 
for their market-know how.  
Crucially however, we cannot ignore the nature of the democracy being promoted – 
sub-state democracy. Sub-states promote and share techniques that, at least in theory, 
attempt to engender a more inclusive, deliberative, accessible, and transparent 
democracy. While these themes do not explicitly resist or jeopardise the transfer of 
market-liberal democracy, they do not necessarily support its transfer either. The focus 
is on deepening and expanding the legitimacy of the democratic governance structure 
within and amongst citizens. That governance structure need not necessarily be a 
liberal and market-centric one. One may even claim that the democracy promoted by 
sub-states aims to empower citizens and enable resistance to damaging or unpalatable 
aspects of the broader model being promoted.   
The neo-Gramscian argument, already heavily contested (see chapter 1), claims that 
Western states seek to promote a very minimalist conception of democracy which de-
radicalizes citizens and restricts any challenge to the economic system. The case studies 
relate to such arguments in an interesting manner, potentially supporting the broader 
291 
 
theory, but not necessarily providing any empirical corroboration. There were certainly 
no suggestions of an explicit coordinating force pushing a particular model of 
democracy. It might be argued however that sub-states provide an important 
legitimacy-building component to the broader democratic model being exported, which 
itself remains unchanged. Further research is required to explore such a notion, 
particularly in examining the motivations for democracy organizations have for 
sourcing the sub-state knowledge.  
It could be argued in response however that the nature of the knowledge that sub-state 
officials and practitioners bring to broader democratization partnerships jeopardises 
the minimalist and de-radicalized model of democracy that neo-Gramscian scholars 
such as Robinson (1996) have argued is being promoted. Sub-state democracy is 
concerned with the capacity of citizens to access and take part in democratic 
governance. It may entrench and legitimize the broader governance structures, but it 
also provides the means to re-politicize, and for citizens to re-engage with democratic 
governance. 
Guilhot’s (2005) claims with regard to the role of NGOs in depoliticizing and embedding 
a particular model of democracy may nonetheless benefit from a closer investigation of 
sub-state international development. Sub-states have become new donors with varying 
amounts of financial and political leverage that could influence the medium and content 
of development projects. However, they have been enthusiastic in their efforts to 
emulate practices and norms of the industry without influencing the medium and 
content of the projects. They are, as argued, hollow actors, embedded in the global 
discourse of international development. The consequences of this decision – taken it is 
argued due to a lack of domestic expertise and a belief that the industry is the source of 
development expertise – is that the same discourses and practices of international 
development are practiced and propagated, entrenching the discourse further and in 
new spaces.  
8.1.7 Theorising sub-state international activity 
The project’s empirical and analytical findings can also enrich and develop theories of 
sub-state international activity or paradiplomacy. Empirically, the three case studies in 
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this project offer the first extensive explorations of sub-state democracy promotion, a 
“fringe” activity that is nonetheless increasingly prevalent since the end of the Cold War. 
It is now known that sub-states promote democracy abroad, and there is also a 
understanding of their democracy promotion. Furthermore, and with regard to the 
study of paradiplomacy and its relevance to IR; it is a rare instance whereby a specific 
activity is the focus of analysis and not international activity in general. The “better” 
understanding has allowed the study to inform the broader literature on the activity, 
giving a tangible scholarly benefit to understanding sub-state paradiplomacy beyond 
efforts at understanding sub-states. 
The modified Lecourian framework‘s understanding of sub-state democracy promotion 
suggests that the key variables for a theory of paradiplomacy to consider are those 
opportunity structures that emerged as particularly pertinent in the various types. For 
explicit democracy promotion,  the capacity and competence of the sub-state itself are 
key and are themselves factors mitigated by the IGR between it and the central state. 
Relations between sub-states and other partners is another key opportunity structure, 
itself influenced by the broader global security and political context. For implicit 
democracy promotion the constitutional allocation of competence for international 
development, again mitigated by IGR are key, as are global norms and their emulation 
and adoption, and the global context with regard to the practice. Subcontracted 
democracy promotion meanwhile illustrated how sub-state officials and knowledge 
plays a part in international relations, even if not through the agency of the sub-state.  
Constitutional set-ups are often seen as key factors and a common consideration within 
the paradiplomacy scholarship (see chapter 2). Relatively common also are the semi-
legal, “rules of the game” formed by the interpretation of the constitution through the 
IGR. The historical institutionalist emphasis on ‘rules’ has clarified the crucial role the 
latter plays in structuring and conditioning the former, and consequently what sub-
states can and cannot do. Paradiplomacy literature has emphasized the importance of 
IGR in structuring those rules, but this project draws particular attention to the self-
discipline and adherence to the rules by the sub-states themselves. The Welsh 
Government for example, is very aware of an unwritten dividing line with regard to 
international affairs that they take great care not to cross. 
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The Lecourian analysis has also highlighted the crucial role that political agency plays, 
particularly with regard to the construction of actorness at key stages. Furthermore, it 
has proved of benefit to distinguish between types of paradiplomatic activity, to 
understand why some activities are permitted and others not, by the same structural 
factors.  
This project also demonstrates that Lecours’ (2002: 96) claim that historical 
institutionalism is ‘a great source of theoretical insight’, is particularly valid. Lecours 
himself does not give much attention to the historical institutionalist concept of critical 
junctures, or institutional dynamism. However, they have enabled a richer 
understanding in this particular case, highlighting the key, post juncture period, and the 
diminishing interest in promoting democracy due to changing governments and 
political context within the institutions.  
The importance of temporal factors have emerged as key aspects to consider. The 
historical institutionalist approach encourages a focus upon critical junctures in time. A 
key finding in this project has been the identification of the formative period, 
immediately after the establishment of a ‘new’ set of governance institutions such as a 
sub-state. These are critical junctures. When the ‘rules’ are ambiguous, there is an 
opportunity for political agency to influence and shape these rules, a period where 
forces can construct the actorness of the sub-state.  
This latter point emphasizes the role of agency as sub-states develop their international 
activities. The data does not contradict theories that suggest that nationalist parties are 
the source of much of the political agency that seeks to exploit international 
opportunities. However the case studies do demonstrate that nationalists are by far not 
the only political forces in government that seek to do so, and that constructing 
actorness need not be a nationalist issue, particularly during the formative period of a 
sub-state’s existence.  
Furthermore, the concept of constructing actorness combined with the identification of 
a critical formative period shortly after devolution or decentralization of powers to the 
sub-state, is an important contribution. Understanding such phase as extraordinary, a 
period where rules are ambiguous but can be clarified by action, and actorness defined 
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through activity, helps understand why sub-states have looked to engage extensively in 
activities during such periods. In both cases where the sub-state became an implicit or 
explicit democracy promotion actor, activities were initiated during this formative 
phase. In both cases also, political interest in, and lead for such activities diminished or 
evaporated once the rules were established, and actorness defined – the activities had 
fulfilled their definitional role. The continuation of activities can be explained by the 
new paths that had been constructed, upon which succeeding governments were 
dependent.  
Finally, the importance of the global political context, it is argued here, is a key variable 
that significantly influences when and where a sub-state may engage in the promotion 
of democracy. The collapse of a bipolar and highly politicized global context appears to 
have proved particularly conducive to sub-state engagement in political relationships 
involving the reform of governance structures. The willingness of partners to involve 
sub-states in internal reforms is also a key factor. Once more, following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, a host of states turned to liberal democracy as the governance model 
to adopt. At the same time, the collapse of the apartheid and Pinochet regimes resulted 
in two further international causes for liberals and liberal democracy. LDCs in Africa 
meanwhile have willingly opened their borders to development practitioners and their 
governance reforms. These global political factors are key in facilitating the involvement 
of sub-states in democracy promotion and development. 
Overall, the project is of further benefit in enriching and informing the attempts at 
theorising paradiplomacy. In exploring the Lecourian framework, we learn that 
particular activities are affected in different ways by the structural context. The 
typology used in this project, itself based upon the academic literature, was useful in its 
distinction between political paradiplomacy and economic or broader co-operational. 
Explicit political activities are not an option for the Welsh or Maryland executive, but 
economic and co-operational activities are acceptable, while all three are possible for 
the Flemish government. 
This finding problematizes how paradiplomacy is theorised and generalized. Broad or 
sweeping generalizations regarding sub-states are increasingly difficult to sustain if the 
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opportunity structures for specific policy areas and activities are so variable. The 
insights of this project may not be as relevant with regard to a different activity; 
economic paradiplomacy for example does not seem as tied to temporal contexts. Or at 
least the global economic context and IGR are far more facilitating of sub-state 
involvement in economic paradiplomacy than the political context and IGR are with 
regard to promoting democracy. 
Furthermore, even if a generalizable theory of sub-state international activity is 
possible to construct, how useful will such a theoretical understanding be if it does not 
relate to the scholarship on the activities themselves? The inductive approach adopted 
in this project has allowed for an understanding of sub-state democracy promotion. But 
it has been necessary to link that understanding to the broader understandings of 
democracy promotion in international relations for the research to be relevant. In 
remaining relevant to the democracy promotion scholarship, this project has sought to 
contribute to the understanding of international relations, not just to the understanding 
of sub-states. To ignore the contribution that studying sub-states can make to 
international relations, is to consign that study to an irrelevant fringe of the diplomacy 
literature.  
In this regard, the flexible and modifiable Lecourian framework has shown itself to be a 
valuable tool with which to inductively build theory of sub-state activity that can also 
relate to the broader academic literature on the topic. The understanding constructed is 
far more relevant than the existing perspectives explored in chapters 1 and 2. 
That is not to claim that the Lecourian framework is without its faults. The framework’s 
construction is based on the implicit assumption that the sub-state is the actor; itself 
problematic to some theoretical perspectives. But it is a more problematic assumption  
with regard to subcontracted democracy promotion, where the sub-state was better 
understood as an opportunity structure for other actors.   
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8.2  What will the new understanding of sub-state democracy 
promotion contribute to the understanding of sub-states, and 
of democracy promotion? 
 
The preceding sections of this chapter have related to the third research question, and 
this brief section will look to address the third research question directly by way of 
conclusion. It is argued here that studies of both sub-states, and of democracy 
promotion gain much from a better understanding of sub-state democracy promotion. 
The understanding presented in the previous chapter is itself a “better” understanding 
due to its theoretical and methodological approach, as argued in chapter 3 in answer to 
the second research question. That understanding is itself a valuable empirical and 
analytical contribution to the sub-state literature, detailing as it does, sub-state 
engagement in a specific and hitherto under-researched activity and the nuanced nature 
of sub-state engagement with that activity. It offers to the democracy promotion 
literature meanwhile, the first understanding and account of sub-state involvement, 
both as actor and subcontracted source. For both bodies of literature, the understanding 
offered in chapter 7 serves as a basis for discussion and further research. But as detailed 
in this chapter, there are further contributions.  
Firstly, sub-states emerge as less objectionable actors, immediately presenting 
themselves as potential alternative actors, theoretically less susceptible to the ‘backlash’ 
faced by Western states. Moreover, when subcontracted, sub-state officials serve as 
proxies, also capable of bypassing difficult political contexts. In this sense, 
subcontracting sub-states to promote democracy may be of normative benefit for the 
‘problem solving’ democracy promotion literature that seeks to address the backlash 
against democracy promotion.  
Integral to sub-state democracy promotion, when not emulating broader norms and 
practices, is the democracy itself that is promoted. The focus of sub-state democracy 
promotion on inclusive and deliberative aspects of democratic governance, and 
practical experience of developing these concepts, is of value to existing promoters. 
Exposing the nature of sub-state democracy promotion consequently enriches the 
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understanding of the democracy being promoted by Western actors. Their role as 
constructers of democratic legitimacy for governance structures further enriches that 
understanding, while the growth of sub-state networks that share and promote 
democracy requires further research. 
The “better” understanding also presents challenges to IR theory's explanatory 
potential with regard to democracy promotion. While potentially supporting liberal 
internationalist or critical perspectives, and challenging realist assumptions, the 
understanding, more than anything, calls for more work to develop the theoretical 
perspectives in order to incorporate their involvement in promoting democracy. The 
understanding presented here acts as a catalyst for such further research.  
For the sub-state, and paradiplomacy literature in particular, there are several key 
findings deriving from this understanding. Firstly, that the global political context can 
be a key structuring force alongside the domestic structures in cases of political 
paradiplomacy. Secondly, with regard to the ‘rules’ of paradiplomacy constructed by the 
domestic structure, the sub-state’s self-disciplined adherence to those rules are 
important considerations.  
Finally, by  seeing democracy promotion and international development as a means of 
constructing actorness, the thesis suggests firstly, as some authors have hinted at (see 
Criekemans, 2006: 16; Lecours, 2002: 100), that the symbolic profile and borrowed 
legitimacy that activities offer sub-states are as integral to their motivation as 
engagement in the activity itself. Sub-states engage in activities for the profile it lends.  
Secondly, the understanding points to key junctures in time, where actorness can be 
constructed and new rules formed; a facet exposed by the historical institutionalist 
perspective in particular. These periods, and the post-juncture process of defining and 
constructing actorness and new ‘rules of the game’, offer an explanation as to why a 
flurry of activities are initiated early in a sub-state’s existence.  
The understanding presented here makes a further contribution to theorising 
paradiplomacy. In particular, the  distinction made between types of paradiplomacy has 
proved useful. In distinguishing between economic or co-operational paradiplomacy, 
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and political paradiplomacy, a more nuanced understanding of sub-state paradiplomacy 
has been developed.  
Finally, the Lecourian framework itself has emerged as a flexible and modifiable 
framework that constructs a narrative of a paradiplomatic activity that nonetheless 
remains relevant to both sub-state scholarship, and the academic debates surrounding 
the activity itself. It has allowed the understanding of democracy promotion to 
contribute to the evolving debates in IR.  
In “better” understanding sub-state democracy promotion therefore, paradiplomacy 
and democracy promotion scholarship is provoked into improving their explanatory 
capacity. The understanding itself begins that process by serving as a source for 
discussion and further research.  
8.2.1 Policy considerations  
While acknowledging that it was not the core intention of this project to seek to 
contribute to the practitioner and policy communities, it would be appropriate to briefly 
note some considerations here. 
For central governments, there is data to support the tentative theories of 
paradiplomacy scholars that sub-states could act as potential proxies in difficult 
political contexts. The MCI for example allowed US governance knowledge to be 
promoted amongst Chinese officials while Flanders’ officials claimed that its 
development work could avoid association with Belgium’s colonial legacy. Considering 
the difficulties and backlash facing the US or Western democracy promoters, sub-states 
may act as more palatable vehicles. The backlash the UK government experiences when 
it attempts to promote democracy, even rhetorically, through the commonwealth for 
example, may be avoided or sidestepped by its constituent devolved nations.  
The forums encountered within and between the networks of sub-states also allow for 
the transfer and exchange of good democratic governance practice. The democratic 
good practice is depoliticized, technical, and removed from broader political context. 
Democracy organizations may benefit from further research into the activities of these 
networks and by exploring their potential as vehicles for promoting democracy and 
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sourcing sub-state knowledge in a similar manner to which the US organizations make 
use of the NCSL. 
Sub-state knowledge and experience is sourced by national level democracy 
organizations and other networks. However, there was no suggestion of any attempts 
within the sub-states to institutionalize or develop their contribution. Networks such as 
the European Network of Political Foundations seek to coordinate and develop the 
democracy promotion work of political foundations for example, but nothing exists with 
regard to sub-states. The relationship is one-way, with the organizations dictating the 
content and the medium of delivery. Given time and resources, sub-states may offer 
valuable contributions in support of the first two suggestions above, and even in 
reforming the methods of exchanging and transmitting knowledge.  
The MCI and CEEP have for example, been successful in developing mechanisms for 
exchanging governance knowledge, both based on a show-and-tell method making use 
of practitioners sourced form companies and organizations from within their respective 
societies. Both, the MCI explicitly so, are based on an older model of knowledge 
exchange, similar to the post-war Marshall plan. Nonetheless, the methods are contrary 
to development and democracy industry standards. Standards dictate that work is 
conducted in the partner country, the show-and-tell method is not possible under 
current good practice. Further research and evaluation of these mechanisms may reveal 
why the show-and-tell method is considered successful by its practitioners and funders, 
and whether it may be utilized to support broader democracy and development 
methods.  
The more immediate concern however remains the invisibility of sub-states to the 
academic element of the democracy industry. This is particularly relevant to scholars 
looking for potential responses to the global backlash to democracy promotion. Sub-
states offer knowledge, expertise, and experience of providing an added element to 
democratic governance. This element in theory at least, seeks to empower citizens, 
enhancing access, transparency, and understanding of democratic governance regimes, 
in turn building and deepening the legitimacy of those regimes. In developing theories 
and plans to counter the backlash against the efforts to promote democracy worldwide, 
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This project has sought to explore how we might better understand the practice of 
democracy promotion as conducted by sub-states. This core objective derived from two 
problems with the existing academic literature that might be expected to do so, 
problems that were uncovered in answering the first research question; 1) What are 
the problems associated with understanding sub-state democracy promotion? 
Chapters 1 and 2 sought to address this question by way of a review of the democracy 
promotion and paradiplomacy literatures respectively. Sub-states and their 
international activities were absent from the democracy promotion literature, and the 
broader IR perspectives. Sub-states are not present, and theoretical approaches fail to 
adequately account for the particulars of sub-states as international actors. Other actors 
are understand however, and the practice and associated themes are explained in 
varying ways, giving a particular context to which any “better” understanding of sub-
state democracy promotion would need to relate.  
The second chapter’s review of the paradiplomacy literature meanwhile revealed little 
account of sub-state democracy promotion activities, and a disconnect between studies 
of paradiplomacy and the broader IR discussions. The very little attention devoted to 
sub-state democracy promotion is not related to the broader scholarship on the topic. 
However, a framework for analysing the paradiplomacy of sub-states that takes account 
of both the structuring factors and particular agent-structure relationship emphasized 
by scholars was identified. 
In short, the problems regarding understanding sub-state democracy promotion, and 
the answer to the first question, is that neither sub-states nor their democracy 
promoting activities are adequately understand and contextualized by either body of 
literature. However, the reviews of both literatures also provided a basis for addressing 
the second research question; 2)  How might these problems be addressed, and the 
how, when, and why of sub-state democracy promotion better understood? 
Andre Lecours’ (2002) framework of opportunity structures maps the factors present at 
multiple levels, that have been claimed by paradiplomacy scholars to be key in 
conditioning the paradiplomacy of sub-states. In its historical institutionalist approach, 
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the framework also gives insight into the peculiar agent-structure dynamic that 
characterises sub-states’ international activities.  
The first chapter also identified the core themes of the democracy promotion literature 
that would anchor any empirical investigations undertaken through the analytical 
framework, keeping any resulting understanding relevant to the broader scholarship. 
The second chapter also highlighted key themes that are purported to influence and 
condition paradiplomacy generally. Combined, the thematic focus and Lecours’ 
framework offered the most advanced means by which paradiplomacy can be 
investigated. The framework provided a means of accounting for the key conditioning 
factors and complex agent-structure dynamic purported to characterise paradiplomacy. 
Furthermore, the framework proved flexible and modifiable, allowing it to take account 
of and incorporate factors claimed to structure democracy promotion and international 
development. Any understanding resulting from the thematically-focused framework 
would produce a more contextualized, relevant, and therefore “better” understanding of 
sub-state democracy promotion. 
Three empirical cases were then investigated in chapters 4-6 to test the framework, to 
produce a understanding, and address the final research question; 3) In what ways will 
this new understanding contribute to the knowledge of sub-states and democracy 
promotion? 
The cases (Flanders, Wales, and Maryland), were selected using a most different system 
design, in order to explore fully the extent and nature of sub-state democracy 
promotion. Selection was guided by the key domestic structures purported by Lecours  
to be key conditioning factors. Flanders, perhaps the most constitutionally 
“empowered” sub-state in the world, was a deliberate and explicit promoter of 
democracy through its government’s Central and Eastern European Programme. The 
programme sought to support the transition of former Soviet counties to liberal 
democracies, and later, members of the EU. The government’s bilateral partnership with 
Chile meanwhile was explored as another example of an explicit attempt to promote 
democracy, while the government’s international development programmes in sub-
Saharan Africa revealed a donor that was deliberately emulating and adopting the 
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global practices and norms as it established itself as a new “actor” in the field. This 
involved the emulation of “good governance” projects that promoted democracy more 
implicitly, within the broader development model. It was argued that the activities were 
initiated, at least in part, in order to ‘put Flanders on the map’, and to define its 
international character shortly after the key constitutional reforms of 1993. 
Maryland, a functional international actor at most, its executive restricted from 
politicizing its international activity, did not emerge as a democracy promotion actor. Its 
executive did not engage in the activity in any way. Nonetheless, its officials and their 
knowledge and experiences were subcontracted by other, national level actors, in order 
to support their democracy packages and partnerships. The National Guard, the 
National Council of State Legislatures, the Maryland-China Initiative, and other 
democracy organizations more directly, used Maryland staff to supplement or provide a 
proxy source of specialist democratic governance knowledge. In the realm of democracy 
promotion, Maryland is better understood as an opportunity structure to other actors, 
than an actor capable of capitalizing on opportunities itself 
Wales meanwhile offers an insight into “other” or “mid-way” possibilities; a constituent 
part of a unitary as opposed to a federal state holding very limited formal capacity and 
competence international affairs. While the government was found to be constrained 
from engaging in political paradiplomacy, it has however established an international 
development programme which, though implicitly, promotes democracy through “good 
governance” schemes adopted and emulated by Welsh practitioners. The legislature 
meanwhile has frequently engaged with international networks and partners to 
explicitly promote a distinctive, “Welsh” democracy. Doing so was a means of 
constructing a particular notion of the newly empowered Welsh Assembly, and the 
government’s development programme was similarly, at least in part, a means of 
projecting a particular notion of Wales’ international actorness. Furthermore, the 
legislature has become a source of expertise, sourced and subcontracted by the 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy and other democracy organizations in a 
manner similar to Maryland’s staff. 
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Alone, the findings of the three case study chapters offers a significant empirical and 
analytical contribution to the democracy promotion literature. But the chapter 7 
constructed a understanding of sub-state democracy promotion based on the 
comparative conclusions of the case studies. It argued that sub-states promote 
democracy in three ways; implicitly, explicitly, and by being subcontracted. When 
promoting explicitly or implicitly through other activities – specifically, international 
development – they can be understood as actors, though their actorness is understood 
to be different from other actors, established in the scholarship.  
Constitutional settlements, negotiated and clarified through IGR form key opportunity 
structures for sub-states to do so. Sub-state governments, and in one case its legislature, 
provide the agency that deliberately engages the sub-state’s resources in the activity. 
Key constitutional junctures such as the devolution of power to a newly created sub-
state are critical periods, where the agency of governments and legislatures can 
mobilise the sub-state’s resources to engage in democracy promotion, at least in part, as 
a means of defining the international actorness. That agency does not necessarily come 
from nationalist governments; non-nationalists have been the most enthusiastic 
initiators of sub-state democracy promotion.  
In being subcontracted however, sub-states are not actors, but are key to understanding 
the contracting actor’s democracy promotion. Sub-states are best understood as a 
source of knowledge and expertise, and a means by which national level organizations 
can bypass and avoid the difficult constraints created by state-level relations. Sub-states 
are proxies and opportunity structures for other actors.  
In all cases, the global political-security context at particular times, was also a key 
conditioning factor, often facilitating opportunities for all kinds of sub-state 
involvement in promoting democracy. Sub-states are also capable of promoting a 
particular, more inclusive and deliberative form of democracy. They bring to their 
democracy promotion, knowledge that is grounded in experiences of operationalizing 
and institutionalizing inclusive and deliberative democratic concepts.   
This understanding is itself a valuable analytical contribution, on top of the empirical 
contribution of the case studies, that informs, and serves as a basis for further 
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discussion and research on the topic. But the understanding has broader implications 
for the democracy promotion and paradiplomacy literatures explored in chapters 1 and 
2. These implications are explored in chapter 8, effectively addressing the third research 
question directly.  
Firstly, the potential for sub-states to bypass political difficulties faced by states, or act 
as proxies for national governments and organizations is noted. Their democracy 
promotion can also be seen to complement current theories, as providing an ‘extra-
liberal’ component to packages (see Kurki, 2013). However, their subcontracted 
knowledge can also be seen to be a particular knowledge focussed on constructing 
legitimacy for the broader state.  
The explanatory potential of the IR theoretical perspectives employed to understand 
democracy promotion are also challenged by both the empirical and analytical 
components of the project. Meanwhile, the paradiplomacy scholarship is also addressed, 
suggesting that the global political context, and key historical junctures are also key 
structuring factors for sub-state engagement in particular activities such as promoting 
democracy. Further emphasis is placed upon the concept of constructing actorness at 
key, formative periods as a means of enriching the understanding of sub-state 
international activities. Ultimately however, it is argued that both literatures benefit 
from the understanding of sub-state democracy promotion, both empirically and 
analytically. Indeed, in seeking to address the backlash against, and difficulties facing 
democracy in the world, scholars may benefit from exploring sub-states, their relevance, 
and potential contribution. Sub-state scholars meanwhile may find that their insight has 
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